

The Freedom of a Christian:

Enevold Ewald's *Ordo Salutis*

under the microscope and macroscope

PhD dissertation

By Laurel Lied

Arts

Aarhus University

2022

Supervised by Prof. Anders-Christian Jacobsen

The Freedom of a Christian:

Enevold Ewald's *Ordo Salutis* under the microscope and macroscope

Laurel Lied

ISBN: 978-87-7507-589-8

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7146/au.610>

Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND METHODOLOGY	6
1.1 INTRODUCTION	6
1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS	10
1.3 METHODOLOGY	12
1.3.1 MICROHISTORY	12
1.3.2 MACROSCOPE	16
1.3.3 STRUCTURE	21
1.4 EWALD’S BIOGRAPHY AND LITERATURE REVIEW	26
1.4.1 EWALD AND DANISH PIETISM: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY	26
1.4.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ABOUT EWALD AND DANISH PIETISM.....	31
1.4.3 RESEARCH OF THE LUTHERAN <i>ORDO SALUTIS</i> AND THE <i>UNIO MYSTICA</i>	34
1.4.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON BUDDEUS, WALCH, AND UNIVERSALISM	41
1.5 HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN JOHANN FRANZ BUDDEUS AND DANISH PIETISM—IN PARTICULAR, ENEVOLD EWALD	45
CHAPTER 2: EWALD’S 1734 TRIAL BEFORE THE ROYAL COMMISSION	51
2.1 THE TRIAL, MANUSCRIPT COPY, AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TREATMENT	51
2.2 THE KAASBØLL-EWALD EXCHANGE	56
2.2.1 MAJOR THEMES OF THE KAASBØLL-EWALD EXCHANGE	65
2.3 REENBERG-EWALD EXCHANGE	75
2.4 FINAL THOUGHTS ON REENBERG, KAASBØLL, AND EWALD	82
CHAPTER 3: ORDO SALUTIS (SALIGHEDS ORDEN) IN EWALD’S THEOLOGY	86
3.1 INTRODUCTION	86
3.2 EWALD’S CATECHISMS AND THE STRUCTURE OF HIS <i>ORDO SALUTIS</i>	86
3.2.1 INTRODUCING THE <i>ORDO</i>	88
3.2.2 STRUCTURE OF THE <i>ORDO</i>	93
3.3 CONVERSION: <i>OMVENDELSE</i> AND THE HOLY SPIRIT’S CALL: <i>VOCATIO</i>	98
3.3.1 EWALD’S <i>ORDO</i> TERMS	100
3.3.2 CONVERSION: <i>OMVENDELSE</i>	101

3.3.3 <i>VOCATIO</i> : THE CALL OF GOD’S GRACE	111
3.3.4 FINAL THOUGHTS ABOUT CONVERSION	119
3.4 FAITH IN CHRIST: <i>TROEN PÅ CHRISTUM</i> AND ILLUMINATION: <i>OPLYSNING</i>	120
3.4.1 FAITH	120
3.4.2 ILLUMINATION: <i>OPLYSNING</i>	143
3.4.3 FINAL THOUGHTS ON EWALD AND ILLUMINATION.....	150
3.5 THE HOLY LIFE: <i>ET HELLIG LEVNET</i>	153
3.5.1 SANCTIFICATION AND A HOLY WAY OF LIVING IN THE SECOND CATECHISM.....	154
3.5.2 SERMONS ON A HOLY LIFE AND SANCTIFICATION	159
3.5.3 A MEDITATION ON EWALD AND APOKATASTASIS	182
3.5.4 SANCTIFICATION AND APOKATASTASIS	189
3.6 FINAL THOUGHTS ON EWALD, SANCTIFICATION AND THE <i>ORDO SALUTIS</i>	203
<u>EARLY MODERN CONTEXT</u>	<u>206</u>
<u>CHAPTER 4: GRACE AND NATURE</u>	<u>207</u>
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO NATURE.....	207
4.2 DEFINING GRACE	213
4.3 PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES	217
4.4 CONCLUSION: EWALD AND GRACE	221
<u>CHAPTER 5: HUMAN FREEDOM AND THE <i>ORDO SALUTIS</i></u>	<u>226</u>
5.1 INTRODUCTION	226
5.2 GEORG WALCH AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.....	228
5.2.1 BACKGROUND.....	228
5.2.2 WALCH’S DISCUSSION OF FREEDOM	229
5.2.3 WALCH’S DEFINITION OF FREEDOM IN CONTEXT	235
5.3 BUDDEUS, THE HUMAN BEING, AND FREEDOM.....	236
5.3.1 THE ACTIVE INTELLECT AND THE EFFECT OF SIN.....	236
5.3.2 BUDDEUS AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.....	240
5.3.3 EWALD ON FREEDOM: A COMPARISON	244
5.3.4 BUDDEUS: PHILOSOPHICAL FREEDOM AND SPIRITUAL SLAVERY	246
5.4 BUDDEUS: THE WAY TO REPENTANCE.....	249

5.4.1 A MATTER OF EXPERIENCE.....	249
5.4.2 THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL FREEDOM: IDOLATROUS SELF-LOVE	251
5.4.3 THE <i>ORDO</i> AS THE SOLUTION TO IDOLATROUS SELF-LOVE.....	255
5.4.4 RETURN TO EWALD.....	258
5.5 FINAL THOUGHTS ON BUDEUS’S <i>MORAL THEOLOGY</i> AND WHAT HAPPENS NEXT.....	259
5.6 CONCLUSION	264
<u>CHAPTER 6: PIETISM, LUDWIG GERHARD, AND APOKATASTASIS</u>	<u>266</u>
6.1 WHY DOES <i>APOKATASTASIS</i> MATTER?.....	266
6.2 POSSIBLE INFLUENCES ON EWALD	269
6.3 THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE ABOUT PIETIST UNIVERSALISM: WHO WERE THE MAJOR FIGURES?	271
6.4 LUDWIG GERHARD’S <i>KURTZER BEGRIFF</i> DESCRIBED.....	278
6.4.1 DIPPEL’S TREATISE.....	280
6.4.2 GERHARD’S MAIN DEFENSE	282
6.5 FINAL THOUGHTS ON BUDEUS, EWALD, AND GERHARD	294
<u>CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION.....</u>	<u>302</u>
<u>APPENDICES</u>	<u>309</u>
APPENDIX A: KAASBØLL’S AND REENBERG’S THESES AGAINST EWALD	309
APPENDIX B: EWALD AND REENBERG TRIAL EXCHANGE.....	316
APPENDIX C: SERMON TRANSCRIPTION FROM <i>DET GAMLE OG NYE TESTAMENTES HERLIGE HARMONIE</i> VOL. 1 (1761)	326
APPENDIX D: CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FULL TITLES OF ENEVOLD EWALD’S PUBLISHED TEXTS, ORIGINAL EDITIONS AND LATER PRINTINGS.....	343
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</u>	<u>346</u>
<u>ABSTRACT.....</u>	<u>371</u>
<u>SAMMENFATNING</u>	<u>376</u>

Chapter One: Introduction, Background, and Methodology

1.1 Introduction

The following dissertation explores a number of theological and philosophical issues in the thought of Enevold Ewald, a leading Danish Pietist figure during the era of State Pietism, 1730s-1740s. Ewald is often considered a radical Pietist but he remained a priest in the Danish State Church until his death. In comparison to the still-remembered Danish Pietists, the famous hymnist Hans Adolph Brorson and the catechism writer Erik Pontoppidan, Ewald's legacy is mainly preserved in the Danish academic church histories. Insofar as Pietism must be remembered and studied not only as a social or religious movement, but also as a theologically significant movement, Ewald exists within a larger intellectual conversation that stretches beyond Denmark-Norway's borders with implications for both Pietism and Evangelicalism. Before I embark on this study of Ewald's theology, let me offer a few remarks on Pietism in the widest sense and its descendent, Evangelicalism. These remarks also introduce one of the issues in viewing Pietism as a theological movement—namely that its descendent appears to have rejected a Christian life of the mind.

Justin A. Davis offers a brief history of Pietism research in the introduction to his *Pietism and the Foundations of the Modern World* (2019). Based on the negative interpretation of Pietism in the 19th and early 20th centuries by figures such as Albrecht Ritschl and Karl Barth, he argues that there was a change in Pietist historiography with F. Ernest Stoeffler. Stoeffler challenged the Pietist foundational myth of Philip Jacob Spener and saw Spener in continuity with past figures. Davis gives a broad characterization of Pietism beyond Lutheranism and Germany. He emphasizes Pietism as “the experiential strand of Protestantism, or more precisely, as those Protestants who prioritize experience over scholasticism and rationalism”¹ and ties this general definition into a particular intellectual history and theological legacy centred around three figures: William Perkins, Johann Arndt, and Philip Jacob Spener.² Davis is concerned with the heritage and influence of Pietism, and his broad definition includes the Reformed and Anglican traditions as part and parcel of the debate. He also anticipates figures

¹ Davis, *Pietism and the Foundations of the Modern World*, 1.

² Davis, 2.

such as John Wesley and Pietism's importance for the Protestant religious culture of the English-speaking world, particularly Evangelicalism.

The historian W. R. Ward also recognizes the critical importance of Pietism in his *Early Evangelicalism: A Global Intellectual History, 1670–1789*. His work, which sketches out a specific thought-world of Pietism,³ is more openly critical of the intellectual heritage of Pietism. Systemic weaknesses, Ward argues, wounded the cohesion of the religious movement deeply.⁴ Beyond the measured words of Ward, come the more anguished reflections of American historian of religion Mark A. Noll in his well-known book, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*: “there is not much of an Evangelical mind.”⁵ Noll traces the causes of this weakness, commenting at one point on the experiential focus of some Pietists:

some Pietists began to view Christian faith as only a life, without a concern for beliefs at all. This led to fascination with practice, deep involvement in spiritual experience, and absorption in the psychological dimensions of the faith. Objective realities of revelation were sometimes almost totally eclipsed.⁶

Pietists are the ancestors to Noll's Evangelicals and ought not to be equated with the intellectual failings, lack of curiosity, or more bluntly, the anti-intellectualism of American Evangelicalism. Noll acknowledges the manifesto nature of his book; he desires Evangelicals to take up the life of the mind as Christians.⁷ Ward is not so taken up with contemporary

³ “These themes - the close association with mysticism, the small-group religion, the deferred eschatology, the experimental approach to conversion, anti-Aristotelianism and hostility to the theological system, and the attempt to reinforce religious vitality by setting it in the context of a vitalist understanding of nature or, as in the case of Jonathan Edwards, supporting it by a typological reading of the natural world - formed a sort of evangelical hexagon lasting until the original evangelical cohesion began to fail.” Ward, *Early Evangelicalism: A Global Intellectual History, 1670–1789*, 4.

⁴ “...that the early evangelicals were not successful in replacing the general framework of the belief of their earliest predecessors, and this in the end contributed to the fragmentation of their common corpus of doctrine.” Ward, 4–5.

⁵ Noll, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*, 3.

⁶ Noll, 48.

⁷ “I mean more the effort to think like a Christian — to think within a specifically Christian framework — across the whole spectrum of modern learning, including economics and political science, literary criticism and

concerns and the modern (and future?) legacy of Evangelicalism, but other historians of Evangelicalism such as D. Bruce Hindmarsh do write about and reflect on its legacy as relevant for today.⁸ If Pietism has become, in a certain fashion, a historical artifact or episode, tying it to its progeny, Evangelicalism, forces more practical questions into the mix.

All of this is not tangential to this dissertation. The purpose and problem of Noll's book drives this research—why has the Evangelical mind failed to sustain deep intellectual engagement with the world? Mark Noll's question might even mirror on a larger scale the focus on the will—and hence the fundamental irrationality of faith—for Pietists like Joachim Lange that historian Markus Matthias suggests.⁹ Yet this dissertation is not a straightforward retrieval of Pietist doctrine and teachings for the modern Evangelical world.¹⁰ Neither is it a broad recreation of the entire cultural and scientific world from which it emerged.¹¹ Rather, I begin with an obscure corner of Pietism research, namely Scandinavian Pietism and specifically the theology of Enevold Ewald,¹² before moving outward into the larger Early Modern intellectual

imaginative writing, historical inquiry and philosophical studies, linguistics and the history of science, social theory and the arts." Noll, 7.

⁸ "The question still stands: Is it possible for ordinary men and women to experience the immediate presence of God in the modern world? We ought at least to pause a little over this question and feel its difficulty and importance. It was raised with some urgency by the modernizing of society in the eighteenth century and by the related turn to natural explanations of the material and human world." Hindmarsh, *The Spirit of Early Evangelicalism: True Religion in a Modern World*, 275.

⁹ I will discuss Matthias's remarks more in chapter three. Matthias offers his remarks after a close reading of pre-Pietist theologians. He argues that even prior to Pietism, "Their methodological (Dannhauer) and epistemological (Musäus) problemization of the scriptural principle, and increasingly psychological view of faith as an act of the conscience, had unintentionally hollowed out the Orthodox system from the inside and made a new approach necessary." Matthias, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy," 18. I think Matthias has a number of valid points, but this dissertation suggests a way of bypassing the 'irrationality' of faith.

¹⁰ See, Olson, *Reclaiming Pietism : Retrieving an Evangelical Tradition*; Gehrz and Pattie Iii, *The Pietist Option: Hope for the Renewal of Christianity*.

¹¹ See again, the excellent treatment of Evangelicalism by Hindmarsh, *The Spirit of Early Evangelicalism: True Religion in a Modern World*.

¹² Ewald's texts only exist in a few remaining copies. All of his texts are in Danish. Any translation from Danish or German into English (including scriptural quotations), unless otherwise noted, is my own. I am responsible for any errors contained within. There is not a great amount of translation precedent of Danish Pietist

context especially through the writings of his teacher, the German theologian Johann Franz Buddeus. My argument for this dissertation is that Ewald's theology, in a narrow but important way, united the intellect and will, or experience and reason, at least when it came to God's character and our experienced response to his actions towards us. Ewald need not be considered an original thinker, nor a subtle one untouched by the intellectual trends of the Early Modern period. But if seen rightly, his theology avoided a major pitfall: namely, the conception of the Christian God as anything other than the good God.

Noll and Ward, along with many other excellent historians, have approached Pietism (and Evangelicalism) from the perspective of the history of thought or cultural history, but I suspect answering Noll's dilemmas requires something more. Noll recognizes and assumes a division between the life of the mind and the role of experience in human life—at least as modelled in Evangelicalism. He also finds the simultaneous lack of interest in the world a disheartening aspect of Evangelicalism.¹³ A historical, or even an ideological framework, is exceedingly useful, but those ideas themselves require investigation, not merely description, to further understand the fundamental issues behind Noll's observations.

It is hoped that the narrow lens of Ewald's *ordo salutis*¹⁴ may better clarify the theological and philosophical assumptions held by him and his contemporaries Buddeus and Walch. This

resources into English. I have tried to preserve the unique vocabulary of Pietism, while also recognizing that Evangelicalism in particular has utilized a lot of the language around conversion and re-birth. I have occasionally made use of Christian Friderich, *Fuldstændigt Dansk Og Engelsk Haand-Lexicon*. as a translation aid for more archaic Danish vocabulary.

¹³ "Even in its more progressive and culturally upscale subgroups, evangelicalism has little intellectual muscle. Feeding the hungry, living simply, and banning the bomb are tasks at which different sorts of evangelicals willingly expend great energy, but these tasks do not by themselves assist intellectual vitality. Evangelicals sponsor dozens of theological seminaries, scores of colleges, hundreds of radio stations, and thousands of unbelievably diverse parachurch agencies — but not a single research university or a single periodical devoted to in-depth interaction with modern culture." Noll, *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*, 3.

¹⁴ In Danish: *Saligheds Orden*. I will also occasionally use the English translation, order of salvation, for *ordo salutis* as this is the usual translation in English-language theology. In German scholarship, the term *Heilsordnung* is often used. However, the Danish term of *Salighed* or being *salig* carries with it connotations of the highest joy and happiness. In Kierkegaardian scholarship, *Salighed* is often translated as bliss or

topic hides within it questions about the nature of grace, the structure and re-structuring of human nature within salvation, the pressing concerns about the relation of God and the world, and the intertwining of experience and the structure of knowledge. Pietism research has seen a wealth of historical studies in the recent years, leading to a reassessment of the definition of the term. Yet, for a religious movement with such a long research history, at times the actual theological arguments and structures of this period remain relatively untouched and uncontested in contemporary research. To ignore their understanding of grace or the philosophical turns that pushed towards an experiential focus in religious devotion is to miss sight of the movement's strengths and weakness as a Christian phenomenon. It is to lose a conversation partner that Evangelicalism might have with its past or where the Roman Catholic debate of *pura natura* may have something to say about the tensions about justification and sanctification that preoccupied Lutheran thought.

Noll and Ward see, as they termed it, the intellectual failures of Evangelicalism and Pietism, but the reality is that Pietism's descendants live on, their forms of religious experience and expression have not been abandoned, their practices of lay Bible studies are ever present in many congregations. I hope this dissertation reveals what happened when a Danish Pietist combined the intellectual with the experimental and discerned not existential fright but a coherent vision and hope of better times.

1.2 The Research Questions

In the winter of 1733–34, Lutheran Orthodoxy and Pietist parties within the Danish state church faced off over questions of confession, “awakened” priests, and general tensions

blessedness. (see, Davenport et al., *Kierkegaard's God and the Good Life*; Khan, *Salighed as Happiness?: Kierkegaard on the Concept Salighed*.) A Danish-English dictionary from early 19th century makes this point as well. Christian Friderich, *Fuldstændigt Dansk Og Engelsk Haand-Lexicon*, 757. This ‘eudemonistic’ aspect of salvation ought not to be fully disregarded when considering Pietistic understanding of moral action and duty in a pre-Kantian landscape. A technical theological term present in both early modern Reformed and Lutheran theology, Louis Berkhof defines it as “the process by which the work of salvation, wrought in Christ, is subjectively realized in the hearts and lives of sinners. It aims at describing their logical order, and also in their interrelations, the various movements of the Holy Spirit in the application of the work of redemption.” Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, 415–16.

about lay participation in conventicles.¹⁵ The head priest at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus (The Royal Orphanage), Ewald, came under heavy theological criticism from the royal commission established to investigate these tensions. But putting aside questions of political and ecclesial power struggles, what was at stake theologically in Ewald's vision of the Christian life—his *ordo salutis*? What might an investigation of Ewald's thought reveal about assumptions about grace, substance, freedom, and eschatology in the Early Modern period?

These research questions function primarily within larger concerns about the nature of Pietism as a theological movement as such. I have already named Mark Noll's concerns about Evangelicalism (Pietism's offspring) and its anti-intellectualism. Also influential on this dissertation, especially in terms of focusing my research on questions of psychology, anthropology and their role in theological concerns, are Markus Matthias's observations in his article, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy" in *A Companion to German Pietism, 1660-1800*. In fact, I would argue that Matthias's comments offer a certain historical explanation to Noll. I will discuss Matthias's comments more in chapter three, but Matthias writes at the conclusion of his article:

If the explanations given here are historically and theologically convincing, then one will not regard Pietism as merely a social, piety movement. One will instead have to describe Pietism as the greatest and most significant reform movement since the Reformation, because it essentially marks the beginning of Neo-protestantism [sic]. In spite [sic] of, or perhaps because of, its emphasis on piety, Pietism meant a fundamentally new approach to Protestant theology...¹⁶

¹⁵ This period, part of Danish State Pietism (roughly Christian VI's reign in Denmark, 1730–1746) will be referred to only as Danish for the sake of clarity and the fact that Ewald lived and worked in Southern Jutland and then Copenhagen. However, technically one might write Denmark-Norway since the two kingdoms existed in a political union (in which Norway had become the underling by this point). One of the leading Danish Pietist figures, Erik Pontoppidan (1698-1764) was bishop of Bergen for several years and Pietism did influence Norway as well. Denmark, however, had the main responsibility to educate priests for the state church of Denmark-Norway. Nonetheless, the history of Pietism in Denmark may also be read as part of the history of the Norwegian church.

¹⁶ Matthias, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy," 42.

As will become clear I agree to a significant extent with Matthias's analysis—particularly in terms of viewing Pietism as a theologically significant movement. I discuss in my conclusion a bit more of the research path that drew me to the final formulation of the above questions. These questions are stated in an open-ended way, but one could reformulate the structure of my dissertation in this manner: chapter two deals with the main theological disagreements between Ewald and his Lutheran Orthodox opponents, chapter three explores how Ewald defines the *ordo salutis* and its place in his theology, chapter four and five discuss the necessary early modern philosophical, anthropological, and psychological elements needed to grasp the theological 'functioning' of his *ordo*, and chapter six seeks to reconcile Ewald's eschatology and the importance he attaches to the *ordo*. A fuller description of the dissertation's structure will follow below. The answers I give to these research questions serve to address the larger tensions that Mark Noll and Markus Matthias raise about Pietism and Evangelicalism—although mainly as a theological possibility, not a historically significant outcome. Rather, I suggest it is because Ewald's theological answer is ignored, silenced or misunderstood that Noll and Matthias can conclude what they do.

1.3 Methodology

This dissertation is situated at the center of three research spheres: the history of the Danish church, the history of Early Modern ideas, and systematic theology. It attempts to describe the work and ideas of Ewald, a Danish priest, and then place these in the larger European Early Modern context. Specifically, I use the thought of Buddeus, Ewald's renowned teacher, Johann Georg Walch, Buddeus's son-in-law and a German theologian and Lutheran historian, and finally the Pietist Ludwig Gerhard, particularly his defense of *apokatastasis*, the restoration of all things (universal salvation). I treat Ewald's trial and texts as a microhistory before providing a broader contextualization in the final part of the dissertation. Present throughout the dissertation is a critical discussion of the arguments (philosophical and theological) of the Early Modern authors Ewald, Buddeus, Walch, and Gerhard.

1.3.1 Microhistory

Ewald's biography and thought are best treated as microhistory, which has been used in the study of Pietism before. Douglas Shantz, in his book *Between Sardis and Philadelphia*, writes that "microhistory is a method that examines case-studies that have the potential to reveal

general historical trends. ‘Nearly all cases which microhistorians deal with have one thing in common; they all caught the attention of the authorities, thus establishing their archival existence. They illustrate the function of the formal institutions in power and how they handle people’s affairs.’¹⁷ In this dissertation I hope to capture something of the historical debate between Danish Pietism and Lutheran Orthodoxy and use this glimpse to investigate further Ewald's theology and idea world. I will admit here that the questions of power and politics—while undoubtably pertinent for the outcome of Ewald's career and influence¹⁸—are put to the side as primary explanatory factors of Ewald's story. It is in theological and philosophical debates that I draw my main discussion.

Within Danish church historiography, Ewald has received only sporadic attention, and unlike his fellow Danish Pietists, Erik Pontoppidan and Hans Adolph Brorson, his literary and historical legacy within Denmark and Norway is not significant. Yet, he fits well within a certain requirement of microhistory, namely, that he caught the attention of the authorities and left behind a condensed discussion of the theological disagreements between Lutheran Orthodoxy and Danish Pietism. The case against Ewald by the royal commission in 1734 thus provides a unique glimpse into Ewald’s thought and the theological debates during this period of Danish state Pietism. Ewald is forced to divulge theological viewpoints that might have remained hidden from the historical record given the political and theological climate of the era.

Georg Iggers describes the history of microhistory and analyses its strengths and weakness in *Historiography in the Twentieth Century*.¹⁹ Microhistory developed in response to social science history and attempted to highlight the experience of individual humans in the

¹⁷ Shantz, *Between Sardis and Philadelphia: The Life and World of Pietist Court Preacher Conrad Bröske*, xvii. Shantz is citing here Sigurder Gylfi Magnusson, “What is Microhistory?” George Mason University's History News.

¹⁸ For example, Ewald seems to be permitted certain exceptions from his priestly responsibilities that another Pietist priest, Ole Hersleb, was not permitted. Hersleb had to resign his priestly office. Holger Rørdam suggests that Ewald was better protected politically than Hersleb. Rørdam, “Waisenhusets Ældste Historie,” 65.

¹⁹ Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, 101–17.

historical discussion—what is called “everyday history.” In Italy, this methodology was influenced by Marxism; the individuals under historical investigation were not often the ones at the center of power. Rather, the focus turned to the many and “the many are for [the Italian historians] overwhelmingly the disadvantaged and the exploited.”²⁰ Ewald fits this characterization, even if not perfectly. He was the person on trial in 1734, but he cannot be described as a fully disadvantaged person.²¹ More accurately, in light of Danish historiography, Danish Pietism as a movement was marginalized and mischaracterized.²² Even the more recent favorable historical treatments of Pietism fail to do justice to the complex theological issues and ideas in Ewald’s thought.²³

Iggers notes that the individual should not be considered hermetically, but as part of a larger “macrosocial context.”²⁴ Always present is the thrust outward towards a larger contextualization—which I attempt to carry out in the second half of this dissertation. Despite Iggers’s positive evaluation of the method—“history, like anthropology, was an interpretive and not a systematic science. Cold analysis was replaced by an immediacy difficult to put into words”²⁵—he critiques the contradiction inherent in the historical model that the subject is a

²⁰ Iggers, 102.

²¹ Ewald does hold a rather important position as the priest of the Royal Orphanage and the Danish King, Christian 6, is favorable towards pietism.

²² See discussion in Krogh, “Rationalismens Syndebuk. Christian 6. Og Pietismen i Dansk Historieskrivning.”

²³ In Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 59. Ewald is rather a positive and optimistic figure, advocating for human improvement, but Tyge Krogh speaks rather of Pietism’s pessimism, Krogh, “Rationalismens Syndebuk. Christian 6. Og Pietismen i Dansk Historieskrivning,” 71.

²⁴ “Now for Medick 'small is beautiful' by no means signifies an anecdotal history cut loose from larger contexts. In fact, Medick insists that history should move from concern with 'central' institutions to the margins, where individuals who do not conform to the established norms can be found. Nevertheless, the individual can only be understood as part of a larger cultural whole. Thus the microhistory he pursues cannot stand without a macrosocial context. Not only the *Alltagsgeschichte* (everyday history) that Medick represents in Germany, but also microhistory as conceived by its Italian advocates...assumes the existence of a contemporary popular culture. Hence the turn to historical anthropology with its semiotic approach to the symbolic expressions of culture.” Iggers, 101–17.

²⁵ Iggers, 116.

text capable of being read in a variety of ways.²⁶ Iggers is forced to admit that while microhistory adds “a sense of concreteness to the study of the past,”²⁷ historians must assume that “they [a]re confronting a real subject matter.”²⁸ What this dissertation draws from microhistory, rather than pure conceptual history, is the use of “thick description” for Ewald’s thought.²⁹ An analysis of the web of conceptual connections and ways in which he spoke, argued, and phrased ideas constitutes my discussion in the section on Ewald’s texts in Chapters 2 and 3. Now, Iggers suggests the microhistory approach must operate with certain assumptions about the reality of its subject matter and the macrosocial context it seeks to be in dialogue with. By ‘the reality of its subject matter’ Iggers seems to mean something along the lines of the actuality of a historical individual life situated within its culture and societal context. Iggers recognizes that microhistorians were attempting to get away from “the preoccupation of the social sciences with anonymous structures and processes”³⁰ even as

²⁶ Even if Iggers is concerned here about the objectivity of microhistory, we should not be surprised at this hermeneutical turn or conundrum. Consider the Radical Pietist Johann Goerg Hamann’s insistence that all knowledge was hermeneutical and that the subject-object distinction is a false Enlightenment dichotomy. Jonathan A. Linebaugh notes, “For Hamann, research is reception, interpretation and response...Hamann’s relational hermeneutic, in other words, is part of a more comprehensive relational anthropology. In an age in which the unions between contingent and necessary truth, subject and object, and rationality and sensuousness were being dissolved by what Hamann criticized as ‘the art of divorce’ (*Scheidekunst*), he insisted on the ‘art of marriage’ (*Ehekunst*). This is ultimately a Christological contention, rooted in the ‘*communicatio* of the divine and human *idiomata*’...But this is not a narrowly Christological confession. For Hamann, the Christological *communicatio* discloses a relational understanding of reality: it is a ‘fundamental law and master-key of all our knowledge and of the whole visible economy’” Linebaugh, “Rational Hermeneutics and Comparison as Conversation,” 146.

²⁷ Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, 117.

²⁸ Iggers, 116.

²⁹ The cultural anthropological practices of Clifford Geertz are key for Iggers. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, 104; See also, Matthias, “*Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs*.” This is an excellent study, but it must necessarily leave out the internal logic of the doctrine of the *ordo salutis* and has little to say about the changing philosophical context in which this term was being employed.

³⁰ Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, 116.

they employed the social sciences' tools. This real subject matter of which Iggers speaks, includes a reference to social reality, but in Iggers understanding, microhistorians would deny that historical individuals, and thus history, are *fully* determined or describable by social processes. In the new section, I will clarify the assumptions that I bring to this dissertation and the macro-context I engage with. I use the term macroscope rather than macrosocial context because I am less engaged with the contemporary social pressures and more towards theological and philosophical concepts of the era. At the same time, I am taking advantage of the pressure microhistorians place upon older models of history where socioeconomic approaches were seen as deterministic. Rather, I turn to a different causal factor in history, namely ideas.

1.3.2 Macroscope

Although Ewald's thought is under-examined in Danish church historiography, during his lifetime he played a moderately important role in spreading Pietism in Denmark. Additionally, in so far as Pietism can be considered a theological or intellectual movement, it is part of the larger intellectual history that is Christian theology, and in the second half of the dissertation, I focus on the macro-'intellectual' environment, namely, Ewald's Early Modern theological and philosophical context. I recognize Iggers's concerns about the assumption of a subject matter's "reality," but approach Ewald and his contemporaries primarily through a philosophical and theological lens. As such, I investigate them as offering, or attempting to offer, coherent, reasonable, and persuasive argumentation. Essentially, I am claiming that historical circumstances are not the only influencing factor here; even within a historical frame of reference, one can seek for coherence of argumentation—although this may not serve as a necessarily exhaustive explanation. Logic is one thing, historical happenstance another.³¹ All I want to claim is that if political pressure and social circumstances are viewed

³¹ Stephen R. L. Clark muses "the cosmos, I have said before, is unified by the presence everywhere in it of Intellect, conceived itself as the union of Forms in a single, coherent system. But Intellect (as we conceive it) may have limits: what it grasps is only what is graspable by intellect. Even the Divine Intellect may not, of itself, be able to contain mere happenstance. As some philosophical theists have suggested, God may know the law but not the infinite particulars, insofar as they are not determined by laws." Clark, *God, Religion and Reality*, 80.

as two influences in history, ideas and coherent structure are another two. Still, I will admit that I approach Ewald's texts and the ideological debates with an *a priori* hope in reasoning, coherence and internal intelligibility. This is not to claim from the first that Ewald's (or Buddeus's, Walch's, or Gerhard's) texts display these attributes—only that this is my primary hermeneutical starting point.

To put it another way, while a traditional modern biographical treatment of Ewald would be beneficial (a close examination of his life, education, work at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus, role in popularizing Pietist notions and concepts, etc.), as mentioned above this dissertation is primarily concerned with his thought and theology as preserved in his writings.³² Contrary to a strict division between systematic theology and church history, this work falls into the discipline of historical theology. In the process of analyzing the structure and formulation of Ewald's *ordo salutis*, it seems natural to turn to theology and philosophy (broadly considered) to contextualize Ewald's and Buddeus's concepts in such a way as to provide a coherent picture.

The three main figures whose texts I examine in the second half of the dissertation, Buddeus, Walch, and Gerhard, have been selected both for their ties to Ewald and his library *and* their relative historical importance to Lutheran and Pietistic thought and debates during the 1710s–1730s. If their texts and the themes touched on below are not the widest intellectual framework in which to set Ewald's *ordo salutis*, they are a step towards a macroscopic investigation, insofar they offer conceptual clarification or speculative possibilities.

In terms of my *a priori* hope for internal intelligibility and coherence, I am influenced in this matter by a number of modern theologians and philosophers of religion. This influence extends both to this starting point and, in a more limited sense, to the content of my

³² There has been strides towards this. After I wrote the above, I discovered a recent *prisopgave* on Enevold Ewald by Sigrid Nielsby Christensen. As of yet, I have been unable to obtain a copy of her thesis. Christensen has published a shorter article drawing on her research which I discuss below. See, Christensen, “En Undersøgelse Af Enevold Ewalds (1696-1754) Teologi Og Dens Historiske Kontekst På Baggrund Af Hans Prædikener.”; Christensen, “Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram.”

dissertation: in particular, the external-internal tensions of causality and human-divine action. As regards to the question of causality, I draw occasionally on two Catholic thinkers, D.C. Schindler and Michael Hanby. Both are engaged in a critique of modernity: although Hanby in a genealogical mode in his discussion of causality in *No God, No Science Theology, Cosmology, Biology*, and D.C. Schindler in a philosophical mode in his ontological critique of the modern understanding of freedom, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty* and "Freedom Beyond Our Choosing: Augustine on the Will and Its Objects". Additionally, while their works do not fill much of the discussion in this dissertation, how theologians Rowan Williams and Kathryn Tanner frame the issue of divine-human interaction as non-competitive has been extremely important for my analysis.³³ Williams' and Tanner's formulation suggested that I need not read Ewald's or Buddeus's language of participation, grace, and agency as fundamentally illogical or non-sensical. This is not to say that I directly interpret Ewald's thought through the anachronistic lens of Williams's or Tanner's theological principles. Rather Williams and Tanner were examples of theological reflections that treated the question of divine-human interaction as a worthy and 'solvable' philosophical question. This in turn prompted me to view Ewald's and Buddeus's understanding of divine-human agency as *potentially* coherent and reasonable. Thus, it is fair to credit Williams and Tanner as the theological inspiration for my methodological starting point: both in terms of the micro-picture and the macro-picture.

When I speak of Ewald's theology expressing a coherent whole, I may not be doing justice to all the intricacies in the historical reality of his texts. However, I do think there is both internal evidence to suggest a way of viewing his theology in a systematic fashion *and* that it is a good methodological starting point to seek to find unity within historical textual readings. With this *a priori* methodological hope, all I wish to express is the tendency for any explanation to seek unity and coherency. That is simply the interpretative and synthetic task for anyone who acknowledges "any mental acts whose internal connections appear to be conceptual or logical

³³ See, Williams, *Christ the Heart of Creation*; Tanner, *Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity : A Brief Systematic Theology*. This might seem rather obvious to a number of readers, but there are tendencies in the early modern contemporary Lutheran scene to read any discussion of cooperation as suggesting meritorious salvific human action. See my discussion in chapter two.

rather than merely physical".³⁴ And even insofar as there may be a 'physical' connection—for example, instances of personal acquaintance or textual reception, it is only grasped and understood as a physical connection by a mental act of comprehension.³⁵

Here I stand indebted to David Bentley Hart and Stephen R. L. Clark.³⁶ Clark speaks of two dominating trends in the philosophical or the scientific establishment which he names anti-realism and eliminative materialism. The anti-realists argue, in Clark's view, for the notion "that 'there is nothing outside the text', that 'true' means only 'what we find seriously appropriate to say'"³⁷. In contrast, the eliminative materialists attempt "to persuade others that they should not believe that there are any beliefs"³⁸, i.e. not only do ideas not have any 'causal' power, but they are also mere illusory. In terms of this possible 'causal' power of ideas or concepts, this need not be construed in a mechanical fashion. Consider David Bentley Hart's remarks about the notion of a telos (final cause) in ancient thought,

A final cause, for instance, was an inherent natural end, not an adventitiously imposed design; and this was true even when teleology involved external uses rather than merely internal perfections (as in the case of human artifacts); it was at once a thing's internal fullness and its external participation in the totality of nature. In a sense, a causal relation in this scheme is less like a physical interaction or exchange of energy than it is like a mathematical equation, or like the syntax of a coherent sentence. Admittedly, this is a picture of reality that comes from ages in which it was assumed that the structure of the world was analogous to the structure of rational thought.

³⁴ Hart, *Roland in Moonlight*, 144.

³⁵ Any claim to even a corresponding sense of truth between the 'outside' physical or material world and the 'inner' grasp of these circumstances presupposes intelligibility on the part of the physical world. Thus any attempt to argue for the truth of materialism in an extreme form, such as eliminativism, is incoherent since the proponents already appeal to something they have eliminated, rationality. For an extended discussion that explores what the congruence of thought and the world presupposes, see chapter two in Clark and Pickstock, *Can We Believe in People? Human Significance in an Interconnected Cosmos*.

³⁶ I am also again indebted to D.C. Schindler whose project in *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty* begins with the logical incoherence in John Locke's notion of liberty.

³⁷ Clark, *Animals and Their Moral Standing*, 121.

³⁸ Clark, 122.

But, then again, this was an eminently logical assumption, if only because there appears to be a more than illusory or accidental reciprocal openness between mind and world...³⁹

In historical research, eliminative materialism is never going to get much traction as the metaphysical framework. However, it is clear from Iggers's above comments on history as an interpretative science, that Iggers does not want to remain entirely within the 'nothing outside the text' anti-realist model. As noted above, one is forced to assume a real subject matter. Thus, in historical research, once one assumes a real subject matter and the reality of logical ideas and concepts, the *possibility* of discovering some elements of Ewald's thought as mutually influential and explanatory in a logical sense arises.

Furthermore, Stephen R. L. Clark takes this tendency towards explanatory unity in a philosophical mode further, noting,

The Truth is of its nature single: to think that there are two Truths, without any asymmetrical relation of derivation or dependency, is to think what can't be thought. But even saying that the Truth is One may be misleading: it is not that there might be many Truths, or that the Truth we are addressing is but one of many. By calling it One, we only mean that It is not multiple, nor one of many.⁴⁰

As mentioned above, logical or conceptual unity may not require a necessitated historical causality.⁴¹ But the desire for explanatory unity remains at even a more fundamental level prior to any *theory* of interpretation.⁴² Thus an attempt to draw things together and tell a plausible story (history is an interpretive science) of conceptual theological or philosophical unity ought to receive equal validity as a historical methodological starting point as, for

³⁹ Hart, *Roland in Moonlight*, 143.

⁴⁰Clark, *God, Religion and Reality*, 41.

⁴¹ At least not in an immediate sense, or not in a sense that we presently can comprehend.

⁴² In a different fashion, this explains Thomas Nagel's preference for a single 'monist' theory of reality, rather than a dualistic approach to mind and matter. See Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*.

example, a more political or feminist reading of ecclesiological debates.⁴³ This does not mean that the quest for conceptual coherence erases the questions of power dynamics for an explanatory account of historical events: although it certainly might complicate the 'completeness' of such a narrative, microhistory or not. Perhaps one might fairly say, these explanatory factors exist alongside one another creating a more complicated historical picture than a single methodology can properly outline.

As such, this dissertation includes elements of historical investigation and reception, and I hope I have done justice to the 1700s Danish Pietist sociolect and the historical document record. However, I would argue overall my analysis falls more into a theological *interpretation* of Ewald's thought, supplemented by his historical context through the concepts found in Johann Franz Buddeus, Johann Georg Walch, and Ludwig Gerhard. Still, by interpretation here, I do not want to say that any interpretation could be drawn from the text. It may be a *partial* truth of Ewald's thought and historical circumstances, but I would argue it is not a subjective fiction in principle. Additionally, I do not think my methodological approach guaranteed that I would arrive at a coherent theological system for Ewald. The discovery of fundamental logical incoherence or conceptual ambiguity would have been just as helpful as a clarifying result and might reveal a larger explanatory framework where political tensions find their place. One could also argue that such ambiguities are likely to have historical repercussions in later theological debates. However, this is a matter for another day.

1.3.3 Structure

In terms of the structure of my treatment of Ewald and his thought, I begin in Chapter 2 with an analysis of Ewald's 1734 trial. The transcript includes the accusations leveled against Ewald and his written responses to his two opponents, along with the final judgment and concluding (mixed) verdict against him.⁴⁴ This trial forced Ewald to write for an academically trained audience and operates as a "philosophical" hermeneutical key for Ewald's thought. It suggests

⁴³ See for example, Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6." It is a good article about the political currents surrounding Pietism, my point here is to contrast it with my own approach.

⁴⁴ See chapter two for details about the trial transcript.

areas that need further clarity or a more careful treatment. It also points to a conflict between Pietists and Orthodox priests that had reached an impasse. Based on that analysis, I then offer a close reading of Ewald's published works in chapter 3, particularly as they pertain to the *ordo salutis* (order of salvation).

Based on that analysis, I then offer a close reading of select extracts of Ewald's published works in chapter 3, as they pertain to the *ordo salutis* (order of salvation). First, I lay out the form of the *ordo salutis* that Ewald first presented in his two early interlinked catechisms. The form of the *ordo salutis* (Danish: *Saligheds Orden*) is roughly tripartite: conversion (*omvendelse*), faith in Christ (*Troen på Christum*), and the holy life (*et Helligt Levnet*). I discuss the different parts of this order, not merely in relation to Ewald's catechisms, but also how they manifest themselves and how Ewald elaborated on them in his sermons. The five-volume collection of Ewald's sermons, *Det Gamle og Nye Testamentes herlige Harmonie* (1744-1750), which focus also on the exegesis of the Pentateuch, form the bulk of his theological discussion. A closer examination of his elaboration of the *ordo salutis* in these volumes is the basis for the majority of my analysis of Ewald's thought. I look especially at the terminology that Ewald used and lay out his understanding and definition of the *ordo*.

Although Ewald is an attractive subject for this project, given his relative historical importance in Danish Pietism and his mainly lay-orientated authorship, the genre of his texts also complicates my examination of his conceptual world. There is limited concrete information about his sources and influences in his sermons and catechisms (they did not require much citation apart from scripture). Moreover, his writings lack a systematic, structured treatment of his subject matter because of the genres he wrote in. The court case against Ewald, which comprises charges and his written responses, provides a venue for a more precise treatment of his theological ideas and language. But it does not provide a comprehensive unfolding of philosophical and theological ideas, which I argue are crucial for illuminating Ewald's theology. Given these reasons and the historical connections discussed below in section 1.5, I have selected two connected German theologians and academics, Johann Franz Buddeus (1667–1729) and his son-in-law and close colleague Johann Georg Walch (1693–1775), as my main interlocutors for the second half of the dissertation. As mentioned above, Buddeus and Walch offer an opportunity to examine the theological and philosophical debates of the

period, particularly in connection with Pietist thought. I mention other figures who also help situate Pietism in the larger world of ideas, but Buddeus receives the lion's share of my attention. A third German theologian, Ludwig Gerhard (c. 1680–1738), will be the main focus of the final chapter on universalism.

My attempt to place Ewald's theology (as an example of Danish Pietistic theology widely available to a lay audience) within a larger and technically defined world of ideas, allows for a conversation that touches on the assumptions and conceptual necessities of Ewald's thought. What may be implicit or obscure in Ewald's theology of the *ordo salutis* is often treated in an explicit way by Buddeus and Walch. Methodologically, investigating Ewald's philosophical background and looking for technical definitions of the concepts he uses in his writings is risky given both the lack of direct source citations by Ewald and the nature of his writing (sermons and catechisms) and thematic focus.⁴⁵ My shift from Ewald to Buddeus is based on certain assumptions about Ewald's use of Buddeus. I do not argue that my analysis of Buddeus's thought is directly and fully reflected in Ewald's writings, only that certain connections are present and that reading Ewald through Buddeus allows aspects of Ewald's thought to unfold with more clarity. Buddeus serves as a mirror in which I see Ewald's discussion of the *ordo salutis* in connection with the larger debates and tensions in the Early Modern period, particularly within Lutheran theology and the philosophical debates related to freedom and causality.

Buddeus has been written about in the context of Early Modern thought mainly from two different perspectives: the history of philosophy and as a transitional theologian bridging Orthodox Lutheran and Enlightenment theologies. This is discussed in greater detail in the history of research section 1.4. In the history of philosophy, Buddeus receives attention because of the importance of his opponents (Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Christian Wolff). However, in the history of Lutheran theology, he occupies an uneasy position. Sometimes he is linked to Pietism, while other times, the Pietist label is removed from him. My attempt to paint a larger world of ideas in which Danish Pietism moved looks

⁴⁵ Ewald wrote other more 'academic' works such as a biblical concordance and church chronology, but no systematic theology treatises.

in particular at Buddeus's moral theology, *Collegium theologico-morale, eller gudelig Lærdom om gode Gierninger og Sæder*, which remains the only work of Buddeus translated into Danish.⁴⁶

Since this dissertation has as its main thematic focus Ewald's *ordo salutis*, broadly considered, and thus its corresponding effect for the believer, the nature of freedom, grace, and human anthropology in Buddeus's *Collegium theologico-morale* will be detailed.⁴⁷ Chapter 5 will also touch on Walch's definition of human freedom. How did his understanding of freedom and the nature of sanctification shift in Ewald's contemporary world of ideas?

My final chapter is the hermeneutical key to the entire dissertation, even as it builds on the earlier discussions of grace and human nature. Once the philosophical implications of Gerhard's universalism are understood, Ewald's thought achieves a measure of internal coherency. I view Gerhard's arguments as historically pertinent for Ewald. I offer a brief examination of the contemporary awareness and discussion of universalism, alongside possible historical sources for Ewald's eschatology.

Ultimately, though I marshal historical contextuality to supply clarity to what is obscure in Ewald's texts, my dissertation begins with a different premise than a cultural history or a descriptive history of ideas. I read Ewald with the assumption that his writings are coherent to a certain extent, rather than solely cultural artifacts bequeathing a vocabulary and

⁴⁶ When I refer to Buddeus' moral theology in this dissertation, I am referring both to the actual text (mainly the Danish translation and adaption: *Collegium theologico-morale, eller gudelig Lærdom om gode Gierninger og Sæder*) and to Buddeus' concept and discussion of moral theology in this text.

⁴⁷ I have chosen to use the term believer, not merely as a translation for *den troende* (lit. the believing one), but also a general term to describe the human being existing in a state of grace in Ewald's (and Buddeus') writings. The term 'the reborn' is used in translations for *det igjennfødt* and the convert for *den omvendte* (lit. the converted), but I don't find that Ewald uses these designations as frequently as *De Troende* (the believers). Additionally, the reborn is difficult to use in a singular sense in English and the convert seems, to me, to focus too much on the first 'step' of the *ordo salutis*. I also try to stay away from the honorific 'Christian' because in Ewald's writings, he recognizes a broad usage and a narrow, 'truer', use of the term. When writing about believers, it is always in the narrower special sense, of the human being in the state of grace.

sociolect⁴⁸ to its audience and future generations.⁴⁹ While Ewald is an interesting research subject because of his historical role and thus contributes to the historical understanding of Pietist culture and its descendants, what I mean by *coherent* refers to the reasonableness, or the (semi-)systematic nature, of his thought. Instead of reading Ewald's texts primarily in a forward historical direction—who they spoke to, in what manner they influenced a religious movement—I am and remain primarily interested in their inner cohesion and argumentation. Ewald's position in historical theology as an orthodox Lutheran, a Halle-Pietist, a Radical Pietist, or Moravian-inclined thinker is secondary,⁵⁰ although I hope my observations might have something to contribute to these historical labels. Whether or not one accepts Ewald's premises, I aim to investigate his own internal consistency. The authors I have selected as aids for understanding Ewald's *ordo* in a "macroscopic perspective" serve this coherent reading I present.

⁴⁸ Nielsen defines sociolect and notes that "In all these considerations pietism is a sociolect and in such a high degree that in certain respects one must learn to know it as a foreign language, which is more or less secretly embedded in the common language." (*I alle disse henseender er pietismen en sociolekt, og den er det i så høj grad, at man i visse henseender må lære den at kende som et fremmed sprog, der mere eller mindre hemmelighedsfuldt er indlejret i det fælles sprog.*) (38) See his discussion in Nielsen, *H. A. Brorson : pietisme, meditation, erotik*, 38–41.

⁴⁹ I have no dispute with treating Ewald or, for example, Erik Pontoppidan as originators or popularizers of a Pietist culture and practice of faith. Indeed, Ewald, Erik Pontoppidan or Hans Adolph Brorson are important for Danish-Norwegian Pietism (and thus most likely also American religious history and self-understanding). Insofar as they cease to be strong theological authorities and touchstones for the formulation of Danish-Norwegian religious life, they still remain crucial as part of the cultural history and landscape. As such they are a relevant and interesting historical research area. However, if not as explicitly anymore as in the 19th century, I suspect that the traditions and language of Scandinavian pietism remains a theological authority for some. The language of Ewald's *ordo salutis* has many similarities to language used in contemporary American and global evangelical religious practice, such as 'conversion, re-birth, born again'. The historian of Evangelicalism, W.R. Ward, emphasizes how the roots of Evangelicalism lie partly in Pietism, see Ward, *Early Evangelicalism. A Global History, 1670-1789* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). In *Pietism and the Foundations of the Modern World*, Justin Davis makes the remarkable claim that "From its Protestant roots, Pietism birthed Pentecostalism, existentialism, modern liberal Protestantism, neo-liberalism, Fundamentalism, and a whole host of Christian ethics. Furthermore it provided the groundwork for neo-orthodoxy, hermeneutics, female ordination, and the Emergent Church". Davis, *Pietism and the Foundations of the Modern World*, x.

⁵⁰ See discussion in Christensen, "Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram."

1.4 Ewald's Biography and Literature Review

1.4.1 Ewald and Danish Pietism: A brief biography

Danish Pietism, or rather the period of Danish state Pietism, is a relatively late phenomenon in comparison with the traditional linking of German Lutheran Pietism to Philip Spener and his associates in the latter part of the 17th century. In contrast, the period normally called state Pietism by Danish church historians because of the support of Pietism by King Christian VI, began in the late 1720s. It might be linked more closely to the timeline of Pietist Count Zinzendorf and the Moravians; Zinzendorf himself played a small role in the Pietist-Orthodox tensions in Copenhagen.

Enevold Ewald (1696–1754)⁵¹, the first priest at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus in Copenhagen, grew up in Southern Jutland, the son of a priest.⁵² He began his theological studies in Kiel (then a part of the Danish Kingdom), before leaving for Jena (ca. 1714–1715) and possibly Halle.

His experiences in Jena formed him theologically and spiritually, as he wrote nearly forty years later.⁵³ At the time, Buddeus was an important teacher of theology and a major draw for the

⁵¹ Biography mainly drawn from Neiiendam, "Enevold Ewald"; Graversen, *Wajsenhuspræsten Enevold Ewald Og Den Pietistiske Bevægelse i København i Det 18. Aarhundrede*.

⁵² Likely given its proximity to Germany, this area of Southern Jutland was part of a first wave of Pietism in Denmark. The events in Copenhagen, which Ewald was a leading figure in, were a sort of 'second wave'. See, Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 34–35.

⁵³ "After that there were then various changes, which occurred in my circumstances and condition, since the time I spoke about above, the faithful Providence of God led me to the Academy in Jena, a place, where I found an especially good opportunity to be taught and reminded about the true Christianity's right type and quality, and to be awakened to travel upon the true way and path of Christianity" (*Efter at der da vare adskillige Forandringer forefaldne i mine Omstændigheder og Tilstand, siden den Tiid jeg før har talet om, førde den trofaste Guds Forsyn mig til Academiet i Jena, en Sted, hvor jeg fandt en besynderlig god Leylighed til at undervises og paamindes om den sande Christendoms rette Art og Beskaffenhed, og at opvækkes til at indtræde paa denne den sande Christendoms Vey og Vane...*) Ewald, *Den Eeneste, Sande Og Salige Wiisdoms Kilde, Som Er Guds Ord, Eller, Den Hellige Skrift*, Preface, n.p.

university, one of the largest and most popular destinations for theological study in Germany.⁵⁴ (I discuss Buddeus's connection to Ewald in more depth in section 1.5.) Ewald returned home probably in 1719 and began working for his father as a catechist, though he was not an ordained priest. He gained recognition for his teaching and held Pietist conventicles (or the like) in the area of Tønder, which caused a revival of sorts.⁵⁵ Ewald published a catechism in 1720 formed principally of scriptural quotations. A second more conventional catechism followed a year later, though it relied on the scriptural citations of the first. After some years in Jutland, Ewald began to attract attention from Copenhagen.

A connection between the Danish government and the Halle Pietist orphanage and various institutions, Die Franckeschen Stiftungen zu Halle, already existed prior to this. The first Protestant mission to Tranquebar, India, in 1706 was a joint venture between Denmark, the Halle institutions, and the English *Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge*.⁵⁶ Despite not being as Pietist in reputation as his son, King Frederik IV oversaw the beginning of several missions (Tranquebar, Greenland, Northern Norway).⁵⁷ The German mother-in-law of King Christian VI was sympathetic to Pietism and had important connections, including one to Zinzendorf. In 1727, a Danish version of the Halle Orphanage was established, Det Kongelige Vajsenhus, and Ewald was initially appointed head teacher and then priest. His ordination followed on the heels of his appointment. It was either due to Bishop Peder Hersleb or the queen's mother that Ewald, known as an excellent preacher and leader of Pietist gatherings in Southern Jutland, was given the position.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Groetsch, *Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768): Classicist, Hebraist, Enlightenment Radical in Disguise*, 21.

⁵⁵ Elle Jensen, *Pietismen i Jylland*, 42; Dahl, Aage, "Bidrag Til Johannes Ewalds Slægtshistorie."

⁵⁶ For a robust account of this venture, see Gross, Kumaradoss, and Liebau, *Halle and the Beginning of Protestant Christianity in India*.

⁵⁷ Pedersen, "Pietismens Tid 1699—1746," 48–61.

⁵⁸ Dahl, Aage, "Bidrag Til Johannes Ewalds Slægtshistorie.," 236; Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6," 287–88. Aage Dahl gives Hersleb (a moderate Pietist) the credit, while Engelhardt points towards the queen's mother. Perhaps it was a mixture of official and unofficial influence.

In addition to his official position, in which he drew a large congregation, Ewald became involved with informal Pietist gatherings in the early 1730s.⁵⁹ Count Zinzendorf visited Copenhagen during this period and encouraged these meetings (whether he attended in person or merely recommended them is unclear).⁶⁰ There is evidence that Zinzendorf met Ewald during his 1731 visit to Copenhagen.⁶¹ Ewald and his mother-in-law, Marie Wulff, held gatherings at her inn, Den forgyldne Okse (The Golden Ox), which drew a cross-section of the Danish population, from the educated to the lower classes. It is possible that Madam Wulff also preached during these gatherings, which could extend far into the night. Whatever the case, she was active in the meetings.⁶² Tensions arose between Orthodox clergy and Pietist clergy in Copenhagen, and in spite of the king's support of Pietism, a royal commission was established in 1733 to deal with these tensions. The commission--run mainly by Orthodox clergy or more moderate figures--also accused several Pietists of heresy. Several Pietist teachers at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus were convicted or voluntarily left their posts, and in early 1734 Ewald himself faced the commission.⁶³

Depending on one's interpretation of the historical political currents and tensions, it is difficult to claim that the only reason Ewald was called to answer the commission was on theological grounds. Still, he was questioned on theological issues, and while Ewald was forced to admit that he held the doctrine of *apokatatasis* and had written the preface for the controversial tract by Moravian Christian David, *De Otte Saligheder (The Eight Beatitudes)* (1733), he was allowed to retain his position at the Vajsenhus. A portion of his salary was used to pay a chaplain, since Ewald refused to offer absolution for sins to parishioners he judged unrepentant. Later in life he suffered financial woes, probably related to this expenditure.

⁵⁹ "Kirkehistoriske Samlinger," 289.

⁶⁰ "Kirkehistoriske Samlinger," 288.

⁶¹ "Kirkehistoriske Samlinger," 406, 764–65. This includes a transcribed letter from Zinzendorf to Ewald.

⁶² Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Hallske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6," 294–96.

⁶³ Ottesen, *Det Kgl. Vajsenhus Gennem to Hundrede Aar*, 208–9, 218–23.

Denmark enacted a prohibition on private conventicles for the sake of “unauthorized” Bible study in 1741, which remained in effect until 1848.⁶⁴

The commission’s judgment against Ewald reflected a decision against radical Pietist elements, yet even so, state Pietism continued to have long-lasting effects in Denmark, including the publication of Pontoppidan’s catechism, mandatory confirmation (and the instruction required for confirmation), the translation and publication of Pietist texts by the orphanage’s publishing press,⁶⁵ and the training of parish priests sympathetic to Pietism. Ewald’s involvement in the pre-1734 Pietist gatherings and his trial have received the most notice from Danish historians. It is more difficult to fully assess the importance of his later, less visible role.⁶⁶ The sermons this dissertation draws on were preached from 1738 to 1743, and Ewald published most of his other texts in these later years as well. Ewald also had close familial connections with the Moravians in Denmark; his godson founded Christianfeld, a Moravian community in Jutland.⁶⁷ Neiiendam’s characterization of Ewald as an ecumenical figure suggests an openness to Christian communities beyond state Lutheranism. Ewald’s son, Johannes Ewald, was a well-known Danish poet, and the literary historian Erik Nielsen comments on the Pietist (though idiosyncratic) thought world behind Johannes’s work.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Overgaard, “Konventikel.”

⁶⁵ Graversen suggests that Ewald as priest-in-charge of the Royal Orphanage also had a large influence over the associated printing press. Graversen, *Vajsenhuspræsten Enevold Ewald Og Den Pietistiske Bevægelse i København i Det 18. Aarhundrede*, 69.

⁶⁶ Jensen speculates that the later spread of Pietism in Denmark via Pietist priests was due to their presence in Copenhagen in the 1730s for their theological education and in no small part in thanks to Ewald’s role at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus. Elle Jensen, *Pietismen i Jylland*, 42.

⁶⁷ Møller, Jon Monrad, “Vajsenhuspræsten Ewalds Slægt i København På 1700-Tallet,” 135.

⁶⁸ Nielsen’s excellent long essay on Johannes Ewald provides a literary analysis of the Pietist world view that offers a much more nuanced and positive take on Pietist thought in its complexity and style. “Johannes Ewald was a child of pietism. Not only, because he, through his father, Enevold Ewald, was born into the heart of the pietistic milieu, but also because the life of his imaginative-world was imprinted by Pietism’s world-map. The consequence, which followed in his life’s fate, was inconceivable without the thoroughly Pietist training of attentiveness to one’s life-accounts, whose status must be updated daily. For his own part this contained incessant self-disciplining, so that a new era’s poetic soul came into being in him with the opening towards the highest experience of inspiration. Pietism remained undoubtably the paradigm he aimed his life’s conduct

What remains mostly unexplored⁶⁹ is the theological vision that Ewald left in place for his congregation and readers (lay, student, and professional). It is this that I hope to illuminate in this dissertation. Aiding this investigation is not only Ewald's published texts, but also a copy of the trial manuscript⁷⁰ and the sale catalogue of Ewald's library following his death.⁷¹

towards—and under his doubts, he denied himself with the help of [Pietism's principles]. At times, Ewald read pietism's faith-world as a sinner reads of piety, convinced that he has fallen out of it, but also with a Luciferic clear view of it. And at last, Johannes managed to formulate the Lutheran doctrine of grace—not as pious repetition of the Reformation's dogma, but as his own harrowing life experience." (Johannes Ewald var barn af pietismen. Ikke kun, forbi han gennem sin Far, Enevold Ewald, var født ind i hjertet af det pietistiske miljø, men også fordi hans forestillingsverden livet igennem var indskrevet på pietismens verdenskort. Den konsekvens, der lader sig følge i hans livsskæbne, er utænkelig uden pietisternes gennemskolede agtpågivenhed over for det livsregnskab, hvis status dagligt må ajourføres. For hans eget vedkommende indebar denne uophørlige selvdisciplinering, at en ny tids digteriske sjæl blev til i ham med åbning mod de højeste inspirationserfaringer. Pietismen forblev utvivlsomt det paradigme, han bøjede sin livsførelse efter - og under sine anfægtelser forkastede sig selv ved hjælp af. I perioder læste Ewald pietismens trosverden som synderen læser fromheden, i forvisning om, at han var faldet ud af den, men også med et deraf følgende luciferisk klarsyn. Og til sidst nåede han frem til at kunne formulere den lutherske nådelære - ikke som fra repetition af reformationens grunddogme, men som sin egen oprivende livserfaring.) Nielsen, *Solens Fødsel: Seks Tekster Om Kristendommens Hemmeligheder*, 117. The entire essay argues that Johannes Ewald represents the poetic expression of the Pietist world-view with the Christological telos of the human subject: an identification of the 'I' with Christ made particularly possible through the alchemic signs and symbols of transformation. Erik Nielsen complicates the picture of Pietism in any attempt to force a purely logical system and equivocal meaning on this 'I' identification with Christ, something this dissertation touches upon. But he also offers a formidable justification for trying to stay within the tension of the moral vs. substantial transformation offered in a Pietist *ordo salutis*. Perhaps a messier but more honest treatment of Pietism's metaphysics may come forth.

⁶⁹ Graversen only mentions that the sermons demonstrate Ewald continued to hold the ideals of his youth, although the sermons were not as accessible (one part focused on a Pentateuch text, the other on the Gospel reading) as his sermons in his earlier years. The impression one receives is one of consistency of beliefs and ideas. Graversen, *Wajsenhuspræsten Enevold Ewald Og Den Pietistiske Bevægelse i København i Det 18. Aarhundrede*, 69–72.

⁷⁰ See chapter 2 for archival details.

⁷¹ Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*.

1.4.2 Previous research about Ewald and Danish Pietism

Ewald has been noted in research primarily in bits and pieces of the historical account.⁷² Attention has been drawn to him not only because of his role as priest but also as the father of the well-known Danish poet Johannes Ewald.⁷³ There is only one lengthy biographical treatment of Ewald, written in 1912.⁷⁴ This account provides a biographical overview and focuses mainly on Ewald's first years at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus. It does not treat his writings in any great detail. Ewald is also mentioned in the historical record in other surveys of Det Kongelige Vajsenhus's history, such as A. Exner's *Efterretninger om det kongelige Vaisenhuus* (1881).

The most interesting recent discussion of Ewald as a theological figure is in Thomas Bredsdorff's *Den Brogede Oplysning* (The Diverse Enlightenment). Bredsdorff argues that Ewald and Pietism contributed to greater human freedom (particularly from church authorities and institutions). For him, Ewald mirrored the overall cultural push towards freedom in the Enlightenment.⁷⁵ Bredsdorff discusses Ewald's trial, but his analysis does not pay as close attention to the complexity and background of the theological positions Ewald expressed as I do in this dissertation.⁷⁶ Bredsdorff's work is a cultural history that stands in

⁷² See, for instance, Michael Neiiendam's biography of the Pietist Erik Pontoppidan, which includes several mentions of both Ewald and Buddeus. Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930; Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930.

⁷³ For instance, Dahl, Aage, "Bidrag Til Johannes Ewalds Slægtshistorie."

⁷⁴ Graversen, *Wajsenhuspræsten Enevold Ewald Og Den Pietistiske Bevægelse i København i Det 18. Aarhundrede*.

⁷⁵ See, Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*; Bredsdorff, Hansen, and Mai, *Nordic Light*. Bredsdorff concludes his book with these words about Ewald and the Enlightenment, "The Enlightenment...is Ewald's will to enlighten the commoner, as well as his general knowledge about the price of enlightenment; the chasms that open for the one who is set free to make their own choices." (*Oplysningen...er Ewalds vilje til at oplyse almuen, såvel som den er hans geniale viden om oplysningens pris; de afgrunde der åbner sig for den der er sat fri til at træffe sine egne valg.*) Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 371.

⁷⁶ Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 59, 62. Bredsdorff writes "the conflict between Magister Kaasbøll and Pastor Ewald before the Royal

contrast to the larger corpus of church history of Danish Pietism.⁷⁷ Erik Nielsen, a literary historian of Danish hymnody, in several dense works dealing with the richness of Christian iconography in Danish hymnody, pays detailed attention to the hymnody of Ewald's fellow Pietist H. A. Brorson and thus to Pietist thought,⁷⁸ but Ewald is only mentioned in connection to his son, Johannes.⁷⁹ In Danish historical research, there has been an increasing awareness of the connection between the Enlightenment and Pietism.⁸⁰ This dissertation offers one of

Commission is nothing less than a conflict about how far it is possible for the human being to progress." (*Striden mellem magister Kaasbøll og pastor Ewald foran den kongelige Kommission er intet mindre end en strid om hvorvidt det er muligt for mennesket at gøre fremskridt.*) (59) and "Pertaining to the restitution of all things, that is the belief that sin can be overcome here on earth, he claims that it is possible and that he has maybe said to some fellow clergyman, but in the carrying out of his ministry he keeps this to himself." (*Hvad angår alle tings genopretning, altså troen på synderne kan overvindes her på jorden, tilstår han at det mener han nok er muligt og det har han måske også sagt til en og anden embedsbroder, men i embeds medfør har han bestemt holdt det for sig selv.*) (62) Bredsdorff's culture analysis may be convincing but he does not understand the importance and nature of grace in Ewald's (and perhaps Christian) thought. That human improvement within Christian theology (not merely Lutheran theology) has been grounded in a much larger discussion about grace vs nature (though I will argue that even this distinction is over-simplified) and a discussion about whether human progress and perfection is already oriented toward the supernatural (i.e. union with God). Also, Bredsdorff seems to misunderstand eschatological framework of the doctrine of the restitution of all things (*alle tings genopretning*), preferring to view this restitution as sin's defeat in the present world, not universal salvation.

⁷⁷ Pedersen, "Pietismens Tid 1699—1746"; Pedersen, *Fra brydningen mellem orthodoxi og pietisme : Københavns kirkeliv 1704- 1712*; Larsen, *Fra kirkens historie 1500-1700*; Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6"; Lundbye, *Herrnhutismen i Danmark*; Elle Jensen, *Pietismen i Danmark*; Koch, *Danmarks Kirke gennem Tiderne*.

⁷⁸ Nielsen, *H. A. Brorson : pietisme, meditation, erotik*.

⁷⁹ Nielsen, *Solens Fødsel: Seks Tekster Om Kristendommens Hemmeligheder*.

⁸⁰ Bredsdorff, Hansen, and Mai, *Nordic Light*; Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*; Horstbøll, "Enlightenment and Pietism in Denmark-Norway in the Eighteenth Century. The Discourse of Erik Pontoppidan"; Jakobsen, "Johan Ernst Gunnerus-a Conservative Theologian and an Enlightened Scientist (?)"; Coninck-Smith et al., *Historiens kultur : fortælling, kritik, metode : tilegnet Niels Finn Christiansen*.

the first theological discussions of an important but mostly forgotten preacher and leader of the Pietist movement in Denmark.⁸¹

In addition, while I was writing this dissertation, Sigrd Nielsby Christensen published an article on Ewald's sermons as advocating self-examination as a devotional exercise. Christensen also provides a succinct summary of the historical research record on Ewald, including older sources from the 1800s.⁸² Her account touches on the various ways in which Ewald has been considered a "leading figure either within the Halle Pietism circle or the Moravian circle."⁸³ This is a fascinating investigation into historical interpretation, though as I mentioned above it is not the main concern of this dissertation. Christensen reached a conclusion similar to mine: research explaining Ewald's theological position have focused more on his social circle than his writings.⁸⁴ Christensen draws mainly on Pietistic and Puritan devotional material to place Ewald within a stream of spiritual practices. She mentions briefly how, for Ewald, the spiritual state of the believer gave glimpses of "the coming eschatological salvation"⁸⁵ and that there was a communal perspective to this in Ewald's thought. I find her analysis sound and her presentation of the structure of Ewald's sermons a useful next step in Ewald research.

⁸¹ Contemporary assessments of Ewald described him as one of Denmark's best preachers and catechists "Større Prædikant og Katechet haver Dannemarch neppe havt,". Dahl, Aage, "Bidrag Til Johannes Ewalds Slægtshistorie.," 235. Neiiendam describes his preaching as elegant and powerful (*Hans forkyndelse var båret af veltalenhed og kraft*) and Ewald appears to have drawn a large congregation while preaching at The Royal Orphanage. Ottesen describes the Royal Orphanage as the center for church life during its earlier years. See, Dahl, Aage, 235; Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 2:25; Pedersen, "Pietismens Tid 1699—1746," 96; Ottesen, *Det Kgl. Vajsenhus Gennem to Hundrede Aar*, 32. Ewald's importance for racial Pietism in Denmark is acknowledged by Martin Laursten, who describes him as "the key person in the entire radical Pietism movement" (*hovedpersonen i hele den radikale pietistiske bevægelse*). Lausten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*, 331.

⁸² See, Christensen, "Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram," 8–12.

⁸³ *som en ledende skikkelse enten inden for den hallensiske pietisme eller herrnhutismen*. Christensen, 12.

⁸⁴ Christensen, 12.

⁸⁵ *den ventende eskatologiske frelse*, Christensen, 28.

Particularly in the English-speaking world, there has been a recent growing awareness of Pietism as an ancestor to Evangelicalism.⁸⁶ Anglo-American Pietism scholarship in the last few years has also increased,⁸⁷ to say nothing of the ongoing German scholarship and the four-volume *Geschichte des Pietismus* (1993–2004). Historical research on Pietism is vast, but my focus is on recent scholarship in my effort to position Ewald, a theologian who has figured only in Danish research, in a larger dialogue with Pietism and longer historical and theological lines of inquiry. An exception is Danish historiography, where I have used older sources.

1.4.3 Research of the Lutheran *ordo salutis* and the *unio mystica*

The literature on the theological concept of *ordo salutis* has an extended history.⁸⁸ As mentioned above, Ewald's thought has received no sustained attention, much less any of his

⁸⁶ Ward, *Early Evangelicalism: A Global Intellectual History, 1670–1789*; Davis, *Pietism and the Foundations of the Modern World*; Hindmarsh, *The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England*.

⁸⁷ Collins Winn, *The Pietist Impulse in Christianity*; Lieburg and Lindmark, *Pietism, Revivalism and Modernity, 1650-1850*; Stoeffler, *German Pietism during the Eighteenth Century*; Shantz, *An Introduction to German Pietism: Protestant Renewal at the Dawn of Modern Europe*; Lindberg, *The Pietist Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*; Gawthrop, *Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia*; Peucker, *A Time of Sifting: Mystical Marriage and the Crisis of Moravian Piety in the Eighteenth Century*; Shantz, *Between Sardis and Philadelphia: The Life and World of Pietist Court Preacher Conrad Bröske*; Shantz, *A Companion to German Pietism, 1660-1800*.

⁸⁸See, Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs"; Koch, *Der Ordo Salutis in Der Alt-Lutherischen Dogmatik*; Coors, *Scriptura efficax. Die biblisch-dogmatische Grundlegung des theologischen Systems bei Johann Andreas Quenstedt: Ein dogmatischer Beitrag zu Theorie und Auslegung des biblischen Kanons als Heiliger Schrift.*; Seeberg, "Heilsordnung"; Dyrness and Kärkkäinen, *Global Dictionary of Theology: A Resource for the Worldwide Church*; Fesko, *Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700)*; McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification: Volume II*, 219–40; Lindström, *Wesley and Sanctification*, 113–20; Arndal, "Den store hvide Flok vi see -": H.A. Brorson og tysk pietistisk vækkelsessang, 294–95; Pontoppidan, *Sandhed Til Gudfrygtighed Udi En Eenfoldig Og Efter Muelighed Kort Dog Tilstrekkelig Forklaring over Sal. Doct. Mort. Luthers Liden Catechismo ...*, Q. 476-515; Skarsten, "Erik Pontoppidan and His Asiatic Prince Menoza," 34. Fesko, Lindström and McGrath expand the discussion beyond the Lutheran sphere. In relation to Danish Pietism, the *ordo salutis* is discussed in Arndal. The *ordo salutis* also plays a role in Erik Pontoppidan's famous catechism, *Sandhed til Gudfrygtighed*, and even in his authorized hymnal, the hymns are organized around the *ordo salutis* (See Skarsten).

theological themes, such as the *ordo salutis*. Traditionally, it is Buddeus who is credited with coining the term *ordo salutis* (I argue that Ewald's catechism, even if influenced by Buddeus, offers an earlier published instance of the phrase).⁸⁹ However, R. Seeberg dismisses the entire Pietist and Enlightenment era as irrelevant for the term's history.⁹⁰ Historian and Pietism scholar Christian Collins Winn notes

whereas Protestant Orthodoxy distinguished between the logical and the chronological senses of the order of salvation, Pietism regarded the order of salvation as descriptive of (and normative for) personal religious experience. The movement from awakening to regeneration could be narrated in terms of one's actual life history.⁹¹

Winn's observations suggest why theological research on the *ordo salutis* turns away from Pietism: the way in which the term is used has shifted so much that a purely dogmatic understanding of it does not fit the Pietist model. Yet the push towards a personal religious experience and the self-conscious narration that accompanied this turn not only has a historical record but also a historiographical tradition. Jonathan Strom's recent book on

⁸⁹ See my comments on the connection between Ewald and Buddeus in section 1.5. Note that Ewald is using a Danish translation of the phrase *ordo salutis* (*Saligheds Orden*).

⁹⁰ *Die Dogmatik des Pietismus und der Aufklärungszeit hat auch unser Lehrstück nicht gefordert, denn weder die erbaulichen noch die kritischen Bemerkungen, welche hier an das überkommene Lehrschema geschlossen wurden, bezeichnen einen Fortschritt der Erkenntnis... Wir wenden uns daher sofort der neueren Entwicklung zu. Sie beginnt mit Schleiermacher.* Seeberg, "Heilsordnung," 595.

⁹¹ Collins Winn and Drury, "Karl Barth and the Future of Evangelical Theology," 103. Here I think D. C. Schindler's comments on actuality and potentiality could be of use in the chronological and logical debate'. Schindler notes that "actuality precedes potency logically, ontologically, and in one respect chronologically, while potency precedes actuality in another chronological respect. Actuality, we could say, comes both before and after potency, giving it order, while potency has a certain place *between* priority". Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*, 327–28. In the next page, Schindler comments that "the sequentiality of temporal movements in any change is therefore always relative to, and indeed embraced by, the supratemporal condition of form." Schindler, 329. Combining the Schindler's insights with Ludwig Gerhard's insistence (see chapter six) that for God the salvific act is one, there remains no problem in speaking both of a chronological unfolding of salvation in a human life and a logical or horizontal priority to God's act. This is particularly true given *apokatastasis*, which ensures that finally in the 'temporal' sense, God's salvific action will be complete.

conversion in Pietism challenges the scholarly perception that a particular and singular conversion experience was the norm in early Pietism.⁹²

Strom's historical analysis of the mutating nature and description of conversion fits also with Markus Matthias's exploration of the history of the term *ordo salutis*. Matthias dispenses fully with the historiographical tradition linking Buddeus to the technical term. He acknowledges the theological criticism the term has received and argues that this term finds its historical origins in connection with the theme of applicable grace. Matthias links Buddeus's understanding of the term, not to different applications of grace, but to the economy of salvation, or "the entire summary of the Christian life, which then shows how a sinner, out of his perversion and damnation, may reach the enjoyment of salvation and bliss."⁹³ Other Pietists used the term in a similar fashion.⁹⁴ Matthias argues that this psychological approach, or an historical-empirical understanding of the *ordo*, was common in both Orthodoxy and Pietism.⁹⁵

Praxis in relation to the *ordo salutis* expresses the "reality of faith in time, that is, something like experience of faith or piety."⁹⁶ Matthias's historical investigation complicates research that assigned the shift to the experiential understanding of the *ordo* in Pietism, just as Strom

⁹² Strom does argue that the Pietists reframed the discussion about conversion or regeneration into narrative terms, but he pushes back on an early systematizing of a distinct and singular conversion experience—there is no standard model. Strom also criticizes scholars of conversion who focus on the "external change in affliction and identity" to the extent that they "marginalize what Karl Morrison describes as the 'supernatural' aspect of religious conversion that nearly all medieval and early modern authors who have identified as the essential precondition of authentic conversion..." Strom, *German Pietism and the Problem of Conversion*, 5. This last comment turns again to questions about a theological understanding of conversion/*ordo salutis* even as a personal experience.

⁹³ "ist der ganze Zusammenhang der Christlichen Lehren, die da zeigen, wie ein Sünder aus seinem Verderben und Vedammniß zum Genuß des Heils und der Seligkeit gelangen möge" Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs," 324.

⁹⁴ Matthias, 324.

⁹⁵ Matthias, 333.

⁹⁶ "Schon hier geht es beim *ordo salutis* um die Wirklichkeit des Glaubens in der Zeit, also um so etwas wie Glaubenserfahrung oder Frömmigkeit." Matthias, 341.

revisits the historiography around Pietist conversion experiences. Matthias dismisses the accusation that Pietism alone introduced developmental and psychological aspects into the *ordo* and claims that even if Pietists used the term, it was only in a broad sense; they did not develop it.⁹⁷ Thus again, though in a different manner than Seeberg, he removes the *ordo* from Pietism research. This makes an investigation into Ewald's understanding of the *ordo salutis* and its connected terminology a fascinating excursion. Rather than seeking a defined dogma or a pure experiential use of the term, I examine anew the particular manifestation of a shifting notion of the order of salvation. If Ewald used the phrase in a broad sense, the other theological concepts and terminology he used in close connection with it may help to trace the *ordo's* broad contours.

The *ordo salutis* interweaves closely with other theological concepts, like conversion, but for Ewald, union with Christ, or the *unio mystica*, was key.⁹⁸ Research on the *ordo* outside the Lutheran usage suggests that it is often discussed in close connection with the *unio mystica*.

⁹⁷ Coors, *Scriptura efficax. Die biblisch-dogmatische Grundlegung des theologischen Systems bei Johann Andreas Quenstedt : Ein dogmatischer Beitrag zu Theorie und Auslegung des biblischen Kanons als Heiliger Schrift.*, 247. Coors is summarizing Markus Matthias here.

⁹⁸ Peter Erb notes "within the Lutheran tradition, the term "mystical union" (*unio mystica*) was, for the most part, understood in a radically different way than it was within Catholicism. As I have noted elsewhere, Luther taught of an ever-present mystical union of the believer with Christ; such a union is 'not the end of the search for Christian perfection but rather the beginning'". Arndt and Oberman, *Johann Arndt: True Christianity*, 7. The Lutheran Ewald, likely following Luther and Johann Arndt, continues this centrality of the *unio*, particularly in his language of participation. I will refer frequently to language of participation in this dissertation. The language of *unio mystica* was also present in the important Lutheran theologian, Johann Gerhard. K. James Stein comments that "Gerhard's grasp of such Greek fathers as St. Athanasius, Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, and Pseudo-Macarius, let him develop and support the 'unio mystica', the doctrine of the soul's mystical union with God in Christ— that is, 'Christ in us,' as an inevitable consequence of what has been done by 'Christ for us.'" Stein, *Philipp Jakob Spener : Pietist Patriarch*, 22. I would argue that Johann Gerhard's notion is worked out by Ludwig Gerhard, see chapter six. The use of Pseudo-Macarius is likely important as well, since he remains an influence on Buddeus's notions of grace which also draw on the union with Christ, see Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 147. Recent scholarship treats this aspect of Gerhard's thought as enabling a synergism between God and humanity, Illg, "Philipp Nicolai and Johann Gerhard," 303. This is not too far from the pietistic and Buddean claims about sanctification that my dissertation outlines.

Sometimes the *unio* is subsumed under the *ordo*, sometimes they are placed in opposition to each other, and sometimes they are understood as near synonyms of one another.⁹⁹ This concept, not the *ordo*, has recently become a common theological theme, even in historical theology.¹⁰⁰ Part of the impetus behind my selection of the *ordo*, and by extension implicitly the *unio*, in Ewald's thought comes from the semi-contemporary debate within Lutheran studies of what is often termed the New Finnish Interpretation of Luther.¹⁰¹ Its main argument is that the interpretation of Luther has been

to criticize the neo-Protestant, neo-Kantian distinction between God's "essence" and "effects," which means that we do not have any means of knowing anything about God; we only can know the effects of God in our lives. This so-called "transcendental effect" orientation, originated by the German philosopher Hermann Lotze in the

⁹⁹ McCormack, *Justification in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary Challenges*, 156 sqq.

¹⁰⁰ In the last thirty years see, Lehmkuhler, *Inhabitatio: Die Einwohnung Gottes Im Menschen*; Campbell, *Paul and Union with Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study*; Tamburello, *Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard*; Huijgen, *The Spirituality of the Heidelberg Catechism*; Macaskill, *Union with Christ in the New Testament*. Even more lay-orientated theology suggests this focus, Wilbourne, *Union with Christ: The Way to Know and Enjoy God*; Billings, *Union with Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church*. Reformed theology in particular seems to have enjoyed a particular revival of the term. It is beyond the purview of this dissertation, but the puritan and reformed influence on Lutheran Pietism has long been observed. There was a large amount of translation of Puritan devotional literature into German and Danish. See, Damrau, *The Reception of English Puritan Literature in Germany*; Huisman, Frans W., "Danske Oversættelse Af Puritansk-Pietistiske Værker i Det 17. Og 18. Århundrede." Erik Pontoppidan's biographer goes so far as to claim that pietism does not originate in Germany but comes from the Puritans and the Reformed churches in England and Scotland. Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 1:21. There was a significant English influence on preaching in Copenhagen churches in the early 1700s. Lindhardt, *Peder Hersleb : Studier over Dansk-Norsk Kirke- Og Kulturhistorie i Første Halvdel Af Det 18. Århundrede*, 33. Figures like William Perkins (for whom the *ordo salutis* and the union with Christ as synonymous-see Fesko, *Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700)*, 20:262.) are found in the libraries of Ewald and Pontoppidan. The theological context of these books aside, it is best not to see Lutheran priests existing in a pure Lutheran bubble of literature and theological discussion.

¹⁰¹ See, Braaten and Jenson, *Union with Christ : The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther*; Vainio, "Justification and Participation in Christ : The Development of the Lutheran Doctrine of Justification from Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580)"; Bielfeldt, "The Ontology of Deification"; Kärkkäinen, *One with God : Salvation as Deification and Justification*. For a short summary , see Saarinen, "Justification by Faith."

nineteenth century, has blurred the meaning of the real presence of Christ in Luther research.¹⁰²

Inherent in the Finnish interpretation of Luther are philosophical debates about the nature of ontology.¹⁰³ Questions about the presence of Christ have led inevitably to metaphysical reflections, even if a lack of clarity continues.¹⁰⁴ My work is not to wade into an interpretation of Luther but to draw three observations from this theme of union with Christ, which was central for Ewald. First, the Finnish school and the debate around it suggest it remains an important issue when thinking about the *ordo salutis*. Second, in the Finnish reading, if Kant, Lotze, and a relational ontology are at play, what is the historical development of that ontology? Pietism sits between Luther and Lotze, and what is more important, these same issues about the presence of God in the believer were under debate in the Early Modern period. Walch described this Early Modern Lutheran debate,¹⁰⁵ and Buddeus, as well, touched

¹⁰² Kärkkäinen, *One with God : Salvation as Deification and Justification*, 39.

¹⁰³ John D. Koch Jr. spells this out about Lotze: "...he rejected a traditional "substance ontology" in favor of a "relational ontology". Koch, "Saving Faith Alone," 94.

¹⁰⁴ Koch Jr. Finds the ontological issues here confused and unclarified. "Koch, 94.

¹⁰⁵ Walch describes the conflict over the spiritual union of the believer with God as a recent debate. He frames this debate over the union as about the increasing nearness of the divine being/essence or a particular influence of the divine operations of grace. (see Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:133–45.) Already the concepts of power, presence, essence, and the nature of grace are obvious. The linguistic and hermeneutical issues also come to the fore as the interpretation of Scripture passages referring to the indwelling of God are under discussion. Walch acknowledges that the debate has also occurred earlier within Lutheran theology, but he wants to follow the debate's contours in the recent period. Walch discusses how in 1704, Johann Jacob Müller pushed for a particular divine influence. Müller read Luther, Gerhard, and others as advocates of his position. Walch divides the debate into three parties: first those who advocate an increasing nearness of the divine being and assert that "the union of the believer with God happens by a greater nearness of the divine substance" (*die Vereinigung der Glaubigen mit Gott geschehe per maiorem substantiæ diuinæ adproximationem*) (133), they also deny the claim for only a particular influence of grace (*nur einen besondern Gnaden-Einfluss*). The second group think the reverse and the third group dislike the whole debate and suspect it is a linguistic issue (how the matter is being explained). Walch covers a bit of the debate in the chapter including this historical Lutheran debate. He seems to divide the operations of God (workings of divine grace) from the essence/being of God, and he also ties the debate into the nature of the presence of God and into the Christology (the hypostatic union comes into the picture). The book is a historical description of the debate, but Walch see

on the issue in his moral theology.¹⁰⁶ Finally, concerns about metaphysical structures are inherent in language and theological debate.¹⁰⁷ Ignoring them is not to remain neutral but to seek confusion or to have already (perhaps unconsciously) chosen a side. The contours of the Finnish interpretation of Luther (and Walch's recounting of the early 1700s debate)¹⁰⁸ reveal how quickly the discussion of the *unio*, even in historical theology, dives straight into a philosophical discussion simply for reasons of clarity. The Pietist understandings of the *ordo salutis* and the *unio mystica* need more than descriptive historical research. They require paying attention to the philosophical questions behind the debate and the Early Modern philosophical resources that drove the tensions. Ewald's trial revealed this intertwining of philosophical and theological frameworks. Particularly in the second half of this dissertation, I open a way forward for research into the conceptual world of Pietism by reframing questions about the *ordo salutis* in light of Early Modern assumptions about the nature of (cooperative) grace, the nature of the human, and the God-world relation. While I cannot engage with the

contradictions on both sides with a literal reading of Scripture. He ends the section commenting that it is better not to examine too closely the manner of the *unio mystica* because it only ends with conflict.

¹⁰⁶ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:90, 252–57.

¹⁰⁷ Vainio tries to address certain of the criticisms against the Finnish school, defending their systematic analysis/close reading of texts compared to any motif-research and arguing for their reading of Luther as in line with certain patristic and medieval strands of thoughts. He pointedly states that “the proper starting point of metaphysical thinking is salvation history, not abstract metaphysical approaches” which is why the Finnish school avoids clarifying the nature of a union too closely. (Vainio, “Luther and Theosis: A Response to the Critics of Finnish Luther Research,” 2015, 465.) He acknowledges that the Orthodox and Roman Catholic models of justification and union were cautious because they feared “deification in the absolute sense”, but seems content with Luther jettisoning apparently “unnecessary concepts and entities” as a nominalist (Vainio, 474.). Vainio is interested in the metaphysical questions about Christ, but he already assumes a pure difference between God and the world—the realm of pure nature or pure human action “If the presence of Christ is just a logical consequence of faith, then faith has to be a *human achievement*.” (Vainio, 468.) Yet the Finnish school's structural analysis methodology and commitment to the historical roots of Luther's ideas are fascinating. They preserve and prepare the path forward to other questions about the *unio mystica* in Lutheran thought, pointing to the unavoidable nature of philosophical reflection.

¹⁰⁸ See above footnote on prior page, Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:133–45.

Finnish Interpretation of Luther here, I found their research and the questions it raises to be a stimulating aid for this dissertation.

1.4.4 Previous research on Buddeus, Walch, and Universalism

Ewald's teacher, Johann Franz Buddeus,¹⁰⁹ has received attention in two different areas: the history of philosophy and the history of theology/church history. In the history of philosophy, he is often described as an opponent to famous philosophers (Spinoza, Leibniz, and Christian Wolff).¹¹⁰ In research on his role as a theologian, there is disagreement about which label should be attached to him: Lutheran Orthodox, Pietist, or pre-Enlightenment transitional figure.¹¹¹ His life and thought is treated thoroughly in two monographs, the relatively recent *Bund und Versöhnung* by Fredericke Nüssel and the older *Die Theologie des Jo. Franc. Buddeus und des Chr. Matth. Pfaff* by A. F. Stolzenberg. Nüssel's excellent work explores Buddeus's dogmatic theology, but she reads Buddeus as an anti-Pietist,¹¹² ignoring Buddeus's close

¹⁰⁹ This dissertation uses the Latin form Buddeus. There is a lack of agreement in the scholarship, with some preferring the German form, Budde, which creates some confusion when searching for literature on Buddeus. I am using the Latin form because the theological discussions of the Buddeus generally prefer this spelling. I suspect this simply linguistic choice also reveals how Buddeus is either considered a figure in early modern philosophy, or a Lutheran late-Orthodoxy/Pietist theologian.

¹¹⁰ See, Hochstrasser, *Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment.*; Israel, *Radical Enlightenment : Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750*; Klemme and Kuehn, *The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers*; Santinello and Piaia, *Models of the History of Philosophy Volume II: From Cartesian Age to Brucker*; Watkins, "From Pre-Established Harmony to Physical Influx: Leibniz's Reception in Eighteenth Century Germany"; Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*; Sparr, "Auf Dem Wege Zur Theologischen Aufklärung in Halle: Von Johann Franz Budde Zu Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten"; Brooke, "How the Stoics Became Atheists"; Whitmer, *The Halle Orphanage as Scientific Community: Observation, Eclecticism, and Pietism in the Early Enlightenment*; Fabbianelli, "Leibniz, Budde et Wolff."

¹¹¹ Karl Barth discussed Buddeus, which has drawn some modern attention to the early modern theologian. See, Williams, *The Election of Grace: A Riddle without a Resolution?*; Busch, *Karl Barth & the Pietists : The Young Karl Barth's Critique of Pietism and Its Response*; Williams, *Reason Judges Revelation: A Case Study in Buddeus, Tindal and Locke*; Brouwer, *Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy*; Williams, "Barth, Buddeus and the Eighteenth Century."

¹¹² Nüssel seems to acknowledge the apparent similarities between Buddeus and Pietism but is ready to deny them, see Nüssel, *Bund Und Versöhnung : Zur Begründung Der Dogmatik Bei Johann Franz Buddeus*, 70, 165.

historical connection to Halle Pietism and Zinzendorf, among others (like Ewald and Pontoppidan), and the treatment Buddeus receives in other historical accounts.¹¹³ Nüssel does not treat Buddeus's moral philosophy as closely as his dogmatics. At times, it seems scholars disagree about the theological versus philosophical aspects of Buddeus's work.¹¹⁴

I draw extensively on a unique version of Buddeus's *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis. Johannis Francisci Buddei Collegium theologico-morale, eller gudelig Lærdom om gode Gierninger og Sæder* is a Danish translation of the Latin text supplemented by an unknown student's lecture notes.¹¹⁵ To the best of my knowledge, this work has not been previously examined in any scholarship. Copies of the work, which was printed only once, are found in a

She is concerned with portraying Buddeus as representative for transition-theology (*Übergangstheologie*) Nüssel, 341. This seems to place too harsh a barrier between Buddeus and Pietism, which was diverse in its expressions. Compare to Stoeffler who closely connects Pietism and Buddeus, particularly in regards to Buddeus' moral theology, Stoeffler, *German Pietism during the Eighteenth Century*, 53–54.

¹¹³ If Buddeus cannot be classified as a Pietist, he is almost always pictured as a friend to Pietism. Beyreuther and Meyer, *Zweiter Sammelband Über Zinzendorf*, 13:30–36; Schmidt-Biggemann, "Praktische Philosophie Als Provokation: Christian Wolffs Philosophie in Der Ideenpolitik Der Frühaufklärung"; Becker, "Pietism's Confrontation with Enlightenment Rationalism: An Examination of the Relation between Ascetic Protestantism and Science," 152; Grossmann, *Johann Christian Edelmann : From Orthodoxy to Enlightenment*, 11–12; Wundt, "Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," 64.

¹¹⁴ He is also on the theological side attacked for his use of reason and development of natural theology (see Williams, "Barth, Buddeus and the Eighteenth Century."), but then in a philosophical analysis attacked for his Christian 'dogmatic-religious' premises (see, Caro, "The Best of All Possible Worlds? Leibniz's Optimism and Its Critics 1710 - 1755," 63.). Likewise Max Wundt describes Buddeus's philosophy as *Realphilosophie* and phenomenistic; Wundt argues Buddeus only uses scholastic metaphysics because it is necessary for theological discussion, but this use is mere word classification. (Wundt, "Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," 69.).

¹¹⁵Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740. Höjer, the translator, notes in his preface that he received a Latin manuscript--presumably from a former student of Buddeus--and that the manuscript had been supplemented with notes from Buddeus's oral lectures. As a translation and adaption, this text is complicated in terms of authorship. However, in terms of a conveyor of a Buddean moral theology and reflecting some of the informality of a class lecture, it is fascinating.

variety of libraries in Scandinavia.¹¹⁶ Buddeus's moral theology remained popular in Copenhagen until at least 1757, when the Pietist Bishop Pontoppidan noted that nearly all the theology students owned a copy. Presumably this was the Latin edition, but this is unclear.¹¹⁷

Buddeus's son-in-law and colleague Walch was another cross-disciplinary figure (history, philosophy, and theology). He participated in the Pietist-Christian Wolff controversy over the nature of freedom (alongside Joachim Lange and Buddeus), which has made him a subject of research among historians of philosophy.¹¹⁸ No biographical monograph on him exists, but his *Philosophisches Lexicon*, which Ewald owned, provides a good summary of contemporary Early Modern thought from a perspective sympathetic to Pietism. While not as well-known as Zedler's *Universal-Lexicon* (1731–1754), Walch's *Lexicon* has reached more readers than previously thought. It is now known that Zedler plagiarized substantial portions of Walch's *Lexicon*, particularly his philosophical articles.¹¹⁹ The *Lexicon* provides a philosophical perspective on the topics Buddeus treated more from a theological angle. Related to Walch and Buddeus is also the Early Modern discussion of human freedom and causality, subject matters which have vital theological implications pertaining to grace and God's relation to the world.¹²⁰ I would argue that the failure to understand the theological implications of this

¹¹⁶ Copies exist still in The National Library of Norway, University of Bergen Library, Norwegian University of Science and Technology Library, the Linköping State Library (Sweden), Ersta Sköndal Bräcke högskolebibliotek (Sweden), Luther Seminary Library (USA).

¹¹⁷ Pontoppidan, *Collegium Pastorale Practikum : Pontoppidans Pastoralteologi*, 478.

¹¹⁸ Corr, "The Existence of God, Natural Theology and Christian Wolff"; Bianco, "Freiheit Gegen Fatalismus. Zu Joachim Langes Kritik an Wolff." See also the above literature related to Buddeus and philosophy, and Von Wille, "Bruno, Campanella Und Die Renaissance in Johann Georg Walchs Philosophischem Lexicon."

¹¹⁹ Gasparri, *Étienne Chauvin (1640-1725) and His Lexicon Philosophicum*, 234; Falduto, *The Faculties of the Human Mind and the Case of Moral Feeling in Kant's Philosophy*, 8.

¹²⁰ See, Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough"; Matava, *Divine Causality and Human Free Choice: Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy de Auxiliis Revisited*; O'Neill, "Influxus Physicus"; Nadler, *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony*; Clatterbaugh, *The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739*; Ott and Ott, *Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy*; Schonfeld, *The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project*.

debate obscures its importance for historians of philosophy, *and* the failure of church historians to consider the contemporary philosophical discussions about causality leads to an incomplete picture over why experience and the *ordo salutis* were so important to Pietists. This dissertation attempts to bring the philosophical debates further into the discussion of Ewald's theology by investigating, for example, how to understand the concept of freedom in Ewald's sermons given the shifting Early Modern philosophical definitions. The lexicon helps show some of the contemporary philosophical frameworks available to Pietist theologians.

The final chapter of this dissertation introduces the figure of Ludwig Gerhard, a defender of *apokatastasis*. For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms *universalism* and *apokatastasis* are used mostly interchangeably. I introduce Gerhard and his historical context more thoroughly in the final chapter. During the first half of the 18th century in Germany, debates raged over universalism, particularly in connection to chiliasm.¹²¹ Recently there has been an increased interest in the history of universalism,¹²² but Gerhard's defense has received minimal attention.¹²³ During his lifetime, his treatise did not lack for eager opponents, and he

¹²¹ For a good contemporary overview of the early Pietist strain of universalism and the debate, see, Zedler, "Wiederbringung aller Dinge." The older English history, *The Modern History of Universalism*, gives an brief overview of the doctrine's history in the first half of 18th century Germany, Whittemore, *The Modern History of Universalism: From the Era of the Reformation to the Present Time*, 249–71.

¹²² McClymond, *The Devil's Redemption*; Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?*, Volume 2: *Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*; Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena*; Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?*, Volume 2: *Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*; MacDonald and Parry, "All Shall Be Well": *Explorations in Universal Salvation and Christian Theology, from Origen to Moltmann*. Additionally, a German treatment of the history of the *Apokatastasis* doctrine was released three weeks ago. I have been unable to procure a copy as of yet, but the Table of Contents indicates a treatment of *apokatastasis* within Pietist thought. The brief online glimpse also indicates that Weigelt divides Pietism into churchly, Württemberg, and radical groupings. See, Weigelt, *Universale Heilshoffnungen Im Christentum: Apokatastasiseiden in Theologie Und Kirche, Literatur Und Musik*, 75, sqq.

¹²³ Gerhard is named by McClymond but not investigated. The older histories treat Gerhard in a little more detail-but still not much, see for example, *The Modern History of Universalism* or Schröckh, *Christliche Kirchengeschichte Seit Der Reformation*, 8:253–54. Otherwise only Peschke, "Der Pietismus in Dargun." discusses Gerhard at length in modern research.

was seen as the new standard bearer of “Petersen” universalism.¹²⁴ Also informing this chapter and the final conclusions of the dissertation are the recent universalist arguments of David Bentley Hart, particularly his fourth meditation in *That All Shall be Saved*.¹²⁵

1.5 Historical connections between Johann Franz Buddeus and Danish Pietism—in particular, Enevold Ewald

Ewald’s writings, mainly sermons, catechisms, and devotional literature, are aimed at a lay audience. He did not publish any academic theology and even his other works, a biblical concordance and two biblical chronologies, were intended as aids for studying the Bible.¹²⁶ Ewald’s writings (and likely his preaching as well) aimed at the edification, encouragement, and moral and spiritual formation of the Danish population. Undoubtedly there were students and other educated people in his congregation and audience, but he did not write

¹²⁴ See, Heinsius, *Unpartheyische Kirchen-Historie Alten Und Neuen Testaments, Von Erschaffung Der Welt Bis Auf Das Jahr Nach Christi Geburt 1730*, 2:825–27.

¹²⁵ Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*, 159–95.

¹²⁶ Ewald writes in the preface that there are a lack of church histories of the Old Testament available in Danish. He also mentions that he will use a different methodology than the history by Jonas Ramus, namely chronology. Most of his chronology he draws from Archbishop James Ussher’s famous chronology. (Ewald, *Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ Veteris Testamenti Index Chronologicus*, Preface, u.p.) Ussher’s chronology attempts to combine not only biblical history but also the chronology of the entire world’s history. It also established with apparent certainty the date of Creation. Though vulnerable to ridicule in modern understanding, Stephen Gould wrote that “Ussher represented the best of scholarship in his time. He was part of a substantial research tradition, a large community of intellectuals working toward a common goal under an accepted methodology.” (Gould, “Fall in the House of Ussher,” 16.) Ewald himself, while not an originator of such a form of historical scholarship, is aware of this research tradition and brings it further into the Danish-speaking and reading world. At the same time, he also furthers certain patterns of thinking about the linear and mathematical nature of time to his audience. In Ewald’s eyes, his audience consists of “The reader who loves God’s word and the truth” (*Den Guds Ord og Sandhed elskende*), and the devotional use of his chronology is also clear in his words, “and it should be especially dear to me, if this could serve the one who would read this little text, as an encouragement and an inducement to read and reflect not alone on the historical truths of The Holy Scriptures, but also its divine teaching and holy examples.” (Og det skulde i besynderlighed være mig kiert, om dette kunde tiene dem, som ville læse dette lille Skrift, til en Opmuntring og Anledning til at læse og eftertænke den Hellige Skriftes ey ellene historiske Sandheder...men tillige dens Guddommelige Lærdom, og hellige Exempler.) Ewald, *Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ Veteris Testamenti Index Chronologicus*, Preface, u.p.

solely for them. Ewald can best be described as a mediator of Pietism to his audience. However, the nature of Ewald's audience and the genres he wrote in make it difficult to discern the larger academic world of ideas that Ewald drew on. He rarely quoted or named other authors in his writings, and there is not a great deal of personal correspondence to draw upon. What is left behind is the auction catalog of his library¹²⁷ and his brief account of his spiritual conversion. In the preface to *Den Eeneste*, he wrote that the providence of God led him to Jena as a student and there he was taught and reminded

about true Christianity's right type and quality, and was awakened to begin on this way and path of true Christianity, partly by my highly beloved true teacher Dr. Buddeus's foundational teaching, instructing, and admonishing, which I had the opportunity to partake in, both privately and publicly, and partly by the society of such persons, who earnestly had begun to tread on the same path. With this last group, I found the opportunity daily to start a type of practice in the contemplation of the Holy Scripture.¹²⁸

Ewald's words establish a direct link to Buddeus and suggest an initial and valuable source for his theological vision. Michael Neiiendam underlines the theological and formational debt Ewald owed to Buddeus and suggests that scholars have misunderstood and undervalued the connection between Ewald and his teacher.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*. This catalog runs to 46 pages of listed books. This is a large library, but nowhere near as extensive as Erik Pontoppidan's. Pontoppidan actually has two auction catalogs, one during his lifetime from 1747 and one after his death at 1765. Both are about 170 pages of listed books. See, *Catalogus over En Deel Gode Bøger Og Mss.; Catalogus Librorum*.

¹²⁸ *om den sande Christendoms rette Art og Beskaffenhed, og at opvækkes til at indtræde paa denne den sande Christendoms Vey og Vane, deels ved min høyt-elkede troe Læreres D. Buddei grundige Lærdom, Underviisning og Formaninger, som jeg havde Leylighed, saa vel offentlig, som privatim at blive deelagtige udi, deels ved Omgængelse med saadanne Personer, som alvorigen havde begyndt at indtræde paa samme Vey. Med disse sidste fandt jeg i sær Leylighed dagligen at anstille et Slags Øvelse i den Hellige Skriftes Betragtning...* Ewald, *Den Eeneste, Sande Og Salige Wiisdoms Kilde, Som Er Guds Ord, Eller, Den Hellige Skrift*, 5–5b. The timeframe for Ewald's presence in Jena is a bit uncertain. He is born in 1697 and is back in Denmark preaching at his father's church around 1718, Graversen, *Wajsenhuspræsten Enevold Ewald Og Den Pietistiske Bevægelse i København i Det 18. Aarhundrede*, 10.

¹²⁹ Opholdet i Jena fik afgørende betydning for Ewald, selv om han, så vidt vi ved, ikke oplevede en omvendelse efter pietistisk opskrift. Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 2:24. Neiiendam also pushes back

There are other less well-established links between Ewald and Buddeus. Ewald's early catechisms, published in 1720 and 1721,¹³⁰ use the term *ordo salutis* (or rather the Danish equivalent, *Saligheds Orden*). In fact, it receives its own section in both catechisms. Buddeus has traditionally been associated with the term *ordo salutis*, and, if not its originator, discussed the concept at length in his *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmatica* (1723).¹³¹ In Ewald's 1720 catechism, the technical term *Saligheds Orden* titled a section that separated two main parts of the catechism, one on the Ten Commandments and the other on the Creed.¹³² It seems most likely Ewald picked up the term from his teacher Buddeus, given his later comments describing his awakening in connection to Buddeus.

against earlier Danish church historiography, arguing that A. Jantzen ignores and openly doubts the importance of Buddeus for Ewald, even against Ewald's own words. There are research prejudices at play here in Jantzen's interpretation. Buddeus in this earlier historical research is praised as a famous teacher, but Jantzen claims that any influence in the direction of Pietism could hardly have happened in Jena. (Jantzen, "A. D. Jørgensen: Johannes Evald. Kjøbenhavn (Gyldendalske Boghandel) 1888. (263 SS.)," 141–44.) Neiiendam questions this, recognizing that Buddeus does teach 're-birth' (*genfødelse*). Jantzen's review is also critical in discussing Enevold Ewald's marriage. Touching on the issues surrounding a controversial figure like Ewald, Neiiendam mentions the vulgar nature of the contemporary criticism around Ewald. (Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 2:240.). To a certain extent the earlier historical research around Enevold Ewald continues in this contentious manner.

¹³⁰ The two catechisms are somewhat intertwined. Ewald attempted to publish a catechism that reads like a scriptural proof texting-minimal outline and headings all explained by scriptural citations. The second catechism a year later uses the outline but fills it with his own explanations. The earlier text remains essential for this second one, however, as each section cites the page(s) of the first catechism, *Rette Grundvold*, as support.

¹³¹ See, McCormack, *Justification in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary Challenges*, 148. As discussed above in section 1.4.3, Matthias disagrees that Buddeus and Carpov are the origin of the concept of *ordo salutis* as it applies to the different acts of *gratia applicatrix*. Still, insofar as Ewald's texts involves both reference to different types of grace and the experiential human aspects as this dissertation will discuss, he certainly follows his teacher in Buddeus's broader usage. See Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs," 330.

¹³² Ewald, *Den Sande Christendoms Rette Grundvold i Guds Og JEsu Christi Levende Og Saliggjørende Kundskab*, 119–33.

Another possible link between Ewald and Buddeus lies in the publication of Buddeus's *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis* in Danish. Ewald owned a number of Buddeus's works, including three copies of his *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis*.¹³³ The Danish translation of this book is fascinating. It is not a direct translation of the Latin and German editions but had been extensively supplemented by Buddeus's possibly private oral teaching and lectures, according to the translator.¹³⁴ Ewald's catalog lists a Latin edition, a Danish edition (two volumes), and a bound manuscript of the Danish edition.¹³⁵ Although Det Kongelige Vajsenhus in Copenhagen where Ewald was the priest had its own printing press, the Danish edition of *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis* was not printed there.¹³⁶ However, that Ewald owned a bound manuscript copy of the Danish translation suggests a close connection to the book. If

¹³³ See the sale catalog of Ewald's library. *Fortegnelse paa en Deel gode og vel conditionerede Bøger*, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen 1755. n.p.

¹³⁴ See "Erindring om Anledning til den Danske Oversættelse" in Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:Preface, n.p.. Here the translator writes of the translation issues he faced, the need to retain certain non-Danish words and expressions. He also writes that "Author Blessed Doctor Buddeus' printed Latin and German moral *Institutions* are not near the fullness and richness as this translated work, which draws from his own oral teaching and further explication of the same *Institutions* in his lectures" (*At Autors Sal. Doct. Buddei trykte Latinske og Tydske moralske Institutioner ikke ere nær af den Fulde eller Rigdom, som dette nu oversatte Collegium, der hidrinder af hans egen mundtlig Læsning og videre Ydførelse af samme Institutioner paa hans Lectier.*) The translator is clearly working from a Latin, not German, source as sometimes the original Latin sentence is given after the Danish translation. The Danish translation does not have footnotes like the German or Latin versions, which means, for example, that the technical discussion of grace as used by Augustine and Macarius is condensed or altered in the Danish translation. In the German and Latin versions, Buddues refers to a modern debate with Le Clerc over this usage (1.1.1.39), while the Danish merely mentions that Augustine and other church fathers used grace in such a way (Buddeus, 1:26.). On the other hand, the Danish translation includes a recommendation of German Lutheran devotional texts, Müller's *Himmlische Liebes-Kus* [sic], as the source for Buddeus's discussion about grace. Buddeus, 1:38.

¹³⁵ Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*, 18, 20, 21. I assume that a bound manuscript was handwritten, not printed.

¹³⁶ Ewald also has connections to other printers. For example, he wrote a preface to the Danish translation of Henrich Müller's *Himmlischer Liebes-Kuß*, praising the devotional work. The Danish translation was printed by Christian Gottlob Mengel & Comp., not Det Kongelige Vajsenhus. See Müller, *Himmelske Kierligheds-Kys*.

the manuscript was the original that Hans Höjer translated from,¹³⁷ either Ewald knew the translator and received the manuscript from him or he was Höjer's original source for the manuscript—and the notes from the lectures were Ewald's notes. This may be too speculative because Buddeus had many students,¹³⁸ but it remains an intriguing historical possibility.

Buddeus's theological and personal reputation was also acknowledged by the more famous Danish Pietist, Pontoppidan. Pontoppidan, a contemporary of Ewald,¹³⁹ wrote to Buddeus, seeking advice on theological matters.¹⁴⁰ Neiiendam notes the practical thrust of Buddeus's theological stance: that religion was not a knowing or confessing but a "tasting of divine things."¹⁴¹ Pontoppidan also fictionalized the theologian in his novel *Menoza*, a fictional travelogue of an Indian prince who converted to Christianity and traveled around Europe seeking other true Christians. The main character, Menoza, met a mixture of fictional and real figures. In Jena, Menoza spoke with Buddeus about the appalling behavior of his students,¹⁴² but Buddeus replied that there were some students who were "renewed truly in the spirit of their mind to know what is the good, pleasing and perfect will of God" and that they met in groups for encouragement.¹⁴³ Menoza called Buddeus a man worthy of love (*elskværdig*

¹³⁷ Höjer makes clear that he received the manuscript from someone else and then translated it. The supplementary material is not his own notes. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:Preface, u.p.

¹³⁸ Dahl, Aage, "Bidrag Til Johannes Ewalds Slægtshistorie.," 235. 7

¹³⁹ Pontoppidan is the author of the well-known and long enduring Lutheran catechism "Truth unto Godliness" (*Sandhed til Gudfrygtighed*) that has an extended life particularly in Norway (Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 2:81.) and is also translated into English for the Nordic Lutheran diaspora in the United States. See my article, Lied, "Danish Catechism in Action? Examining Religious Formation in and through Erik Pontoppidan's *Menoza*." Pontoppidan likely knew Ewald well and he sought Ewald's advice when writing his catechism. Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 2:82.

¹⁴⁰ Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 1:242–43.

¹⁴¹ "gestus rerum divinarum" Neiiendam, 1:242.

¹⁴² Pontoppidan, *Menoza*, 1860, 85–87.

¹⁴³ Pontoppidan also writes of the evening prayer time for students after Buddeus' lectures and it seems likely that Pontoppidan places Count Zinzendorf at this fictional prayer meeting ("Især faae jeg her Grev Z***, men tænkte ej, at han faa Aar derefter skulde give al Verden saa meget at tale om sin Person og Idrætter", Pontoppidan, 87.) and remarks that this count was well regarded by Buddeus. Pontoppidan through Menoza

Mand), and the two men spoke about the behavior of people who were ashamed to be seen as too devout or pious.¹⁴⁴ If one accepts the travelogue as a fictional version of Pontoppidan's thought, the picture he gave of Buddeus was positive. He also echoed Ewald's description of his experience while a student in Jena, that is, receiving public and private instruction from Buddeus and gathering with like-minded students. In any case, Pontoppidan further disseminated Buddeus's good reputation.

In the wider Nordic world there are additional hints about the importance of Buddeus. Gina Dahl, in her investigations of 18th-century Norwegian libraries, mentions that Buddeus "in particular seems to have been one of the most important theologians in 18th century Norway, at least in terms of book distribution."¹⁴⁵ What is important is that Buddeus as a theologian was sympathetic to Pietism and important for Danish-Norwegian theology. As such, he provides a wider Early Modern context not just for Ewald, but the larger grouping of Danish and Norwegian priests, theology students, and educated readers. Whether directly through Ewald's adaption of Buddeus's *ordo* or in the dissemination of Buddeus's *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis* and other texts, Buddeus can be seen as a bridge between the wider Early Modern thought-world and 18th-century Denmark and Norway.

speculates that the Count is despised not merely for his acts but that he has acted in a manner unbecoming to the status of a nobleman (too lowly). The 1931 Norwegian abridgement of this novel does explicitly name this figure as Zinzendorf. Pontoppidan, *Menoza*, 1931, 135.

¹⁴⁴ Pontoppidan, *Menoza*, 1860, 88–90.

¹⁴⁵ Dahl, *Books in Early Modern Norway*, 82.

Chapter 2: Ewald's 1734 trial before the Royal Commission

In the following analysis and mentioned above, I will treat Ewald's trial primarily as an intellectual and theological discourse, rather than a political or cultural struggle between two different groups within the Danish state church. I do not deny that a political reading of the debate has a place within Danish historiography; there were most certainly political pressures and personal (economic and social) consequences for the people brought before the royal commission.¹⁴⁶ My concern is not with labels of heresy, but I examine the theological and philosophical issues that were most pressing for the participants, Ewald, Eiler Christopher Kaasbøll, and Christian Christopher Reenberg. As such, I treat Ewald and his accusers as honestly engaged in Christian thought (a particular intellectual history), rather than principally undertaking a political tussle. As for my methods, I will not read against the grain of the text but look for explanations given by Ewald that aid a discussion of his published theological writings. The trial transcript reflects a measure of rhetorical horror at both the accusations and the accused's answers, but I read all the responses as sincere and not as conscious fabrications. In my presentation and analysis of the trial, I tease forth three major themes from it that serve as further areas of exploration in this dissertation: eschatological debates, disagreements over the *ordo salutis*, and the role of human activity and experience in theological discussion.

2.1 The trial, manuscript copy, and historiographical treatment

I will attempt to describe the trial as a whole and portions of it in detail because the trial format does not lend itself well to summarization; it would simplify the theological disputes and philosophical assumptions (shared or not) too much. The number of accusations leveled

¹⁴⁶ The king himself ended the trial against Ewald, bringing a judgment and penalty (30 rigsdaler) against Ewald but allowing him to maintain his post. Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 64–65. He did have to pay about 40% of his salary for a chaplain to give absolution in his place. In contrast, the priest Ole Hersleb, who asked for the same exemption from absolution that Ewald was later given, had to resign his office. He ended his days in quiet poverty with some support from his brother Bishop Peder Hersleb. See, Rørdam, "Waisenhusets Ældste Historie," 65; Rørdam, "Vartovspræsten Ole Hersleb," 200.

against Ewald were significant: a combined 70 theses in addition to Kaasbøll's opening discussion of four controversial issues. Three of these issues were explicitly eschatological: the conversion of the Jews, the chiliastic kingdom, and *apokatastasis*, while the final one centered around annotations and allegedly inappropriate scriptural parallels in the new Vajsenhus Bible translation. I do not have the time to explore translation issues here, but I do treat the three eschatological doctrines. In addition to these eschatological accusations, Ewald was accused of refusing to give absolution to his congregants and thus denying them permission to partake in the Eucharist.¹⁴⁷ I will describe more fully the Kaasbøll-Ewald exchange because it was the first exchange (sometimes Ewald referred to his answers from this exchange when he replied to Reenberg) and was less antagonistic than the Reenberg-Ewald exchange (Ewald and Kaasbøll interacted with the content of the other's remarks), allowing for a more nuanced picture. For the Reenberg-Ewald exchange, I summarize some of the main themes, discussing in particular three theses that represent those themes. As a helpful reference, I have transcribed the 70 theses from the trial manuscript (see Appendix A). The three theses exchanges that I discuss from the Reenberg-Ewald exchange are also transcribed and translated in Appendix B.

The accusations and written defenses that comprise the case (*Sag*) against Ewald were written between 1 February 1734 and 4 March 1734.¹⁴⁸ The case was not a physical trial but

¹⁴⁷ The accusation about absolution and *Altergang* are combined with an apparent contempt of baptism (it did not secure one's salvation apparently). Ewald was placed in the odd position of both taking the sacraments (*Naade Middeler*) too seriously in his first refusal of a general absolution and not seriously at all in his understanding of baptism's 'security' or lack thereof. See, "Reenberg's Accusations against Ewald," 1. One begins to hear hints of Heinrich Müller's old frustration over the four dumb idols in this confrontation. See Müller, *Apostolische Schlußkett Und Krafft-Kern*, 271.

¹⁴⁸ These accusations and responses are mainly preserved in copies in Kall 93 folio and Kall 102 folio, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen. Kall 102 folio does not have Ewald's responses, only Reenberg's accusations. I also found Kall 93 folio more legible, although Thomas Bredsdorff refers to both in his research. There is a separate copy of the accusations against Ewald labeled "Sagen Mod Enevold Ewald 1734 (Kopier)." in Ledreborg 417, 4° folio, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen. This document does not include Ewald's responses, although it does contain the king's judgement on the case, which concluded the matter. Copies of the some of the documents are found in the Gunnerus Library in Trondheim (see, Reenberg, "Hr. Christian Reenbergs Replique Paa Hr. Ewalds Indlæg i Den Kongl. Commission"; "[Innlegg] Hr. Magister Kaasbølls Indlæg

a written exchange between Ewald and his accusers, which the commission members read. There were two accusers in the case, Kaasbøll and Reenberg.¹⁴⁹ Kaasbøll had two exchanges with Ewald (an initial accusation, Ewald's response, Kaasbøll's first response, and Ewald's counter response), and it lasted from 1 February to 22 February. Reenberg's accusation against Ewald was much more extensive (57 theses compared to Kaasbøll's 13) and also two exchanges (Reenberg's accusations, Ewald's response, Reenberg's counter response, and Ewald's second response). It began on 18 February and continued to at least 4 March 1734.¹⁵⁰ The trial ended by order of the king, who also issued a summary judgment in the case.¹⁵¹ Hence, there is an unresolved feeling in parts of the exchange. (See Figure 1 for the exchanges and archive locations. The English titles are my own divisions and classifications mainly drawn from Kall 93 folio.)

Imod Mig..."; Ewald, "Hr. Enev. Ewalds Svar Paa Hr. Christian Reenbergs 57 Poster Indgivne Mod Ham i Den Kongel. Commission"; Ewald, "Enev. Edwalds [Sic] Replique Paa Hr. Christian Reenbergs Indlæg Af d. 18 Mart. 1734."). Several of these documents have been digitalized. It is possible that the Ledreborg 398 folio at Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen, also contains a copy of the trial's accusations and responses. Recently a transcription of this folio was completed by Sigrid Nielsby Christensen, as part of her *prisopgave* (an academic report). As mentioned above, I have been unable to access Christensen's recent unpublished *prisopgave* or transcription as of yet. A selected transcription of source material related to the Pietist vs. Orthodox debates in Denmark, which lead to the Royal Commission and Ewald's trial can be found in *Kirkehistoriske Samlinger* 5 r., 5. bd. 1909-11, pp. 657-770.

¹⁴⁹ Christian Christopher Reenberg was the nephew of Morten Reenberg, another priest who was actively against Ewald in the Pietist-Orthodox struggle. See, Bricka, "Reenberg, Christian Christopher"; Bricka, "Reenberg, Morten."

¹⁵⁰ The date of Ewald's final response is not included, although Reenberg's last response is dated 4 March. The description of the trial copy held in Norway indicates a 22 March 1734 date, but all the Norwegian dates seem a trifle delayed. Since the Kall 93 folio is unpaginated and for the sake of comparison with other copies of the trial, I cite the different responses and answers as individual documents. Ideally one could compare my reference to Ewald's response to Reenberg with the digitalized manuscript of the same response in the Gunnerus Library.

¹⁵¹ As mentioned above, see Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 64.

Figure 1: Archival Sources for Ewald's Trial under the Royal Commission

Exchanges	Kall 93 folio, Det Kongelige Bibliotek (KB)	Kall 102 folio (KB)	Sagen mod Enevold Ewald, Ledreborg 417, 4° folio (KB)	Gunnerus Library, Trondheim
Kaasbøll's accusations against Ewald	present	present	present, with Latin letter from Bishop Christen Worm attached	GUNNERUS XA; Fol. 73
Ewald's first response to Kaasbøll	present	present	absent	GUNNERUS XA; Fol. 73
Kaasbøll's response to Ewald	present	present	absent	GUNNERUS XA; Fol. 73
Ewald's second response to Kaasbøll	present	present	absent	GUNNERUS XA; Fol. 73
Reenberg's accusations against Ewald	present	present	present	GUNNERUS XA; Qv. 114b, digitalized
Ewald's first response to Reenberg	present	present	absent	GUNNERUS XA; Qv. 114c, digitalized
Reenberg's response to Ewald	present	present	present	GUNNERUS XA; Qv. 114g, digitalized

Ewald's second response to Reenberg (unsigned)	present	present	absent	GUNNERUS XA; Qv. 114d, digitalized
Conclusion to case	absent	absent	present	?

The Danish historiographic accounts of the trial all mention Ewald's confession that he held chiliastic and universalist (the restoration of all things, *Wiederbringung aller Dinge*)¹⁵² beliefs.¹⁵³ The precise nature and form of these beliefs as held by Ewald are difficult to discern, as Ewald did not describe them fully in the trial. Rather, his opponents described a vulgar (*grove*) chiliasm,¹⁵⁴ and Ewald replied that he held this belief but did not teach or preach it. Thomas Bredsdorff, in his description of the trial, asserts that for the Orthodox opponents "to believe in a 'chiliade,' which is Greek for a 1000-year kingdom, on this side of

¹⁵² In various languages in this dissertation, this doctrine is alternatively known as *Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, *Restitutio Omnium*, *apokatastasis*, *genoprettelse/genopretning af alle ting*, restoration of all things, Christian universalism, universal salvation, or universalism. The modern scholarship often discusses it as *apokatastasis*, Christian universalism or universalism. Ewald's trial contains the Danish, Latin, German, and Greek terms, which occasionally I translate into English. Rather than eliminate or flatten the historical variation found in the text itself or to feign avoidance with the modern discussion, I will move freely among the terms in the following dissertation.

¹⁵³ Besides Bredsdorff, see Lundbye, *Herrnhutismen i Danmark*, 60; Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6," 297; Ottesen, *Det Kgl. Vajsenhus Gennem to Hundrede Aar*, 209; Elle Jensen, *Pietismen i Danmark*, 56.

¹⁵⁴ The distinction between 'subtle' and 'vulgar' chiliasm seems to be a common one for the period. Even the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz used it and "Many Pietists argued that [Augsburg Confession] condemned only that form of millenarianism which they called *chilasmus crassus*, which included the expectation of a literal kingdom of Christ and the saints on earth. *Chilasmus subtilis*, or the expectation of a future age of enhanced enlightenment, grace and piety, they argued, remained a valid position for churches subscribing to the Augsburg Confession". Alsted et al., *Alsted and Leibniz: On God, the Magistrate and the Millennium*, 153. Leibniz even had some sympathy for Johann Wilhelm Petersen's views on universal salvation. Alsted et al., 185.

Judgment Day, and to believe in the *Wiederbringung* of all things, which is German for the restoration of all things, is essentially the same sin.”¹⁵⁵ Bredsdorff’s analysis is shrewd and captures the close historical connection between chiliasm and *apokatastasis*, but he is interested in the cultural implications of a belief that humanity can be good (without original sin) and the world thus becomes a good place to be. Bredsdorff slightly misreads the theological meaning of such claims. While the historical implications of such a belief might result in certain optimistic cultural and intellectual trends, Ewald’s claims of overcoming original sin must still be seen on the individual level within a particular framework of repentance, conversion, and re-birth (the *ordo salutis*) in this present age. Society at large was not mystically free of the effects of original sin, at least according to Ewald. When compared to moderate Pietists, Ewald and other universalist Pietists (who believed in *wiederbringung aller dinge*) were unique in their claim that all humans (and perhaps devils as well) underwent the individual transformation of the *ordo salutis*. Depending on whether one held a premillennialist or post-millenarist interpretation of the chilastic kingdom, the overthrowing of original sin did not necessarily occur in the *present* age (this age). In fact, for premillennialists like Ewald, the chiliastic kingdom was the arrival of the *age to come*. As will be clear, the discussion of the chilastic kingdom in the trial points towards a premillennialist understanding since it has not yet begun.¹⁵⁶

2.2 The Kaasbøll-Ewald Exchange

Kaasbøll’s accusations

Kaasbøll’s accusations against Ewald began with a description of vulgar chiliasm, a thousand-year kingdom on earth when Christ and his saints would reign in honor and bliss. Kaasbøll was uncertain whether this reign consisted only of living saints or also the resurrected elect. In

¹⁵⁵ At tro på en ‘chiliade’, hvilket er græsk for et tusindårsrige, på denne side of dommedag, og at tro på alle tings *Wiederbringung*, hvilket er tysk for alle tings genopretning, er i grunden samme synd. Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 59.

¹⁵⁶ Robin Parry also asserts that the Petersen-school of universalism opted for a premillennialist understanding. I mention this also below in chapter three, see Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 93.

this kingdom, evil and ungodly people had been destroyed (*ødelagde*) and worldly authorities overthrown. Kaasbøll attributed this type of chiliastic belief to Anabaptists, Weigelians, new prophets, and fanatics. Kaasbøll also saw this belief reflected in the new Danish Bible translation, which linked parallel verses.¹⁵⁷

Kaasbøll next described *Wiederbringung* (the redemption of all devils and damned from hell) and connected the two beliefs (chiliasm and *Wiederbringung*).¹⁵⁸ His evidence against Ewald came from reported conversations Ewald had had with two priests in Copenhagen about these doctrines. He was concerned that Ewald would mislead Christian souls and cause them to despise the means of grace and God's word. Here, Kaasbøll revealed one of his main quarrels with Ewald. He was concerned that the path of illumination, conversion, and rebirth would no longer receive its power through scripture and the sacraments.¹⁵⁹ These means of grace must be the efficient causes of salvation. According to Kaasbøll, he and Ewald formally shared an understanding of the *ordo salutis* but disagreed on the effecting power of the salvific end.

Kaasbøll's Theses against Ewald¹⁶⁰

After this opening salvo, Kaasbøll attributed thirteen theses to Ewald. Theses 1–3, 9, 12, and 13 were concerned with the Holy Spirit moving a listener to repentance or rebirth. They suggested the need to understand and discern spiritual movements, along with a sense of the Holy Spirit's freedom to move the believer when it willed.¹⁶¹ Theses 4–7 and 11 dealt with the extent to which sin was removed from the believer. For Kaasbøll, the language about Christ's

¹⁵⁷ Ewald answered that the Danish Bible translation was based on the Halle Bible (1708). See, "Kaasbøll's Accusations against Ewald," 1; "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 3.

¹⁵⁸ See "Kaasbøll's Accusations against Ewald," 2. Within the text itself and without further historical and theological context, this is not necessarily apparent how these two necessarily 'hang' together. The destruction of the evil and ungodly people could be read as a type of annihilationism and there is no necessary millennial kingdom involved in an idea of a finite hell.

¹⁵⁹ "Kaasbøll's Accusations against Ewald," 3–4.

¹⁶⁰ See Appendix A for a transcription of these these.

¹⁶¹ "Kaasbøll's Accusations against Ewald," 4–6.

conception and birth in believers was concerning.¹⁶² Thesis 10 was connected to this and spoke about the restoration of the image of God in believers. Thesis 8 asserted a natural “innocence” (guiltlessness) if a person acted in response to innate desires.

Following an outline of the thirteen theses, Kaasbøll concluded his accusation with a discussion about the dangers of tolerance and the right of a person to have their own opinions, which he feared would foster heretical beliefs.¹⁶³ This, no doubt, had political and cultural implications, but it also revealed Ewald’s (attributed) philosophical and psychological belief in the absolute freedom of thought.¹⁶⁴ Kaasbøll was concerned that Ewald’s beliefs removed the necessity of actual and particular knowledge of God’s revelation, knowledge that separated Christians from Jews, Muslims, and heathens. It was only this Christian knowledge that allowed for “right and true opinions about God and worship of God,” and preserved peace and daily life.¹⁶⁵ One ought to read this as a part of the reason versus revelation debate. In Kaasbøll's mind, Ewald’s belief in the freedom of the mind, which lifted up the importance of reason, endangered the societal benefit the Christian revelation has secured, perhaps for a 'Christian' Denmark?

Ewald’s first response and the eschatological debates

Ewald did not begin his first response with a denial of the accusations of chiliasm and *apokatastasis*. Instead, he insisted that he did not constantly speak about “particular opinions” (*particulair Meeninger*)¹⁶⁶ in sermons or in teaching catechists, but only when the text required it and it would edify his congregation. He also castigated Kaasbøll for using secondhand information, rather than his actual sermons and teachings. Ewald also took pains to defend several doctrines: the conversion of the Jews, chiliasm, and *apokatastasis*. He

¹⁶² “Kaasbøll’s Accusations against Ewald,” 5–6.

¹⁶³ “Kaasbøll’s Accusations against Ewald,” 6–9.

¹⁶⁴ For a good contemporary discussion on the absolute freedom of the intellect, see Walch and Hennings, “Freyheit des Verstandes.” Walch characterizes the absolute freedom of the intellect as the inability to be forced to believe something as true that your intellect judges to be false.

¹⁶⁵ “Kaasbøll’s Accusations against Ewald,” 8.

¹⁶⁶ “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 1.

defended the conversion of the Jews both from scripture (Romans 11) and tradition (some Orthodox Lutheran theologians taught this). Ewald admitted he had preached on this doctrine, and his later published sermons attest to this.¹⁶⁷ He denied, however, that the conversion of the Jews, would take place outside *ordinaire midler* (word and faith). He also denied that he taught and preached about the chiliastic kingdom either privately or publicly. However, he wrote that he “along with many other of our church’s right-minded teachers believes that the 1000th [year kingdom that] Rev. 20 speaks about is yet forthcoming, and this I hold not without some certain reasons.”¹⁶⁸ Ewald positioned chiliasm as an orthodox doctrine supported both by scripture and tradition. He also denied that his belief came from Anabaptism, Weigelism, or fanatical writings. He then briefly discussed biblical hermeneutics, focusing on a contextual reading in response to the problematic parallels in the new Danish translation. Finally, Ewald returned to the doctrine of *apokatastasis* (the restoration of all things), noting that the doctrine did not always and necessarily follow upon chiliasm, hinting at an awareness of the doctrine’s various historical manifestations.¹⁶⁹ Earlier Ewald endorsed the doctrine of a vulgar chiliastic kingdom almost hesitantly;¹⁷⁰ here his affirmation of universalism is straightforward and unqualified. Again, he denied that he taught or preached on the doctrine and insisted that the majority of his listeners were not aware of his belief. Rather, he had divulged his belief in a conversation with Professor Woldikke and Provst Woldikke when they confronted him.

Whether or not one takes Ewald at his word about his preaching and teaching, his own statement subtly suggests that he had held this belief for some time. He writes that “the majority, who have heard me now *for some years*, do not know that I have that same

¹⁶⁷ See section 3.5.

¹⁶⁸ *Vel negter ieg icke at ieg jo med mange andre vor Kirkes retsingige Lærere troer de 1000^{de} Apoc. XX tales at være endnu tilkommende og det, som jeg meener icke uden visse Grund...* “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 3.

¹⁶⁹ “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 6. See discussion in section 3.5 and chapter 6.

¹⁷⁰ This is how I interpret the prior quotation where in a roundabout and negative manner, Ewald notes that he has certain reasons for holding the chiliastic doctrine.

opinion.”¹⁷¹ He also remarked on Professor Woldikke’s “moderate judgment” (*moderate Judicium*) at the time of the conversation. When Ewald had denied that he propagated the doctrine, Woldikke had acknowledged “that was all one could demand” of him.¹⁷² This description given by Ewald suggests that Woldikke, if not agreeing with Ewald’s theology, allowed for a distinction between private and public theology for Ewald as a learned theologian.¹⁷³ If this interpretation is correct, Woldikke also upheld, as a philosophical principle, the absolute freedom of thought (one cannot be forced to hold something as true that one believes to be false).¹⁷⁴

Ewald’s final comments about his universalism suggest that he never intended to preach on the doctrine. However, he qualified his statement by insisting that he was unable to entirely abhor the doctrine; it would be against his conscience. Rather he preferred “to focus on present matters [of Christianity] rather than future things.”¹⁷⁵ This passage presents a number of interesting angles of exploration that I will touch upon later in this dissertation. There are repeated references (explicit and oblique) to an Early Modern anthropological/psychological model, for example, in Ewald’s allusions to his conscience¹⁷⁶ and in the freedom he attached to the intellect.¹⁷⁷ Connected to the latter, were hints of a divide between private and public theology among the learned. Woldikke’s comments about Ewald’s public and professional silence about *apokatastasis* being the most one could demand, indicated this. The learned, in Woldikke’s view, were allowed their theological speculations—likely because of a belief in the

¹⁷¹ ...at de allerfleeste, som have hørt mig nu i nogle Aar, icke veed, at ieg har samme Meening, “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 6; emphasis added. The length of time Ewald has been a universalist also impacts possible sources of such a belief. I discuss this in chapter 6.

¹⁷² ...det var alt det mand kunde forlange. “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 6.

¹⁷³ This division of public and private theology runs deep where *apokatastasis* is concerned. For my discussion on this, see chapter 6.

¹⁷⁴ Again, see Woldikke’s acknowledgment that official silence was all one could demand of Ewald. For more on this as a philosophical issue, see chapter 5 on Walch and the freedom to think.

¹⁷⁵ ...at agte paa de nærværende end de tilkommende Ting. “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 7.

¹⁷⁶ “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 12.

¹⁷⁷For a relevant contemporary theological discussion of the various human faculties, see Buddeus’s *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis*.

freedom of the intellect—but the public airing of such matters was not permitted.¹⁷⁸ Ewald also gave reasons why he avoided preaching and teaching on eschatological matters, but in a manner that did not contradict his own beliefs. Finally, Ewald acknowledged that chiliasm and *apokatastasis* were not always and necessarily linked, suggesting at the very least he privately reflected upon or read about the two doctrines.¹⁷⁹

Following these comments, Ewald vigorously affirmed his respect for scripture while resisting a mechanistic hermeneutical model that suggested scripture was necessarily effective when read by a priest.¹⁸⁰ When read privately, scripture could “quiet” its power—not every reading of the scriptures prompted repentance. Why not also when read by an ungodly priest?¹⁸¹ Ewald saw no requirement that scripture was effective merely because an ordained priest

¹⁷⁸ See my further discussion of this theme in chapter 6.

¹⁷⁹ At least in comparison to the earlier general statement by Kaasbøll that these two doctrines are always linked.

¹⁸⁰ By this I mean, that whenever an ordained priest reads scripture, it is salvificly 'effective'. Consider this contemporary understanding of the Lutheran "power of the word", "Such 'word power,' such word pronouncement is what continues to bring something out of nothing and has the character of producing that which God declares. So, if we look to our church's liturgy, there are instances where 'word power' makes something just so", Cobb, *Lutheran DNA: Testing the Augsburg Confession in the Parish*, 17. Sometimes this effectiveness of the scripture reading is considered a "performative speech act of the word" such that "God's spoken *Thettel-Wort*, according to Luther, *always* accomplishes its purpose", Wengert et al., "Word of God," 799. This understanding is thus similar to (or identical to) what the philosopher Stephen R. L. Clark calls the Divine Language, "Things are as God has called them, not as our merely human languages decree. Our languages do not 'cut things at the joints': the Divine Language, the First-born, decrees what joints there are." Clark, *The Mysteries of Religion: An Introduction to Philosophy through Religion*, 56. Ewald is too much of an experiential or common-sense realist to permit this performative speech without seeing some effect.

¹⁸¹ Ewald writes, "I have never denied the power of the word but know that many thousands hinder it. The world can quiet its power when read in a book, why not also when it is spoken by an ungodly person? But how much the ungodly invade in various ways and hinder the progress and entrance of God's word among the people, that I will let all reasonable people judge." (*Jeg har aldrig nægtet ordets Kraft, men vel viist at mange 1000de selv hindre den. Ordet kand tee sin Kraft naar det læses i én bog, hvorfor icke ogsaa naar det tales af én Ugudelig? Men hvor meget den Ugudelige indbryder paa adskillige maade, og hindrer Guds ords Fremgang og Indgang hos Menniskene, derom vil ieg iade alle forstandige dømme*) "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 7.

read it. From the trial transcript, it is obvious that Ewald's understanding of the effective power of scripture was multifaceted. He drew on his experience of human behavior and a complex grasp of causal interaction between the Spirit, the priest reading the text, the words of scripture, and the listeners.¹⁸² Ewald's appeal to experience in particular will also be discussed below when I treat his exchange with Reenberg, but it is clear that, according to Ewald, the listener played an active role in hearing and responding to the Word¹⁸³ and was not merely a passive recipient.¹⁸⁴

Ewald's first response to Kaasbøll's accusations

In Ewald's treatment of the thirteen theses (pertaining to his teachings), he consistently reflected on the human being's role portrayed in these theological themes and teachings. Pertaining to the salvific role of the Holy Spirit, Ewald affirmed the ability of the human being to resist the Spirit (Thesis 1) and that humans could deceive themselves, believing in an impulse to be good that was not (Thesis 2).¹⁸⁵ Ewald spoke to the need for growth in one's Christian life, but rejected the notion that a lack of growth indicated that one's initial conversion was not the will of God. Human beings could be deceived about the actual goodness of an impulse, but any truly good impulse came from God. And God desired that

¹⁸² Consider also, Ewald's response to Kaasbøll's thesis 9 "It is not anyone, who speaks the word so that it can bring about rebirth, but the one who speaks the word with spirit and power." (See Appendix A for the Danish). Ewald replies that these are not his words but he "confesses that the word is spoken by many with little fruit for their audiences and the right goal cannot be achieved thereby, but this does not lessen the power of the word." (*tilstaaer at ordet tales af mange saaledis at det har liden frugt for Tilhørere, og ey det rette maal kand vel naaes dermed; I hvorvel der afgaar ordets kraft slet intet*) "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 11. Ewald retains the power of Scripture in itself, but refuses to grant the speaker some mechanical and extraordinary ability to convey the message of Scripture. Nevertheless, a bad speaker/preacher can be a severe hinderance.

¹⁸³ Presumably the Scripture reading in a church service and possibly also the sermon.

¹⁸⁴ For a very good and succinct discussion of how a reception necessarily involves an active or activating element, rather than mere passivity, see Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*, 172–73. My hypothesis is that Ewald needs a metaphysics more like what Schindler offers, rather than a binary and purely externally determinative reception of scripture's saving truth.

¹⁸⁵ *Bevægelse*, see "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 8. For Ewald this impulse or movement is felt internally but not identified with the human being's self-motivation.

people repent and convert. It was the human will that was inconstant, according to Ewald, not God's.

In his response to Thesis 4, Ewald also displayed a certain amount of philosophical reasoning about spiritual rebirth, likening it to human nature, which was perfect in one sense (a newborn baby was a human being), but not perfect in terms of degree (a baby was not yet a perfect person). To consider rebirth as imperfect in the first sense was monstrous (*monstrum*).¹⁸⁶ Still, for Ewald, rebirth and the restoration of the image of God in the believer was never a mystical or philosophical external mechanism, "object" or immaterial ticket guaranteeing eternal life. Even Adam in his state of innocence and having the image of God, needed to obey God to receive eternal life. There was an active component of Ewald's characterization of Adam.¹⁸⁷ Thus, Ewald acknowledged the possibility—even the necessity—of growth and development in the Christian life. With this distinction, Ewald clarified his understanding of the continuing presence of sin and the continuing sanctifying/purifying work of Christ.¹⁸⁸ In connection with this sanctifying work, Ewald also defended as scriptural his

¹⁸⁶ "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 8. Ewald displays here some notion of the end or *telos* of a thing as the perfection of a thing according to degree. See also, Buddeus's comments on the difference between degree of perfection and 'participation' of perfection, "The word: perfection can be understood both in terms of degree of perfection, as well as the participation of perfection; when all Christians are called perfect, it is not understood in terms of degree, but in terms of the participation of perfection, after all they partake in the doctrine, which belongs to faith, and so they are called *τελειοι* and so all Christians are perfect, though they are not perfect by reason of degree." (*Det Ord; fuldkommen kand forstaaes baade om Gradens Fuldkommenhed, saa og om Deelagtighedens Fulkommenhed; Naar alle Christne kaldes fuldkomne, da forstaaes det ikke i Henseende til Gradens, men til Deelagtighedens Fulkommendhed, eftersom de have alle Lærdommens Deelagtighed, som hører til Troen, og saaledes heder de τελειοι, og saa ere alle Chrisne fuldkomne, omendskiønt de ratione graduum ikke ere fuldkomne.*) Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:For-Lecture 74. I suspect that Ludwig Gerhard and possibly Ewald would argue that perfection must finally also be in respect of degree. See chapter six.

¹⁸⁷ "Doubtlessly, Adam [would] had received an eternal life, if he had been obedient to God..." (*Adam havde og uden tvivl faaed at ævigt Liv, om hand havde blevet Gud lydig;*) "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 10.

¹⁸⁸ The scriptural reference in the trial text is 1 Thes 5:23, which speaks of God "hallowing you all completely and entirely" (*hellige eder ganske og aldeles!*). See the 1740 Vajsenhus Bible, *Biblia*.

reference to Christ's spiritual (*aandelig*) conception and birth in humans (Responses to Theses 5 and 7).

Ewald's initial response also hinted at the larger theological and philosophical framework within which he (and even Kaasbøll) worked. In his reply to Thesis 11, Ewald wrote, "it is certainly known that a human being can deny and abandon this or that natural power for the sake of his own use, advantage or honor, see 1 Cor. 9:25. And it is certainly known that those who wish to be Christ's disciples must forsake all that they have..."¹⁸⁹ Ewald was responding to Kaasbøll's attribution to him of the statement that when "a human can deny himself in some things, flee this or that evil, all by natural powers, but when [the reborn?] receives power, he denies all evil."¹⁹⁰ The first part of Ewald's reply demonstrates a common ground between him and Kaasbøll. Both men asserted that self-denial could be carried out to a certain extent and in some areas by means of other motivating factors. A man might reign in his temper because he feared being punished for fighting. A possible anthropological/psychological model at work in both Kaasbøll's and Ewald's arguments will be partially sketched out later in the dissertation in Chapter 5 on human freedom.

After Ewald's responses to the thirteen theses, he turned to the topic of controversial doctrines: the refusal to give a general absolution, the conversion of the Jews, and presumably *apokatastasis*, though this was not explicitly named. He affirmed a person's right to hold particular opinions as long as they did not threaten the main doctrines of faith but then discussed whether such beliefs in actuality threatened the main articles of faith. He referenced a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles of faith¹⁹¹ but appealed most strongly to truth, rather than an all-encompassing fideism. He held forth conversion/repentance, faith, justification, and sanctification as fundamentals but refused to

¹⁸⁹ *At et Menneske kand fornægte og forlade eet og andet af Naturlige Kræfter, for sin egen nytte, fordeel, eller ære skyld er gansk vist vide: 1 Cor: 9: 25 Og det er og gandske vidst, at den der vil være Christi-Discipel maa forsage alt det hand haver Luc: 14:33 Saaleedis er min lærdom om denne Sag.* "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 10.

¹⁹⁰ See Appendix A, Kaasbøll Thesis 11.

¹⁹¹ "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 12.

deny his freedom to “believe what is right according to God’s word.”¹⁹² At the same time, he denied that anyone was infallible and, as such, wrong opinions must simply be borne or tolerated.¹⁹³ However, Ewald did not treat freedom of thought as an end in itself. Rather, as his invocation to God reveals, it remained in service to a search for and delight in the Truth when found (*glæder mig ved den, naar ieg finder den*).¹⁹⁴ If one takes his invocation seriously, it must be maintained that Ewald retained a sense of an innately human desire for the truth.¹⁹⁵

2.2.1 Major themes of the Kaasbøll-Ewald Exchange

Eschatological Debates

I will not spend as much time detailing Kaasbøll’s and Ewald’s further responses to each other. Rather, I wish to examine their discussion of controversial doctrines (conversion of the Jews, chiliasm, universalism), Ewald’s understanding of rebirth, conversion, and sanctification (roughly the *ordo salutis*), the Early Modern philosophical and theological anthropologies at work and, finally, the nature of contemporary theological disputes.¹⁹⁶

There was, unsurprisingly, a dispute about the extent to which Ewald’s views were publicly known in Copenhagen and among his congregation,¹⁹⁷ but I will leave aside these historical issues in this study, except when they reveal something of Ewald’s thought. For instance,

¹⁹² troer det er saa ret efter Guds ord “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 12.

¹⁹³ Ewald’s plea is for patience with the intellectual errors of others, as they must suffer our own errors.

“Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 14.

¹⁹⁴ “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 15.

¹⁹⁵ Taken further and in a Platonic direction, one might speak of the convertibility of Goodness and Truth for Ewald. The Truth delights because it is the Delightful itself (or a reflection thereof) and worthy of admiration and worship. In a way, this reflects Buddeus’s complaint against Christian Wolf’s god: that it was not worthy of worship and therefore not God. Nüssel, “Gott Als Spiritus Independens : Zur Umformung Der Gotteslehre in Der Lutherischen Theologie Der Frühaufklärung,” 96. See also my discussion in Chapter 5.

¹⁹⁶ What was allowed in the academy that ought not be debated in the public sphere? “Kaasbøll’s Response to Ewald,” 2.

¹⁹⁷ “Kaasbøll’s Response to Ewald,” 1–2.

Kaasbøll accused Ewald of devoting entire sermons to the conversion of the Jews and asked how edifying such material would be for the average congregant. If Kaasbøll's question were not rhetorical, a theological commentator might ask what this information revealed about God and whether the image of God being communicated was one of a divinity who keeps its promises and continues to care for the Jewish people.¹⁹⁸ In my view, Kaasbøll is expressing the view that there should be a difference between private (academic) theological speculation and the public theology proclaimed to the masses—see my discussion of this topic in chapter six.

On the conversion of the Jews, Kaasbøll admitted that some Orthodox theologians taught it, but more as a theological problem than as a settled matter.¹⁹⁹ Again Kaasbøll pointed to the need for a distinction between public teaching and private theological discourse. He also rejected Ewald's characterization of his own preaching and suggested if his sermons were published, they would show that the conversion of the Jews was mentioned frequently.²⁰⁰ Whether or not Kaasbøll's characterization and Ewald's defense are to be believed, Kaasbøll left the impression that Ewald saw this doctrine as important and ultimately true. Modern readers of Ewald's writings ought, therefore, to consider the theological implications of such (explicit or implicit) eschatological beliefs.

¹⁹⁸ This remark must be read within a Christian intellectual framework that attempts to articulate theologically God's position and attitude towards the Jewish people. Obviously, it does not express the theological attitude or reflection of the historical Danish Jewish community. Here I disagree with Martin Schwarz Lausten's approach towards Ewald's and Pietism's beliefs about the conversion of the Jews. While Lausten may be correct in his criticism that the Pietist discussion of the relationship between God and the Jewish people (ancient and contemporary) often leads into a discussion of God's relationship with Early Modern Christians. Lausten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*, 99–100. I argue that this discussion might reveal much about how Pietists conceived of God and God's faithfulness towards humanity. The Pietist language might be culturally insensitive and naive by modern standards, but it certainly is a theologically interesting shift.

¹⁹⁹ "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 4.

²⁰⁰ "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 5.

Kaasbøll admitted a linguistic distinction between chiliasm and millenarism (vulgar chiliasm), but argued they were the same: There was no difference between the 1000 years and the 1000-year kingdom; both were future events.²⁰¹ He dismissed Ewald's claim that Ewald could not give a sufficient and clear description of the doctrine and linked Ewald directly to vulgar chiliasm, that is, the golden *Seculum*.²⁰²

Concerns about Grace and the Ordo Salutis

Kaasbøll accepted Ewald's explanation for a number of theses. He found fault or sought further clarification on Theses 2, 6, 5/7, and 8. Concerning Thesis 2, Kaasbøll pressed Ewald on the notion of "good" movements that were actually good (not just seemingly good). These movements stemmed from God's prevenient grace (*forekommende Naade*), a technical theological term that both Kaasbøll and Ewald used. The disagreement, in Kaasbøll's view, turned on whether a movement was considered truly good according to its ultimate source (God's grace) or its actual effect.²⁰³ Nevertheless, the exchange reveals a shared theological language and practical conceptual distinction that both appealed to.

Kaasbøll's restructured Thesis 6 clarified some of the tensions between the Orthodox party and Pietism, as he perceived it.²⁰⁴ What was at stake was the *ordo salutis*. He accused Ewald (and "nearly all Pietists") of muddling up the acts of grace (*actus gratiæ*), making the effect

²⁰¹ In contrast, Kaasbøll argues that most Lutheran theologians interpret the millennial as beginning with Constantine, so that one is living in the millennial age presently. "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 6.

²⁰² Kaasbøll's source here are the present histories that link this belief to the Anabaptists, Weigelians, and fanatics who speak of dreams, visions, and revelations (perhaps figures such as Jane Leade). He does refer again to Ewald's estimable intellect and gifts, suggesting such beliefs to be unworthy of such a figure. "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 7.

²⁰³ "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 16. Kaasbøll refers to Paul's sermon to Agrippa as an example of good movement because it came by God's prevenient grace, even though it did not have a good effect in Agrippa.

²⁰⁴ The tension arises from Ewald's response to thesis 6, when he speaks of the "necessity of purification and that we shall always and as long as we live and notice the slightest deviation, proceed with sanctification by Jesus's grace and power." (*som ellers ofte Renselsens fornødenhed, og at vi skal altid, og saa lenge, som vi leve og mercke mindste afvigelse, fare fort med helliggjørelsen ved Jesu Naade og Kraft.*) "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 9.

into a cause and abandoning the systematic Lutheran way of teaching the *ordo*. Kaasbøll was frustrated with Ewald's conceptual imprecision when he used terms like *sanctification* (*helligjørelse*), *renewal* (*fornyelse*), and *conversion* (*omvendelse*). In Kaasbøll's opinion, penitence (*boed* or *poenitentiam*) must precede sanctification, leading to the forgiveness of sins and the receiving of grace. In the following paragraph, he also accused Ewald (and others) of "mingling together" rebirth and renewal.²⁰⁵

In this dissertation, I pay much attention to the *ordo salutis* and Ewald's explication of it. At this point, however, it is helpful to recognize that Kaasbøll followed a strict theological sequence; there are hints of a chronological sequencing as well. In contrast, Ewald's response to Thesis 6 outlined an ongoing need on the part of humans for purification as experienced by the believer. He was less concerned about a strict technical order. Rather, he asked rhetorically, "When I say that sin is cast off in sanctification by Jesus's grace and power, is this not the most important order?"²⁰⁶ Sin's destruction was Ewald's chief concern, and he emphasized that this happened only through Christ. It is also clear that Ewald viewed the *ordo* from the perspective of the Christian, not merely from the perspective of Christ's or God's soteriological work, given Ewald's emphasis on the daily laying aside of sin.

Combining Theses 5 and 7, Kaasbøll resisted the notion that Christ was conceived, or born, in humans in a spiritual fashion. He allowed that spiritual rebirth renewed the image of God in the believer, but he was wary of language that described Christ being born in believers by faith and a holy life. The issue was where the power that the believer needed for righteousness and holiness was located and the sequence of events leading to the conception of Christ in the believer. Ewald's later response to Kaasbøll made this clear: The conception of Christ in believers was not the result of a holy life—but of faith only.²⁰⁷ This exchange

²⁰⁵ *beblandelse* "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 18.

²⁰⁶ *Nar ieg siger at Synden aflegges i helligjørelsen ved Jesu Naade og Kraft; Er den icke den vigtigste orden udi?* "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 10. A similar argument is given by Ludwig Gerhard, who also wants to step back from the details and gesture towards the overall goal of the *ordo*. See my discussion in chapter 6 of a longer quotation from Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.28, p. 365.

²⁰⁷ "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 10.

represents the battle to avoid a Pelagian understanding of salvation: a person's actions cannot merit anything—Christ must come first. Both Ewald and Kaasbøll wanted to avoid this, but Kaasbøll was suspicious of Ewald's theological formulations in this matter. Understanding Kaasbøll's concern illuminates why he was wary of the language of Christ in the believer. I argue in Chapter 4 that for Ewald and his teacher Buddeus, this mystical language was necessary because the union of Christ with the believer was the source of all virtue and good works for them.²⁰⁸ Cooperating, or indwelling, grace (*medarbejdende/iboende naade*) stemmed from this mystical union and ensured, in Ewald's eyes, that sanctification was not self-effected, or Pelagian.²⁰⁹

The final matter that Kaasbøll addressed was in regard to Thesis 8. He wrote that in Ewald's view,

it is not thus sin, which we are born in, that condemns. Rather, it is much more unbelief and contempt of grace. This I [Kaasbøll] hold for an intricate and suspect thesis. I must ask! Who does original sin come from? Is it not from Adam, but [or rather?] Adam's head, sin *was* [the] un-belief that he believed the snake much more than God, so both un-belief and contempt of grace follow naturally with original sin, and so therefore it is this [that] God's spirit says [that] we were both the children of un-belief and children of wrath by nature Eph 2: 2–3. But it is not therefore better and more fitting for Scripture to say that is not only the sin we are conceived and born with, but even the un-belief and contempt of God's grace that follows and flows from original sin, which particularly condemns the people.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Also, as mentioned above in section 1.4.3, the Lutheran Johan Arndt moves the union with Christ to an early and central position.

²⁰⁹ See chapter four on grace in Buddeus (and Ewald) and my article on grace and nature in Danish Pietism, in *Pietismus und Neuzeit*, publication pending.

²¹⁰ *At det er nu icke saavel Synden, som vi ere fødte udj den fordømmer, som det er meget meere Vantro og Naades foragt; holdes Jeg for én intricat og fordægtig Thesis, Jeg maatte gjerne spørge! Hvem har vi den Oprindlige Sjynd fra? Er det icke fra Adam men Adams hoved, Sjynd var jo Vantro, at hand troede Slangen meere end Gud, saa følger jo naturlig viis baade Vantroen og Naadens foragt med Arve Sjynden og just derfor er det Guds Aand siger vi vare baade Vantroens børn og Vredens børn af Naturen Eph 2:2:3: Man det icke derfor var bædre og Skriftmæssigere sagt at det er ej alleene den Synd, vi ere undfangne og fødte udj, Men end og den*

I share this quotation in full because it reveals a dispute about the origin of condemnation, the extent of God's forgiveness, and the hindrances to reconciliation between God and human beings. Ewald, in his reply, wanted to sharpen the conceptual difference between a person's actual deeds and actions and the fallen or evil nature—the human being *in potentia*.²¹¹ He substantially agreed with Kaasbøll's comments that suggested what initially (perhaps even ontologically) condemned people was un-belief and contempt—though that of Adam.²¹² However, by separating the actual and the potential sin, Ewald cleared a path for the pastoral focus to be on a person's actual deeds and how these separate people from God.²¹³ As for the inherited sin, or fallen nature, two possibilities seem likely: either original sin was seen as an inherited guilt that has already been atoned for by Christ's death or in rebirth it became possible to increasingly "oppress" original sin.²¹⁴ Either option could be seen as transforming the human being *in potentia* and explains Ewald's insistence that it was a person's response to Christ and the Gospel that either condemned or saved them. By

Vantrø og Guds Naades foragt den følger og flyder af Arve Sjynden, som besynderlig fordømmer Menniskene.

"Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 18–19.

²¹¹ Erik Pontoppidan's catechism also distinguishes between inherited sin (*arvelig synd*) and actual sin (*gjørlig synd*). See, Pontoppidan, *Sannhet Til Gudfryktighet: Forklaring over Martin Luthers Lille Katekisme*, Q. 276-280. I discuss this also in chapter three.

²¹² "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 10–11. Ewald does not deny that we have evil desires that exists 'naturally'. See his catechism, Ewald, *Begyndelses Elementer i de Guds Ord*, 40–42.

²¹³ "But the un-belief and contempt of grace, I have spoken about is this: when a human now hears the call of grace in Christ and hears his gospel preached, and then he, by un-belief, [pushes] grace and the gospel away from himself, so this is and remains the real reason for his condemnation according to Christ's words, Mark 16:15-16" (*Og Vantrø og deris fordømmelighed; Men den Vantrøe og Naades Foragt, ieg har taldt om, er denne: Naar et Menniske nu hører Naadens tilbydelse i Christo og Evangelium ham forkyndes, da hand da ved Vantrø skydes [?] Naaden og Evangelium fra sig, saa er og bliver det, den Egentlige Aarsag til hans fordømmelse efter Christi ord Marc 16 /15 16*) "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 11.

²¹⁴ The first option is in line with Buddeus's strong sense of the forensic nature of justification (see, Brouwer, *Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy*, 193.). Of course, for Buddeus, this forensic sense of justification is based on a transformation that has already taken place. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification: Volume II*, 142. This fits well with the second option I named above and which is found in Ewald's catechism. Ewald, *Begyndelses Elementer i de Guds Ord*, 44.

removing condemnation as pertaining to original sin, the nature of condemnation shifted for Ewald more to one's actual sins.

Theological Speculation: How to hold together self-condemnation and universalism

Here some theological speculation may clarify the issue. One must move away from condemnation as an externally imposed judgment—one that finds its cause (*aarsag*) in God's divine command, which is willed without reference to real or actual actions²¹⁵—to condemnation as a natural, internal consequence of one's actions. The actualized form, or structure, of the human being who refuses to trust (believe) Christ and despises the good news becomes the form that condemns.²¹⁶ Condemnation (as misery in one's self-separation from Christ and God, the highest good)²¹⁷ follows from such a refusal as a natural consequence. Yet after a fashion, the condemnation is self-imposed (even if not with full awareness by the human being). Ewald cited Mark 16:15–16.²¹⁸ The one who had contempt for the offer of grace had contempt for the only source of their bliss. What state could this be but condemnation/damnation?

Several things are involved in this understanding of condemnation that I am proposing. First, it depends on an understanding of human anthropology and psychology wherein bliss (*lyksalighed*) as salvation (*blive salig*) is bound up in internal human formation, rather than externally affected like a drug-induced euphoria.²¹⁹ This hints at human nature being capable of being perfected. It also situates condemnation as principally related to internal misery.

²¹⁵ Here I am thinking of an extreme sense of Augustinian imputed guilt and condemnation, not necessarily the notion of original sin as an explanation for one's evil desires. Obviously, the notion of imputed guilt or sin has been a major source of theological debate. For a brief overview of proposed solutions see, Thiessen and Doerksen, *Lectures in Systematic Theology*, 186–90.

²¹⁶ I am using form or structure here in a quasi-Aristotelian sense. For example, the form of the human being involves the intellectual faculty, whereby one thinks or reasons. On an actualized level, the human being who trusts becomes 'internally' capable of being in a mutually trusting relationship.

²¹⁷ See my discussion in chapter five and Buddeus's conception of God as the greatest good.

²¹⁸ "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 11.

²¹⁹ Experiential bliss might be one thing, but generally we don't treat that as true happiness. The drug-fueled orgies of Huxley's *Brave New World* are dystopian, not utopian.

Most importantly, it places God's nature as the highest good, if not precisely transcendent goodness itself,²²⁰ and assumes that goodness is naturally what one desires. The final piece is the sense that God does not condemn as only the external judge but is presented as willingly waiting and offering grace and good news to all. This last piece is especially pronounced if one takes seriously the concept of God offered by *apokatastasis* and universalism.²²¹

How well this theological reflection reflects the Early Modern world of ideas will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. The first piece of the puzzle—the structure of human faculties, in particular the will, God's nature as the highest good, and the natural desirability of goodness—will be drawn from Buddeus's and Walch's texts. The sense that a person condemns themselves is less pronounced in the historical literature, although Johann Conrad Dippel mocked the idea that God can be somehow reconciled to the creature's sin, while the creature remains "in disgust and enmity against God."²²² In Dippel's logic, it was the human condition that separated people from God. But modern eschatological debates have focused strongly on the self-locking door of hell in an effort to preserve the goodness and justice of God.²²³ Yet one does not need go that far. In Pietist texts like Pontoppidan's *The Mirror of*

²²⁰ This is perhaps the most important piece of the puzzle; at present I find it difficult to discern how far God is simply the highest good or goodness itself in Ewald's thought.

²²¹ There may be space for God to be viewed as a judge is a temporary or motivating factor within the playing out of the *ordo*. This would be described as the state/condition of slavery which prompts repentance. See my below discussion of Buddeus on slavish fear in chapter 5, also Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:19–42. Ewald appropriates Buddeus's discussion of the slavish-state/fear of the law.

²²² *Der Creatur selbst aber in dem Abscheu und der Feindschafft gegen Gott stecken bleiben lassen solle*. Dippel, *Der von den Nebeln des Reichs der Verwirrung gesäuberte helle Glanz des Evangelii Jesu Christi oder Schrift- und Wahrheit-mässiger Entwurff der Heyls-Ordnung*, 157.

²²³ The classic statement of this is found in *The Great Divorce* and *The Problem of Pain* by C.S. Lewis, where the doors of hell are locked on the inside. Lewis's formulation is widely referenced. See, Seymour, *A Theodicy of Hell*, 173; Gregg, *All You Want to Know About Hell: Three Christian Views of God's Final Solution to the Problem of Sin*, 79–80; Matarazzo and Jackelen, *The Judgment of Love: An Investigation of Salvific Judgment in Christian Eschatology*, 125; Kvanvig, *The Problem of Hell*, 120.

*Faith*²²⁴ and earlier devotional texts like Heinrich Müller's *The Heavenly Kiss of Love*²²⁵ and *The Faithful's Union with Christ their Head* by Johann Arndt,²²⁶ one finds concepts of how an *internal* change (the application of divine grace) was accomplished through faith. This transformation drew a person nearer to God. Its lack was expressed as a separation from God.²²⁷

Where Ewald differed from Kaasbøll (and Arndt) was his refusal to set death as the irrevocable limit for un-belief to be transformed into infinite condemnation. The historical forms of universalism available to Ewald included the experience of condemnation as externally imposed, but this experience of condemnation had pedagogical elements.²²⁸ These universalist texts will be explored further below, but I will demonstrate that certain elements

²²⁴ Pontoppidan, *Troens Speyl, Forestillende Guds Børns Kiende-Tegn*. The devotional treatise is a translation of an earlier German version. See in particular the first chapter on the nature of faith.

²²⁵ Müller's work was translated to Danish in 1745 as *Himmelske Kierligheds-Kys*. Ewald wrote the foreword. Consider, for instance, Müller's insistence that "my soul is like a mirror: if I turn it towards God, then it becomes like God" (*Min Siel er som et Speyl; vender jeg den til Gud, da bliver den Gud liig.*) and "good works are the natural consequence of faith, as fruit from the tree. And as it is unnecessary to command a good tree to bear fruit, so one dare not give the faithful any law of love. His own heart drives and forces him to it." (*Godgiørenhed er Troens naturlige Følge, som Frugtens Træets. Og som det er uforførdent, at befale et got Træ at bære Frugt, saa tør man ikke give den Troende nogen Kierligheds Lov. Hans eget Hierte driver og trænger ham dertil.*) Müller, *Himmelske Kierligheds-Kys*, 554.

²²⁶ *Om de Troendes foreening med Christo deres Hoved*, a small treatise reprinted as part of the Vajsenhus Danish translation of Arndt's *True Christianity*. Arndt, *Sex Bøger Om Den Sande Christendom, Handlende Om Sande Christnes Salige Omvendelse, Hjertelige Anger Og Ruelse over Synden*.

²²⁷ See in particular part two, chapters 14 and 15 of Arndt's *Om de Troendes foreening med Christo deres Hoved*. Arndt, 1108–11.

²²⁸ As does Müller's understanding of God's disciplining but not rejecting action towards us. "If we sin, he disciplines us, but he does not throw us away from himself. What father rejects the child who comes to him with crying eyes, and is not a Father's heart easily won over" (*Synde vi, da tugter hand os, men hand kaster os ikke bort fra sig. Hvilken Fader støder vel det Barn fra sig, der kommer til ham med grædende Øyne, og hvor let er en Faders Hierte ike vunden?*) Müller, *Himmelske Kierligheds-Kys*, 3.

of the anthropological/psychological framework (how a human being “works”) available to Ewald pushed towards an internally imposed misery.²²⁹

At the end of the Kaasbøll-Ewald exchange, Ewald referred to a long tradition of theological speculation about the eventual conversion of the Jews (mostly in the Patristic era, though also among early Lutheran theologians). He mentioned the Pietists Philip Jacob Spener, Joachim Lange,²³⁰ and (presumably) Johan Conrad Dippel as sources that discussed the chiliastic kingdom.²³¹ He remained uncertain about the details of the chiliastic era, indicating his willingness to remain in the murkiness of Biblical hints rather than attempt clear prophetic descriptions.²³² He compared chiliasm to the hope of pious Jews before Christ that the Messiah would return. In his opinion, their hope was justified, but the form of their hope did not fit their expectations.²³³ Yet despite Ewald’s intentional lack of an “adequate concept” (*jeg har ingen tilstreckelig begreb derom er sandt*),²³⁴ it is still possible to consider what impact this eschatological hope had on his thought. Even if he did not have a perfectly formed grasp on *how* the conversion of the Jews could come about, the belief still matters for his thought. Unlike his references to Spener, Lange, and Dippel in his discussion about the conversion of the Jews and a chiliastic kingdom, Ewald did not reference in this response any specific

²²⁹ For instance, it is the negative image in Buddeus’s insistence that God is the only perfectly satisfying object of our insatiable love. Ergo, to not love God is to be unsatisfied in our love. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:178.

²³⁰ A later comment by Ewald suggests he is referring to Joachim Lange’s biblical commentaries. “Ewald’s Second Response to Kaasbøll,” 9. Ewald owned at least five volumes of *Licht und Recht* (the trial reference must be to Lange’s commentary on the Epistles). See, Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*.

²³¹ The copy of the trial says *Dimpel*. “Ewald’s Second Response to Kaasbøll,” 4. Johan Conrad Dippel is likely the referent. In *Pia Desideria*, Spener’s own defense of the doctrine concerning the conversion of the Jews involves a large number of quotations from early Christian theologians, along with a list of later medieval, then Lutheran and Reformed theologians who have touched upon the topic. Spener, *Pia desideria*, 152 sqq.

²³² Compare this to Emanuel Swedenborg’s descriptions of the afterlife in *De Caelo et Eius Mirabilibus et de inferno, ex Auditibus et Visis* (1758) or even Johann Albrecht Bengel’s exact predictions about the beginning of the Chiliastic kingdom. See, Olson, *Reclaiming Pietism : Retrieving an Evangelical Tradition*, 76.

²³³ “Ewald’s Second Response to Kaasbøll,” 4.

²³⁴ “Ewald’s Second Response to Kaasbøll,” 4.

sources for his understanding of *apokatastasis*.²³⁵ He did, however, suggest there was a place for a discussion about whether *apokatastasis* contradicted the teaching of the Lutheran Symbolic Books. But he was adamant that he had not broken his priestly oath, which was about preaching the divine doctrine to the faithful.²³⁶ On this point, Ewald used his conscience as a guide to understand what was right, even if it overruled his oath.²³⁷

His comments after this last point also reveal something of Ewald's functional understanding of the human mental faculties. Ewald noted that "humans can and should, by the power of the imagination, represent something to themselves as good, which is not good for God."²³⁸ I will return to this in Chapter 5.

2.3 Reenberg-Ewald Exchange

I have described Kaasbøll and Ewald's exchange and offered some speculative thoughts on how the different theological themes of their debate fit together. Reenberg's accusations were similar to Kaasbøll's, and the Reenberg-Ewald exchange helps to fill out our understanding of Ewald's philosophical assumptions. Reenberg's exchange with Ewald was more aggressive than Kaasbøll's. Where Kaasbøll praised (sincerely or not) Ewald's intellect and gifts²³⁹ and used his responses to seek clarification, even at times approving of the careful formulation of Ewald's answers,²⁴⁰ Reenberg did not. He was rarely convinced by Ewald's replies and brought in several witnesses. Like Kaasbøll, his accusations consisted of

²³⁵ The text here uses the Latinized Greek form: Apocatastasi. "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 4.

²³⁶ Ewald quotes part of the Latin oath that all Danish state priests took, "Doctrina Coelestis Comprehensa Scriptis Phropheticis et Apostolicis et Libris Ecclesiarum Dannicarum Symbolicis Auditoribus Fideliter instilletur". "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 5.

²³⁷ "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 5.

²³⁸ *at Mennsker kan og bør ved Imaginationens kraft Kraft forrestille sig noget som got, der icke er got for Gud...* "Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 9. Ewald's argument here is that externally good actions in themselves do not indicate the internal spiritual freedom to do God-pleasing actions.

²³⁹ "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 7.

²⁴⁰ "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 19.

statements attributed to Ewald. To get through the onslaught of accusations, I organized²⁴¹ the 57 theses into accusations about the sacraments (7 theses),²⁴² the *ordo salutis* (34),²⁴³ mystical union (4),²⁴⁴ knowledge of truth (14),²⁴⁵ and experience (8).²⁴⁶ Transcriptions of the 57 theses are available in Appendix A. Ewald's responses to the accusations were mixed. He agreed with 23 of the accusations, firmly denied seven, and offered a mixed or nuanced response to the rest. While this statistical analysis of the Reenberg-Ewald exchange has limited use when it comes to the nuances of the debate, it strongly emphasizes the continuing importance of the *ordo salutis* and its various components that were featured in the Pietist-Orthodox debate. Any treatment of Ewald's theology would do well to examine why Reenberg (like Kaasbøll) was so concerned with the *ordo* in Ewald's theology. What was at stake? The Reenberg-Ewald exchange also affirms the importance of experience in Ewald's teaching and preaching. It is vital to emphasize the term *experience* (*Forfarenhed*) as a philosophical and epistemological starting point. Prioritizing experience as a means for discerning truth carries with it philosophical assumptions that was not necessarily shared by everyone in this trial

²⁴¹ This was not a perfect system, not every accusation fit into one of these categories and some fit into two.

²⁴² Th 1, 3, 18, 22, 31, 35, 36. For example, thesis one reads "That baptism's worth is proven thereof, because Christ held himself away from the world until he was thirty years old before he would let himself be baptized" See Appendix A for the Danish.

²⁴³ Th 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, 28-30, 33-55. This is a large category where I included the theses that mentioned one of the 'steps' of the *ordo*. For example, thesis 4 "that God's word, which is spoken before a human's conversion is nothing" or thesis 37 "That a human in sanctification should and could cleanse themselves from all external and internal sins".

²⁴⁴ Th 6, 29, 36, 55. For example, thesis 29 "Self-denial is that one goes into themselves, digs, seeks, looks, ransacks with all diligent and effort the innermost nooks and crannies of the heart until the rock, Christ is found."

²⁴⁵ Th 6-8, 12, 13, 15, 25-27, 32, 34, 54, 56, 57. For example, thesis 15 "He has taught about the inner and outer; that one shall use God's word inwardly and the illumination of God's spirit inwardly, make the meaning of Scripture double, makes a difference between the literal knowledge, which a un-reborn has and the spiritual [knowledge], which the reborn alone have; that he makes the word and the spirit as two different effecting causes."

²⁴⁶ Th 8, 10, 12, 15, 27, 30, 45, 47. For example, thesis 8 "Which misleads the most: doctrine or experience, Fx[?] [take] examples, which are not able to be proven by the text, but are taught by experience".

exchange. This valuing of experience was likely connected to the eclectic philosophical movement involving Christian Thomasius, Buddeus, and Walch.²⁴⁷

Since the Reenburg-Ewald exchange involved so many theses, to get a sense of the tenor of the discussion hidden away in this archived trial, I will briefly discuss three of the theses in relation to the thematic groupings I used above: one related to the sacraments theme, one to the *ordo salutis* and the final one to knowledge of truth *and* experience. The last one I will discuss reflects particularly on the *connection* between knowledge and experience for Ewald and Reenberg. These thematic theses are transcribed in full in Appendix B, and an English translation is given. My transcription groups together the Reenberg-Ewald exchanges on a particular theme to make it easier to grasp the main thread of the argument. It is important to remember that Reenberg's initial accusations were often alleged quotations of Ewald's.

Reflection on the Sacraments: Thesis 3

In the exchange over Reenberg's third thesis against Ewald (see Appendix B), what began as an accusation about Ewald's understanding of the sacraments quickly turned into a short mediation on the nature of understanding, perception, and prejudice. In the exchange, Ewald asked his audience to reflect on hermeneutics (how we approach, interpret and respond to what we hear and read). In Ewald's first response, it seems likely that he was speaking about the sacraments as a means of grace but not as a meritorious practice in and of themselves. Taking part in the sacraments did not mean a person was pleasing to God, as if earning salvific points in their favor. Like Ewald's later comments about judgment and prejudice, the sacraments had a directional duality. They were firstly much more about God's actions towards humans and then secondarily about our response to God's action. Ewald was applying conceptual depth to sacramental theology, rather than viewing it mechanistically or as opaque mysticism, which would amount to mechanical magic.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁷ See, Schneider, "Eclecticism and the History of Philosophy"; Mulsow, "Eclecticism or Skepticism? A Problem of the Early Enlightenment."

²⁴⁸ A further area of exploration might be the wider Danish debate over absolution during these years. Why is it that absolution (not baptism or the eucharist) bothered certain Pietists? I wonder if absolution very

Ewald's appeal to the intellect's role in the true worship of God was paralleled in his appeal to the commission to consider the nature of understanding and meaning, and not merely word choice. He spoke harshly about witnesses who just wanted to find ammunition against him. Not only did they wrench his words out of context, but they had left before his sermon ended! How could they understand Ewald's theology when they were determined not to? Additionally, how could the commission listen to Reenberg's accusations when he had never heard any of Ewald's sermons? Ewald called into question the validity of hearsay in his case, but he also complicated the notion of knowledge as untouched by understanding and (prejudiced) judgment. A person's understanding was dependent in part on their prior attitude towards the speaker. If Ewald positioned God as the "speaker," it followed from his later statements that the listeners' responses (as worship or blasphemy)²⁴⁹ to the sacraments were partly determined by their own attitudes. The mental element could not be overlooked according to Ewald. His observations brought together the thematic topics of sacraments, experience, and knowledge. Knowledge was bound to understanding and judgment, not merely the collecting and regurgitation of facts or phrases. Once this was realized, the divine and salvific knowledge became complicated. This did not mean that knowledge of the divine was the same type of knowledge as historical knowledge or knowledge of this world.²⁵⁰ But

obviously depended on the prior 'attitude' of the supplicant, whereas the Eucharist could be first seen as God's action towards us. The priest can still offer Christ's body to his repentant or unrepentant congregation. It is more difficult to declare one is forgiven if repentance isn't in place. Can this be a real reconciling then?

²⁴⁹ One of the main accusations against Ewald was his unwillingness to allow access to the Eucharist to those he considered un-repentant. He did not want to give out a general forgiveness for sin. (Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6," 290–91.) I do not read this as a devaluation of the sacrament, rather a re-evaluation of the priest's 'power', the nature of forgiveness, and an insistence that one's actual mindset or attitude is crucial in response to God's gift in the sacrament. Ewald is not alone here, for "out of both Pietism and rationalism, new questions emerged regarding the objectivity of the sacraments and the place of faith in subjectively appropriating their benefits." Pless, "Sacraments," 655.

²⁵⁰ There is intellectual tension between Walch and Christian Wolf in terms of how far one can be said to know the being of God vs. know merely the existence of God. The debate is also grounded upon Buddeus's desire to ensure a strong difference between God as an infinite independent spirit and human beings as dependent. Buddeus fears that Wolff only separates God as an object of knowledge by degrees of perfection, not real (perhaps, transcendent) difference. See, Walch and Gleditsch, "Gott."

the human mental element remained, and it was important *how* a person knew, understood, and judged.

Reflection on the *ordo salutis*: Thesis 52

The exchange over Reenberg's Thesis 52 reveals, besides the bitter words and reported personal attacks between the Pietist and Orthodox parties (the exchange refers to other witnesses' descriptions of Ewald and his words), a tension in understanding the extent and importance of sanctification. Was Ewald teaching Christian perfection (as freedom from sin) as either achievable in this life or necessary for salvation? As other exchanges will reveal, Ewald nuanced his understanding of sin and did not claim to teach that Christian perfection was achievable in this life. But a close reading shows that Ewald did not defend Art. 20 of the Augsburg Confession in his first response to Reenberg's Theses 52²⁵¹ but referred only to scripture. How did he understand the relation of sanctification to justification and salvation? Sterotyping the Orthodox Lutheran position as actively forbidding good works went too far for Ewald, but this stereotype helps us understand the tension. Was the debate between Ewald and Reenberg about doing good works as a result of faith? Or was it about the internal and external conditions of the human being that were the subject of sanctification?

Ewald's reference to Theses 37 and 38, which deal with sanctification and the cumulative cleansing from sin, made clear this was a debate about the internal condition of the human being.²⁵² Once this was established, it became a question about whether the internal condition of the human being had an impact on one's understanding of salvation. Was salvation defined in external (legal) terms or also as an internal condition? A positive answer to the latter part of the question necessarily includes a human psychological and anthropological description—how a human being should be.

Reflection on Knowledge and Experience: Thesis 8

²⁵¹ See Appendix B, Reenberg's Thesis 52.

²⁵² See Appendix B, Ewald's second response to Thesis 52.

In the dense exchange about Thesis 8, there are several unclear areas that I will attempt to clarify. How did Reenberg and Ewald define experience and example? By experience, did Reenberg and Ewald mean the “book of nature” (how the world functioned), our phenomenological impressions of everyday living, or the integration of these impressions into our memory, from which judgments arises? Or did the term cover all three? Did the concept of an example refer to an observed action or perceived quality of a person, or did it mean a narrative example versus a moral command or axiom? Ewald and Reenberg linked examples to actions committed by people and their moral character, which was observed by others. Ewald noted this in his final response where he suggested that morally evil people led other people astray, not because of their doctrine but through their ungodly, unloving actions and nature. This response had implications for Ewald’s epistemological understanding, which I will return to shortly.

Read correctly, this exchange reveals a great deal about Ewald’s and Reenberg’s understanding of knowing. Hidden within Ewald’s comments about correct Biblical interpretation were two observations Ewald made: what people knew was influenced by the means through which they learned something (examples versus propositional knowledge) and a person’s moral character influenced their ability to know. Moral degeneration aided theological and intellectual degeneration. Both claims were epistemological in nature and practically concerned with humans’ mental abilities. However, the second one also pointed beyond the method of knowing to something inherent about right, or true, knowledge, according to Ewald. True knowledge was not morally neutral; it was entangled with moral content and depth.²⁵³

²⁵³ One could confine this to theological or spiritual knowledge and thus preserve knowledge of the world as neutral. The other option is to define knowledge more expansively as involving also the subjective understanding of something, not merely the first knowing or sensation of a thing. The modern materialist paradigm that measures knowledge by purely quantitative norms is again coming under suspicion. See, for instance, the philosopher Thomas Nagel's defense of moral realism in *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False* (2012). Nagel is looking for a realist account of value that is non-subjectivist.

For when first such people are, by evil examples, abandoned to the ungodliness (as it happened with the first Christians, they abandoned the first love) so they can easily fall into heretical and erroneous opinions, believing lies 2 Thes 2:10–11. On this they must have themselves persuade many thousands to take by the unreasonable Islamic doctrine. When then the wrong doctrine comes by an ungodly way of life, so such people worsen reasonably quickly.²⁵⁴

Ewald was concerned with theological knowledge (hence his reference to heresy and Islamic doctrine), and he argued that goodness was more inclined towards the truth. Or rather, he argued this *via negativa*: Those who lived ungodly lives were more likely to hold heretical beliefs, not simply because their mind was prejudiced by their own evil (a methodological concern), but because if theological truth was co-extensive with moral goodness, an evil mind would *always* misunderstand theological doctrines. Goodness was part of the nature of the thing known.²⁵⁵ In my view, by making this argument, Ewald went beyond the historical text and drew implicitly upon ancient and medieval notions of the transcendentals. But how else can one make sense of Ewald's reference to the early Christians' departure from their "first love"?²⁵⁶ It is not necessary to require a consistent philosophical framework from Ewald. By assuming some likeness between human love and divine love,²⁵⁷ if one practices the way of love and trusts the scriptural declaration that God is love, must not the first thus reveal or clarify the second?

Reenberg's Latin quotation²⁵⁸ inverted Ewald's order: Knowledge must come before pious action. One might even say that love presupposes knowledge: "we cannot love what we do

²⁵⁴ English translation, see Appendix B. Danish original cited from, "Ewald's Second Response to Reenberg (Unsigned)," 9.

²⁵⁵ This is not merely confined to ancient thought, consider the philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel's recent defense of moral realism and value as an objective quality, Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*, 97–126. Nagel is not quite as optimistic as Plato, value can also be negative, something can be objectively 'bad', but value is part of reality, thus part of what can be objectively known.

²⁵⁶ Possibly a reference to Gottfried Arnold's book *Das Erste Liebe* (1696) about the early church.

²⁵⁷ One need not but it is certainly assumed by the pietist universalists like Seigvolck and Gerhard.

²⁵⁸ *Piè vivere, recte de Deo Doctrinaque Christiana sentire*. See Appendix B.

not know.”²⁵⁹ Yet this axiom assumed the very thing Ewald was arguing for: a world filled with moral depth and coherence, where, for example, it was natural to love justice. The true knowledge of justice always involved an affirmation of the moral goodness of justice. Can a person who does not understand justice as good, can they be really said to know justice?

With this difference of order (which is logically first, love or knowledge?), the Reenberg-Ewald exchange referenced a much older epistemological discussion. However, Reenberg’s citation can be interpreted on a purely authoritarian level (like traditional divine command theory): one must know God and Christian doctrine to know what God wills and thus to be able to do what he wills. It is not clear whether Ewald’s theory about heresy actively worked against the Augustinian axiom (the role of experience and the spirit’s movement of the Christian play a role in foregrounding “knowing”), but it definitely disregarded an extreme voluntarist version of divine command theory.

2.4 Final Thoughts on Reenberg, Kaasbøll, and Ewald

If one sets aside the political and cultural implications of the Pietist-Orthodox tensions, there is still reason to examine the theological arguments and debates that instigated this trial. Since I am unable to address all of them, I have categorized Reenberg’s theses and counter responses to Ewald in order to outline the main thrust of his accusations. While he also addressed eschatological issues and heresies in his accusations, he was overwhelmingly concerned with Ewald’s use of and teaching on the *ordo salutis*.²⁶⁰ For Reenberg, good works/actions must not come before faith or replace faith. This Pelagian/Socinian, or works-orientated, reading of Pietist theology was echoed in Bishop Trellund’s “impartial theological thoughts” about the scriptural parallels in the Vajsenhus Bible (1732).²⁶¹ Trellund took issue with eschatological topics, but in Parallel 11 he censured that Bible for associating sanctifying

²⁵⁹ See Michael Hanby’s discussion of this theme in Augustine, *Augustine and Modernity*, 65.

²⁶⁰ I am using this term here as a catch-all for conversion, purification, sanctification, repentance, faith, good works, rebirth, etc...

²⁶¹ “J. Trellunds ‘Upartiske Theologiske Tanker.’” This is the same Bible that Kaasbøll mentioned as suspect in his opening remarks at Ewald’s trial, see above.

faith (*den Saliggjørende Troe*) with “new obedience” (a Socinian doctrine in Trellund’s view), instead of with the certain apprehension of Christ’s merits.²⁶² Other major concerns for Reenberg were the correct use of the sacraments, the nature of knowledge, and the role of experience in the spiritual life.

Was there a common thread in the Kaasbøll-Reenberg-Ewald disagreements? Or were Kaasbøll’s and Reenberg’s major concerns more a scatter-shot attack against Ewald? I want to suggest the former. There is a way of reading these Orthodox Lutheran concerns that also takes seriously the eschatological disputes (the conversion of the Jews, chiliasm, but most importantly universalism). The traditional eschatological perspective of heaven and hell in the straightforward sense relies on a binary destination or destiny. This destiny is present in the living human as a state of grace (by means of sanctifying faith) or a state of non-grace. In Trellund’s (and Reenberg’s) understanding, this sanctifying faith resulted in good works (the fruit of faith). But what I am asking is how someone like Trellund envisioned the completion of that sanctifying faith. Are good works as the fruit of faith reflective of an inherent change, healing, and sanctification in the Christian? If not, they may always be present in the Christian, but they do not, strictly speaking, affect one’s ultimate destiny. They are not an “efficient” cause of salvation. In terms of the eschatological issues at play, there is less need to speculate about the individual’s state *post mortem* because sanctifying faith in this life has already guaranteed one’s destiny.

But what happens to this picture when the *ordo salutis* requires a perfect holiness and sanctification, or put another way, the complete casting off of sin?²⁶³ Even if Ewald did not see good works in an efficient, or meritorious, sense, the presence of those good works might

²⁶² Trellund gives this in Latin (*fiducialis apprehensio meriti Christi sine operibus*) and Danish (*Christi fortænestes tilforladelige Tilegnelse*). The Latin explicitly denies the presence of works in sanctifying faith. See Parallel 11 (linking Gal 5:6 and Matt 12:50), “J. Trellunds ‘Upartiske Theologiske Tanker,’” 11–12.

²⁶³ There is no need to tie this into a perfect holiness by human effort, the same question is asked by Ludwig Gerhard in the context of the *appropriation* of Christ’s merits. See chapter six.

reveal the internal state of the believer/reborn.²⁶⁴ The fruits of one's faith might affirm that one was being sanctified and casting off sin. The binary language about being reborn, or being in a state of grace, as compared to being un-reborn remains in Pietist literature,²⁶⁵ yet advancing towards perfect holiness, or perfect healing from sin (sanctification), was about psychological or perhaps existential vulnerability. There could be no psychological certainty that one existed in a state of grace and that one's final destination was secure no matter what one did. It was no longer adequate (if it every truly was) to consider good works an accidental fruit of faith. This vision of perfect holiness demanded more. And human experience demonstrated that even the reborn failed to achieve perfection in this life. It is not surprising to me that an insistence on inherent holiness, or realized sanctification, began to force theologians to reconsider purgatory²⁶⁶ and to desire a guarantee that the sanctifying and perfecting work would not be abandoned until it had reached its fullness.²⁶⁷ If the end, or fullness, of sanctification is not reached in this present life; what about elsewhere?

This purgatorial discussion was in the realm of speculation and not experience. It can be claimed that such perfection could occur at once post mortem, but this solution was not

²⁶⁴ It seems clear from Ewald's argument about the true worship of God vs the external worship of God (see discussion of Thesis 3) that he does not view external actions as meritorious.

²⁶⁵ The chiliastic and universalist vision one finds in Paul Siegelvolck reveals how a certain dualism remains even within his universalism (between the first-born and the after-born). See chapter six and Robin Parry's description of Siegelvolck's universalism in Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*.

²⁶⁶ The English scholar Thomas White (1593-1687) defended Purgatory from this standpoint in *The middle state of souls* (1659). Both the Catholic church and English Parliament censured the book, but a German translation by Gottfried Arnold (*Betrachtung Von dem Mittleren Zustand der Seelen, Nach ihrem Abschied aus dem Leibe*) appeared 1703. McKenzie, *A Catalog of British Devotional and Religious Books in German Translation from the Reformation to 1750*, 429. I must admit this translation deserves more investigation since White's treatise is 260 pages with a limited amount of English text on each page and Arnold's version is 468 pages. It seems likely to me that if Arnold's is a translation of White's, it has been substantially supplemented.

²⁶⁷ I will return to this theme in the chapter 6. It is a major point by Ludwig Gerhard about how God's constant faithfulness is the promise that encourages the believer on the path of sanctification. Gerhard assumes one must be fully sanctified, but he clearly understands this as a process. The key factor here is God's patience.

accepted by all, hence the need for purgatory in the first place.²⁶⁸ If sanctification was not accomplished in this life in an instant, one could imagine the continuation of the process post mortem as the Pietist universalist Gerhard did.²⁶⁹ It was not only Early Modern advocates of *apokatastasis* who posited human activity post mortem. Even in some arguments for eternal punishment in hell, there was the sense that a human being acted rather than remained passive. They must continue to earn their place in hell by constant blasphemy and hatred of God.²⁷⁰ Thus, the continued activity of the human being was assumed and required.

Hidden in these debates over the *ordo* in Pietism were concerns about human activity in general: what role did the human being play in salvation? More speculatively, were the concerns about the “extension” of human activity post mortem. My analysis of this trial has identified three main contemporary concerns of this trial: the eschatological disputes, concerns about the *ordo salutis* in Pietism, and the role of experience in theology. In the rest of the dissertation, I will investigate and describe Ewald’s understanding of the *ordo salutis* before returning to human experience and activity (Chapters 4 and 5). Finally, in chapter six, the last chapter on the Early Modern context, I will discuss eschatology. I have already suggested that these issues are interconnected. This dissertation will look to flesh out that claim.

²⁶⁸ Erik Pontoppidan affirms the need for an intermediate place (*Middelstand*) as a place of spiritual improvement *if* it is impossible to improve from one degree to another towards perfect bliss after the final resurrection. Pontoppidan is not a universalist in the treatise. Pontoppidan, *Tractat om Sielens Udødelighed samt dens Tilstand i og efter Døden, stadfæstet ved Guds Ord og den sunde Fornuft*, 319–21.

²⁶⁹ Again, see chapter six.

²⁷⁰ Walch argues this at one point during his lengthy rebuttal (200 pages) of Gerhard's universalism. See, Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:318–20.

Chapter 3: Ordo Salutis (Saligheds Orden) in Ewald's theology

3.1 Introduction

My analysis of Ewald's treatment of the *ordo salutis* is loosely organized around the *ordo* structure from Ewald's catechisms—his earliest publications. I examine not only the term *Saligheds Orden* (order of salvation) but also the terminology for the different parts of the *ordo*. I also consider the place of the *ordo* in relation to catechisms' overall structure. I draw Ewald's pedagogical purpose from the texts themselves, and I assume a lay audience in my analysis.²⁷¹ The first part of this chapter outlines the *ordo* as presented in Ewald's first catechism. His *ordo* introduced overarching theological and philosophical issues, some stated explicitly in the text and others are implicit in his assumptions about human nature and grace. A further breakdown of the three main parts of Ewald's *ordo* (conversion, faith, sanctification) follow this short introduction. Ewald's extended explanation of the *ordo* and his usage of connected terminology (for example, conversion) is more fully described in these following sections—3.3, 3.4, 3.5. I draw upon Ewald's second catechism and his sermon series, *Det Gamle og Nye Testamentes herlige Harmonie* (1744-1750). I conclude with a brief discussion about the questions that Ewald's *ordo* raises before moving on to the second half of this dissertation in which I offer some solutions to these questions from the Early Modern historical context. This discussion arises from my above analysis of Ewald's trial before the 1733–34 royal commission, in which the *ordo salutis* was central. A secondary aim in this section is to describe the theology and texts of this Pietist priest to a wider audience who lack access to his Danish texts.

3.2 Ewald's catechisms and the structure of his *ordo salutis*

Ewald's two early catechisms are entitled *True Christianity's right foundation in the living and sanctifying knowledge of God and Jesus Christ. that is, the foremost, clearest, and most powerful verses of the entire Holy Scriptures ordered by the Catechism so that also the simplest by the grace of God can achieve a basic, powerful, and close knowledge of all the*

²⁷¹ As mentioned in chapter one, a very recent article on Ewald's theology has argued for understanding Ewald's sermons as a tool for self-examination and testing of one's faith (a key Pietist and Puritan theme). See, Christensen, "Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram."

things that belong to faith, piety, and blessedness. Given particularly for the use of the simple and the young by one who loves their blessedness (1720), hereafter *Rette Grundvold*²⁷² and *Beginning elements in the Word of God, that is, Luther's little catechism authored with simple though clear and close explication in short questions and answers according to the instruction of God's Word. To the end that one thereof might seek and receive a living knowledge of the things that are required of anyone who will be blessed* (1721), hereafter *Begyndelses Elementer*.²⁷³

Ewald's catechisms were published in Jutland before Ewald became priest at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus and presumably soon after he returned from his theological studies in Jena. Both refer to the living and sanctifying knowledge of Christ. The first catechism (*Rette Grundvold*) consists mainly of scriptural quotations divided under headings. The publication of the second catechism (*Begyndelses Elementer*) so close on the heels of the first suggests the scriptural quotation format was a pedagogical misstep.²⁷⁴ Still, the format makes scripture its key focus, and the second catechism treats the first as its point of reference. Ewald's preface to the *Rette Grundvold* catechism expressed concern that many people did not, or could not, read the Bible in an edifying manner.²⁷⁵ The *Rette Grundvold* catechism was a pedagogical tool such that one could be enabled to use both the parish priest's sermons and the Bible for the purpose of edification (*opbyggelse*). Despite the subtitle, Ewald noted that the catechism was intended for both young people and advanced learners.²⁷⁶ In his introduction, he wrote that the book required heartfelt fear and serious prayer to achieve its true "use, edification, comfort, and enjoyment."²⁷⁷ Its focus was the practical aspects and purpose of theology, but

²⁷² See Appendix D for the full Danish title, Hereafter, *Rette Grundvold* or RG

²⁷³ See Appendix D for the full Danish title, Hereafter, *Begyndelses Elementer* or BE

²⁷⁴ Ewald's preface to the second catechism (*Begyndelses Elementer*) indicates that the format of the first catechism (*Rette Grundvold*) was a little too confusing. This is how he justifies reformatting it into a question-and-answer form. Ewald, BE 2.

²⁷⁵ Ewald, RG 3.

²⁷⁶ Ewald, RG 4.

²⁷⁷ *Nytte/Obyggelse/Trøst og Fornøjelse*. Ewald, RG 5.

at the same time, the practical required a particular disposition and attitude of the reader.²⁷⁸ There was an implicit hermeneutical theory at work in Ewald's catechisms that recognized the reader as "pre-formed": the reader or listener always came to the text with certain intentions that were (partially) determinative of the catechism's effectiveness—as I also discuss above.

3.2.1 Introducing the *Ordo*

Ewald first mentioned an order in the first section of the *Rette Grundvold* catechism, which explained that the Bible was given for humanity's salvation.²⁷⁹ He used the term *Saligheds Orden* (in which humanity shall come to faith and salvation) following his discussion of the Law.²⁸⁰ The section on the *ordo* was preceded, however, by a discussion about the ten commandments and how they led to death: spiritually (in the hardening of the heart), bodily (in bodily misery in this world), and eternally (damnation). Already in this section on the closing remarks on the ten commandments, Ewald raised the theme of conversion²⁸¹ as a

²⁷⁸ Ewald follows similar reasoning in his responses to Reenberg's thesis 3, when he mentions how people who come to hear his sermons in order to find evidence against him are pre-disposed to misunderstand him. See my discussion in chapter 2 and Appendix B.

²⁷⁹ ...til deris Salighed (*i Omvendelsens og Troens Orden*). Ewald, RG 8.

²⁸⁰ Ewald, RG 119. I usually capitalize Law to indicate the Mosaic Law (specifically the moral law, not the civil or ceremonial law) and to distinguish it from human positive laws. At times I use law in a manner that is synonymous with virtue or the good moral life—the purpose of the moral Law. This dissertation does not explore whether Ewald has a legal theory or treats even human laws as a reflection of the Divine Law.

²⁸¹ Ewald RG 108-112. Danish: *Omvendelse*, this is a technical term in Danish Pietism that I render as conversion, but it should be noted that conversion for the early modern Lutheran tradition has connotations of repentance within it. Strom, *German Pietism and the Problem of Conversion*, 8–9. In his book on Pietism and conversion, Strom discusses three major ways that the term conversion has been understood in historical research, namely, conversion from one religion to another (often as a group), cross-confessional conversions and conversion as intensification, such that one's "faith becomes qualitatively different", Strom, 3. Strom, however, argues that Pietists would have rejected "an interpretation of their personal conversion as merely a kind of intensification" Strom, 4. He also notes that these categorizations in the study of conversion have meant that "scholars especially marginalize what Karl Morrison describes as the 'supernatural' aspect of religious conversion that nearly all medieval and early modern acts would have identified as the essential precondition of authentic conversion, and it particularly excludes attention to inner-Christian forms of conversion as intensification." Strom, 5. 12/21/2021 6:57:00 PM Strom's observations here serve to justify

response to this situation. Moreover, he wrote, in response to conversion, a “common payment of grace” had been promised not only as a heavenly prize but as a “spiritual life” on earth. The second catechism, *Rette Grundvold*, defined this spiritual life as union with God,²⁸² but in the first *Begyndelses Elementer* catechism, Ewald merely cited 2 Peter 1:5–10 on the building up of Christian virtues. After describing the rewards of conversion, Ewald wrote about the “manner and way to salvation,” asserting the centrality of the Law and upholding it by means of faith in Christ. Ewald made clear that the Law had never been abolished (holiness was still required), only its imposed nature (*tvang*) had been.²⁸³ By this he meant that human actions according to the Law were done intentionally by the human. Already the *Rette Grundvold* catechism pointed to an understanding of the Law, where moral actions were to be undertaken *freely* (see my discussion in Chapter 5). Only at this point did Ewald begin the section titled *Saligheds Orden*.

Introducing the *ordo* in light of the pedagogical purpose of the catechism suggests that any analysis of Ewald’s *ordo salutis* must take into account the arguments and preceding structure leading up to his usage of the term.²⁸⁴ Ewald’s treatment of the Law culminated in his linking

paying closer attention to the theological and philosophical issues at hand. Strom’s historical investigation problematizes the assumption that early Pietism required a specific conversion moment or experience. Storm argues this assumption stems from a reading of Francke’s autobiography with its conversion experience as normative for all of early Pietism, Strom, 27. My takeaway is that Strom’s arguments justify paying closer attention to the theological understanding of conversion for Pietists and the philosophical implications in discussing a ‘supernatural’ aspect. The supernatural as making a ‘real’ or actual difference explains the importance of their understanding of grace. See chapter four for further discussion.

²⁸² Ewald, BE 48.

²⁸³ Ewald, RG 116-119.

²⁸⁴ This basic structure, even if simply and un-fleshed out at this point, becomes a useful tool in the absence of a longer dogmatic theology. The older tendency to dismiss Pietist writers as not concerning with doctrine (see, Jörg Baur’s pronouncement that with pietism, “*wir es nicht in erster Linie mit einem Phänomen der Theologie, sondern mit einer Gestimmtheit der Frömmigkeit zu tun bekommen, die sich zudem in einen Mehrzahl von Strömungen ausfächert.*” Baur, “*Salus Christiana: Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Der Geschichte Des Christlichen Heilsverständnisses,*” 87.) which, from a historical perspective, risks missing out discussing the theological vision presented and available at a non-academic level. Baur goes on to explicitly label Pietism as untheological, especially in comparison to ‘*wissenschaftliche Theologie*’. In my view, Baur’s assessment is

three concepts: *imago dei*, holiness (1 Pet 1:16), and conversion.²⁸⁵ But for Ewald the teacher, it was not enough to tie these concepts together and then proceed to the *ordo*. Rather, he explained the consequences of the Law (death in various senses) and the solution (the rewards of grace, which were offered because of God's goodness).²⁸⁶ Ewald explicitly linked the rewards of grace to virtue and good actions in the present life ("thus God rewards either immediately especially in the spiritual...and the eternal").²⁸⁷ The use of the word *spiritual* carries religious connotations, but for Ewald, it also entailed the nonphysical aspect of human life and experience.²⁸⁸ He could not simply equate the non-material aspect of human life with moral action, ethics, or psychology as if these were *a priori* theologically neutral topics.²⁸⁹ To speak of spiritual rewards (in contrast to eternal rewards), for Ewald, was to speak of psychological changes for the better. This section, "The conclusion of the 10

dated and mistakes the form of academic discussion or treatises as the only way to be a proper theologian. Douglas Shantz notes that Philip Spener's theology has received comparatively little attention because he wrote sermons and letters, not systematic theologies. (Shantz, *An Introduction to German Pietism: Protestant Renewal at the Dawn of Modern Europe*, 94.) Also historically speaking, Pietist thought is important simply for understanding the historical impact of Pietism. In Norway, for example, the Pietist catechism by Erik Pontoppidan becomes, in effect, the lay dogmatic theology (Aarflot, *Hans Nielsen Hauge: Liv Og Budskap*, 49.).²⁸⁵ Ewald, RG 107.

²⁸⁶ The healing aspect here as a major Pietist theme will be discussed in the following chapters, particularly in relation to Buddeus' moral theology.

²⁸⁷ *Saaledes belønner Gud enten Umiddelbar fornemlig i det Aandelige...og Evige*, Ewald, RG 115.

²⁸⁸ Compare the three deaths Ewald describes (spiritual as related to the hardening of heart and despair, bodily as related to bodily misery, and eternal). Ewald, RG 109-110.

²⁸⁹ This is the key argument in Stephen Long's analysis of Wesley and moral theology. Long is resisting anachronistic readings of Wesley's ethics. See, Long, *John Wesley's Moral Theology: The Quest for God and Goodness*. It is an anachronistic description given that psychology (as a self-defined academic discipline) develops only in the late 1700s. Matthew Bell notes that psychology existed as a subset of anthropology before this establishment. (Bell, *The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700-1840*, 12.) His book offers a genealogy of psychology's origin in Germany but does not mention Buddeus, nor treat Pietism much at all. Hidden in the journal *Dansk Medicinhistorisk Årbog* is Steffen Arndal's interesting discussion of competing Pietist understandings of the human being as either body and soul or body, soul and spirit, Arndal, "Krop, Sjæl Og Ånd Georg Ernst Stahls Og Christian Friedrich Richters Medicinske Antropologi." Arndal connects Richter's 'piety psychology' to Richter's medical anthropology, which fits in Bell's historical discussion.

commandments,” made it clear that the three linked terms, *imago dei*, holiness, and conversion, were tied into the practice of virtue. Ewald did not use traditional terms like *status integritatis* and *status gratiæ*, but the traditional division ought to be brought to mind.²⁹⁰ This is not to deny eschatological hope in the text, merely to stress that for Ewald, the spiritual reward of grace was also available in the present life (and seen in good actions).

Ewald’s claim made the following section of the *Rette Grundvold* catechism (“On the manner and way to salvation”)²⁹¹ less harsh with its focus on the non-abolition of the Law. Ewald did not see himself as describing an impossible and damning system. Instead, one can read the Law section as an alternative description of *ordo salutis*, with a focus on the present life rather than on the eternal reward. The purpose of the Law was righteousness and salvation, even though it was impossible to achieve 'naturally' because of sin. Still, believers were saved (*salig*)²⁹² by faith in Christ for the end, or *telos*, of holiness (and the holy life), which was the Law upheld freely (i.e., without force).²⁹³ Ewald argued for a realist understanding of the Christian life, virtue, and action. I am not claiming that at this point Ewald had articulated a fully formed metaphysical realism, but in a simple way, it was clear that the Christians’ (or “repentant sinners”) responsibility to the Law did not vanish for Ewald (“For the law is not

²⁹⁰ Ewald is following a long Christian tradition here. Augustine speaks of the fourfold states of man in relation to sin in his *Enchiridion* and in the early modern period, the Scot Thomas Boston published *Human Nature in its Fourfold State* (1720) which used the labels: primitive integrity, entire depravity, begun recovery, consummate happiness (or misery). Boston's book went through many editions. It is also in the legal discussion of the time where the depth of human corruption (*status corruptionis*) is under dispute. (Hunter et al., *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany*, 133.). The four states of human nature are still referenced in contemporary reflections, see Timpe, *Free Will in Philosophical Theology*, 113–14. Additionally, Sigrid Nielsby Christensen essentially describes the four states in Ewald's theology as "the original condition, the natural condition, conversion and sanctification" (*urtilstanden, den natulige tilstand, omvendelsen og helliggørelsen.*) Christensen, “Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram,” 25. She does not connect these to the larger theological tradition, except for a reference to Francke's *Selv-Prøvelses Fornødenhed* (1732).

²⁹¹ *Om Maaden og Veyen til Salighed*, Ewald, RG 116.

²⁹² A better translation might be bliss.

²⁹³ Ewald, RG 116-119.

abolished by faith”).²⁹⁴ Moreover, there needed to be a (natural/actual) correlation between the subject, the subject’s action, and the subject’s identity/end, that is, the subject needed to follow the Law willingly.

Let us briefly step away from Ewald’s text to understand what he meant. This understanding of the believer’s new relation to the Law finds similar articulation in certain English Antinomian circles from the 1600s. David R. Como notes that

all surviving early Stuart antinomian texts maintained that true believers would, in reality, obey God’s will, despite the fact that they were free from the Law. Each and every figure...argued that the faithful would do good works. Their good works, however, would be done not out of external compulsion, but by virtue of a new, internalized principle that flowed from true belief.²⁹⁵

Ewald did not speak of being free from the Law but shared the sense that the believer would follow the Law willingly. This focus on the freedom of the will was important for the *ordo* and will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. But here I want to also draw upon certain insights about internal and external motivations from the Catholic philosophical theologian, D. C. Schindler. Schindler describes the role of freedom and the will in John Locke’s thought and accuses Locke of separating the external and internal determining factors of the will, such that the good no longer determines the will in an *a priori*, transcendent manner (“from above” as Schindler says). Schindler writes that following the classical understanding of freedom,

[i]f the good determines the will in some sense “from above,” there cannot be any facile separation between outside and inside, between the transcendent (or “absent”) and the immanent (or “present”), or, what follows from this, between obligation and desire. We described the “action” of the classically conceived good on the will as attraction, and of course this is simply a description from the other side, as it were, of internal desire. But insofar as this action implies that the will is measured by the good, it is at the very same time a description of “obligation.”²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ *Thi Loven afskaffes ikke ved Troen*. Ewald, RG 118.

²⁹⁵ Como, *Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War England*, 36.

²⁹⁶ Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*, 33–34.

In his simple fashion, Ewald argued in the same manner as Schindler, although Ewald limited this understanding to the reborn believer. The carrying out of the Law (at least for the true believer) happened ostensibly without force because the believer was 'internally' attracted by its holiness and desired to do good works. Equally, one can never abolish the Law because the Law itself was "given for righteousness and bliss."²⁹⁷ The content of one's action correlated to one's desired end.

The problem with this interpretation I have presented is the potential for misinterpretation of Ewald's first catechism. Ewald writes that the Law's force was abolished and that one was driven by the Spirit instead. I read this force as an external obligation and the Spirit's driving, not as an imposition upon the will, but as the freeing of the will to recognize and respond in desire to the Law's goodness, that is, its attractiveness.²⁹⁸ But if one reads even the internal driving of the Spirit as a limitation of one's freedom to fully determine themselves, Ewald was speaking nonsense. When freedom is defined as an absolute or spontaneous ability to determine oneself, any law must be an imposition of the freedom that was promised the Christian or any sense of internal influence (motivation) would automatically negate the voluntariness of the action. These tensions over human freedom and divine-human causal interaction will find historical contextualization in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.2.2 Structure of the *Ordo*

It is immediately apparent that Ewald interpreted the *ordo* as formed around the experience of the human subject. Ewald's *ordo salutis* section contained three parts, with several subsections: conversion,²⁹⁹ faith in Christ,³⁰⁰ and a holy life/way of living.³⁰¹ It is not clear from the *Rette Grundvold* catechism whether he read this division as chronologically sequential. A

²⁹⁷ *Loven er vel given til Retferdighed og Salighed*. Ewald, RG 116.

²⁹⁸ Ewald, RG 119.

²⁹⁹ Ewald, RG 120-123.

³⁰⁰ Ewald, RG 123-128.

³⁰¹ Ewald, RG 128-133. Danish: *et helligt levnet*, "Life, Way or Manner of Living" (Christian Friderich, *Fuldstændigt Dansk Og Engelsk Haand-Lexicon*, 536.). This term cannot be reduced to a biological property but carries within it elements of time, action, and conscious/unconscious intention.

logical order is also possible, since the Danish is either a misprint or an antiquated expression that I am unfamiliar with (“Concerning conversion, which goes [before/for] faith—this consists in a changing of the mind”).³⁰² Ewald’s experiential orientation supports a reading that allows for both a logical sequence (technically, the mind must be changed if faith is considered a mental action on the part of the human subject) and a loose temporal ordering. The anthropological approach requires a notion of time because “a holy life” is a human life and way of living.³⁰³ We are not God; we live in a temporal unfolding of life.

In the section on conversion, Ewald listed several requirements for conversion, which “consists of a changing of the mind [*sind*]”:³⁰⁴ the knowledge of sin and God’s wrath, “regret and contrition or a divine sorrow/melancholy,”³⁰⁵ hating sin and a new purpose, and a hunger and thirst for righteousness.³⁰⁶ Despite Ewald’s focus on the human mind and temperament, he made clear from the start that conversion was the work of God (*Guds Gierning*). Ewald did not elaborate on this phrase, but it hints at a major theological and conceptual dilemma of this dissertation also named above: namely, the question of agency in the relation of God to the world. Either this phrase was an intellectual issue for Ewald (and by extension for Danish Pietism and Early Modern thought) that deserves an explication or it expressed a logical contradiction and pious commonplace. The answers that Ewald and his fellow Pietists gave will be discussed more below and in Chapter 4.³⁰⁷

In the section “Faith in Christ,” Ewald called faith a gift of God and listed three aspects of faith: divine knowledge, divine assent, and divine trust.³⁰⁸ They correspond to the tradition in

³⁰² *Om Omvendelsen som gaar for Troen. Dend bestaar i en Sinds Forandring*, Ewald, RG 120.

³⁰³ Ewald uses the word *levnet* in the title of his section on sanctification (*Om et helligt Levnet*) which translates roughly as way of life or manner of living. Ewald, BE 55. See also section 3.5.

³⁰⁴ *Dend bestaar i en Sinds Forandring*, Ewald, RG 120.

³⁰⁵ *Anger og Reuelse ell[er] en Gudelig Bedrøvelse*. Ewald, RG 121.

³⁰⁶ Ewald, RG 122-123.

³⁰⁷ See also my article, Lied, “Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on ‘Grace and Nature’ Influenced Danish Pietism.”

³⁰⁸ *en gudelig Kundskab...en gudelig Samtykke...En gudelig Tillid*, Ewald, RG 124.

Melanchthon and most Lutheran Orthodoxy: *notitia, assensus, and fiducia*.³⁰⁹ Ewald's comments following this division suggest a dissatisfaction with Lutheran epistemology. For Ewald, faith was not merely concerned with historical knowledge: "the natural knowledge and assent and fleshly certainty [*sikkerhed*, instead of *tillid*]." ³¹⁰ Rather, faith had several characteristics: it always grew, it was active, the believer (the one who had faith) did not sin, and its fruit was a holy life.³¹¹ It is apparent why Ewald faced accusations of perfectionism in the lead up to the trial and why Ewald was careful to insist that if faith was lost it could be regained through a true conversion.³¹² This raises several other questions: what did it mean for a believer not to sin? How did historical knowledge contrast to Ewald's "divine knowledge"? In what way did faith bring about a holy life? The last two questions express the text's lack of clarity about Ewald's understanding of faith in particular but also human action in general. From a philosophical standpoint is activity in contrast to non-activity or to Aristotelean potentiality? Is it a binary distinction or one that allows degrees? Ewald's statement that faith must grow hints at a notion of becoming within the life of faith, rather than a stasis, or faith as an "object." Yet the language of losing faith and re-gaining faith paints a stronger duality and polarity, a being versus non-being of faith as an object, or as a condition of the subject. All of these tensions need further explication even if a catechism text is not expected to be a philosophical treatise.

Ewald did not connect faith as closely to pure emotion (regret, hatred) in the *ordo* as he did conversion.³¹³ Yet Ewald's treatment of the experiential aspect of faith quickly developed into

³⁰⁹ Matthias terms this model as the Aristotelian-Melanchthonian, which already brings with it a certain type of anthropological understanding. Matthias' article details the historical shift of emphasis in this anthropology (from the intellect to the will). Matthias, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy," 38.

³¹⁰ *Saaledis falder den naturlige Kundskab og Samtrykke og kiødlige Sikkerhed bort som er en historisk og falsk Troe*. Ewald, RG 125.

³¹¹ Ewald refers his readers to the additional sections on sanctification (under the third article of faith about the Holy Spirit) and the fruits of the faith (under the second article of faith about Christ).

³¹² Ewald, RG 125-128.

³¹³ I am not collapsing conversion into emotions, merely noting how Pietist conversion is more easily classified as an empirical phenomenon. One simply cannot ignore the anthropological framework which 'processes' the phenomenon.

a reflection on the holy life and a (self-)conscious awareness of it. Ewald mentioned that the holy life was a mark (*kiendetegn*) of faith and that one must test oneself.³¹⁴ This self-reflection has been described as anxiety about one's election.³¹⁵ The literary historian Erik Nielsen, however, comments that this reflection entailed a doubling of the self. He describes this practice as a hermeneutic, or reading two texts together: Christian mythology (Adam and Christ as ur-figures) and personal life history.³¹⁶ Both of these understandings of this reflection assume that faith and the life of the believer include an intellectual meditation not merely on the articles of faith, but also on one's self. Ewald included this in his section on faith, even though it seemed actually to be a discussion of the holy life/way-of-living. This suggests that, for Ewald, faith was always concerned with the believer's own life, not merely an intellectual assent to certain facts that had no bearing on one's circumstances. The mental act of faith was not his principal focus, although he was careful to describe the holy life as the consequence (not cause) of faith; the two were intertwined in his theological system.

In Ewald's discussion of the final stage of the *ordo salutis*, which he titled "Concerning a holy life [*levnet*] or good works,"³¹⁷ he referred to the Law/Ten Commandments (from his previous section) as belonging to the holy life. Ewald upheld the Law and just as he had written in the section "the manner and way to salvation," in the final section he wrote that the holy life, that is, following the Law, was not a matter of coercion but was lived freely and fully with desire and solemnity.³¹⁸ I am combining here his section headlines that he supported with various scriptural passages. Ewald suggested that to be free to do something involved an element of desiring to do that action. The adult who enjoyed their roasted asparagus is freer

³¹⁴ Ewald, RG 127-128. See also Christensen, "Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram."

³¹⁵ This is especially true within the earlier Puritan tradition. See, Fuchs et al., *Religious Individualisation: Historical Dimensions and Comparative Perspectives*, 1386; Hindmarsh, *The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England*, 36–38. In the Lutheran context, the language is about faith, rather than election. That this can lead to worry and anxiety is clear also for Danish Pietism, where a follower of Ewald finally broke with Pietism because of her melancholy over the expectations of perfection. Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6," 293–94.

³¹⁶ Nielsen, *Solens Fødsel: Seks Tekster Om Kristendommens Hemmeligheder*, 148.

³¹⁷ Ewald, RG 128.

³¹⁸ Ewald, RG 129-130.

than the child only eats it after being bribed with the promise of ice cream. If the child could refuse to eat it, technically it is not forced upon them even if the ice cream was forfeited. In a binary understanding, both the adult's and child's eating of the asparagus are voluntary actions, but in a nuanced understanding, the adult's action is 'freer' than the child's because the adult *liked* to eat the asparagus. I will return to this theme in Chapter 5.

Like Ewald's comments on the growth of faith, his description of upholding the Law—or to do good works—entailed a sense of development; one's actions became more and more perfect (*Altid fuldkommelig*).³¹⁹ Finally, he returned to the requirement that the holy life, or good works, happened through faith in Christ and love of God and neighbor. This treatment of moral action was not a theologically neutral ethic.³²⁰ Ewald concluded the section with an assertion that a person received the power and ability to do all this by faith in Christ and pointed the reader to another section, "On power from Christ" (*Om Kraft af Christo*).³²¹ Ewald's understanding of power and ability in this section was a pivotal point given his emphasis on a believer's ability to uphold the fullness of the law. Ewald made it clear he understood this in an active or actual (i.e., not forensic) manner, hence also his comment about greater and greater perfection.

Ewald's formal discussion of the *ordo salutis* is incomplete without a further understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit (especially as related to sanctification), his doctrine of grace, and his Christology. Even from this rudimentary theological framework of his catechisms, it is clear that the *ordo* was pivotal for Ewald's theology. While the *ordo* is incomplete in itself as a theological system, Ewald used the *ordo* and its relation to human experience to ground many

³¹⁹ Ewald, RG 131.

³²⁰ By this I mean, Ewald is not setting up a standard of good works that can simply be done and considered good actions. The actions must be 'hallowed' by the virtues of humility, faith, and love of God and humanity. This is more explicit in his second catechism, where he asks "which are then the main virtues which shall hallow all our works and make them pleasing to God?" (*Hvilke da vel de Hoved-Dyder / som skal hellige alle vore Gierninger og gjøre dem behagelige for Gud?*) Ewald, BE 56.

³²¹ This exact section does not exist. I suspect that Ewald is referring either to the entire section on "The diverse use of Christ's Office as Mediator" (Ewald, RG 183-190), or more specifically one of its sub-sections "Power of faith and the Spiritual Union" (*Kraft af Troen og den Aandelige Foreenelse*), Ewald, RG 189-190.

of the discussions in his two catechisms, from which he led the readers to other theological subjects. Any attempt to define Ewald's *ordo salutis* in a manner that limits an investigation to the usage of the term or a single sequence as Markus Matthias or certain early modern Protestant historians did,³²² ignores how Ewald's text hints at the inadequacy of an investigation.³²³ On the other hand, to disregard the term and focus only on the first step (conversion)—as research on Pietism has sometimes done—is to mistake the historical popularity of the idea of conversion for its place within a much more complex theological structure.³²⁴ Such a step misses the role of moral theology, questions about the purpose of the holy life, and the discussions about grace, which are vital for Ewald's theology.

3.3 Conversion: *Omvendelse* and the Holy Spirit's Call: *Vocatio*

As I attempt to flesh out Ewald's notion of conversion (drawing on his wider corpus and not just the catechisms), a few remarks about the *ordo* in this expanded setting are in order. I have shown that Ewald's first catechism, *Rette Grundvold*, named and presented a simple *ordo* from the perspective of the human subject (the anthropological turn).³²⁵ But this was an incomplete depiction and functioned best as a pedagogical tool guiding the reader to other theological doctrines (the Law, the role of the Holy Spirit, Christology). There is a logical and temporal progression within Ewald's simple *ordo*, but this progression is both fluid (there is the possibility of repeating one's conversion) and overlapping (faith is not a temporal step

³²² I refer here to Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs." I am also thinking of Kaasbøll's worry that Ewald was confounding the acts of grace, see my discussion in chapter 2. For a good summary of the early modern discussion and criticism of the *ordo*, see Fesko, *Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700)*, 20:53–101.

³²³ Also missing from this basic structure are a variety of terms that are generally associated with other versions of the *ordo*, such as calling (*vocation/Guds Naades Kald*), illumination (*illuminatio/opsyning*), re-birth (*igienfødelse*) and renewal (*fornyselse*). These terms appear in other areas of Ewald's writings in ways that overlap or are preconditions for the *ordo*, particularly connected with the work of the Holy Spirit. This will be explored below.

³²⁴ See especially, Strom, *German Pietism and the Problem of Conversion*; Matthias, "Bekehrung Und Wiedergeburt."

³²⁵ I refer here to the notion that "ever since the anthropological turn in Descartes's philosophy, the autonomous subject has acquired a central and foundational place within philosophy as well as within culture." Anckaert, *A Critique of Infinity: Rosenzweig and Levinas*, 1.

that is surpassed in the holy life). In a word, the human subject *qua* human (with its acts of affection, will, and the intellect as temporally experienced) cannot be conceptually removed from considerations about the nature of the *ordo* itself.³²⁶

All of this fits into a picture of later Pietism and Evangelicalism that privileges the conversion experience above all else, but it is not the final judgment on the *ordo* in Ewald’s theology. As will be seen, Ewald did not rigidly nor consistently use terminology about the *ordo*. His sermon series (written about twenty years after the catechisms) employed a variety of similar but not identical phrases to designate the *ordo salutis*. Some of the terms require one to reconsider Ewald’s other theological doctrines and their significance for the anthropocentric, or subject-centered, *ordo*. The rest of this chapter will complicate the simple picture presented above—the *ordo* as conversion, faith, and sanctification. Complaints about lack of clarity and systematization aside, I suggest these complications point to a conundrum over the relationship of God and the world. This relationship is fraught with linguistic and logical murkiness that cannot be purely overcome with an objective theological *ordo* offered up in contrast to a subjective *ordo*.³²⁷ Still, for the sake of an investigatory structure, I take up the human “side” of the *ordo* first and then follow it with the divine “side.” My discussion of conversion will be followed by a discussion of *Vocatio*, or the call of the Holy Spirit. See Figure 2 for the structure of Ewald’s *ordo*. It does not include all the terminology that appears in Ewald’s texts but hopefully can be an aid to understanding the following sections in this dissertation.

Figure 2: Breaking down Ewald's *ordo*

Subjective human <i>ordo</i>	Objective Divine <i>ordo</i>	Divine <i>ordo</i> , simplified
Conversion	The call of the Holy Spirit	
Faith in Christ	Illumination	Sanctification

³²⁶ As I will discuss more in the close of chapter 5.

³²⁷ One might be tempted here to speak as Buddeus does about conversion both in a transitive sense and intransitive sense (God converts us, we convert). Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, IV.3.XXIX, 897-898. To turn to Buddeus is already to acknowledge (rightfully in my opinion) the academic background and debate surrounding these issues for Ewald.

3.3.1 Ewald's *ordo* terms

As mentioned above, Ewald employed a variety of phrases in his sermons, including *Saligheds Orden* (order of salvation), *Saliggjørelses Orden* (order of beatification),³²⁸ *Omvendelses og Troens Orden* (order of conversion and faith), *Troens og Helliggjørelses Orden* (order of faith and sanctification), *Omvendelsens, Troens og Helliggjørelsens Orden* (order of conversion, faith, and sanctification), *Omvendelsens og Fornegtelsens Orden* (order of conversion and [self-]denial), *Bodfærdigheds og Troens Orden* (order of repentance and faith), and *Naadens Orden* (order of grace).³²⁹ In addition to these phrases, Ewald also spoke of the order in which to participate in grace.³³⁰ This variety of terms reveals, not a precise terminological usage of *ordo salutis*, but a web of associations and interwoven concepts. This complicates the picture even while affirming the one I sketched based on his first catechism. For example, Ewald's *ordo* cannot be discussed apart from his understanding of sanctification (discussed as the

³²⁸ Interestingly Ewald seems to give an extended version of the *ordo* here that matches more traditional lists (see Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte eines dogmatischen Begriffs."). "...the whole order of beatification...to which belongs the teaching about conversion, illumination, re-birth, sanctification and renewal, as well as, the teaching about the forgiveness of sins and justification by grace by means of faith in Christ." (...den hele Saliggjørelsens Orden...hvortil den Lærdom om Omvendelsen, Oplysningen, Igienfødselen, Helliggjørelsen og Fornyelsen, ligesaavel hør, som den Lærdom om Syndernes Forladelse og Retfærdiggjørelsen af Naade formedelst Troen til Christum.) Ewald, *Det gamle og nye Testaments herlige Harmonie*, 3:610–11. Hereafter abbreviated as HH III. It is more obvious that Ewald conceives of a strong conceptual distinction between justification and sanctification and that most of the different aspects of the *ordo* focus on the goal of sanctification, hence the first grouping.

³²⁹ *Saligheds Orden* (HH I 490, HH II 991, HH V 119) *Saliggjørelses Orden* (HH I 915, HH III 610, HH V 6, 259), *Omvendelses og Troens Orden* (HH III 294, 995, 623, 678, 709, 952, HH II 171, 765, HH V 44, 452), *Troens og Helliggjørelses Orden* (HH II 641, HH III 449), *Omvendelsens, Troens og Helliggjørelsens Orden* (HH IV 332, HH V 890), *Omvendelsens og Fornegtelsens Orden* (HH IV 384), *Bodfærdigheds og Troens Orden* (HH V 496), and *Naadens Orden* ("...as well as the evangelical order of grace, in which we shall come to Christ and partake in him and his grace", *saa vel som den Evangeliske Naades-Orden, i hvilken vi skal komme til Christum, og blive deelagtige i ham og i hans Naade*) HH II 677, also 993.

³³⁰ See, HH V 119, 223, 871.

work of the Holy Spirit). But this is not merely part of the third step, for the call of God's grace and illumination (*oplysning*) more properly fit within a discussion of the first step of conversion and second step of faith. In the following explication of Ewald's *ordo*, I highlight areas of overlap and ambiguity and resist the desire to over-simplify for conceptual clarity. To do this, I engage in several close readings of Ewald's texts, before commenting on the general presentation of conversion (and calling) in Ewald's thought.

3.3.2 Conversion: *Omvendelse*

3.3.2.1 Conversion in the second catechism

The description of conversion in the second catechism, *Begyndelses Elementer*, follows closely Ewald's section on *ordo salutis* in the first catechism.³³¹ He framed conversion as a preparatory step and a "change of the mind or heart."³³² However, in his description of it as the work of God alone, he emphasized the importance of scripture (the Law and the Gospel) and reflection on scripture (specifically, on Christ's suffering). This emphasis fit well into his next assertion that one must know one's sins and God's wrath. The entire section on conversion is driven forwards as a process, each step following (*følge*) the previous. Compared to the list of characteristics of conversion given in the first catechism, the description in the *Begyndelses Elementer* catechism more explicitly provided a succession of steps. The knowledge of sins led to regret and contrition (*Anger og Ruelse*), which Ewald summed up as divine sorrowfulness (*bedrøvelse*). This sorrow led to a hatred of sin and the "intent to flee and shun such misery" (*et Forsætt at flye og skye saadan Jammer*). This intent in turn led to a hunger for righteousness. Ewald distinguished between righteousness by faith and righteousness by the Law. The first was backward looking, indicating a (legal?) blamelessness for one's past; the second, forward looking as "a new heart, which now must [*maatte*] live innocently for God."³³³ The legal sense was not absent from the second type of righteousness, but the focus was on the quality of the agent (the new heart), not merely the acts themselves. It is good to remember that the last step of this conversion process was not

³³¹ Ewald, RG 120-123.

³³² *vort Sinds eller Hiertes Forandring*, Ewald, BE 51.

³³³ *...men og efter Lovens Retferdighed / d.e. efter et nyt Hierte / som ny maatte leve ustraffelig for Gud*. Ewald, BE 52.

righteousness but hunger and thirst for righteousness. Ewald sidestepped here the charge that he taught that righteousness existed prior to faith in Christ.³³⁴

It is clear that this process did not stand alone for Ewald. His first catechism drew extensively on biblical quotations for its structure, but equally present, if less clearly, was a vision of the human being and human nature. To ask whether the *ordo* was a logical or temporal process misses the point.³³⁵ It had clear temporal elements for Ewald in that human experience occurred in time—what else can a divine sorrowfulness refer to? In my view, what is happening is more complicated. There are unspoken assumptions in Ewald’s catechism about how the human mind worked. How did knowledge of one’s sins (the first step) lead to a “heartfelt and painful regret and contrition over sin”(the second step)?³³⁶ To skip ahead briefly, how were the acts of the intellect related to acts of the will (and vice versa)?³³⁷ Additionally, Ewald’s description of the desire for righteousness acknowledged forensic righteousness but also sought inherent righteousness.³³⁸ Perhaps more urgently for inherent

³³⁴ See discussion in Chapter two and Kaasbøll’s accusation that Ewald makes an effect (righteousness) into a cause (of faith), “Kaasbøll’s Response to Ewald,” 17.

³³⁵ For a taste of the contemporary discussion usually related to Reformed circles, see Fesko, *Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700)*, 20:53–102; Ellis, “Covenantal Union and Communion: Union with Christ as the Covenant of Grace.” This is not merely a historical academic debate, especially among certain evangelical Reformed circles, such as Trevin Wax’s examination of the ministerial implications of David Petersen’s *Possessed by God*, which argues for sanctification as a state or condition, not a progress. See, Wax, “Is Sanctification a Process or a Position?”; Peterson and Carson, *Possessed by God: A New Testament Theology of Sanctification and Holiness*.

³³⁶ *En hjertlig og smertelig Anger og Ruelse over Synden*, Ewald, BE 52.

³³⁷ Jorg Baur may be correct in his argument that the Pietists prioritized the will over the intellect (as compared to the Lutheran Orthodox writers), (Baur, “Salus Christiana: Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Der Geschichte Des Christlichen Heilsverständnisses,” 111.) but this position requires unpacking.

³³⁸ This is how I read Ewald’s answer, when he speaks of a longing for righteousness and not “only according to the righteousness of faith that God may erase our sins for the sake of Christ [forensic righteousness?] but also according the righteousness of the Law, that is according to a new heart, which now may live without blame before God. [inherent righteousness?]” (*allene efter Troens Retfærdighed at Gud maae udlette vore Synder for Christi Skyld, men og efter Lovens Retferdighed d.e. efter et nyt Hierte som ny maatte level ustraffelig for Gud*) Ewald, BE 52. It seems clear to me that Ewald wants to retain elements of forensic justification, particularly in regards to past sins, but equally, his focus is on inherent righteousness (powered through union

righteousness, in contrast to forensic/imputed righteousness, the *ordo* required a structure of human nature within which to work. On one hand, Ewald's use of a "new" heart or mind does not fit easily into a framework of continuity when it came to human nature. Still, it ran the risk of being unintelligible, if by new, Ewald meant an utterly different human nature that lacked any reference to the past. Why then would it matter if a person's past sins were forgiven, if a repentant sinner was completely new?³³⁹ Though the section on conversion in the second catechism is brief (seven questions over two pages) it sets up a host of questions and explanations that need to be addressed.

I now consider the theme of conversion in Ewald's sermons. In the following section (and the corresponding sections "Ewald on Faith" and "Ewald on Sanctification"), I carefully work through two of Ewald's sermons, section by section, discussing his arguments and raising

with Christ—though that language is not found here but in his discussion about the holy life). Alister McGrath notes that for Pietists only the regenerate (reborn) were candidates for justification, such that

For the Pietist, the object of justification was the potentially or actually morally regenerate man, whose moral regeneration both caused and demonstrated his justification. This emphasis upon the moral dimension of justification, and the rejection of the view that justification entailed a synthetic, rather than an analytic, judgment, is also characteristic of the early *Aufklärung*. Thus Johann Franz Budde[us] makes no reference to the concept of the *iustificatio impii* where it might be expected, and insists that it is the regenerate alone who may be justified. (McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification: Volume II*, 142.)

McGrath's good overview, however, does not mention how Buddeus argues that God's grace and Christ's salvific merit is intended to be universal and not a limited atonement in theory. (Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.3.XVII, 467.) In practice, Buddeus must blame then humans for rejecting the application of Christ's merit. Pietist universalists like Ludwig Gerhard take up this universal atonement thread to argue for the eventual necessity of universal reconciliation, see chapter 6. I wonder if Gerhard's views—and Ewald's—disrupt the synthetic vs. analytic judgments of justification or at least allow that the 'synthetic' work that must be done, may be yet accomplished *post mortem*.

³³⁹ Or worse (in the eyes of some interpreters like Jorg Baur) deification/a divinization of human nature, Baur, "Salus Christiana: Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Der Geschichte Des Christlichen Heilsverständnisses," 95–98. This point will be returned to in the discussion over grace (and nature). Buddeus comes at this language from another angle essentially arguing for a *perfection* of human nature, see chapter 4. I also argue this is Buddeus's meaning in my article, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 147–48.

questions about them. I have selected the sermons based on the relevance of their main theme, often in conjunction with Ewald's sermon index. Most of Ewald's sermons in his published series began with a treatment of a Pentateuch text before focusing on a Gospel text. Each sermon opened with a prayer and most with an introduction to the themes.

3.3.2.2 Sermon given on the Common Prayer Day, 1739

Exordium: Isaiah 55:6–7

Gospel: Genesis 27:38

Invocation

Ewald began his sermon for the Common Prayer Day as usual, with an invocation, in which he touched upon many of the elements of conversion.³⁴⁰ He affirmed the notion of God's (frequent) call to human beings and stated God "wishes to lead us by [his] goodness to conversion."³⁴¹ This goodness was also reflected in the fact of God's will that all be converted and saved. Ewald moved back and forth between humanity's condition (hardness or falseness of heart) and God's action in response to this (God must touch people's hearts and persuade them). Ewald portrayed conversion as God's action:³⁴² it was God who "inclined," humbled, awakened, and drew people.³⁴³ Humanity was unable not stir itself. It is within this framework that Ewald's discussion of conversion must be understood. Human action or human experience apart from God's initiating work was never Ewald's starting point.

³⁴⁰ HH I 562-583. See Appendix C for a transcript of on this sermon as an example of Ewald's preaching. This special holy day, still known as the Great Prayer Day (*Store bededag*) occurs on the fourth Friday after Easter each year. It was established in the Kingdom of Denmark (and thus also in Norway, Island, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) in 1686. It replaced, in part, the many holy days from the Catholic tradition. These prayer days or days of penitence has been abolished in the Reformation, but many similar days had been reinstated during the 17th century. The day survived the 1770 reform of the Danish holy days/feast days (which abolished (officially) among others: Michaelmas, All Hallows' Day, Epiphany, Candlemas).

³⁴¹ ...ville lede os ved din Godhed til Omvendelse. HH I 562.

³⁴² Omvend du os selv, o Herre! saa blive vi omvendte. HH I 562.

³⁴³ ...bøyer og ydmyger, opvækker og drager os. HH I 562. Here it is clear that the term awakening (*opvækkelse*) describes God's action at the beginning of the *ordo*.

Pentateuch Exordium

In this sermon, explicitly called a conversion sermon (*Omvendelses Prædiken*), Ewald preached on two Old Testament texts, Isaiah 55:6–7 and Genesis 27:38.³⁴⁴ He began by describing arguments used against the necessity of conversion: 1) one is baptized, thus already Christian, 2) one exercises outward signs of piety, thus one is already converted, 3) one knows that they are unconverted, but prefers to delay, and 4) one knows they are unconverted, but is waiting until one's deathbed (this is a variation of the third reason).³⁴⁵ Ewald argued that Esau's regret and tears in the text were not an example of a true conversion. He termed this the "too late," and thus false, conversion. Ewald was doing two things in this part of the sermon. First, he used negative examples to clarify the nature of conversion (or rather, what it was not). Second, the examples functioned as a commentary on human nature and his understanding of its flaws.

As to the first, Ewald did not see conversion that resulted from fear or force as a true conversion.³⁴⁶ He also did not understand conversion as only repentance (*Omvendelse fra Synden*).³⁴⁷ Instead, the mind must be changed (*Sinds Forandring*). Ewald provided an interesting interpretation of Hebrews 12:17 in light of the Esau story. He actively refuted the idea that Esau was forever denied the chance of conversion (and thus salvation). Instead, it was Isaac who would not change his mind about blessing Jacob.³⁴⁸ Ewald emphasized that conversion (a change of mind) was not something to be undone. Esau was not utterly without possibility of salvation, but conversion was not an action lightly undertaken. Ewald used his reading of the text to push conversion beyond mere tears or regret. He echoed this point

³⁴⁴ Unlike the normal Sunday sermon, Ewald is not following the Gospel lectionary for this special day of penitence.

³⁴⁵ HH I 564.

³⁴⁶ HH I 564. Both in the catechisms and in the invocation of this sermon, Ewald speaks of God's goodness or mercy leading one towards conversion. In the catechisms this discussion occurs in an earlier section (not the section titled *Saligheds Orden*) summing up God's Law or Ten Commandments (Ewald, BE 47-48, RG 112-113). Here we have a hint about Ewald's understanding of the will's nature—that it is or ought to be inclined towards the good. Otherwise, the rejection of a conversion from fear or force makes less sense.

³⁴⁷ HH I 567.

³⁴⁸ HH I 567-568.

when he argued that “late” conversions (deathbed conversions or conversions driven by dire circumstances) were usually false.³⁴⁹ Emotional experience (tears and crying in Esau’s case) did not equal true conversion, despite a similarity to Ewald’s description of the *ordo* in other places. Ewald also denied that knowledge of one’s sins (a requirement for his *ordo*) was the same as fear of hell (i.e., the loss of blessing and heavenly inheritance).³⁵⁰ Fear alone does not guarantee true conversion.

Ewald’s distinction reveals his understanding of human nature and its flaws. Earlier in his sermon he condemned the tendency to value the less important (momentary pleasures) over the more important (one’s soul).³⁵¹ But Ewald did not allow his listeners to claim ignorance in this matter. It was not that they did not know what was most valuable, but rather, they chose to disregard it.³⁵² Ewald’s problem was that this knowledge had not brought on the proper response among the un-reborn. Rather, they had actively and intentionally resisted God’s grace, Ewald describes the un-reborn person as “one who sins [against/on?] grace and obstinately pushes God’s prevenient, enticing, and persuading grace away from themselves, or sins by the means of free will after he has received the knowledge of truth.”³⁵³ However, before a reader of Ewald might assign 'a change of the will' priority over 'a change in the intellect' in conversion (that one’s free will can overrule one’s knowledge of truth), the rest of Ewald’s exegesis complicated the matter. According to Ewald, there was still a self-deception present even in deathbed tears and repentance of sins. For Ewald, the un-reborn may recognize they have loved the world more than God, but like Esau, they do not truly

³⁴⁹ HH I 570.

³⁵⁰ *...at de skulde derover miste Velsignelse, og den Himmelske Arvedeel.* HH I 571.

³⁵¹ HH I 566.

³⁵² *De meene vel, at de kunde først faae deres Deel her, og saa alligevel faa den lige fuldt og faa hisset.* HH I 566.

³⁵³ *...én, som synder paa Naade, og modtvilligen skyder Guds forekommende, dragende og overbevisende Naades Virkninger fra sig, eller og synder med Fri Villie, efter at hand har annammet Sandheds Kundskab.* HH I 570. Ewald’s description of grace here (the workings of God’s prevenient, drawing, and persuading grace) has traces of a technical terminology. This will be discussed below with Buddeus’ description of grace.

know their guilt, fickleness, and unholy mind.³⁵⁴ If this knowledge was lacking, no true change could happen, and they would continue to deceive themselves. Ewald distinguished between a knowledge of one's actions (as externally sinful) and a fuller knowledge of one's self (an unholy mind). In the first type of conversion, as Ewald defined it, actions *and* the ultimate reward (the heavenly inheritance) were external. True conversion followed, instead, from a fuller knowledge of one's self and one's inward unholiness. In this part of the sermon, the priority of true knowledge, not the will, was the focus of conversion.³⁵⁵

This internal focus was why Ewald insisted that God's goodness led human beings to conversion and why he claimed in 1721 that "God according to his holiness cannot look past the least sin, but must eternally punish it."³⁵⁶ If one reads this purely in the sense of two agents (offender and offended), a proportional punishment might be thought fitting. Despite this, an eternal proportional punishment is problematic since a finite action (a sin) does not merit an infinite punishment.³⁵⁷ But if these two agents are not externally positioned against

³⁵⁴ Ewald describes Esau as full of hypocrisy but also somewhat ignorant (*Hand kiendte ikke sin Skyld, sin Letsindighed og sit vanhellige Sind*), HH I 570.

³⁵⁵ The only suggestion of the will's ability to reject this *full knowledge* is Ewald's description of the unforgivable sin against the Holy Spirit. Those "who have been at one time illuminated, and have tasted the heavenly gift and have become partakers of the Holy Spirit" (*som have været eengang oplyste, og have smaget den himmelske Gave, og ere blevne deelagtige i den Hellig Aand*, HH I 569) and who then reject him, this is unforgivable. But note here the language of tasting and partaking which complicates the epistemological picture.

³⁵⁶ *Gud efter sin Hellighed ikke kand see over med dend minste Synd men maa straffe dend evig*. Ewald, BE 52. See also above footnote in reference to the opening *Exordium* of this sermon, HH I 564.

³⁵⁷ I am aware of the argument from God being the offended party which merits an infinite punishment. However, the argument named in the text seems accepted by legal scholars or theologians in the early modern period. As I mentioned above, Johann Georg Walch's refutation of Gerhard's universalism implicitly accepts this understanding but attempts to circumvent it by proposing that human beings continue to sin in hell. Thus, though human action is finite, they simply continue to finitely act in an infinite timespan. (Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:318–24.) Walch's argument turns the focus on the internal condition of the damned which confines them to hell. One is closer to C. S. Lewis's 'hell is locked from the inside' argument. The argument against infinite retributive punishment also exists in early modern English thought in figures such as David Hume and Thomas Burnet (who had universalist leanings). See Almond, *Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment England*, 155;

each other, the internal nature of the human can come into greater focus. Given God's holiness, that which is unholy (e.g., the unholy mind of Esau) cannot partake in the holiness of God (the heavenly inheritance). That holiness is not an external or accidental "object" to be imputed, but also has to do with the human's internal condition. God requires the believers to be 'like' him, since only like can partake in like (perhaps in some analogous sense).

Additionally, Ewald positioned God's goodness as the motivating factor in conversion. Inherent in such a move was the rejection of a mechanistic model of motivation that operated with a value-neutral concept of force. Ewald was arguing for a qualitative, not quantitative, sense of force. Ewald did not deny that fear could motivate human actions, but he argued implicitly that *like begets like*, the form of the Good—which was not passive, but purposed and intentional—caused both the knowledge of one's own unholiness and the desire for internal holiness.³⁵⁸

Gospel Exegesis: On Conversion

Ewald began the second half of his sermon with the urgency of God's call to conversion and rebirth. The term *rebirth* disappears from the text after half a page, but before that, Ewald used it to secure the so-called spiritual/supernatural aspect of conversion. Ewald saw that actions flowed from a structure (nature) that was perverted. In this way, rebirth affirmed the inward focus that Ewald discussed in the previous section because it was hope for a new structure, a new "nature," that could "save our souls from depravity."³⁵⁹ Ewald then described a hunger and thirst for "the grace and salvation in Christ" (*Denne Naade og Salighed*

Burnet, *De Statu Mortuorum & Resurgentium Tractatus. Of the State of the Dead, and of Those That Are to Rise*. Gerhard quotes Burnet as the epigraph to his *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii* and Burnet is said to have promoted both a chiliastic reign of Christ and the 'restoration' of the Jews. Mandelbrote, "'Generous Men Will Spare the Memory of the Dead': The Posthumous Publication of Writings by Thomas Burnet," 206.

³⁵⁸ Ewald speaks of goodness and holiness, but one might also speak of Beauty. For, following Stephen R. L. Clark, "Beauty, in brief, has in the past been reckoned not merely analogous to Moral Worth: it is what Moral Worth consists in, the beauty of action and the virtuous soul, the sight of which induces 'wonderments and a delicious trouble'." Clark, *God, Religion and Reality*, 87.

³⁵⁹ ...*og redde vore Siele fra Fordervelsen*. HH I 573. The concept of persistence and healing of the soul from depravity assumes a human continuity even if in Pietist language, a 'new' heart is required.

i Christo), “the great riches of grace” (*den store Naades Rigdom*), and the Lord himself.³⁶⁰ Combine these remarks with the remarks in his catechism (about a hunger and thirst for righteousness) and his comments about rebirth, and one ends up with a conceptual grouping that includes: un-depraved nature, a righteous nature, and the possession of God (in some sense). All three elements must be present in rebirth. Ewald did not unpack these ideas in this sermon, but it is clear that for him, righteousness belonged to Christians. It was not purely external. Yet righteousness remained equally “from” the grace of God: the worthy fruits of conversion must be visible yet they came from partaking in Christ’s grace.³⁶¹

Ewald repeated this tangling and overlapping of agency in the following section by returning to the urgency of God’s call to conversion: the Lord calls now and if he doesn’t want to let himself be found, we cannot seek him.³⁶² This could be read as a picture of an ultra-voluntarist God, a divine figure changing his mind about his call. However, I read this highly anthropomorphized picture of God as preserving the strong intentionality of the call and how human action is dependent on God acting ‘first’. Also I might suggest that one could read this picture of God’s call as an obscure meditation on the human experience of time and “now” being the only time in which we can experience things. Again and again, Ewald asserted the idea of now (*Nu, Nu!*) as the moment in which to respond, the moment that God could be found, the moment one actually experienced. According to Ewald, time, or moments of time, were not homogeneous, interchangeable, or equal: “Now, Now! When this now is past, so it will never come again.”³⁶³ Yet after this section urging for a response or action *now*, Ewald again put the language of agency (divine and human agency) under a logical stress, for God converted the Christian.

Ewald recognized the tension of agency and responded with a lengthy explanation about the nature of this new heart (a scriptural symbol that was interchangeable with conversion and

³⁶⁰ *Alle og enhver, at de i Tide skulle søge Herren...* HH I 574.

³⁶¹ HH I 573.

³⁶² HH I 575.

³⁶³ *Nu, Nu! naar dette Nu er forbi, saa kommer det aldrig mere igjen.* HH I 575.

rebirth considered in their entirety).³⁶⁴ His explanation layered the notion of God's action into the different steps of the *ordo*. Ewald began by asserting that God acted by the word of the Law and Gospel. This is a slight re-emphasis on scripture, compared to the catechisms.

Thereby [God] presses in on our hearts and conscience, thereby he persuades us of our deep depravity, our miserable condition, our wretchedness and poverty, blindness and nakedness. Thereby he bends and humbles, bruises and worries our hearts, and thereby he makes us hunger and desirous for grace. Thereby he makes us sensible of grace, and persuades us that it alone is to be found in Christ Jesus, thereby he awakens us from sleep, and encourages us and provokes us to come to Jesus, yes works in our hearts' faith and trust in Jesus's blood and death.³⁶⁵

The steps one encounters in Ewald's catechism are visible here: the move from knowledge of sins/depravity, to humility, to hunger for righteousness (grace). Ewald emphasized the continual action of God (in some fashion) in each step. There was never a purely human action at any part of the *ordo*, for Ewald. It is also clear that the symbol of a new heart read in the light of this explanation was not meant to be reified into a new object, discontinuous from an earlier "heart."³⁶⁶

In the last section of the sermon, Ewald repeated many of the previous elements and argued for a "true and heartfelt conversion."³⁶⁷ He again addressed the negative definitions of conversion: the theme of self-deception (as hypocrisy and lukewarmness)³⁶⁸ along with the insistence that good intentions and an external morality, or virtue, was not enough. In the sermon, fear of self-deception and the appearance of conversion echoed the concept of true

³⁶⁴ Ewald quotes here Ezekiel 36: 26-27.

³⁶⁵ *Derved trænger hand ind paa vore Hierter og Samvittigheder, om vor jammerlige Tilstand, om vor Elendighed og Fattigdom, Blindhed og Nøgenhed. Derved bøyer og ydmyger, sønderknuser og ængster hand vore Hierter, og derved gjør hand os hungrige og begierlige efter Naaden. Derved foreholder hand os Naaden, og overbeviser os der om, at den er alene at finde i Christo Jesu, derved opvækker hand os af Søvn, og opmuntrar og tilskynder os til at komme til JEsu, ja virker i vore Hierter Troe og Tillid til Jesu Blod og Død.* HH I 576.

³⁶⁶ Preuss discusses this theme in Preus, "The Reified Heart in Seventeenth-Century Religion."

³⁶⁷ *...en sand og hiertelig Omvendelse.* HH I 578.

³⁶⁸ *...dermed kand vi ikke bedrage Gud, men vel os selv...* HH I 578.

self-knowledge as the beginning point of conversion. Ewald, in his explication of conversion (even of a false conversion), always pushed towards the holy life as linked to virtue and actions, but he was cautious about judging another purely by their actions (whether by the person or others around them) as a confirmation of conversion. Ewald did not deny the ability of the person to better their life in an outward manner.³⁶⁹ He assumed a depth to the human mind, one capable of deception and mixed motives. Instead, conversion, framed as God's action (more on this below) and dependent upon God's presence, was the desire and search for God.³⁷⁰ Yet despite the reality of self-deception, Ewald affirmed that one could recognize one's sinful mind, desires, and affections ostensibly in the process of conversion. Only with such knowledge could the mind be turned back to God.³⁷¹ Ewald, in describing this search as instigated by God and aimed at God, refused to describe God as a passive eternal object to be desired or found.³⁷² He spoke of conversion as something approaching a state one existed in.³⁷³ But conversion was never an external "held" thing, a ticket securing passage to heaven. Conversion was always active: the change of heart/mind and a new orientation towards the Lord.³⁷⁴

3.3.3 *Vocatio*: The Call of God's grace

It is perilous to read conversion in Ewald's theology as a complete and sufficient action in and of itself. Ewald's second catechism made clear that conversion was a preparatory step for

³⁶⁹ HH I 582.

³⁷⁰ This essentially is the equivalent as the last 'step' of conversion in the catechisms, a hunger and thirst for righteousness. "This search does not consist in a tiresomely vast race and searching, but in an inward and heartfelt longing and desire for his grace, and to come into his fellowship and company again." *Denne Søgen bestaaer da ikke i en møysommelig viitløftig Løben og Leden, men i en inderlig og hiertelig Higen og Begierlighed efter hans Naade, at komme i hans Venskab og Samfund igjen.* HH I 579.

³⁷¹ Ewald speaks of the mind turned away from God, which allows him to also speak of entirely new thoughts, a new mind, and a new desire.

³⁷² Ewald denies we can do anything to even start on this 'way' without him (Christ or God). HH 1 582.

³⁷³ This is more obvious in conversion's or re-birth's opposite, "So you all are still in your un-reborn, sinful, and damnable state" (...saa ere I endnu i eders uigienfødte, syndige og fordømmelige Tilstand HH I 582)

³⁷⁴ HH I 581-2.

faith.³⁷⁵ Yet as mentioned above, as soon as Ewald affirmed this on an anthropological level, he immediately credited this change to God (*alleneste Guds Verk*). This is why he presented the entire *ordo* from a pneumatological perspective in his section on the third article of the Apostolic Creed.³⁷⁶ The Holy Spirit called the believer, enlightened/illuminated, sanctified, and preserved the believer (*Troende*) in faith.³⁷⁷ Although Ewald sometimes listed sanctification as the final part of the *ordo*, it was obvious he understood the entirety of the Holy Spirit's work as sanctification (see Figure 2). It is useful to explore the call of the Holy Spirit, which parallels roughly the first step of the *ordo*.

The word *Berufung* (*vocatio*)³⁷⁸ doesn't have a single technical equivalent in Danish; in the catechisms it is *Guds Naades Kald* (call of God's grace) or *det guddomelige Naades Kald* (the call of divine grace). In Ewald's sermons, it is *Herrens Naade Kald* (call of the Lord's grace), *Herrens Kald* (the Lord's call), *det himmelske Kald* (the heavenly call), and *Jesu Naade-Kald* (Jesus's call of grace).³⁷⁹ If these are all the same divine action, Ewald's various descriptions hint at an implicit Trinitarian understanding of divine action that is not carefully laid out but taken as orthodoxy. The Spirit's role is suggested based on the call's placement in the catechism as part of the discussion of the third article of the Creed and following a discussion of the Holy Spirit. The Christological element is present in the term *Jesu Naade-Kald* and the use of *Guds Naade/Herrens/himmelske Kald* points towards a general divine action. This lack of distinction between Christ and the Holy Spirit's call might also echo Buddeus's notion that grace was a Trinitarian action 'outside' itself.³⁸⁰ Ewald's main concern was that the call was a

³⁷⁵ BE 51.

³⁷⁶ This presentation of the *ordo* fits more into the description that Markus Matthias gives of the *ordo*. Here it is "eine theologische, nicht psychologisch-empirische Unterscheidung der verschiedenen Akte der *gratia applicatrix*". Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs," 318.

³⁷⁷ BE 83.

³⁷⁸ See, Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs."

³⁷⁹ See the sermon series index, HH V 1078.

³⁸⁰ See section 4.2. Another possible reason for this lack of distinction might lie in the influence of Pseudo-Macarius. See my discussion in the conclusion. An older translator of Macarius's homilies, Arthur J. Mason noted that "frequently, like the New Testament itself, Macarius passes from the action of the Spirit to that of Christ, or from the actions of Christ without noting the transition. It is not that he is unaware of the difference,

divine action. I now outline two descriptions of the call in Ewald's writings: his short section from the second catechism, *Begyndelses Elementer*, and an extended reflection on the call in a sermon given on the first Sunday of Advent, 1742.³⁸¹

3.3.3.1 Description of Vocation, or Call, in the Second Catechism³⁸²

After discussing the divinity of the Holy Spirit and the fact that the Holy Spirit was given (*skienkes*) to "the people who believe and obey God" (a statement I return to),³⁸³ Ewald described the call of God's grace as a universal one.³⁸⁴ The next catechetical question and answer is short but require unpacking: "Whereby does God call them? By means of the light of nature. That is, his actions and the Gospel's word."³⁸⁵ Depending on how this quotation is translated, the phrase *light of nature* (*Naturens Lyß*) either includes both the Word of the Gospel (revelation) and God's actions apart from scripture (reason) *or* the phrase refers specifically to the actions of God, which are distinct from scripture (only reason?). Either way, God's actions apart from scripture are also a means for his call to human beings.³⁸⁶ Ewald cut straight through any attempt to read the light of nature or the light of reason as a theologically neutral starting point. The concept of natural religion received more attention in the writings of Pontoppidan.³⁸⁷ Here the brief reverence to the light of nature gestured towards the overarching theological intelligibility of all of reality for Ewald.³⁸⁸ He affirmed implicitly what

but for the moment the mode of the divine operation does not concern him. What the Spirit does, God does." (Mason, *Fifty Spiritual Homilies of St. Macarius the Egyptian*, xxii.) This description seems to describe Ewald's usage as well.

³⁸¹ See HH V 569-593, especially from 581.

³⁸² BE 84-85.

³⁸³ *Dem som troe og lyde Gud*. BE 83.

³⁸⁴ BE 84, Likely an affirmation against double predestination.

³⁸⁵ *Hvorved kalder Gud dem? Formedelst Naturens Lyß [sic]. d.e. sine Gierninger og Evangelii Ord*. BE 84.

³⁸⁶ The role of reason vs revelation, natural theology vs revealed theology forms more the discussion around Johann Franz Buddeus. This will be touched upon in the next chapter.

³⁸⁷ See especially the opening chapters of Pontoppidan's travelogue novel, *Menoza*. Pontoppidan, *Menoza*, 1860, 9–95.

³⁸⁸ This is a simple description of a complex issue, but Ewald's reference to Rom. 1:19-20 in the first catechism affirms this analysis.

was needed for his anthropocentric *ordo*: that human experience in the world even apart from the Gospel's words could be the vessel of divine action towards the person.

In the final part of this short section, Ewald re-stated that the Holy Spirit acted in human beings, but also that this work could be resisted. Ewald insisted on the ability of a person to accept this call freely, even while insisting that the power to come to Christ (because of the call) was given by Christ.³⁸⁹ The brevity of Ewald's remarks glossed over several assumptions and ambiguities operating in the background. First of all, Ewald clearly depended on a certain structure of the human mind and definition of a free act. Second, in light of this implicit structure, how should the description of Christ giving power to the believer be understood? This question was at the heart of the issues of causality and agency in this Early Modern period.³⁹⁰ This is where Ewald concluded his discussion of the heavenly call in his second catechism before turning to the concept of illumination (*oplysning*). I now turn to a longer discussion of the heavenly call in his sermons.

3.3.3.2 *The call in the sermon on the first Sunday of Advent, 1742*

Exordium: Deuteronomy 29

Gospel: Matthew 21:1-9

Gospel Exegesis

Ewald, in his sermon on the first Sunday of Advent, 1742,³⁹¹ used the *Exhortio* to preach on the renewal of the covenant in Deuteronomy 29, and in the second half he preached on Jesus's entry into Jerusalem (Matt 21:1–9). I skip over the first half of the sermon to focus on the exegesis of the Gospel text. Ewald began the second half of his sermon by comparing the need for daily food and drink in the natural life to the need for nourishment and daily care in the spiritual life for the reborn (*igjenfødt Menneske*). Within this framework of daily renewal, he discussed Jesus's call of grace (*Jesu Naades-Kald*). He divided his examination into

³⁸⁹ *At vi frit maa komme til Christum /thi hand skal ei kaste os henud /ja hand giver selv Kraft til at komme /om vi ei imodstaa.* BE 85.

³⁹⁰ I refer to some research literature about these causality debates in the footnotes to chapter 1.

³⁹¹ HH V 569-593. This is one of the later sermons included in the collection.

discussions of “Jesus’s repeated loving and serious call of grace and the right reception of the call.”³⁹² The call can be seen from two different perspectives: an objective, theological description of God’s action and the anthropocentric experience of the call. This oversimplifies the sections of the sermon, but it echoes the duality at work in Ewald’s discussion of the *ordo*.

In Ewald's discussion of the call in this second half of the sermon, the Christocentric emphasis is immediately clear,³⁹³ but he also referred to the call of Christ as the call of God’s grace (*GUds Naades Kald*).³⁹⁴ Ewald used these terms synonymously: *Guds Naades Kald* and *Jesu Naades-Kald*. He lauded this call as one of God’s greatest demonstrations of grace and then laid out three problems with the human condition that the call addressed. First, humans knew nothing of the glory and bliss that was in God. Second, they lacked boldness and a desire to come to him. And third, they lacked the ability to come in the right way, that is, in a God-pleasing way.³⁹⁵ Thus, for Ewald, the call of God’s grace addressed problems of the intellect, the will, and the human ability. Because of these problems, Ewald determined that only God could call humans and did so by a certain order and means (making this an explicit reflection of the *ordo*). One might even say that God's supernatural call was fitted to needs of the internal 'natural' human structure.

Ewald emphasized that the proper means of the *ordo* was the Gospel (in a broad sense, including the preaching of Moses and the prophets). Ewald did not discuss the light of nature here.³⁹⁶ One could read the description of the proper means (*det ordentlige Middel*) as a

³⁹² *Jesu Naades-Kalds kjerlige og alvorlige Igientagelse, og dets rette og ham behagelige Antagelse*, HH V 581.

³⁹³ The call is from Christ (from his sermons and miracles), but also about Christ (he was the one the prophets spoke of), and to Christ. HH V 584-5.

³⁹⁴ HH V 581.

³⁹⁵ HH V 581.

³⁹⁶ Ewald’s final estimation of natural theology is unclear. He does however write three years earlier (3rd Sunday of Advent, 1739) that “by the light of nature and reason, one can know a little, what evil and good, what virtue and vice are, although not in full; but how we can come out of our fallen condition, be reconciled to God...reason knows nothing of this.” (*Ved Naturens og Fornuftens Lyß kand man vel nogenledes kiende, hvad Ont og Got, hvad Dyd og Udyd er, endskiønt ikke i Grunden; men hvorledes vi kand komme ud af vor fordervede Tilstand, blive forsonede med Gud...det veed Fornuften inten af*) HH II 290.

cautionary focus on the centrality of scripture for the *ordo*. Likely, he wanted to avoid permitting private revelation as a means to salvation; his focus was on the proper means and he did not explicitly discuss the “improper” means. Still, Ewald did not back down from the universality of God’s call.³⁹⁷ His focus in the sermon was on those who had heard the gospel but had not responded to it. Ewald emphasized both the particularity and the commonality of the call and that the call was Christ seeking for all.³⁹⁸

As in his catechism, Ewald insisted in his sermon that it was possible to reject the call (the whole sermon hinged on this), and he used the second half of the sermon on the acceptance of God’s call to argue for the persuasiveness of this call, which came from the ground of God’s goodness and care for all. This is not to dismiss the prescription to obedience that followed, but for Ewald, duty was logically secondary to the fundamental reality of “Jesus’s grace and faithfulness towards us.”³⁹⁹ Hidden in the background was the argument that one should worship and be dutiful towards only that which was worthy of worship.⁴⁰⁰ Ewald followed up

³⁹⁷ “We see from this that the call is aimed at the salvation of all, yes that he calls the most obstinate and worst people, and such who have long stopped up their ears, hardened their hearts and thus despised his call” (*Heraf see vi, at dette Kald sigter til alles Frelse, ja at hand og kalder de allergienstrigiste og verste Mennsker, og sadanne, some længe have tilstoppet deres Ørne, forhærdet deres Hierter, og altsaa foragter hans Kald*), HH V 584.

³⁹⁸ HH V 585-586. Or rather 'us', but the emphasis is not that we have come to Christ, but Christ comes to us. Ewald’s description here (*hand forekommer os, og søger os*) suggests the technical language of prevenient grace (*forekommende Naade*). This will be discussed below in the chapter on grace.

³⁹⁹ *...hans Oyemerke var, at hand vilde gjøre vel imod os...* (HH V 588) and *I vor Text siges det vel ikke med udtrykkelige Ord, hvad vi skal gjøre, eller, hvad vores Pligt er herved; men her tales kun om Jesu Naade og Trofasthed imod os. Hermed vises os, at dette og bør være det Allerførste, som vi skal agte paa, og tage til Hierte.* HH V 589.

⁴⁰⁰ See Stephen Clark’s describes the moral argument for God in this manner, “...they respond that nothing less than the Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent can merit worship...One way of interpreting a claim like that would be to say that 'God' names whatever is supremely worshipful; not what *is* but what *ought* to be.” Clark, *God, Religion and Reality*, 14. The moral argument for God as that which ought to be worshipful is put forth by Buddeus against Christian Wolff. Buddeus criticizes Wolff’s concept of God because Wolff’s God is, if not a-moral, not concerned with justice or aware of human beings at all. Nüssel, “Gott Als Spiritus Independens : Zur Umformung Der Gotteslehre in Der Lutherischen Theologie Der Frühaufklärung,” 96.

this description of the call with an explanation of how a recipient of that call should respond. Such a (divine) action *should* bring about humility and shame while simultaneously encouraging the person to receive God's grace. The reception of and trust in such a call *was* faith.⁴⁰¹ For Ewald, the proper response to such a call was humility and shame. It was not that humility, shame, and sorrowfulness (*bedrøvelse*) in his description of conversion were sufficient; they were a response to, or a mirroring of, God's call of grace. The issue was the how and the why. How did humility arise and why was it not always present?⁴⁰² Ewald was not explicitly concerned about this in this text because he already had an answer: the reception of God's call happened by faith (which was a divine working in believers).⁴⁰³ The sermon ends with Ewald's affirmation of the call as a continual and repeated reality of the Christian experience⁴⁰⁴ and a short summary of the *ordo* as God's act.⁴⁰⁵

3.3.3.3 Final Thoughts on Vocatio

In my close readings of these two sermons, I have sketched out aspects of Ewald's understanding of conversion and the heavenly call. Other sermons paint similar pictures. Ewald consistently portrayed the call as a divine action, a persuasive, powerful, and enticing gesture, the act that moved believers or came to them.⁴⁰⁶ The persuasion lay in the goodness of God and the goodness of the end to which God called humanity (Ewald often used the

⁴⁰¹ HH V 590.

⁴⁰² See thought excursion, also this is essentially the debate between Buddeus, Christian Wolff and Buddeus's student, Johann Liborius Zimmermann, in relation to the role of human will/freedom in our relation to moral goods. see Simon Grote's good explication and discussion of this debate, Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:19–42.

⁴⁰³ HH V 590.

⁴⁰⁴ ...vi kaldes jo ogsaa derved nu paa nye igjen. Jesus har ofte kalder os. HH V 591.

⁴⁰⁵ It is difficult to read this final section as anything other than an *ordo*, "[God] himself will illuminate your eyes, convert your hearts, re-birth you, effect faith in you, cleanse you of your sins in his blood, hallow and purify you, yes strengthen and preserve you until the end, and give you a perfect victory over all your enemies. Blessed are those therefore, who are called to the Eucharist of the Wedding of the Lamb." (*Hand vil selv oplyse eders Øyne, omvende eders Hierter, igienføde eder, virke Troen i eder, aften eder af eders Synder i sit Blod, hellige og rense eder, ja stryke og opholde eder indtil Enden, og giver eder en fuldkommen Seyer over alle eders Fiende. Salige ere derfor de, som ere kaldte til Lammets Bryllups Nadvere*. HH V 592-593.

⁴⁰⁶ See, HH I 515, 783, HH II 140, HH III 915.

image of the Eucharist at the wedding of the Lamb).⁴⁰⁷ In other places, Ewald emphasized that this call was individual, repeated, and complete. No other love, will, and self-orientated action was allowed to compete.⁴⁰⁸ Within a single concept, the eudemonistic framework⁴⁰⁹ stood alongside this self-effacing/denying assertion. What is clear in Ewald's thought is that God's goodness was not one among others; it brooked no rivals. It was the goodness of the act that drew the believer to God and set the *ordo* in motion. But this supposed that the listener naturally desired or was drawn to good things. How then to explain the apparent goodness of other objects (simply as false or as less powerful?) or to avoid judging God by some eternal idea of the Good?⁴¹⁰ There is a language about created reality that needs to be articulated and not merely set up as a purely conflicting agent to God.

⁴⁰⁷ *Lammets Bryllups Nadvere*, here HH V 592-3, also HH I 496, 517, HH II 104, 112, 114, HH V 583, Sometimes this is simply called 'his Great Eucharist' (*hans store Nadvere*) and Ewald recognizes it as a symbol of God's kingdom-the eschatological promise (HH II 194, 1013-1014).

⁴⁰⁸ HH III 922, HH IV 412.

⁴⁰⁹ This ought not to be overlooked in Pietism. I would argue that ignoring it is to lose sight of Pietism's one foot in a pre-modern Aristotelean 'ethical' framework and to risk the connection between blessedness/bliss and happiness-even in this present world." Erik Pontoppidan's famous catechism begins with an essentially rhetorical eudemonistic question "Dear child, do you not want to be happy on earth and blessed in heaven? Of course, I only want to be [happy and blessed]." (*Kære barn, vil du ikke gerne være lykkelig på jorden og salig i himmelen? Jo, kunne jeg kun blive det.*) Pontoppidan, *Sandhed Til Gudfrygtighed Udi En Eenfoldig Og Efter Muelighed Kort Dog Tilstrekkelig Forklaring over Sal. Doct. Mort. Luthers Liden Catechismo ...*, Q. 1.. This first question often disappears in later abridgements and translations, thus hiding a central argument of the catechism. Belfour's English translation lacks this question all together (Pontoppidan, *Epitome of Rev. Dr. Erik Pontoppidan's Explanation of Martin Luther's Small Catechism.*) and various Norwegian editions titled *Udtog af Dr. Erich Pontoppidans Forklaring* restate the question to only a matter of 'eternal bliss' thus removing Pontoppidan's focus also on earthy happiness. See, *Udtog af Dr. Erich Pontoppidans Forklaring*, 1845; Pontoppidan, *Udtog af Dr. Erich Pontoppidans forklaring*; *Udtog af Dr. Erich Pontoppidans Forklaring*, 1849.

⁴¹⁰ See the dissertation by Herman Caro about the debate between Leibniz and Buddeus/his student, which essentially deals with this issue, Caro, "The Best of All Possible Worlds? Leibniz's Optimism and Its Critics 1710 - 1755," 45-51.. This also seems to tie into the debate over reason and revelation for which Karl Barth castigates Buddeus. Barth sees Buddeus as allowing reason/judgment to potentially overrule revelation. See, Williams, "Barth, Buddeus and the Eighteenth Century." Williams discusses Barth's attack on Buddeus and problematizes it.

3.3.4 Final Thoughts about Conversion

Conversion for Ewald was not a clear-cut, naturalistic, psychological phenomenon because it contained certain anthropological gaps, that is, areas where humans were incapable of acting on their own. Still, there was also clearly an anthropological vision behind the whole, guiding Ewald. How did the human mind work and how did it not work? Did the insistence on the necessity of the grace of God override, or force, the human mind? Answers to these questions must also take into consideration Ewald's language of depravity. Additionally, Ewald's account did not fall easily into a simple prioritization of the will over the intellect. For Ewald, the act of the intellect had to involve a referential act (seeing fully one's own unholy mind) and, surprisingly, the intellect, not the will, had a logical priority. The notions of self-deception and self-knowledge appeared repeatedly, and Ewald generally connected them to the rejection of the externality of salvation and God. Ewald rejected this externality of salvation and God as something that was out there, competing against the subject. Ewald constantly moved God into or near the subject, even while placing God as or at the "end," to steal Augustinian imagery.⁴¹¹ The internality of God to the subject made the internal make-up of the subject important; in the pages of his sermon, Ewald was not willing to posit a duality of natures for the Christian: one holy and reborn, the other depraved.⁴¹² His language begged

⁴¹¹ "...have partaken in the Holy Spirit" (...*ere blevne deelagtige i den Hellig Aand...*) HH I 569, "[God] exhorts there upon...all and each, that they in time should seek the Lord" (...*saa formaner hand derpaa (i vor Textes Ord, v. 6.7.) alle og enhver at de i Tide skulle søge Herren...*) HH I 574, "...he holds himself near to us, in order to show us grace" (*hand holder sig nær til os, for at bevise os Naade.*) HH I 579.

⁴¹² Compare Martin Schmidt's description of Caspar Schwenckfeld (1489/90-1561), "[Schwenckfeld] ging davon aus, dass ein Christ aus zwei Naturen bestehe, betonte jedoch sofort, dass die eine, die menschliche, verschwinden oder, wie er sich anschaulich ausdrückte, 'gedempft vnd aussgelöscht werden' müsse. Wenn schon der Christ Sünde hat, so bestimmt sie doch nicht sein Leben, denn 'ein anderer, nemlich Christus, hat das regiment eingenommen'" Schmidt, *Wiedergeburt und neuer Mensch*, 241., Schmidt sees the entire discussion of 2 Peter 1:4 and partaking in the divine nature as evidence of the influence of a (foreign) Greco-Roman piety on Christianity--and that Pietism inherited this mystical tendency. Schmidt, 238–39. This Harnackian view of the Hellenization of Christianity as a foreign influence has a long research history but is increasingly held to be suspect. See, Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism*; Wilken, *The Spirit of Early Christian Thought: Seeking the Face of God*. As such, I hesitate slightly to share Schmidt's relief with late Pietism that "Das gefahr einer griechischen, platonischen Überfremdung des christlichen Heilsverständnisses ist gebannt." Schmidt, *Wiedergeburt und*

for a larger anthropological and cosmological picture. Some of how this picture was filled in will have to wait for the second half of this dissertation, but hopefully I have begun to show the importance of the tensions over agency.

In the next section, I explore faith and illumination as the next steps in Ewald's *ordo*.

3.4 Faith in Christ: *Troen på Christum* and Illumination: *Oplysning*

In this section, I treat the concepts of faith and illumination as I did conversion and the heavenly call. I work through their descriptions in Ewald's second catechism and then give a close reading of a sermon concerned with the themes. Additionally, I include a short excursus on revelation as found in Ewald's texts. This is to supplement the notion of faith insofar as it may be considered an intellectual act concerned with certain content (such as Christ's identity). The section ends with a short reflection on illumination and faith in Ewald's thought.

3.4.1 Faith

3.4.1.1 Faith in the second catechism

Unsurprisingly, Ewald's description of faith in the second catechism followed closely the *ordo salutis* section in the first catechism. Ewald made clear that conversion and contrition were not the presence of God's (justifying?) righteousness—only faith could justify. He used the common Lutheran breakdown of faith: divine knowledge, divine assent, and divine trust. As before, he contrasted divine knowledge with natural understanding ("For a natural, unconverted person can understand something of God's word, assent therein of many external reasons and also reach and set one's trust thereupon in a fleshly security and strong

neuer Mensch, 296. Recently the Mannermaa School of Luther interpretation has attempted to reclaim the theme of deification in Luther, all though they want to avoid the problem "of conceiving two subjects in one individual" (Bielfeldt, "The Ontology of Deification," 101.), which is a problem since according to them "a Christian never completely manifests that [ontic-] unity [of Christ and Christian] in this life, rather his or her unity with God is always hidden until the Last Day" (Bielfeldt, 94.) See, Heubach and Luther-Agricola-seura., *Luther und Theosis*; Kärkkäinen, *One with God : Salvation as Deification and Justification*; Vainio, "Luther and Theosis: A Response to the Critics of Finnish Luther Research," 2015. My point here is not to validate either Schwenkfeld's, Ewald's or Mannermaa's theological formulations of rebirth or deification but to affirm *theosis* as a long-standing and complex Christian theme that automatically requires subtle philosophical work.

conceit/imagination”).⁴¹³ Ewald saw each of the steps of faith as the work of the Holy Spirit.⁴¹⁴ The spirit illuminated, secured, and worked a wisdom and perfect persuasion (*fuldkomne Overtøelse*) “that elicits a certainty that the good in Christ will come to the believer.”⁴¹⁵ The text here is sparse and open to misinterpretation.

Before moving on, it is helpful to discuss Ewald’s thought in light of Markus Matthias’s remarks on the development of the acts of the intellect and will in faith in Lutheran Orthodoxy. Certain theological assumptions are in place in historical Pietist research that make interpretation tricky. Matthias discusses Johannes Musäus’s distinction between the content of scripture (the historical knowledge that Ewald referenced) and its validity (its divine authorship). God’s authorship, that is, his revelation, secures the certainty of faith. Matthias finds it problematic that this distinction makes it impossible to draw any certainty from its content, and thus Musäus required “another supernatural concursus, which acts upon the second power of the soul, the will, so that it in turn forces the intellect to accept the dogmas.”⁴¹⁶ Faith thus becomes irrational.⁴¹⁷ Matthias sees August Francke developing this act of the will further.

⁴¹³ *Thi og et naturligt uomvendt Menneske kand forstaae nogenledes Guds Ord samtykke deri af mange udvortes Aarsager og ogsaa fare til og dette sin Tillid derpaa i en kiødlige Sikkerhed og stærk Indbilding.* BE 54

⁴¹⁴ BE 53

⁴¹⁵ *Hvori bestaar dend børnlige og gudelige Tillid? Deri at mand ved dend Vished og fuldkomne Overtøelse som Aanden virker i os ogsaa forsikres at alt det gode som er i Christo Jesu kommer os til Deel.* BE 53. There are three elements at work: first that the Spirit works/effects the trust the believer has, the trust is in the fact that the believer will partake in all that Christ has, *and* the trust ensures or even enables the believer to partake in this good. I read this passage as “that [believer] by the wisdom and perfect persuasion...is also assured”. It is the wisdom and perfect persuasion that are the acting agents of the verb *forsikres* (to be assured/secured). If this reading is incorrect and the acting agent is not one’s wisdom and perfect persuasion, but the Spirit, one is hardly inconvenienced. The first two elements of my argument still work.

⁴¹⁶ Matthias, “Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy,” 31.

⁴¹⁷ Matthias’s assessment is echoed by David Bentley Hart’s criticism that “submission to a morally unintelligible narrative of God’s dealings with his creatures would be a kind of epistemic nihilism, reducing the act of fidelity to God to a brutish obstinate infidelity to reason.” Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*, 61. Of course, Hart’s method of escape from this conundrum is precisely the one the Pietist universalists take.

I find Matthias's language revealing: the will must be "overpowered" and the intellect must be "forced" by the will. There are hints of Descartes's fear that God could make even the concept of mathematics false. There is also the assumption that supernatural action acts like a mechanical "shove" on the will like a powerful "cause" but still logically equivalent to a competing exterior agent. Matthias's discussion of this formulation contains a concept of God's relation with the world as competitive *and* causality as semi-mechanical. He accuses Musäus of avoiding the question "of how this supernatural influence comes about and is recognized."⁴¹⁸ One could reply in turn, how does any supernatural action come about? To answer the "how" is to solve the problem of the mechanics of creation and Christology. Francke and Ewald had a simple answer to the recognizability of supernatural influence: the pious life, that is, the good works of the believer, which Matthias also acknowledges.⁴¹⁹ That Ewald did not lay out the mechanics of the influence of the Spirit does not automatically invalidate the Pietist focus on the will. To a great extent I agree with Matthias's worries but this dissertation argues that the accusation of the irrationality of faith (because of the focus on the will) is not applicable in the case of Pietist Enevold Ewald. Ewald neither ignores the content of faith, nor posits an irresistible external forcing of the will.

If we return to Ewald's comments about faith, when describing "child-like and divine trust" he noted that trust—faith—was that the Spirit will secure the good in Christ for the believer.⁴²⁰ Or paraphrased another way, the believer would share in all the good that Christ had or was. The content of faith was not value neutral for Ewald; something desirable was

⁴¹⁸Matthias, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy," 31.

⁴¹⁹ See, Matthias, 32. However rather than reducing God's action to only an external force on the will, such an answer moves closer to the inherent desirability or beauty of the Good. According to D. C. Schindler, this is merely the classical conception of the good-one that transcends a simple interior vs. exterior paradigm. Quoted above, Schindler, "Freedom Beyond Our Choosing: Augustine on the Will and Its Objects," 33–34. Even if the Pietist or Pietist-related discussion centers around why we do not always immediately judge (and therefore desire) moral goods rightly (see Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:30–37.), this notion of goodness as desirable must still be considered as axiomatic. This is also discussed in chapters four and five.

⁴²⁰ ...som Aanden virker i os ogsaa forsikres / at alt det gode / som er i Christo Jesus / ogsaa kommer til os til Deel. BE 53 Also cited above.

promised. Matthias, reading Musäus, portrays this supernatural overpowering of the will in a negative light. However, did Ewald (or Musäus and Francke) work with an anthropology in which the will was already inclined towards the good or was the will a purely indifferent will?⁴²¹ Was the supernatural act upon the will an aid or an overwriting of the will's nature? These questions are relevant to Ewald's understanding of faith. They are also important to the language of perfect persuasion/satisfaction (*fuldkomne Overtyselse*). As I read Ewald, this language hints that for him, knowledge was not a passive reception of a statement of facts but had qualitative aspects that called forth a response: knowledge either drew in the knower or repulsed them and here in faith it did so 'perfectly'.⁴²² That the Spirit can do so *perfectly* complicates the supernatural-natural tension and the narrative of the supernatural as the foreign external agent. A better reading of Ewald's perfect persuasion finds resonance with the words of Augustine: "you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you."⁴²³ This teleological and anthropological vision does not precisely address the mechanics of the Spirit's work in human beings, but it does fit the eudemonistic concerns of Ewald's "child-like and divine trust." If Ewald's catechetical answer was a valid argument, it requires that we naturally desire the good *and*, perhaps more speculatively, that the Spirit's *perfect* persuasion reflects not just the perfection of our conviction but also the perfection of the Good (promised in Christ). For after all, only the Perfect Good can be perfectly trusted. Otherwise, Matthias's judgment is correct and faith is only irrationality. Historically, Ewald might not have intended this argument, but I suspect it is implicit throughout his entire theological system.

⁴²¹ Holding both this anthropological understanding and a sense of the depravity of the will must be worked out. The section on Buddeus and Walch will explore this tension. But to show my hand, the will in Ewald's thought is inclined towards the good-it is not indifferent.

⁴²² At least, that is how Ewald describes the perfect persuasion of faith. I suspect Ewald might be thinking of the difference between the infinite divine and the finite object. Only an infinite object perfectly satisfies the insatiable curiosity/desire. This is the gist of Ewald's fellow Pietist, Erik Pontoppidan's argument for the soul's immortality in chapters 6 and 7 of Pontoppidan, *Tractat om Sielens Udødelighed samt dens Tilstand i og efter Døden, stadfæstet ved Guds Ord og den sunde Fornuft*, 81, sqq.

⁴²³ Augustinus and Chadwick, *Confessions*, 1.1.1.

These issues receive more attention in my discussion of Ewald's sermons and the early modern anthropological framework of Buddeus and Walch.

Let me now return to the remainder of Ewald's discussion of faith. What is obvious is that Ewald saw faith as a source of motivation and action: by one's actions and motivations one knows the reality of one's faith. He repeated the assertions he made in the first catechism, arguing for a dynamic quality to faith: it was always growing. This clarification balances what I named above as a strong dual and polarized picture of faith: one who has faith does not sin.⁴²⁴ In the second catechism, Ewald used technical language to qualify that statement. Sin was "known sin" (*vitteilig Synd*) according to Ewald.⁴²⁵ At the beginning of the second catechism,⁴²⁶ Ewald distinguished between different types of sin: original sin (*Arve-Synd*) and actual sins (*Giørlige Synder*). He categorized actual sins as sins of weakness (*Svagheds Synder*) and sins of knowing, or intent (*Vitteilige og forsettlige Synder*).⁴²⁷ Sin was not a legal culpability but a question of domination, or power. Ewald did not consider the reborn as legally culpable for sins of weakness. Those sins were committed without one's knowledge and will as sins of offense, foolishness, or rashness (*synder af Forseelse/Vanvittighed eller Overiilelse*). Sins of knowing, or intent, involved knowledge of the will of the Lord and deliberately rejecting it, not seeking diligently (*med Ganske Flid*) to know the Lord's will, and not seeking to do it with all the means available (*ikke vil alvorlig og ret bruge de Middel/som*

⁴²⁴ One section headline in the first catechism merely states "therefore [one] has no faith who commits sin" (*Derfor har ingen Troen som gjør Synd.*) RG 126. See also opening remarks on Ewald's *ordo salutis* and faith in his first catechism.

⁴²⁵ For a similar structural understanding of sin, but slightly different Danish technical terminology, see Erik Pontoppidan's catechism, *Sandhed til Gudfrygtighed* (1752) Q. 283-302. Ewald actually uses Pontoppidan's terms (sins of evil and willed sins) rather than *vitteilige Synder* in his sermons (see, for example, HH III 418). The term *vitteilige Synder* seems to have been widely used among Danish Pietists or people connected to this circle. In an early history of *Den Kongelige Vajsenhus*, A. Exner tells a story of a student who came to Ewald worried about the possibility of grace for one who knowingly (*vitteilige*) had sinned. Ewald reassured the student that there was. Exner, *Efterretninger om det kongelige Vaisenhuus.*, 23.

⁴²⁶ This section of the catechism uses the language of rebirth ("being born anew by the Spirit of God" *at fødes paa nye af Guds Aand* and "a reborn human" *et igienfødt Menneske*" BE 10), rather than conversion, though they are clearly synonymous in the broad sense as they deal with the entire process of salvation.

⁴²⁷ BE 10.

gjør ham dygtig til at gjøre Herrens Vilje).⁴²⁸ In each of these examples of *vitterlige* sins, Ewald brought the intellect and will into the picture, suggesting an intertwined anthropology and understanding of human ethical action that did not focus on one without the other. More hints of his anthropological picture are present in his section on faith in which he wrote that faith could be lost by those who were lulled to sleep and sinned against their conscience.⁴²⁹ The changeability of the intellect and will were not to be underestimated.

Thoughts on Faith (and Rebirth)

Ewald and other Danish Pietists were criticized by their contemporaries for the starkness of their understanding of faith and sin.⁴³⁰ For a movement orientated to human experience, their claim seemed dangerous because of the perfectionism it espoused (that people might believe they could not sin since they were reborn). This was seen as a categorical confusion of cause and effect,⁴³¹ collapsing the situation into a magical, mystical, or substantial transformation.⁴³² Part of this worry stemmed from the strong dualism in which Ewald situated the condition of the reborn in contrast to those not reborn. The urgency of conversion also exacerbated this effect. Faith and conversion were essential properties/accidents (one has faith or a true conversion). This possession, or reification, became the structure from which sinless action mechanically flowed. Attributing this belief

⁴²⁸ BE 11.

⁴²⁹ BE 54.

⁴³⁰ See, Austad, "Mennesket Og Nåden. Til Forståelse Av Bakgrunnen for Erik Pontoppidans Lære Om Frelsestiegnelsen," 97–98.

⁴³¹ Kaasbøll states this directly in the trial, see "Kaasbøll's Response to Ewald," 17. See also the discussion of the trial in: Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Hallske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6," 295–97; Neiiendam, *Erik Pontoppidan*, 1930, 2:36; Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 51.

⁴³² Dippel is accused of this understanding of rebirth, (Harrisville, *Pandora's Box Opened: An Examination and Defense of Historical-Critical Method and Its Master Practitioners*, 96–97.). A short but more nuanced characterization of Dippel's understanding is found in Schmidt, *Wiedergeburt und neuer Mensch*, 261–62. Schmidt ties the focus on deification in Pietism to Greek patristic thought and writes that Dippel speaks of an gift of divine nature to the believer. At least this is how he reads the language of partaking in the divine nature in Dippel, *Vera Demonstratio Evangelica*, 274.

to Ewald is a simplistic reading of his material in that it ignores his insistence on the dynamic reality of faith, the anthropological and metaphysical framework he drew on,⁴³³ and, frankly, the Christological vision at its center.⁴³⁴ I now turn to Ewald's sermons to delve further into these issues.

3.4.1.2 Sermon on the Feast of Mary's Purification (Candlemas), 1740

Exordium: Exodus 16:1–7

Gospel: Luke 2:22–32

Introduction and Exordium

In Ewald's 1740 Candlemas sermon, he explicated the theme of faith, particularly in the second half of the sermon. His two texts were Luke 2:22–32 and Exodus 16:1–7.⁴³⁵ I will summarize briefly the first half of the sermon to give a context for his later remarks on faith. Following the opening prayer, Ewald asserted the centrality of faith as the only "means on our side, whereby we again can come and hold us to God, become pleasing to him, and partake in his grace, friendship, and company."⁴³⁶ Ewald maintained the Lutheran framework. He used the Exodus text to illustrate "the shameful lack of faith (*Vantro*) the majority of

⁴³³ Ewald clearly has some notion of how the intellect and will interact. Even if the catechism is unclear, all three definitions of known and intended sins give slightly different combinations of the intellect and will. Combine this with the language about power and ability, one has a different picture than the early modern mechanical model of power as force, there seems to be a certain structural account in play. For more on this, see Hanby, *No God, No Science: Theology, Cosmology, Biology*, esp. 107-120.

⁴³⁴ Ewald condemns those who fail "to use the means which make him capable to do the will of God" (*bruge de Middel / som gjør ham dygtige til at gjøre Herrens Villie*. BE 11) as committing sins of knowing and intent. The means seems a clear reference to Christ's office as mediator and the very practical use of this role (useful for righteousness, peace, adoption as children of God, joy in the Holy Spirit, union with God, spiritual strength and power). BE 79-80.

⁴³⁵ HH II 467-488, focusing on the second half of the sermon. This sermon was preached on the feast day of Mary's purification (*Mariæ Renselses Dag*). This holy day was officially eliminated from the Danish church calendar with the reforms of 1770 (see above comments about the Great Prayer Day). It is, however, still sporadically celebrated in contemporary Danish state-churches.

⁴³⁶ ...*Middel paa vor Side, hvorved vi igjen kand komme og holde os til Gud, blive ham behagelige, og blive deelagtige i hans Naade, Venskab og Samfund*... HH II 468.

people have” and God’s patience (*Langmodighed*) with them as he tried to make them ashamed of such a lack.⁴³⁷ He interpreted the Children of Israel (*Israels Børn*) as a type, or model, for his congregation.⁴³⁸ Their actions in the text were a warning against unbelief for his audience. Ewald emphasized the astonishment his audience ought to feel about God’s patience and his ongoing search for his children, despite their attitude towards him. He emphasized the goodness and persuasiveness of God: this was not a value-neutral concept nor a mechanical forcing of belief.⁴³⁹ By drawing on the Exodus story and discussing the faith of the Israelites, Ewald complicated the notion of a pure “pre-faith” intellectual naïvety. The Israelites, according to Ewald, were not confronted with a text and asked to believe. The Lord had brought them out of Egypt, parted the Red Sea, led them, and given them water and nourishment. Why then would they think that the Lord would abandon them?⁴⁴⁰

Ewald did not discuss the manner in which divine things could be known with any great subtlety. He took for granted that God’s actions and, more pointedly, God’s actions on behalf of the Israelites, were known by the Israelites and yet they did not trust God.⁴⁴¹ Ewald’s

⁴³⁷ HH II 471, *Vantro*e can also mean something like incredulity, infidelity, or disbelief. *Langmodighed* is not strictly patience (*talmodighed*), but more long-suffering or long-enduring.

⁴³⁸ HH II 469.

⁴³⁹ “...amazing that the Lord is so patience towards them and doesn’t only punish them for their ingratitude and evil but also with new good works seeks to persuade them about his grace and goodness, and his great power...” [...*men det er endnu mere at undre paa, at Herren beviser sig saa langmodig imod dem, og ey allene ikke straffer dem for deres store Ukiønsomhed og Ondskab, men endogsaa ved nye Velgierninger søger at overbevise dem om sin Naade og Godhed, og sin Store Magt*] HH II 471.

⁴⁴⁰ HH II 472.

⁴⁴¹ That Ewald considers the good works of God towards us also in a more general and pervasive way, is clear from later sermons. He speaks of the daily or common things that happen to his audience that are often not consider to be God’s works but only ‘things, which happen of only natural causes, or also just of a mere happenstance’ (...*Ting, der skee af bar naturlige Aarsager, eller ogsaa vel af en blot Hændelse*. HH V 506). Ewald interprets these things in the manner of Rev 14:17, that they should be a testimony or witness for us. He laments that ‘who cares about such things or think that one should therefore attribute them to God, how does one receive these and other good works of God, which we experience daily?’ (...*hvem agter vel paa saadanne Ting eller betænker, at man bør gjøre Gud Regnskab derfor, hvorledes man tager imod disse og andre saadanne Guds Velgierninger, som os daglige vederfares?*) HH V 506.

understanding of faith was bound up with the concept of trust, often expressed as “faith and trust” (*Troe og Tilliid*).⁴⁴² In the sermon, he moved away from an emphasis on the first two aspects of the traditional Lutheran formulation of faith (knowledge and consent).⁴⁴³ For Ewald, the knowledge of God’s actions towards the Israelites and his audience was never in doubt, as is clear in Ewald’s conclusion to the first part of his sermon “[So-called Christians] acknowledge and confess that he is their God and Savior, they comfort themselves with his blood and death, and the redemption, which thereby is given them, by their baptism.”⁴⁴⁴ But hardship turned them away.⁴⁴⁵ Ewald then described the gifts the Lord gave as “an overflowing grace to refresh and rest for our souls.”⁴⁴⁶ Ewald’s subsequent discussion of faith was located within this frame. First, God was already known (to some extent) and second, God was already known as the merciful, faithful, and patient one: why did one fail to trust (and obey) him? Ewald’s notion of faith was not orientated towards a deity as an external concept but focused on the agent who acted towards the human being in meaningful ways with mercy and patience. In return, faith and trust were actions “towards” God (obedience), though in no way were they forced or mechanically necessitated actions.

Gospel Exegesis

If the first half of the sermon explored the pre-conditions of faith and trust—roughly equivalent to the first part of the *ordo*⁴⁴⁷—in the second half of the sermon, Ewald explicitly explored faith. Ewald divided this part into three parts: the ground of faith, the growth of

⁴⁴² See for ex. HH II 77, 87, 216, 272, 332, 357, 540, 587, 670, 857.

⁴⁴³ The next sermon discussed which involves more analysis of how Ewald conceives of historical or literal knowledge vs divine knowledge in faith.

⁴⁴⁴ *De tilstaae vel og bekiende, at hand er deres Gud og Frelser, de trøste sig ved hans Blod og Død, og den Forløsning, som dem derved er vederfare, ved deres Daab...* HH II 474.

⁴⁴⁵ Ewald’s sermons speak about self-denial and abandoning the world, including the three aspects of the world (honor, riches, and pleasure, HH II 474) that act as ‘natural’ motivations for secular moral action (see discussion in chapter 5), but it is an oversimplification to read this language as undermining the essential ‘eudaimonistic’ aspect of his argument for faith: God’s goodness towards us is the ground of our trust.

⁴⁴⁶ *...overflødig Naade til Vederqvægelse og Hvile for vore Siele...* HH II 477.

⁴⁴⁷ Ewald’s exegesis makes clear the logical priority of God’s good, merciful, and caring acts towards us in this lead-up to faith.

faith, and the operations of faith.⁴⁴⁸ He also brought the Christological center of faith to the foreground. He moved beyond the persuasive power of God's merciful actions towards human beings and towards the identification of Christ as Israel's comfort and glory.⁴⁴⁹ Ewald used the example of Simeon in the Gospel text to identify faith with waiting upon Christ.⁴⁵⁰ Christ was the ground of Simeon's faith. The person of Christ was more important than even God's past actions of mercy and care. These actions were not disregarded (Ewald was no Marcionite) but illustrative of an agent whose promises could be trusted. This is why after declaring "the Savior was Simeon's only ground of faith," Ewald could say a page later that "Faith is grounded upon promises."⁴⁵¹ His concept of promises ("the perfect salvation from all evil")⁴⁵² required an active agent to will and secure them. Promises as dependent upon the human temporal experience were future-orientated, not an experience to be known. They

⁴⁴⁸ Ewald titles the section "The ground, growth and operations of the true sanctifying faith" (*Den sande saliggjørende Toes Grund, Vext og Virkninger*), HH II 478.

⁴⁴⁹ HH II 479. I will not detail here Ewald's Christ-focused hermeneutical principle for reading the Old Testament any further, but in general, his typological exegesis of the Pentateuch reflects a traditional Christological reading that valued biblical revelation. Yet, equally he does not simply seek to overcome, disregard or dissociate the Old Testament from the New Testament. The Law has not been fully disregarded: the moral law persists (See the pietist catechisms: Ewald, *Begyndelses Elementer* 8 and Erik Pontoppidan, *Sandhed Til Gudfrygtighed*, Q. 42). Pietism's attitude towards Judaism is complicated and there were Danish attempts to convert the Jews in Copenhagen, also with Ewald's participation (see, Pedersen, "Den Hallensiske Mission Blandt Jøder i 1700-Tallet, Med Særligt Henblik På Danmark.," 65–69.), but Ewald was far from the vein of Voltaire, who read the Mosaic Law as absurdity, see Sutcliffe, *Judaism and Enlightenment*, 240. For a thorough discussion also of the theological debate over Judaism in Danish Pietism, see Lausten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*. Lausten's discussion affirms Ewald's particularly Christological interpretation of the Old Testament. Lausten, 102–4.

⁴⁵⁰ "Simeon waited for Christ, or, which is the same, he believed this about him, namely that he was the one, who should bring him, and all those who would accept his grace, comfort and salvation, light and glory."
...ventede Simeon af Christo, eller, hvilket er det same, dette troede hand om ham, nemlig at hand var den, der skulde tilføre ham, og alle dem som vilde antage hans Naade, Trøst og Frelse, Lys og Herlighed. HH II 480.

⁴⁵¹ Denne Frelser var Simeons eeneste Troes Grund. HH II 480, and saa at Troen grunder sig paa Forjættelserne, HH II 481.

⁴⁵² ...at derved loves en fuldkommen Frelse fra alt Ont, HH II 481.

existed only on the level of temporal un-reality (for humans), but the promise-maker could be known and trusted.⁴⁵³

In his sermon, Ewald shifted from faith as an act of the intellect to a model prioritizing trust and the will.⁴⁵⁴ In the first part of the sermon, Ewald took pains to illustrate the goodness and mercy of God: God the agent could be known as faithful. As I will continue to emphasize, Ewald's argument depended on an understanding of the will as inclined towards the good. Otherwise, his language of persuasion and his description of God's mercy would have no weight. Also important to Ewald's argument was the person, or subject, of God. There had to be a way to progress from the knowledge of actions to the knowledge of the agent, the one who willed and sustained action.⁴⁵⁵ Yet it is not clear that these two types of knowledge (of actions and of persons) were equivalent for Ewald. Nonetheless, on a level of human experience, Ewald's audience knew about trusting persons and how that trust came from knowledge.

In the next part of the sermon, Ewald addressed the matter of faith's growth. He writes, "Just as it is with the natural things in the world, that they do not at once arrive at their perfection, but little by little grow and increase, so it goes with the spiritual, especially with faith."⁴⁵⁶ Ewald's first line in this section had major implications for his theology: with it he introduced an Aristotelean concept of nature that applied both to natural and spiritual things.⁴⁵⁷ How far

⁴⁵³ As Stephen R. L. Clark notes while arguing for personalist theism, "It is better to think of Truth as Someone than as Something." Clark, *God, Religion and Reality*, 139.

⁴⁵⁴ It is important to remember that *Troe* translates into both faith and belief.

⁴⁵⁵ Hence the identity of the ground of faith both with Christ and the promises, these need not be contradictory statements. Christ is the subject of the promises but also the enactor of the promises.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ligesom det gaaer med de naturlige Ting i Verden, at de ikke paa eengang komme til deres Fuldkommenhed, men efterhaanden voxer og tiltage, saa gaaer det og i der Aandelige, i sær med Troen.* HH II 482.

⁴⁵⁷ It is important to distinguish this type of natural thing, which are aimed at their perfection, from the 'natural' human condition as fallen or sinful ('For the human heart is after its natural quality completely deceptive', *Thi det menneskelige Hierte er efter sin naturlige Beskaffenhed overalt bedrageligt*, HH V 440). The literature on Aristotelean teleology is vast, although Hans Jonas argues the overthrowing of Aristotelean

Ewald was willing to carry this Aristotelean ontology is not clear. Still, this sentence involved a concept of nature that was teleologically orientated⁴⁵⁸ and capable of moving from potency to act. Language of developing to one's perfection may allow for degrees of becoming, without denying the identity of a still imperfect thing.⁴⁵⁹ Ewald then laid out a short version of conversion as hearing and understanding God's word and promises, recognizing one's lack, and desiring the promises offered.⁴⁶⁰ The final step of this process was "beginning to set one's faith and hope towards [the words and promises of grace] and waiting for the graced fulfillment of the promises."⁴⁶¹ In this, Ewald complicated his catechetical description of faith by tying faith, trust, hope, and waiting together. The acts of the intellect ("knowing God's word and promises" and "knowing one's lack") were first in the scheme of faith, but here they related more to conversion. Faith was synonymous with trust. Since Ewald's *ordo* required a conversion sequence, it was misleading to characterize faith as prioritizing an act of the will to the exclusion of the first step.

By introducing the notion of growth and increase into the concept of faith, Ewald also distinguished longing for Christ from the "full wisdom and confidence about Jesus's grace and atonement" and the right tasting and seeing of the Lord's goodness (1 Pet 2:3, 4).⁴⁶² This

physics begins to threaten the picture, shifting causal explanations towards force alone-thus endangering teleology. See, Jonas, "Seventeenth Century and after: The Meaning of the Scientific and Technological Revolution."

⁴⁵⁸ Something of this purpose or teleology is expressed in the sense that the Gospel is useful for preparing us for good works (2 Tim 3: 16:17). In a passion-week sermon from 1733, Ewald writes 'This is the word's right natural operation, and as such shows the good scent, which it gives forth, its right power for quenching and strengthening' (*Dette er Ordets rette naturlige Virkning, og saaledes viser den gode Lugt, som det giver fra sig, sin rette Kraft til Vederqvægelse og Styrkning.*) HH 879.

⁴⁵⁹ See section 4.1, where I argue that Ewald's language around perfection in his trial needs to be read in this light. For example, when Ewald argues that a newborn is still considered a full human being.

⁴⁶⁰ HH II 482.

⁴⁶¹ *...begynder at sette sin Troe ogsit Haab til dem, og at vente paa Forjættelsernes naadige Opfyldelse.* HH II 482-3.

⁴⁶² *...fuld Vished og Forsikring om Jesu Naade og Forsoning...* HH II 484.

confidence was part of faith but not necessarily part of faith's beginning.⁴⁶³ In Ewald's treatment of Simeon, the process of longing for, waiting, searching the scriptures, and praying humbly strengthened faith. Ewald was not concerned with assigning a starting point to Simeon's faith.⁴⁶⁴ The language of conversion and faith ran together in Ewald's description of the growth of faith, suggesting this process spiraled through the aspects of longing, waiting, praying, and reading the scriptures. Faith did not grow beyond these stages, or practices, but deepened through them. For Ewald, the contemplative aspect to faith (the longing, waiting, and praying) was not static but could have different seasons or manifestations. This description of faith balanced the call to action that Ewald addressed in the final part of his sermon.

The final part of the sermon addressed faith's operations (*Troens Virkninger*). Ewald was on his way to the third stage of the *ordo*, a holy life. Still, the section is an important reflection on the concept of nature, which Ewald had introduced in the previous section. Ewald began with the affirmation that Simeon's righteousness and fear of God were not the ground of his faith but the working of his faith. Ewald did not use the term *justification* (*retferdiggiørelse*), but he was clearly denying that Simeon's righteousness led him to faith (and thus justified him). At the same time, Ewald affirmed the biblical language that faith was never without good works. He stated, "where there is grace and salvation, there is life, light and power."⁴⁶⁵ Ewald gave no hint of a forensic understanding of justification with his language of power.⁴⁶⁶ The following section also touched on two elements: that participation with Christ lent itself

⁴⁶³ See, Erik Pontoppidan's *Mirror of Faith*, for a similar picture of faith in its beginning or meager form as the longing and waiting, not necessarily confidence or even joy, Pontoppidan, *Troens Speyl, Forestillende Guds Børns Kiende-Tegn*, 60–63. Ewald knew Pontoppidan and owned a copy of the earlier German edition of this book.

⁴⁶⁴ HH II 483.

⁴⁶⁵ *Hvor der er Naade og Frelse, der er og Liv, Lys og Kraft*. HH II 484.

⁴⁶⁶ At least, the focus is not on a forensic justification alone. Ewald refers shortly afterwards to Satan having a right to us because of sin, but Ewald is more concerned with the power and dominion Satan has over us through sin. Here there seems to be a distinction between a legal right and an actual power. HH II 486.

to a shared action⁴⁶⁷ and the mediatorial offices of Christ, which promised people “grace and atonement, power and victory, light and education,” were for the healing of souls.⁴⁶⁸ Ewald returned here to the Christological undercurrent of the *ordo*. Christ was the actor, “he will illuminate and glorify us,” he “teaches and shows us the way,” but he was also the one who “will be our life and grant us all the divine power, which we need for life.”⁴⁶⁹ Ewald’s view here of faith was dependent on an understanding of agency and power that was not easily drawn from the sermon text. A possible context will be discussed later on.

Additionally, the notion of the healing of the soul involved both an internal reality of sin *and* a continuity in the life, or identity, of a believer.⁴⁷⁰ Ewald wrote about “Satan’s dominion, which has held us captive to do his will, and rules in and over us.”⁴⁷¹ It was the internal rule that had to be overcome for the healing of the soul. It is helpful to see how this language was parallel to, rather than in opposition to, the Pietist language of rebirth. Just a page after discussing the soul’s healing, Ewald described the effect of faith as “forming and preparing another mind and being (*Væsen*) for us.”⁴⁷² This language practically replaced the person.

⁴⁶⁷ Ewald refers to John 15: 4-5, HH II 485. Ewald also expresses a more prosaic sense of the shared action (and guilt) between humans. His exegesis of the laws of uncleanness in Leviticus 15:1-33 leads him to comment that just like natural human and their actions are unclean, sinful and contagious before God, ‘so others can easily be inflected by them, both by their word and by their action, by corruption and offense, and it can happen by the least opportunity that one partakes in theirs sins’ (*...saa kand og andre let besmittes af dem, baade ved deres Ord og ved deres Gierninger, ved Forførelse og Forargelse, og det kand skee ved den minste Leylighed, at man kand tage Deel i deres Synder...HH III 767.*) Drawing upon a certain understanding of the natural world, it is clear that Ewald is not operating in a world with hermeneutically isolated subjects or things.

⁴⁶⁸ *...Naade og Forsoning, Kraft og Seyer, Lys og Underviisning...HH II 485.*

⁴⁶⁹ *...hand vil oplyse og herliggjøre os...lære og vise os den Vey...vil være vort Liv og skenke os al den guddommelige Kraft, som vi behøve til Liv...HH II 486.*

⁴⁷⁰ Unsurprisingly, there are similarities here with John Wesley. “Jürgen Moltmann correctly notes that for Wesley sin is a sickness that requires healing rather than a breach of law requiring atonement. Therefore, Wesley was less interested than Reformation theology in the permanent justification of the sinner and more interesting in the process of a moral renewal.” Kärkkäinen, *One with God : Salvation as Deification and Justification*, 76.

⁴⁷¹ *...Satans Herredømme, som har holden os fangne til at gjøre sin Villie, og hersket i og over os...HH II 486.*

⁴⁷² *at danne og berede os til et andet Sind og Væsen, og at gjøre os til nye Creature, HH II 486.*

Still, however far one interprets the notion of faith as a new spiritual “thing” (thus aimed at its own perfection but not necessarily perfect yet), the themes of healing and formation existed alongside it for Ewald. The healing of the soul allowed for a continuity of identity, while the nature or “being,” and rebirth suggest that the soul had an end and activity apart from its healing; it could still become perfect. Formation was explicitly formation in Christ by means of faith. The operations of faith in and by Christ were many, not just formation and preparation, but Ewald concluded with a discussion on the formation of a new mind and being, which led to good works.⁴⁷³ The new creature, mind, and being: these fit within Ewald’s understanding of nature as suited to a certain end, that is, perfection.

Ewald’s sermon referenced this Aristotelian understanding of nature only minimally, and I return to this in my discussion of the Early Modern context. However, the concept clarifies how Ewald could insist on the works, or effects, of faith without seeing them as mechanical or an “unfree” outcome of faith’s power. Rather, the effects of faith occurred in a manner that recognized a natural growth, or dynamism, within a subject or nature.

Ewald concluded the sermon with an instruction for the audience—reflect on the condition of your faith—and a warning against complacency. Ewald repeated the sermon’s major themes with a reminder that the audience should not only listen to the sermon but “be awakened to a serious love and longing to win Christ and be found in him.”⁴⁷⁴ After a sermon focusing mainly on faith, Ewald returned to the entire *ordo*. It is clear that the content of the sermon (Christ, grace, and atonement)⁴⁷⁵ was an answer to the human situation of “inward need, deep depravity, uncleanness and abomination.”⁴⁷⁶ Additionally, this self-knowledge,

⁴⁷³ HH II 486, citing Ephesians 2:10.

⁴⁷⁴ ...at opvækkes til an alvorlig Kierlighed og Længsel efter at vinde Christum, og at findes i ham... HH II 487.

⁴⁷⁵ Or essentially the Gospel message.

⁴⁷⁶ *Saa længe som en Siel ikke kiender eller føler sin indvortes Nød, dype Fordervelse, Ureenhed og Vederstyggelighed for Gud...* HH II 487. Additionally, Ewald’s presentation of faith (as part of his *ordo*) focuses sharply on the internalization of sin (sin’s power and rule in and over us). He is living in an era, where epistemological questions are being raised, what do we know, what can we know? Ewald’s move here affirms experience as a source of knowledge. What does a human being have the most secure access to, if not

described by Ewald as knowing or feeling, complicated the epistemological situation and the “acts of the intellect” in faith for Ewald. It is incorrect to read this Pietist treatment of faith as prioritizing the will because that ignores the first part of the *ordo*, which demands this dual act of the intellect.⁴⁷⁷ Yes, Ewald treated faith as principally trust or waiting upon God, but this never occurred, in his understanding, apart from the prior steps.

3.4.1.3 Excursus: Revelation in the sermon on the third Sunday of Advent, 1740

Exordium: Exodus 34:28–35

Gospel: Matthew 11:2–10

Before I move on to the topic of illumination, or enlightenment (*Oplysning*), which corresponds roughly to the work of the Holy Spirit in the act of faith in Ewald’s *ordo*, I want to discuss Ewald’s understanding of revelation or rather, the knowledge of divine things based on his 1740 sermon on the third Sunday of Advent.⁴⁷⁸ I do this to clarify the distinction between historical knowledge and living knowledge that underlay Ewald’s discussion of faith in the catechisms. Ewald’s idiom of living knowledge was not meant as a special revelation, or mystical vision, and it should not be read as a type of pseudo-magic. Living knowledge is not one more thing, one data-set more, in the category of things to know. It suggests something of the nature of revelation, not as a hidden, or special, knowledge but revelation as the capacity to give life to people.⁴⁷⁹ Ewald also briefly sketched out his anthropology in the sermon, which was not always straightforward in Ewald’s thought; he argued for the logical priority of rebirth (*Igienfødselen*) before illumination (*Oplysning*) but later insisted on the *transforming* power of illumination.

knowledge of self? These themes will be discussed more below on the section on Buddeus, Walch and freedom.

⁴⁷⁷ It is clear that there is more going on than a conceptualizing or representation of some fact to be known. There seems to be an act of comparison and judgment upon one’s own lack. It is not spelled out here how these acts relate to the will and the intellect.

⁴⁷⁸ HH III 430-452.

⁴⁷⁹ Ewald does not fully discard this first notion of revelation, God is said to reveal the sin through the law (HH III 437) and to reveal his majesty, holiness and righteousness (HH III 435), but these revelations are, in a sense, secondary to the revelation of Christ.

Exordium

Ewald began his sermon by remarking on the prelapsarian human condition (*status integritatis*), namely, that the human intellect could “know, grasp and understand all that belonged to the necessity, welfare, and bliss of the natural life.”⁴⁸⁰ The natural will could also desire and secure that which belonged to bliss *in the world*. However, even while unfallen, the human still required (was graced with) divine light and life to understand, know, and be fitting for divine things. According to Ewald, this special grace of divine light and life was lost, and (natural and spiritual) death entered in. However, it is not clear from this text if or how far the natural condition of the human—intellect, will and ability to know, desire, choice, and achieving the natural happiness (*Lyksalighed*)—was damaged, according to Ewald.⁴⁸¹ He focused on connecting the notions of (divine) light and life and asserting the logical priority of life over light:

If we shall now come again to know God in God’s light, so life must be first granted to us of God. Therefore, it is impossible that a human can partake in the divine light, who has not partaken in the life, which is of God, and which is granted in Rebirth.⁴⁸²

Ewald read the spiritual life as analogous to natural human life. Light, related to understanding and the intellect, and illumination were dependent upon life (perhaps an actualized form or nature). If one were writing a philosophy of mental actions, it might be permitted to consider 'natural understanding' abstractly. However, for Ewald any understanding is dependent on the nature of the subject who carrying out that action of understanding: the 'life' proceeds the 'light'.⁴⁸³ Complicating this analogy between spiritual

⁴⁸⁰ ...kiende, begribe of skjønnne paa alt det, som hørde til det naturlige Livs Nødtørstighed [sic], Velstand og Lyksalighed...HH III 431.

⁴⁸¹ HH III 431-2. If undamaged, the will then still is defined by both *desire and choice*, as related to ‘intellected’ happiness. This is not purely choice, or self-determination. See a good treatment on this subject in Schindler, “Freedom Beyond Our Choosing: Augustine on the Will and Its Objects.”

⁴⁸² Skal vi nu komme igjen til at kiende Gud i Guds Lyys, saa maade os først skienkes Liv af Gud. Derfor er det umueligt, at et Menniske kan blive deelagtig i det Guddommelige Lyys, som ikke er bleven deelagtiggjort i det Liv, som er af Gud, og som skienkes i Igjenfødselen. HH 3 432.

⁴⁸³ This preference is important. Abstraction cannot become a pure idealism. Actual experience trumps imagined experience. This is a theme in the works of Walch against speculation related to ontology, essence,

life and natural life, is Ewald's ambiguous language as to the way the human being "had" that divine/spiritual life. It was not another instance of divine nature; it was, in some way, identified with the person of God: "so soon as God leaves the soul, so it has lost the life of God."⁴⁸⁴ Perhaps the best way of understanding Ewald's concept of the divine life comes from the second half of the sermon and his comments on living faith.

Before discussing living faith, Ewald examined the story of Moses's face shining after speaking with God (Exodus 34:28–35). He wrote that "the clearness...was an effect of God's immediate presence and familiar or intimate conversation with him."⁴⁸⁵ Reflecting his larger homiletical project of preaching on Christology in the Old Testament, Ewald insisted that what was revealed to Moses was Christ. The revelation of God's majesty, holiness, and righteousness was not the transfiguring key, but instead, the revelation of Christ, loving and full of grace, allowed this transfiguration.⁴⁸⁶ Christ was the mediator (*en Midlere*),⁴⁸⁷ the one who gave light and life.⁴⁸⁸ Thus, it was essential for Ewald's argument that Moses received not merely the revelation of the Law (which ultimately brought only death and condemnation),⁴⁸⁹ but

and existence. Walch allows existence and essence to be logically or conceptually distinguished from each other, but not in actuality. See, Walch and Gleditsch, "Essentz"; Walch and Gleditsch, "Existenz." Additionally, without claiming a direct influence, Ewald's argument might be read as a different way of stating the Thomistic principle that "whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver", common Thomas citation quoted in Ogden, "On a Possible Argument for Averroes's Single Separate Intellect," 35–36. Consider this statement about "The impossibility to receive and find light, life, righteousness and salvation in and by the law, does not lie in the law, but in the blind and depraved heart" (*Umueligheden til at faae og finde Lyys, Liv, Retfærdighed og Salighed i og ved Loven, ligger ikke i Loven, men i det blinde og fordervede Hierte*. HH III 439). Ewald's impossibility refers to the state of the human being: the depraved person cannot know the light. Scriptural language aside, Ewald's point here is a negative image of Aquinas's.

⁴⁸⁴ *Saa snart som Gud vigede fra Sielen, saa havde den mist Guds Liv...* HH III 432.

⁴⁸⁵ *Den Klarhed...var en Virkning of Guds umiddelbare Nærværelse og fortroelige Omgang med ham*. HH III 434.

⁴⁸⁶ HH III 435 and 436.

⁴⁸⁷ HH III 440.

⁴⁸⁸ HH III 439.

⁴⁸⁹ HH III 437.

the revelation of Christ as well. This was the revelation that brought transfiguration: “Moses’s face was transfigured and glorified.”⁴⁹⁰

Ewald intertwined the scriptural visual imagery, linguistic connections,⁴⁹¹ and concepts of understanding, glory, clarity, and transfiguration: “O! that we all had opened eyes to see, that the veil may be taken away from our hearts, that we might know the glory of Christ, and so be transfigured to the same image.”⁴⁹² Ewald did not clearly explain his argument, but there is the sense that understanding, or clarity, must transform and transfigure its subject. That this is a boundary breaking transfiguration, not merely a change, is clear from the language and Ewald’s earlier comments about the *status integritatis*. The metaphysical or philosophical distinctions push for further clarification that Ewald did not explicitly provide here. The context would suggest that Ewald’s Christology and role of Christ as mediator is important. How far this notion of spiritual clarity or understanding leading to transformation is mirrored in ‘natural’ understanding is not clear. Ewald does allow for historical understanding of the Gospel, but his whole point is that it’s not *effective* or transfiguring understanding. Read in the context of Ewald’s exegesis, revelation was not about hidden, or special, extra knowledge; revelation, most properly speaking, was of the divine and the divine was what gave (spiritual) life. Therefore, revelation in its most proper sense must be life-giving, not condemnation and death.⁴⁹³ It must be the revelation of Christ, the mediator.

Gospel Exegesis

After concluding the Exordium with images of glory and revelation in Jesus’s transfiguration, Ewald returned to the Gospel text (Matt 10: 2–10). His purpose was to answer “Whereby or by what means is Christ’s glory revealed?”⁴⁹⁴ The question might be reformulated as how

⁴⁹⁰ ...blev Mosis Ansigt forklaret og herliggiort. HH III 440.

⁴⁹¹ HH III 442. Ewald equates glory (*Herlighed*) with clarity (*Klarhed*) and explained/clarified (*forklaret*) with glorified (*herliggiort*).

⁴⁹² O! At vi alle havde aabnede Øyne til at see med, at Skiulet maatte borttages fra vore Hierter, at vi maatte kiende Christi Herlighed, og saa blive forvandlede til det samme Billede. HH III 442.

⁴⁹³ As the Gospel text (Matt 11:2-10) will assert: the answer to the question of Jesus’ identity is healing and life.

⁴⁹⁴ Hvorved, eller ved hvad for et Middel Christi Herlighed aabenbares? HH III 443.

does one know Jesus is Christ or how does one know Jesus is God?⁴⁹⁵ This question in turn required another: How can God, or the divine, be known (by humans)? The means for knowing God that Ewald 'permitted' was the Gospel—more specifically the Gospel preached for the poor.⁴⁹⁶ Ewald allowed that as a common measure (or in an objective way), Christ's glory was revealed by his powerful and persuading doctrine and miracles.⁴⁹⁷ But there was a problem in Ewald's opinion: this knowledge of Jesus as Christ was not understood or believed despite its general availability to contemporary Danish Christians.⁴⁹⁸ Using scriptural language and Pietist terminology, Ewald observed that the data set of knowledge, and even the authority of parents or books, carried no guarantee of understanding.⁴⁹⁹ Even the reading of

⁴⁹⁵ As John the Baptist essentially asks in the Gospel text.

⁴⁹⁶ ...den HErre Jesus siger i vor Text: *Evangelium prædiket for de Fattige*. HH III 443. Ewald is careful not to tie divine revelation to new private visions or revelations—the target here is probably the Quakers or similar groups.

⁴⁹⁷ HH III 444.

⁴⁹⁸ HH III 444.

⁴⁹⁹ HH III 445, Br. Dunstan Robidoux notes that this is also generally true about understanding in general not merely understanding of the divine—at least, the Thomist notion of understanding:

As Aquinas himself says, “the knower as such is not an efficient...cause.” Cf. Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 6. Human knowing is not to be equated with the activity or efficient causality of the agent intellect. Human knowledge is not essentially a product of human effort (as a human knower moves from not knowing or not understanding to knowing or understanding). As essential as is the reasoning process for moving toward understanding, no one can know if understanding will ever enter into one's conscious experience. The absence of any guarantees accordingly distinguishes understanding from any kind of human making or human producing. Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 85, a. 2. There is nothing which a person can do whose term is necessarily an act of understanding (even if an act of understanding is personally possessed by a knower when it is enjoyed). Hence, as a consequence, understanding presents itself as something which can only be elicited (and not produced) by what human beings do. It cannot be earned. While given to persons who ask questions, understanding exists as essentially a reception. Dunstan Robidoux, “Applying a Thomist Principle: *Quidquid Recipitur Ad Modum Recipientis Recipitur*.”

Whether Ewald would see this problem of divine understanding as also generally applicable to any understanding is not part of this textual problem. This is a theme that will be picked up on in the early modern context section. For an analysis of the dilemma as Kierkegaard regarded it, that affirms the Incarnation providing “the conditions of the learner” where divine understanding is made possible, see Smith, *Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation*, 161–63.

scripture was not a guarantee of a “powerful and divine illumination and persuasion.”⁵⁰⁰ Ewald distinguished between the historical knowledge about Jesus and a true, living, and powerful knowledge, as he had in his catechism. He had no problem allowing for a historical faith in Jesus. I refer to this historical knowledge a data set of knowledge. This knowledge was still necessary for living knowledge,⁵⁰¹ which suggests that for Ewald, living knowledge was not about adding 'facts' to historical knowledge. Rather, it was the quality of knowledge that affected, formed, and influenced sanctifying knowledge. This sense of formation and pedagogy was an essential part of Ewald’s language here (to be taught, convinced, illuminated, persuaded to believe, and brought to the obedience of faith).⁵⁰² Ewald saw the persuasion *process* (preaching) as central to faith, even more so than miracles.⁵⁰³ This supports the notion that knowing Christ as Savior did not depend on knowing more facts or data—a purely quantifiable piling up of objects.⁵⁰⁴

Ewald’s pedagogical emphasis continued in the final section of his sermon, treating the “mechanics,” or the how, of revelation. He began this section by returning to the *ordo* themes and insisting on the importance of self-knowledge of humanity’s spiritual poverty. This was the starting point for a person: admitting their own un-fittingness, both in intellect and their ability to fulfill the law,⁵⁰⁵ and then coming to the Gospel earnestly and in good faith, desiring

⁵⁰⁰ ...*kraftig og Guddommelig Oplysning og Overbevisning...* HH III 445-6.

⁵⁰¹ “The true, divine Faith and Persuasion cannot be without the literal knowledge of the Word, and the persuasion of the historical truth, which is set forth in the Holy Scriptures about Christ” (...*kand det sande, Guddommelig Troe og Overbeviisning ikke være foruden Ordets bogstavelig Kundskab, og den Overbeviisning om den Historiske Sandhed, som fremsettes i den Hellige Skrift om Christo.*) HH III 446.

⁵⁰² *Underviiste, overbeviiste, oplyste, overtalede til at troe og bragte til Troens Lydighed.* HH III 447.

⁵⁰³ Miracles are termed as a means of persuasion, but logically secondary to the preaching as the right main-means (*Hoved-Middel*). HH III 447.

⁵⁰⁴ The very possibility of miracles is becoming a problem in the early modern era on a metaphysical level as they disrupt the constancy of matter and energy (an emerging axiom of modern science), see Jonas, “Seventeenth Century and after: The Meaning of the Scientific and Technological Revolution,” 66. Ewald is committing himself, at least, tacitly to a metaphysical and epistemological assumption that miracles can occur and that they may be experienced (he is obviously pre-Kantian), but he is unwilling to assume that miracles (the suspension of the natural) is the most important way of knowing the divine.

⁵⁰⁵ HH III 449.

Christ. It was such a person that came to Christ for life.⁵⁰⁶ This reads as a pedagogical observation that a person is most likely to learn if they are desirous and prepared to learn.⁵⁰⁷ Ewald next turned to Christological themes, for it was not just anything that his congregation was to know, but Christ as the effecting one (the one who brought peace for the believer's soul, forgiveness, the power for life, and God-fearingness).⁵⁰⁸ To know Christ as Savior and not to be transfigured, or transformed, was to not truly know him, or to know only the "exterior letter,"⁵⁰⁹ in Ewald's understanding.

I have written so far about the effects of divine knowledge. Now I turn to the logistics. To return to the first image Ewald used in his sermon, he always tied divine knowledge into the presence of the divine life. On the level of the intellect, there was the sense that divine knowledge, or divine illumination, could not exist in precisely the same category as natural knowledge: an understanding/intellection of the divine was categorically incommensurate with a natural finite (human) intellect,⁵¹⁰ as even Ewald acknowledged.⁵¹¹ However, Ewald took it for granted that the human could exist in a graced fashion (as he did in the *status*

⁵⁰⁶ HH III 449.

⁵⁰⁷ One can read this as an action of the will, but not in the sense it will force the intellect to affirm the Gospel, more that it directs the attention of the intellect. If one considers the language of persuasion, educating and convincing, one notices this is not the language of coercion. See a good discussion to this effect in the article, Schindler, "Freedom Beyond Our Choosing: Augustine on the Will and Its Objects," esp. 632.

⁵⁰⁸ HH III 450. The effectiveness of Christ stems from his will to do well towards us and his ability to accomplish this as the Incarnate God, "That he is the true God and the eternal life, God over everything, and also by means of the divine and human nature's close union in his person, all the divine perfections have been communicated with his human nature" (*...da hand er den sande Gud og det evige Liv, Gud over Alting, og endogsaa formedelst den Guddommelige og Menniskelige Naturs nøye Forening i hans Person, alle de Guddommelige Fuldkommenheder ere blevne hans Menniskelige Natur meddeelte...* HH I 511). Ewald is not interested here in questions, for example, about omnipresence and the *communicatio idiomata*, rather that divine/eternal/spiritual life can be communicated to the human nature. Christ then gives it further to us or rather, in some sense, we can be found in him, HH I 511.

⁵⁰⁹ HH III 451.

⁵¹⁰ To borrow an old Reformed phrase, *finitum non capax infiniti*.

⁵¹¹ HH III 431.

integritatis), that is, able to grasp divine things.⁵¹² Divine knowledge and divine life were not fully at odds with the human subject, changing it into something unrecognizable as human, for Ewald.⁵¹³ They allowed the human subject to enact, in a participatory and graced way, actions pleasing to God.⁵¹⁴ This participation referenced Ewald's language of finding *in Christ* "all the power, which we need for life and piety, and a perfect victory over sin, Satan, the world and all powers of darkness."⁵¹⁵ In this sense, Ewald saw no distinction between a human's ability to know Christ as savior—to know, in some sense, God—and the human's ability to desire, will, and do God-pleasing actions in Christ. Christ was the mediator⁵¹⁶ and divine-human bridge that secured the possibility of partaking in the divine life. One might even say that only by doing God-pleasing actions in Christ could one know Christ *as* savior and God.

This last reflection brings us closer to the end of the *ordo*, namely the holy life. But it also reveals how Ewald opened up a space within human experience and action that was commensurate with divine action, rather than a supernatural hijacking of the human intellect, or will. Certain actions can be predicated of us, but they are not predicated of the natural intellect or will.⁵¹⁷ Before I discuss that, I will conclude this section by discussing illumination.

⁵¹² HH III 431.

⁵¹³ See also, Ewald's reference to 2 Peter 1:3,4 and the partaking in the divine nature, occurs within a larger section about the communication of divine perfections to Christ's human nature. Any sense of partaking of divine nature is framed within Ewald's mediatorial Christology and, importantly, the divine perfection discussed is eternal life, not omnipresence, omniscience, etc... HH I 508-513. But of course, the main argument for this assumption is Christ as the incarnation of the Word. Which is why Christ functions as salvific mediator.

⁵¹⁴ This is coming from Rowan Williams's opening remarks on Austin Farrer and classical Christology, Williams, *Christ the Heart of Creation*, 1–7..

⁵¹⁵ *...al den Kraft, som vi behøve til Liv og Gudfrygtighed, og en fuldkommen Seyer over Synd, Satan, Verden og alle Mørkets Kræfter.* HH III 450.

⁵¹⁶ For Ewald on Christ's mediator-office, see particularly HH I 508-513.

⁵¹⁷ Torleiv Austad touches on some of these themes in Erik Pontoppidan's theology. He names the possibility of seeing Pontoppidan's doctrine of grace and conversion as a form of synergism between God and the human. Austad wants to push back against this notion that the natural will is cooperating in conversion, rather it is the will *as already touched and moved by grace*. Austad's brief comments make clear his unwillingness to see cooperative or concurrence language in Danish Pietism as automatically positioning God and the human in a

3.4.2 Illumination: *Oplysning*⁵¹⁸

As before in my discussion of the call as a mirror of conversion, this next section looks at illumination as the mirroring action of the Holy Spirit in faith. Markus Matthias terms this *Erleuchtung (Illuminatio)*,⁵¹⁹ but the Danish term Ewald employed, *Oplysning*, is also used in connection to the Enlightenment.⁵²⁰ Thus, in Danish Pietism, the concept of illumination did not escape its linguistic connection to the historical era. On a theological level, Ewald defined illumination as the work of both Christ and the Holy Spirit. While he distinguished these two, he did not robustly examine the difference between the work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit in his sermon.⁵²¹ I outline two descriptions of illumination in Ewald's writings: a short section from the second catechism and an extended reflection on illumination from a sermon given on Pentecost Sunday, 1740.⁵²²

zero-sum game of responsibility and agency. Austad, "Mennesket Og Nåden. Til Forståelse Av Bakgrunnen for Erik Pontoppidans Lære Om Frelsestilegnelsen," 101–2.

⁵¹⁸ Roger E. Olson and Christian T. Collins Winn describe illumination in Pietist thought in the following way, connecting it to the notion of the inspiration of Scripture:

In Pietism, illumination was also the key category under which both the production and reception of Scripture were understood. Spener, among others, spoke more of the Spirit's work of inspiring or illuminating the writers of Holy Scripture than he spoke of an "inspired text." At the same time, Spener argued that the same Spirit which had illumined the authors of the text was necessary for its understanding. Thus, in general, Spener did not make a qualitative distinction between the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the production of the text and the guidance of the Holy Spirit in its reception. This allowed him to speak of "inspired" writers *and* readers of Holy Scripture. (Olson, *Reclaiming Pietism : Retrieving an Evangelical Tradition*, 174.)

Olson and Winn also note that this illumination was more often located in a communal level, rather than purely as part of private devotional reading. (Olson, 176.). To the extent that the work of the Holy Spirit in illumination is a present action, not a past action, Ewald fits their description. The communal aspect of illumination is trickier to discern in the sermon text. It is important to remember that while Ewald was preaching his sermon series, lay-lead devotional meetings, or conventicles, were essentially banned in Denmark-Norway with the Konventikkelplakaten 1741. (Overgaard, "Konventikel.")

⁵¹⁹ Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs," 318.

⁵²⁰ Often 'Age of the Enlightenment' (*Oplysningstiden*).

⁵²¹ HH II 914.

⁵²² See HH V 569-593, especially from 581.

3.4.2.1 Illumination in the Second Catechism

Ewald's second catechism treated illumination as the divine means by which one "understands the sanctifying doctrine about Christ and believes therein."⁵²³ There is a strong sense of the pre-condition of conversion, humility, and constant prayer for illumination, but illumination was equally tied into scripture. Ewald did not address illumination independently, that is, apart from scripture.⁵²⁴ By doing so, he avoided referring to illumination as a personal revelation wholly unconnected to scripture. Finally, the catechism conveys a sense of progressive illumination in the practical application of the doctrine.⁵²⁵ Ewald laid out the continual need for illumination more clearly in his sermon.

3.4.2.2 Sermon on Pentecost Sunday, 1740

Exordium: Exodus 25:31–39

Gospel: John 14:23–31

Introduction and Exordium

As with his earlier sermon for Candlemas, which I discussed above in relation to faith, Ewald began the Exordium with a reflection on the natural life of the human being.⁵²⁶ He noted how humans require that which preserves *and* strengthens them as well as a good education and teaching, which allows people to understand the necessity of the world. Education prepared the person to be reasonable and was essential for the good of the person and others. Without such an education, the natural capacity of a person remained undeveloped, and humans would be no better than animals.⁵²⁷ Ewald again argued that the spiritual life was similar to

⁵²³ ...til at forstaa dend saliggjørende Lærdom om Christo / og at troe derpaa. BE 85.

⁵²⁴ BE 85.

⁵²⁵ "How shall this grace serve us? (1) For teaching. That we shall then wander as children of light as God's word shows us. (*Hvortil skal denne Naade tiene os? (1) til Lærdom. At vi skal da og vandre som Lysets Børn som Guds Ord os viser.*) BE 86.

⁵²⁶ HH II, 898-918.

⁵²⁷ HH II, 899-900.

this structure of the natural life.⁵²⁸ This Exordium, as I describe in my discussion of revelation above, operated with the logical priority of the spiritual *life* over spiritual *light* (illumination). Natural capacities (potential) must be educated (made actual) within both the natural and spiritual life.⁵²⁹ As such, the natural life was dependent on the world for its nurture and education. In an analogous manner, the spiritual life for Ewald had to be nurtured and formed to actualize its potential. The introduction of illumination into this scheme points towards an ongoing role for illumination in the spiritual life. A point to note: In this sermon, Ewald comfortably moved from using language of the individual human being to language of the congregation of Christ. Soteriology and ecclesiology went together for Ewald: holiness was their end.

The passage from Exodus deals with the furnishing of the tabernacle. Ewald, in the Exordium, interpreted the description of the tabernacle and its sacred decorative objects, in particular, the golden candlestick, as symbolizing Christ in his prophetic office as the only true light.⁵³⁰ The themes of light and life are again linked together. Ewald also brought in the elements of union and participation, moving from a reference to the personal divine-human union of Christ, with human nature partaking in the divine perfections, to the union of Christ with his congregation (*Menighed*). Thus, the candlestick also symbolized Christ's congregation and pointed towards its teachers as light.⁵³¹ Ewald hinted at a larger communal vision of education and illumination within and by the church.⁵³² Nevertheless, the role of the church as light was

⁵²⁸ This is not identity, but analogy at work, they have different frames of reference. "The spiritual [life] is likewise conditioned in its mode in regard to us" (*Ligesaa er det i sin Maade beskaffen med os i Henseende til det Aandelige...*) HH II, 900.

⁵²⁹ Ewald writes of natural capacities (*naturalige Capacité*) HH II, 900. Here natural indicates what is proper to something, not natural vs spiritual. Although Ewald refers to the natural capacities of the 'natural' man which must be trained and taught, he indicates the same is true of the natural capacities of the spiritual/reborn human. The linguistic ambiguities here make misunderstanding likely.

⁵³⁰ HH II, 901.

⁵³¹ HH II, 903.

⁵³² This is the church narrowly defined as 'believers (*De Troende*), or Christ's invisible church and congregation (*Christi usynlige Kirke og Menighed*), HH II, 906-7. It is always only one (in a mystical sense?), "one congregation of Christ, one body, one bride of the lamb" (*saa er der og kun een Christi Menighed, eet Legeme,*

dependent on a prior understanding of Christ's abiding union with his congregation.⁵³³ Ewald concluded the Exordium by referring to daily renewal in the Holy Spirit, suggesting that the work of illumination was never finished in this life.⁵³⁴ Thus, illumination as part of the *ordo* was not reduced to a single moment in the life of the believer. This accords well with Ewald's first image of education and formation in the natural life.

Tying together the role of communal education and daily renewal are traces of a reflection on the nature of light as fire. Ewald closely connected and practically equated light with fire. This move ensured that illumination was not a knowing something extra, but an illumination that changed the believer into itself. The believer became like the light, "but just as the believers are illuminated by Christ, so they themselves must become through him burning and shining lights."⁵³⁵ In this short section, Ewald made it clear what measure, or rule, would be used to determine "true illumination," namely, a "burning in the Spirit."⁵³⁶ Ewald returned to this weaving together of light and fire metaphors a few pages later.

Gospel Exegesis

Up to this point, Ewald had not provided a straightforward definition of illumination. But he had offered two preconditions of illumination: 1) it was part of the spiritual life, and thus

een Lammets Brud) HH II 904. Ewald suggests that believers have a further responsibility to become part of the illuminating process for others, "But just as the believers are illuminated by Christ, so they must themselves become burning and shining lights by means of Christ..." (*Men ligesom de Troende oplyses ved Christum, saa maae de og selv ved ham blive brændende og skinnende Lys...*) HH II, 908.

⁵³³ The act of illumination, while not ignoring the receiving end--the believers who are illuminated--requires the constant presence of the light in Ewald's understanding. "This light shines constantly for us, as long as we remain in the Lord's holiness, in his congregation, and in the company with him and with his believing members" (*Og dette Lys skinner bestadig for us, saa længe vi blive i HErrens Helligdom, i hans Menighed, og i den Samfund med ham og med hans troende Lemmer...* HH II, 907). Just as physical vision requires continual light, illumination as a metaphor or analogue echoes that requirement for the continual presence of Christ.

⁵³⁴ HH II, 908.

⁵³⁵ *Men ligesom de Troende oplyses ved Christum, saa maae de og selv ved ham blive brændende og skinnende Lys...* HH II, 908.

⁵³⁶ *De skal være brændende i Aanden...* HH II, 908.

dependent upon the spiritual life, and 2) Christ was the light.⁵³⁷ In the following section, he would define three aspects of true illumination, but before that, he stepped back and discussed natural knowledge.

Ewald tied this knowledge into knowledge of languages, science, and hermeneutical rules. He did not deny that using these academic tools could achieve much. He even suggested that Jewish scholarship (given its linguistic knowledge) best understood the literal meaning of scripture.⁵³⁸ However, this literal knowledge was not equivalent to true illumination. Instead, illumination was only offered to those who exhibited the proper attitude of humility and desire to please God.⁵³⁹ This attitude and longing, while not in itself illumination, was the necessary precursor to it.

Ewald's definition of illumination contained three separate components: 1) The Holy Spirit first and foremost explained Christ to humanity,⁵⁴⁰ 2) The Holy Spirit taught everything Jesus said,⁵⁴¹ and 3) The Holy Spirit reminded Christians about all the things Jesus said and taught.⁵⁴² It is apparent that illumination was a continual and unfolding process on the part of the believer, for Ewald. His sermon is filled with terms of comparison and increase: "He makes for us the person and office of the Lord Jesus always more glorious and more important, and his

⁵³⁷ In this way, Ewald partly echoes his teacher Buddeus, who distinguishes the instrument (human intellect) from the light (the Gospel which testifies concerning Christ), and the illumination (the reception of the light, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:107–13. Buddeus also defines illumination as wise, true, living and powerful cognition (*vis, sand, levende og kraftig Kundskab*, Buddeus, 1:119.), resulting from the divine operation of the Trinity, in particular the Son and the Holy Spirit. Buddeus, 1:110. This cognition (perception or recognition of the saving gospel) is not merely knowledge (*notitia*) or assent (*adsensus*) in the sense of possessing concepts of the divine things, but also involves the amending of the will, Buddeus, 1:115–16. I draw all these comments from Buddeus's section on illumination in the natural sense and the spiritual sense in *Collegium theologico-morale, eller gudelig Lærdom om gode Gierninger og Sæder*, 107-122. See also my discussion in chapter five on Buddeus and the intellect.

⁵³⁸ Ewald, HH II, 909-10.

⁵³⁹ HH II, 911-12.

⁵⁴⁰ ...at den Hellig Aand først og for alle Ting skal forklare Christum for os...HH II, 914.

⁵⁴¹ ...lærer den Hellig Aand os især alle de Ting, som JEsus haver sagt...HH II, 915.

⁵⁴² ...saa minder os den Hellig Aand ogsaa paa alle de Ting, som JEsus har sagt og lært...HH II, 916.

grace and reconciliation always more valuable.”⁵⁴³ This ongoing illumination problematized illumination as acquiring special knowledge, or revelation, as if this knowledge was *quantitatively* more. This illumination had personal consequences for the illumined believer (“to know what the hope is, which we are called to”).⁵⁴⁴ To put it another way, illumination made clear that to know Christ was to know Christ for us. The knowers, or the illumined, were themselves part of the knowing, or the circumstances that were known. One could perhaps speak of knowledge as *qualitatively* more.

This aspect is taken up again in the second and third components of illumination that Ewald discussed, pushing the illumined towards action. Ewald’s discussion of illumination was pedagogical: how to implement and practice Christian teaching, not the “what” of Christian teaching.⁵⁴⁵ But Ewald provided no specific method for this “how.” Rather, the last component of reminding and remembering suggests that the Holy Spirit worked in specific circumstances when it was needed the most but also pervasively and at all times:

It drives, moves, encourages, and strengthens us to strive in the matter that is taught or commanded of us, as well as in regard to that which shall be believed, as that which we shall do, let be, or suffer.⁵⁴⁶

Ewald’s comments were either general in an indefinite sense or an acknowledgment of the universal and constant reality of the Holy Spirit’s illumination in the life of the believer. I argue that Ewald’s themes of education⁵⁴⁷ and natural growth require a reading of continual

⁵⁴³ *Hand gjør os den HERres JEsu Person og Embede altid herligere og vigtiger, og hans Naade og Forsoning altid dyrebarer...* HH II, 915.

⁵⁴⁴ *...at kiende, hvilket det Haab er, som vi ere kaldte til...* HH II, 915.

⁵⁴⁵ He teaches us also, how we shall rightly use the same [Jesus' teaching] for our comfort, edification, and how we can and shall certainly and actually act afterwards in all uprightness. (*Hand lærer os ogsaa, hvorledes vi skal retteligen benytte os af den samme til vor Trøst og Opbyggelse, og hvorledes vi kand og skal viseligen og vaerligen i al Oprigtighed omgaaes derefter.* HH II, 915.

⁵⁴⁶ *...men den paaminder os agsaa, og erindrer os, naar, hvor og hvorledes alting skal bruges, omvendtes, gjøres eller settes i Verk. Den driver, bevæger, opmuntrer og styrker os til at gribe Sagen an, som læres eller befales os, saa vel i Henseende til det, som skal troes, som til det, vi skal gjøre, lade eller liide.* HH II, 916

⁵⁴⁷ *...So the Lord Jesus himself takes us into his school...(saa tager den HERre JEsus os selv in sin Skole)* HH II, 917.

illumination. There are specific theological doctrines Ewald had in mind,⁵⁴⁸ but equally, these doctrines involved elements of self-reflection, discernment, and embarking upon action.⁵⁴⁹

This third part of his definition of illumination presented illumination not only as true, but as powerful. If one assumes that the picture of the spiritual life reflects the division of natural life and mind (intellect, will, and ability), this last definition of the work dealt with a person's spiritual will and ability. But this power was not a mere forcing of the will (the Holy Spirit "mechanically" shoving the believer), not even a reduction of power to an absolute ability to will and do something—the will willing an action irrespective of any desire, understanding, fear, etc.⁵⁵⁰ Rather, Ewald refused to divorce knowing from *acting in understanding*. To understand was not a conceptual mirroring but grasping what the next thing to "do, let be or suffer" was.⁵⁵¹ Though chronologically subsequent to intellectual grasping, one's actions revealed the truth of the understanding that humans had. It pointed obliquely to the fact that theological language and concepts were tangled up in the reality that humans were not pure intellect and that to understand Christ's teachings meant to understand Christian doctrine as obliging believers to act in a certain manner. People cannot be neutral observing subjects that treat Christ's teaching as an external dataset or object of indifference. Christ's teaching is *for us* to employ Dietrich Bonhoeffer's phrase.⁵⁵²

Ewald saw that because Christ's teaching and actions are for us—humanity—the believer's actions are part of this Christian content that must be understood in illumination. To not act or not suffer, as the Spirit led the believer, was to show that one did not understand Christ's

⁵⁴⁸ HH II, 917-8.

⁵⁴⁹ ...give us a greater wisdom in all things, and a serious instigation and power to wander constantly and always more faithfully in his light, that we can show ourselves to be the right children of light...(*giver os større Vished i alle Ting, og en alvorliger Tilskyndelse og Kraft, til at vandre bestandig og altid troeliger i hans Lys, at vi saa kand bevise os at være rette Lysets Børn...*HH II, 918.

⁵⁵⁰ See my discussion in chapter five, and also the discussion around medieval theological voluntarism. For an short overview, see Murphy, "Theological Voluntarism."

⁵⁵¹ HH II, 916.

⁵⁵² I am inspired here by Rowan Williams' discussion of Bonhoeffer's Christology, see Williams, *Christ the Heart of Creation*, 169–217.

teachings.⁵⁵³ Ewald did not describe the mental process of illumination in the abstract as a singular event—the anthropological mirror to the act of the Holy Spirit—or as an individual process. Rather, his language pointed to an understanding of illumination across daily, or lived, experience: it “admonishes us as well and reminds us, when, where, and how everything shall be used, converted, done, or set in work.”⁵⁵⁴ From a human perspective, illumination (even if it included a mental 'moment' of understanding) had to play out in time because human actions unfolded over time. Thus Ewald insisted that illumination wasn't about showing the truth but about “lead[ing] us in the right way of truth and salvation.”⁵⁵⁵

3.4.3 Final Thoughts on Ewald and Illumination

So what did Ewald mean by illumination? Does illumination include special, additional, or prophetic knowledge? Other sermons by Ewald contain this wider sense, such as when he spoke about Jacob.⁵⁵⁶ But this was not how Ewald used the term in the *ordo*. Illumination was not about a piece of information though obviously it depended on information but about *understanding* this information. Cognition was at play, a receptive element, so that knowledge could be grasped as truth. It was also about knowing the right use of knowledge and the *ability* to use it rightly. Hence, Ewald's language of powerful illumination. However, Ewald, in his sermon and texts, was not interested in an abstract theory about divine illumination and cognition.⁵⁵⁷ His focus was on Christ and the Christian life. Ewald assumed that natural knowledge, or facts, was necessary but inefficient in persuading people.⁵⁵⁸ In this way, illumination, in a broad sense, was spiritual education.

⁵⁵³ One might also term this the 'moral ought', Christ's teachings involve how things should be. Thus knowledge is not merely of historical happenstance, but makes certain claims upon us. To not obey such claims reveals that we fail-in a fashion-to know fully.

⁵⁵⁴ ...*men den paaminder os agsaa, og erindrer os, naar, hvor, hvorledes alting skal bruges, omvendes, gjøres eller setter i Verk.* HH III, 916.

⁵⁵⁵ ...*fører os ind paa den rette Sandheds og Saligheds Vey...* HH III, 916.

⁵⁵⁶ HH I, 947.

⁵⁵⁷ The closest he gets is the language about education, schooling, teaching. Any comments or reflections by Ewald on general pedagogy might be insightful in this regard.

⁵⁵⁸ Ewald does not disregard academic learning, but seems to characterize it as categorically different that true illumination, HH II, 909.

Illumination, in Ewald, operated across the faculties of the mind. He spoke of the Holy Spirit reminding, moving, encouraging, and strengthening the believer.⁵⁵⁹ Additionally, divine illumination was not illumination of God per se, as if the divine were an object or idea to be grasped. Ewald rejected a dualist separation between the senses and the intellect, and between pure abstraction as the perfect form of knowledge⁵⁶⁰ and knowledge as rooted in right use and action, which could not operate in the abstract. The knowledge and understanding of the divine in Ewald's thought pointed beyond cognition. Illumination was knowing that the divine was related to understanding, proper desiring, and proper action.

To speculate a little: one could say that humans only know God as human by being like God in a human mode (through virtuous action in Christ, through Christ, like Christ). If one assumes a classical theistic understanding of God as metaphysically simple, whereby divine substance and act are one and the same, humans can only reflect, or approach, this simplicity by knowing *and* doing. Divine illumination, by the Holy Spirit, is what enables this process. Another interpretation of divine illumination also depends on metaphysical simplicity. The section on divine illumination in the Halle Pietist theologian Johann Jacob Rambach's *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre* touched upon similar themes. Like Ewald, he brought together the inseparability of the images of light and fire in divine illumination: some cognition was living and active and other cognition dead and ineffective.⁵⁶¹ Rambach also argued that the soul was a simple substance so that though the will and intellect could be considered separately in an abstract sense, in actuality they were not. True

⁵⁵⁹ HH II, 916.

⁵⁶⁰ Lydia Schumacher discusses divine illumination in a much more universal and robust sense, where God concurs with all aspects of human cognition. She also discusses the shift in medieval scholasticism where divine illumination ceased to be required for all and any human cognition. See, Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge*, 27:181–216. In particular, Duns Scotus is considered the theologian who abolished a general theory of divine illumination, though he retains here supernatural knowledge of God or special divine illumination (revelation), but this is God as Triune or God as our source and end. Schumacher, 27:200. This is not the main thrust of Ewald's concern with divine illumination.

⁵⁶¹ Rambach and Neubauer, *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre*. 2 2, 1563–64.

knowledge should always move to right action. Thus, to those who wondered why some knowledge was ineffective and dead, Rambach said this knowledge had been affected by prejudices that had been derived from the will's deformed self-love.⁵⁶² In this way, he prioritized the will over the intellect—at least in terms of the principal source of the error or prejudices. Divine illumination must address both faculties of the human soul (intellect and will), not only the intellect. These two possible interpretations of divine illumination are not dissimilar, and Rambach also wished to operate with a concept of divine simplicity.⁵⁶³ If anything, by stressing the simplicity of the *human* soul in the abstract, Rambach's notion of living cognition applied to any cognition. Properly speaking, even the living cognition of finite creatures and things involved a right ethical response and action towards them.

Finally, Ewald used illumination not only with regard to interpretation of scripture, a reading that would minimize the practical aspect of the Holy Spirit's illumination (that it was a powerful illumination).⁵⁶⁴ Tying illumination solely to the interpretation of scripture as if it would reveal hidden facts about the text misses the full manner in which Ewald discussed illumination. He did refer to the illumination of the Spirit in the sense of prophecy in the case of Jacob's final words to his sons.⁵⁶⁵ But that illumination involved the kingdom of the Messiah in Ewald's reading and therefore still falls under the definition of divine illumination discussed above (that the Holy Spirit speaks about and explains Christ).⁵⁶⁶ Christ remained the focus of

⁵⁶² Rambach and Neubauer, 1565.

⁵⁶³ See, Rambach and Neubauer, *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre. 1 1*, 304.

⁵⁶⁴ Douglas Kennard writes "the contemporary evangelical views of illumination emerge through Lutheran pietism. Phillip Jakob Spener replaced the concept of verbal inspiration of the Scriptures with a personal inspiration or illumination of the believing interpreter..." Kennard, "Evangelical Views on Illumination of Scripture and Critique," 797. Kennard does not find this viewpoint any earlier than with Spener, Quenstedt and Hollaz. His article is an attack on the notion of evangelical illumination in general as allowing a sloppy hermeneutics. I do not necessarily disagree with his final assessment, but I think his view of illumination already is too directed towards revelation as facts or data, rather than understanding and formation that is witnessed with Ewald. He also ignores the much longer history of illumination as tied into human cognition, both in general and in particular in terms of Christian theology.

⁵⁶⁵ HH I, 947-8.

⁵⁶⁶ It is this Christological lens through which Ewald reads all of Scripture, even when he acknowledges other elements of the text require the literal knowledge of learning and interpretation. "It is well known, that there

illumination for Ewald. The condition of being like Christ and being in Christ is the theme of the next section: sanctification.

3.5 The Holy Life: *Et Hellig Levnet*

The final part of Ewald's *ordo salutis* is titled "a holy life," or perhaps more correctly "a holy manner of living."⁵⁶⁷ In this section, I depart from my previous presentation of the *ordo salutis*, where I first discussed the *ordo* as depicted from the viewpoint of the believer's action and then on the viewpoint of divine action. Above in Figure 2, I titled these: the subjective human *ordo* and the objective Divine *ordo*, but I want to be clear that the human is not a purely passive recipient. One of this dissertation's goals is to affirm the cooperative role for a human in Ewald's *ordo*. By departing from my previous binary presentation of the *ordo*, Ewald's discussion of a holy life and sanctification are somewhat blended together. Part of the reason for this change came from the fact that under the mirroring part of the objective divine *ordo*, the whole of the *ordo salutis* also fell under the term sanctification (*helligjørelse*), see Figure 2.⁵⁶⁸ Ewald's second catechism, *Begyndelses Elementer*, contains a

are found many for ex. historical, chronological, geographic, genealogical, physical and moral truths in the Scriptures, which should not be completely passed by; though still all these truths are in there, set forth for the sake of the principle thing, and their purpose and goal is always aimed at or grounded upon Christ, and this is therefore always the main-purpose of Scripture, to lead us to Christ, and especially to know that Jesus is Christ, God's son and how we shall see and find life and bliss in him." (*Det er vel vist, at der findes mange f. Ex. Historiske, Chronologiske, Geographiske, Genealogiske, Physicaliske og Moraliske Sandheder i Skriften, som ey bør aldeles forbigaaes; dog ere endogsaa alle sidde Sandheder deri, fremsatte for Hoved-Sagens skyld, og deres Hensigt, Maal og Øyemerke er altid rettet til eller grundet paa Christum, og det blir derfor altid Hoved-Øyemerket of Skriften, at vejlede os til Christum, og i sær at vise, at JEsus er Christus, Guds Søn, og hvorledes vi skal søge og finde Liv og Salighed udi ham*), HH IV, 289-90.

⁵⁶⁷ The Danish *Levnet* is best translated: a way or manner of living. There is a dynamic, temporal, sequential sense to the noun rather than life as a static 'thing'.

⁵⁶⁸ This means I will not address the question of justification in an individual section, though justification is traditionally regarded as part of the *ordo salutis*. Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs," 318. This part of the divine action belongs more properly to Christ's action as discussed under the Second Article of the Creed. It has been the intention of this dissertation, to follow Ewald's structuring, language and use of *Saligheds Orden* (*ordo salutis*) as far as possible. Justification will be mentioned in conjunction with this structure, but it does not arise naturally within a specific sequence in his early

third subsection about sanctification in the narrow sense as happening post-faith. Here the act of sanctification followed after the heavenly call and illumination. Still, Ewald titled the entire section about the third article of the Creed “About Sanctification.”⁵⁶⁹ Thus, it could be argued that other elements⁵⁷⁰ were equally determinative and a part of Ewald’s broad understanding of sanctification. My sermon discussions look at sanctification mostly in the broad sense. I will outline Ewald’s comments in his second catechism before treating three sermons about sanctification and holiness: All Saints’ Day 1741, St. Johannes Day 1740, and the 26th Sunday after Trinity Sunday 1739. The final part of this chapter will re-introduce the concept of *apokatastasis*, and the last sermon discussion gives textual evidence for Pietist chiliastic and universalist claims in Ewald’s writings. This topic and my discussion of sanctification in general serves as a transition point for moving out of Ewald’s writings into the larger Early Modern context.

3.5.1 Sanctification and a Holy Way of Living in the second catechism

3.5.1.1 A Holy Life

Ewald began his section on the holy life by asking bluntly if it was necessary for those who wished to be blessed or saved to lead a holy life. The answer was yes and the reason was that without a holy life, one could not have faith.⁵⁷¹ In contrast to Ewald’s first catechism, he did not immediately suggest that the holy life was equivalent to good works, which could easily have lent itself to legalism. Rather, he defined the holy life as first hating evil and then holding fast to good.⁵⁷² Even if explicit references to the Law weren’t present in the second catechism, Ewald used the same headings as the first catechism and wove them together in a question-

catechisms. It is included as part of the *Saliggjørelsens Orden* (the order of making-blessed) in a 1741 sermon (HH III, 610), but even there is it bracketed off from the sequence including conversion, illumination, rebirth, sanctification, and renewal.

⁵⁶⁹ BE 82.

⁵⁷⁰ See, BE 87-93 and Figure 2 above in the beginning of chapter three. After the section about sanctification in the faith, there follows a section titled “About Perseverance in the faith” (*Om Bestandighed i Troen*) and then sections about each of the remaining lines of the Third Article of the Apostles Creed.

⁵⁷¹ ...men og fordi mand ellers ikke kand have Troen. BE 55.

⁵⁷² Rom 12:9. This is however the same verse he quotes in the first catechism.

and-answer style.⁵⁷³ He stressed that good works were not carried out for the sake of a reward but as thankfulness and an obligation to God.⁵⁷⁴

Ewald returned to the theme of freedom and the voluntary nature of good acts several times, which he contrasted to hypocritical, or forced, action. For Ewald, free action was more perfect and more desired.⁵⁷⁵ This suggests that (right) desire was not in and of itself an inhibition to freedom but part of a believer's true freedom. None of this is discussed any further in this short section, though I will address these themes later on in this dissertation.

The final question Ewald asked in the catechism section was how one received the ability to accomplish good works. He pointed more towards spiritual union and the indwelling of Christ here than in his first catechism.⁵⁷⁶ The spiritual union and indwelling of Christ gave the power for good works without it being a question of merit. It is obvious from the text that Ewald understood holy living in terms of actual human actions that were to be carried out. This was not a holiness utterly hidden or legally imputed. Ewald held to a philosophical realism in the sense that the truth was not determined by what people said and perhaps not even by what God declared as legally valid.

3.5.1.2 Sanctification

The Third Article in the catechism (subtitled "Sanctification"), contains two short sections that roughly correspond to the action of the Holy Spirit in the believer after its call and

⁵⁷³ See my above summary on a holy life at the beginning of chapter three.

⁵⁷⁴ *Til Guds Ære ikke til egen Roos / eller at fortiene noget der med. Men som en Taknemlighed og Skyldighed imod Gud.* BE 56.

⁵⁷⁵ The ground of good works is that "they happen voluntarily, with desire, with solemnity of heart, faithfully, constantly in all aspects which the word of God demands. And this always more perfectly" (*De skeer Frivillig / med Lyst / med Alvor af Hiertens Grund / trolig / bestandig / i alle Stykker som Guds Ord udkræver. Og det altid fuldkommelige*) BE 56.

⁵⁷⁶ "Of Christ Jesus, who lives in us by means of faith and grants us his Spirit, who conquered the world, cleans the heart, and makes that we wander in his commandment" *Af Christo Jesu som boer i os formedelst Troen og skienker os sin Aand / som overvinder Verden / renses Hiertet / og gjør / at vi vandre i hans Bud.* BE 57

illumination, namely, sanctification by faith and perseverance in the faith.⁵⁷⁷ The first section asks *how* the Holy Spirit sanctifies the believer.⁵⁷⁸ Ewald answered: “By faith in Jesus Christ, which both drives us and gives power thereto.”⁵⁷⁹ Two themes are present in the answer: impetus and the issue of capability or power. If one reads this section alongside Ewald’s earlier description of the holy life and his brief but vital descriptions of freedom and desire, the question becomes how to hold these together. Ewald did not present the internal reality of desire for the believer as a constraint on their freedom.⁵⁸⁰ It seems fair then to read the language of driving and drawing⁵⁸¹ in this section as enabling the believer’s freedom. More on this in a moment.

Also present in this section are comments about how God’s spirit renewed the heart every day.⁵⁸² This language refers to being cleansed from the love and dominance of sin. Ewald presented sin as principally *internal* to the believer (“So sin lives in us with which we have to

⁵⁷⁷ BE 86-87.

⁵⁷⁸ The 'what' of sanctification, is the ability to do good actions.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ved Troen paa JEsu Christum / som baade driver os / og giver Kraftertil.* BE 86. This could possible translate to "by faith in Jesus Christ who both drives us and gives power thereto." I am not sure the meaning would be radically different.

⁵⁸⁰ Theologian David Bentley Hart contrasts the popular modern notion of freedom as "arbitrary or pathetic volition, a potency made actual every time one chooses a particular course of action out from a variety of other possibilities. And obviously, for finite intellects and wills, this is the minimal form that liberty must assume" to an alternate ancient notion, "A higher understanding of human freedom, however, is inseparable from a definition of human nature. To be free is to be able to flourish as the kind of being one is, and so to attain the ontological good toward which one’s nature is oriented" Hart, *The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami?*, 70–71. I am not claiming that Ewald expresses this notion explicitly in these sections, but in Hart’s definition, desire for that "ontological good" is no hinderance to the higher understanding of human freedom. See also chapter five and D. C. Schindler's discussion of freedom in Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*.

⁵⁸¹ Under the question of what means God uses to advance sanctification, the cross and prayer are mentioned (among others). The cross draws (*drager*) us from the world and prayer draws (*drager*) God’s heart to us. BE 87.

⁵⁸² Renewal (*Fornyelse*) is often considered as part of the *ordo salutis*. See, Matthias, “Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs.” and Ewald, HH III, 610-11.

struggle”).⁵⁸³ Ewald’s language of indwelling of sin in his discussion of the holy life mirrored his final comments about Christ living in us by faith. He encouraged his audience to see the indwelling of Christ as the alternative to the internality of sin; Christ and the gift of his Spirit must be internal to the believer. Picking up the threads of freedom and desire again, Ewald reminded his audience that the daily renewal of the sanctifying act was not to be viewed as something external to the believer, in the sense of constricting them. Additionally, the power granted by faith, though supernatural, could not be external to the believer.⁵⁸⁴ Rather, one might say it was an internal, or quasi-natural, power/capability of the believer. In general, Ewald’s brief section on sanctification in the second catechism deals with themes of internal change, growth, and an increasing freedom *from* sin.

All of this assumes that the action of the Holy Spirit (its driving and granting of power) was not fully opposed to human action for Ewald.⁵⁸⁵ Another option is to interpret Ewald’s description of the power granted by faith as a magical and miraculous mechanistic force that did good works irrespective of the internal conditions of the human agent. Ewald’s short text does not explain how he defined the term *kraft* (power), but he concluded the section with a discussion of the means God gave to progress in sanctification: Law and Gospel, the sacraments, the cross, prayer, and faith. These means and the dynamism of their action in the

⁵⁸³ *saa boer Synden i os / med hvilken vi har at stride*. BE 86.

⁵⁸⁴ *Kraft* (power) here could also be translated as force, strength, virtue, Christian Friderich, *Fuldstændigt Dansk Og Engelsk Haand-Lexicon*, 603. It has etymologically the same root as the English word 'craft.' Force here is a misleading translation and while virtue might between express the internality I wish to express, I don't want to confuse it with *Dyd* (virtue), which Ewald uses for the moral virtues. *Ordbog over Det Danske Sprog: Historisk Ordbog 1700-1950* (The Historical Danish Dictionary) gives a variety of definitions, including "the ability to set something in motion, to carry out a physical or spiritual work" (*evne til at sætte noget i bevægelse, udføre et fysisk ell. aandeligt arbejde*) and "the capability, power" (*i al alm. om formaen, magt*). See, "Kraft." *Ordbog over Det Danske Sprog*. It seems to me misleading and presumptive to read Ewald’s language of power as the granting of power to us as an eternal and supernatural 'battery' power irrespective of a specific purpose.

⁵⁸⁵ I use 'natural' here, not in the sense of sinful human nature, but in a logically prior sense of the form or quality of human action *qua* human.

believer⁵⁸⁶ point away from a mechanical notion. I do not mean to suggest that the action of the Holy Spirit is not mysterious, rather that the Spirit works in, upon and with the different aspects of human action for Ewald, not against those qualities.

The catechism section on "perseverance in the faith" (*Om Bestandighed i Troen*) is even shorter than its predecessor in *Rette Grundvold*. It serves two major purposes: to reassure the believer that the progress (*Forfremmelse*) of sanctification was always dynamic and that the Lord continued to uphold the believer.⁵⁸⁷ Ewald affirmed the faithfulness of God and Christ to inspire the believer to be constant (*ubevegelige*), diligent (*med Flid*), and intrepid (*uforsagte*).⁵⁸⁸ In this section, Ewald headed off any attempt to read sanctification as a natural action that a person could undertake. Yet he also pictured the Christian life as active: "Always watch, pray and fight."⁵⁸⁹ Sanctification was clearly about the human activity of the believer. Nor was sanctification a single action or state (once achieved, always achieved); there was a risk that a person could "easily draw back"⁵⁹⁰ if God did not preserve them or if they did not turn to God for his aid. Sanctification was synonymous with concrete human life and action (*levnet*). It continued, progressed, or ceased because human life (*levnet*) continued in a

⁵⁸⁶ For example, "The cross, which draws us from the world and to God. Prayer, which draws God's heart to us and faith, whereby we more and more partake in all God's grace and power" (*Kaarset som drager os fra Verden og os selv til Gud. Bønnen/ som drager Guds Hierte til os, / og Troen/ hvor ved vi mere og mere blive delagtige i al Guds Naade og Kraft*) BE 87.

⁵⁸⁷ BE 87.

⁵⁸⁸ Ewald parallels the believer's action as a proper response to the divine faithfulness and love to the believer. It is not so much of a logical argument than a moral argument for human perseverance. The believer is not here asked to respond to God's sovereignty or innate goodness, but to God's loving action *towards* the believer. There is a hint of conditionality in God's action towards the believer, "What comfort do we have if we do this [remain constant]? That the one who so highly has loved us in Christ, now will not remove his hand from us, in what comes upon us, for he is faithful" (*hvad for Trøst har vi / om vi det gjøre? At dend / som saa høyligen har elsket os i Christo / nu ikke vil slaa Haanden af os / i hvad os og paa kommer / thi hand er trofast*) BE 87. A true conditionality of God's love however (that he abandons the one who does not remain constant) does not fit the original 'high' love of God for the believer. I argue it is better to read the conditional in a more positive sense. Ewald is merely affirming to the constant believer that God is likewise faithful.

⁵⁸⁹ BE 87.

⁵⁹⁰ ...ellers maatte vi let vige tilbage. BE 87.

temporal unfolding. Even though I have divided the *ordo* into parallel human and divine lines of action to organize this discussion, the structure was not so neat in Ewald's description. He was not concerned with a theological explication of the act of sanctification in a purely objectively divine sense. He was never far from the temporal progression of human life and action in this section. Yet, even from this perspective it is obvious that Ewald did not depict sanctification as a passive experience for believers (something that merely happened *to* them). Ewald conveyed a strong sense that even as God upheld the believer, the believer, in turn, was required to "diligently and rightly use the grace of God."⁵⁹¹

These catechism sections have only dealt with the nature of sanctification as a process present and ongoing in this life. To find language about the end point of sanctification, namely perfect bliss, or salvation (*Salighed*), one must continue on into the sections that deal with the eschatological elements of the third article of the Creed.⁵⁹² Let us now look instead at Ewald's extensive discussion of the holy life and sanctification in several of his sermons.

3.5.2 Sermons on a Holy Life and Sanctification

3.5.2.1 Sermon given on All Saints' Day 1741⁵⁹³

Gospel Text: Matthew 5: 1–12 (The Beatitudes)

Exordium: Numbers 8: 1–28

Exordium

⁵⁹¹ *At vi skal med Flid og ret bruge dend Guds Naade...* BE 87.

⁵⁹² Ewald asks what the perfect bliss of the Children of God consists of: "that they, free from all evil, shall enjoy all divine delight without end. So completely that if we only will consider a little thereof, we must completely be still and are not able to express [this bliss] with our weak tongues" (*At de / fri fra alt ont / skal nyde al guddommelig Fornøjelse uden Ende. Saa aldeles / at om vi kun vil betænle lidet deraf / vi maa aldeles tie og kand ei udtale det med vores svage Tunge*), BE 92.

⁵⁹³ HH IV, 131-151.

Ewald's Exordium began with a discussion of holiness.⁵⁹⁴ He defined holiness first as the perfection of God's divine attributes.⁵⁹⁵ He understood God as holy in both an absolute and relative sense: "by the name, that he is called Holy, is signified the perfection, which is in himself, as well as that he shows in regards to his creatures."⁵⁹⁶ Ewald did not list the divine attributes here; his focus was on the insistence that since God was a holy God, his people must also be holy.⁵⁹⁷ Still, the text implies that Ewald equated holiness with perfection. But he did not immediately clarify whether this perfection could only be considered in relation to God or whether the creaturely perfection required of human beings was natural and fitting to human nature (the perfection of human nature).⁵⁹⁸

Part of this lack of clarity stemmed from the sense in which perfection and God's perfection might be considered. Are they separate concepts? Was God perfect in a transcendent sense, Perfection itself, Goodness itself, or Being (or beyond Being) itself? Or was God perfect as a perfect divine essence? In the first sense closely connected to classical theism, God was not

⁵⁹⁴ *Helliggjørelse* ("making holy," sanctification) in Danish makes clear the etymological link between holiness (*hellighed*), sanctification (*helliggjørelse*), to hallow or to become holy (*helliges*), the saints (*de hellige*), All Saints' Day (*alle Helgenes Dag*). This is slightly more obscure in the English technical theological vocabulary. To remind my readers of the close linguistic tie between sanctification and holiness, I have often used the archaic verb 'to hallow' to translate the Danish verb *at hellige*, which appears frequently in its passive form, *at helliges*. I would also argue that the Danish etymological links between these terms subtly suggests to Ewald's audience the similarity and unity of all holiness, both God's holiness and the holiness believers are called to.

⁵⁹⁵ ...*sine guddommelige Egenskabers Fuldkommenhed, saa kalder han sig selv Hellig*... HH IV, 132.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ved dette Navn, at hand kaldes Hellig, betegnes saavel den Fuldkommenhed, som er i ham selv, som og den hand beviser i Henseende til sine Creature*. HH IV, 132.

⁵⁹⁷ Ewald cites Leviticus 11:45.

⁵⁹⁸ For a contemporary discussion of the notion of perfection, see the disagreements between Christian Wolff, Buddeus, and Johann Liborius Zimmermann (Buddeus's student and follower). According to Simon Grote, Wolff's believed that "A particular person's life is perfect to the extent that the individual actions "harmonize" with each other to promote his life's ultimate purpose, which Wolff takes to mean the extent to which the person lives in accordance with the essence and nature of a human being in general". Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:24–25. In contrast, (Pietist or Pietist-aligned) Zimmermann argued that perfection for the human being is only found in the union with God and in conformity with God's will. Thus, for Zimmermann, the standard of human perfection cannot be discovered in isolation from a love of God. See Grote's discussion, Grote, 117:24–38.

the most perfect being among other beings, but the perfection that all created beings must participate in. In the second sense,⁵⁹⁹ God's holiness, according to the instance of divine nature that he was, could be paralleled to the believer's perfection according to the instance of human nature that they were.⁶⁰⁰ In the second sense, human and divine holiness were parallel, not participatory. God's holiness was not like human holiness. God's holiness and human holiness might be perfectly equivocal.⁶⁰¹ What *is* apparent in these opening pages is Ewald's insistence that holiness was possible and required for believers: "we shall be hallowed and be holy."⁶⁰²

The text from Numbers that Ewald used in his sermon speaks about the cleansing of the Levites in preparation for serving in the tabernacle. Ewald, in his usual way, read the text as an allegory about the sanctification and renewal of true Christians.⁶⁰³ He then laid out his two concerns in the Exordium: who would be sanctified and how would they be sanctified. "True Christians and the chosen" were like the first-fruits whom God had chosen to serve him, as he did with the Levites.⁶⁰⁴ They were the holy priesthood and as such should be separate from the others. Here holiness took on a sense of separation⁶⁰⁵ rather than perfection. On the flip

⁵⁹⁹ This might be called Theistic Personalism in modern philosophical theological debate, see discussion in Wood, *Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion*, 159–74.

⁶⁰⁰ See above footnote contrasting Christian Wolff and Johann Zimmermann on human perfection.

⁶⁰¹ Or rather, if they are alike, it is because they both share in a third term.

⁶⁰² *...vi skal helliges og være hellige...HH IV, 133.*

⁶⁰³ HH IV, 134. He also mentions that the text can be read as referring to teachers (likely Christian teachers) and their preparatory work. Ewald does not read the text as strictly a one-to-one allegorical interpretation.

⁶⁰⁴ HH IV, 135. There are eschatological implications here. Ewald speaks about how the Levites served God for the sake of the whole community, (*at de forrettede den Tieneste ved Helligdommen paa det ganske Folkes vegne...HH IV, 140*). I will return to the issue of Ewald's eschatology when discussing Ewald and *apokatastasis*.

⁶⁰⁵ According to Philip Peter Jenson, "the theory that the original etymology [of holiness] is now abandoned", Jenson, *Graded Holiness: A Key to the Priestly Conception of the World*, 48. Still, "Separation has often been regarded as the key idea in holiness" Barton, *Holiness: Past and Present*, 98. Ewald seems to follow an older consensus about the Hebrew etymology.

side of separation, was being near holy things and, by extension, God.⁶⁰⁶ Ewald here pointed towards a unified notion of holiness rather than a parallel sense of human perfection.

When turning to the “how” of sanctification, Ewald took up the image of lighting the lamps in Numbers. This light allowed “God-pleasing” worship to happen.⁶⁰⁷ Leaving aside this thought for a moment, Ewald discussed the nature of the Levites’ separation and, by extension, true Christians’ separation. This separation was not physical separation from others but separation from sinful impurity in others and, more fundamentally, in one’s self.⁶⁰⁸ However, even the task of external separation undertaken on one’s own initiative was in vain given people’s internal uncleanness. How much more impossible was the task of internal cleansing! As an answer to these conundrums, Ewald interpreted the image of “sin-water” (*Synde Vand*) in Numbers as both Christ’s reconciling blood and holy baptism.

Complete human uncleanness (sin) was also a part of Ewald’s interpretation of the Numbers text. For him, the perfection of holiness consisted of forsaking worldly desires, holding oneself from the fleshly desires “which strive against the soul, crucify[ing] the flesh with its lusts and desires, and cleans[ing] oneself from the contagion of all flesh and spirit.”⁶⁰⁹ There was a totalizing aspect to Ewald’s notion of sin and holiness: no aspect of human nature and action was unaffected by sin,⁶¹⁰ and likewise, all actions undertaken by true Christians must be holy

⁶⁰⁶ ...at de skulle helliges og være hellige, da de skulde omgaaes med idel hellige Ting, of saadanne som hørde Herren til. HH IV, 136.

⁶⁰⁷ HH IV, 137.

⁶⁰⁸ "We cannot, by power or use, hold ourselves from others impurity and infectiousness, as long as we are impure in ourselves." (*Vi kand ikke med Kraft eller Nytté holde os fra andres Ureenhed og Besmittelser, saa længe vi ere urene i os selv*) HH IV, 137. Ewald does allow that physical separation might be necessary at times.

⁶⁰⁹ ...som stride imod Sielen, forsfæste Kiødet med Lysterne og Begieringerne, og rense sig selv af al Kiøds og Aands Besmittelse, at de saa maae fuldende Helligheden i Guds frygt. HH IV, 139.

⁶¹⁰ "Their natural impurity...no human by nature is pure, holy or worthy to serve God" ...*deres naturlige Ureenhed...intet Menneske af Naturen er reent, helligt eller værdigt for Gud til at tiene ham...* HH IV, 136. It should be clear that Ewald uses this sense of nature to refer to nature effected by sin, not the sense of human nature as an Aristotelian form. See my section above about natural growth and chapter 4 below about Buddeus on nature and grace.

actions “to consider [the Lord’s] holy word and will in all things, in all their dealings.”⁶¹¹ Human holiness received its final definition in this section: to serve and thank the Lord in all ways.

Gospel Exegesis

In the second half of the sermon, Ewald took up the theme, not of God’s holiness, but of human holiness as “rightly God-pleasing holiness.”⁶¹² He asked a secondary question about how unavoidably necessary the state of holiness was.⁶¹³ This question involved an exploration of necessity per se, the nature of human desire, and an understanding of the will oriented towards the ontological good. I will argue that missing from the text, though essential to Ewald’s argument, was a definition of holiness that was its own justification, or validation, that is, to understand holiness properly was to be convinced of its necessity and desirability. Before I get to this point, let us look at Ewald’s sermon.

Ewald began the Gospel exegesis with another definition of holiness: holiness as the possession of the Beatitudes.⁶¹⁴ In this declaration, Ewald did not say if these beatitudinal attributes were applicable only to human beings or also to God. But he nevertheless offered analogous content to his earlier definition of holiness as the perfection of divine attributes. He also emphasized that many people sought holiness, but “in truth the smallest part of them have and receive that [holiness], which they want to speak of.”⁶¹⁵ Ewald insinuated that

⁶¹¹ ...*hvorledes sande Christne i alle deres Fortagende skal vende Øyne, Sind og Hierte til Herren, og see alleneste hen til ham, og agte paa hans hellige Ord og Villie i alle Ting, i alle Forretninger, som de fortage herefter alleneste til at tiene og tækkes ham.* HH IV, 139.

⁶¹² *Hvori den rette Gud-behagelige Hellighed bestaaer?* HH IV, 141.

⁶¹³ *Hvor uforbigængelig fornøden og tillige hvor salig saadan Helligheds Strand er?* HH IV, 141.

⁶¹⁴ ...*der kand ingen kaldes med rette hellig, uden den, som i Gierningen vandrer paa denne Vey, og besidder de Egenskaber [Beatitudes] som den HErre JEsus her beskriver...* HH IV, 141-2.

⁶¹⁵ ...*at den mindste Deel af dem have og naae det i Sandhed, hvad de dog gjerne vil have Ord for.* HH IV, 142.

holiness was widely desired but generally misunderstood. Additionally, humans lacked the power to set out on the path to holiness. For both dilemmas only God could be of help.⁶¹⁶

Ewald made clear that the Sermon on the Mount, and the Beatitudes in particular, “show us the way to true holiness and salvation.”⁶¹⁷ Holiness was thus linked to salvation, as earlier he had linked it to perfection. He also insisted that holiness was not a forensic matter: the one called holy must have these attributes.⁶¹⁸ He then worked his way through the Beatitudes, which he read as a retelling of the *ordo salutis*. To be poor in spirit was to know one’s own inability to do good and to know one’s own spiritual poverty. This corresponded to self-knowledge as the contrition required for true repentance.⁶¹⁹ The second Beatitude (those who mourn) was about divine sorrow (*bedrøvelse*). The third Beatitude (blessed are the meek) did not fit perfectly into Ewald’s *ordo*, but in a general sense expressed the falling away of the desire to please oneself and to look down on others.⁶²⁰ The fourth Beatitude (hunger for righteousness) again fit into Ewald’s description of the final stage of conversion.⁶²¹ At this point the believer had progressed through the first stage of the *ordo*. Ewald was careful to explain that this hunger for righteousness was not righteousness itself. Righteousness could not be produced by human beings, it was a “gift of grace” (*Naadegave*) granted freely.⁶²²

⁶¹⁶ HH IV, 142. Ewald refers in this section to the atoning work of Christ and the action of the Holy Spirit.

Justification (*refærdiggjørelse*) and sanctification (*helliggjørelse*) come hand in hand. I will discuss this more below.

⁶¹⁷ ...viser os Veyen til den Sande Hellighed og Salighed. HH IV, 143.

⁶¹⁸ "No one can be called holy, who is not found on this way, and who is truly holy, as is here [in the beatitudes] laid out" (*Ingen kand kaldes hellig, der ikke findes paa denne Vey, og den er i Sandhed hellig, som er saaledes beskaffen...*) HH IV, 143.

⁶¹⁹ See above section on conversion.

⁶²⁰ "So that one does not any longer please themselves, nor raise themselves over others, nor is harsh and strict with others. One does not even despise the poorest one" (*...saa at man ikke mere behager sig selv, ikke ophøyer sig over andre, ey heller er haard og stiv imod nogen. Man foragter da end ikke den ringeste...*) HH IV, 145.

⁶²¹ See above section on "Sermon given on the Common Prayer Day 1739."

⁶²² HH IV, 145.

Ewald connected the final four Beatitudes to the final step of the *ordo*: a holy life. In this way, faith was the hinge between conversion and a holy life rather than a temporal step between them. Ewald briefly touches upon justification here. He treats it in a forensic manner—it concerns the "graced forgiveness of sin" (*Synders naadige Forladelse*), but this is still insufficient. With the fifth Beatitude (blessed are the merciful), Ewald argued that the believer was justified but, citing John 13:10, noted that some final steps remained. Justification was not that one was actually cleansed of one's unrighteousness (*Uretfærdighed*); one must become holy.⁶²³ Here the contrast was between the first part as the negative aspect of purification (the removing of unrighteousness) and the second part as a positive aspect (the taking on and practice of mercy and love).⁶²⁴ This was what following Christ was, and most importantly, it was directed towards others. The sixth (blessed are those who are pure of heart) and seventh Beatitudes (blessed are the peaceable) dealt with internal virtues and the cultivation of peace, respectively: the end, or purpose, of these practices led to reconciliation and union with God, with one's self, and with others.⁶²⁵

This final statement contains two notable components. First, the language about union with God corresponds roughly to the "end" of Ewald's *ordo* in his second catechism where he discussed the indwelling of Christ. The second is Ewald's language about one's union with others *and* one's self. This concept is just as important as the concept about union with God. Ewald was cognizant of the relational reality of human life and the practical function of virtuous action for the healing of broken human relationships when it came to sanctification.⁶²⁶ He also recognized that human beings were divided *within* themselves and even divided *from* themselves. Ewald's linking of these three "unions" was not a haphazard choice. Rather I argue that *if* human holiness was to be understood in a real (not imputed)

⁶²³ HH IV, 146.

⁶²⁴ HH IV, 146. Ewald also lists the other virtues here as well, citing Col 3: 12. Thus, one could argue that in this beatitude, he sees the practice and possession of all virtues. This theme is also present in the discussion of the 6th beatitude.

⁶²⁵ *Og saaledes at føre dem til Forligelse, Venskab og Forening saa vel med Gud, som med sig selv, eller med hverandre indbyrdes.* HH IV, 147.

⁶²⁶ One might see a parallel between the earlier mention of God's attributes as absolute and relative and the acknowledgment here of the relative quality of mercy and peaceable-ness in human beings.

sense, all three unions were required for such holiness.⁶²⁷ To be united with God, the believer must be united with themselves, otherwise they lacked, in a sense, a proper self to unite with God. Moreover, if personhood (whatever it means to be a person) is fundamentally and actually social, their self-unity in the ultimate sense was also dependent upon their reconciliation with others.⁶²⁸ I hesitate to say whether any of reconciliations (with self, others, and God) were logically prior or secondary for Ewald. Rather in the most perfect and final sense, they were logically co-extensive, or identical. There is no way to read Ewald's sermon outside of eschatological hope. He rejected the qualified sense of *trying* to be peaceable; this peace and reconciliation were obligatory and, I argue, inevitable for Ewald.⁶²⁹ In the sermon text, however, he did not explicitly state this. Perhaps fittingly, the final Beatitude (blessed

⁶²⁷ There are a number of unspoken arguments and metaphysical assumptions about unity here. I read and explain this statement as a reference to Ewald's unexpressed eschatological hopes and belief in *apokatastasis*. My reading here is influenced by David Bentley Hart's Third Meditation in *That all shall be saved*, which focuses on the nature of human personhood. The universal interconnectedness of humanity, along with certain other arguments, requires in Hart's (and Gregory of Nyssa's) view that humanity's final end must ultimately be considered as a unity. Furthermore, "such is the indivisible solidarity of humanity, [Gregory] argues, that the entire body must ultimately be in unity with its head, whether that be the first or the last Adam." Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*, 142. For further reading about the necessity of human-to-human reconciliation and unity in the vision of God's justice, see also, MacDonald, "Justice." I will discuss *apokatastasis* and Ewald's confession of the doctrine below.

⁶²⁸ One can see hints of this understanding in Ewald's earlier exegesis of the Numbers text. Ewald speaks of how the 'true Christians' like the Levites, are the first-fruits and the Levites' role is not an exclusionary possessor of holiness, but rather a pedagogical role for the *entire people* (*det ganske Folk*). HH IV, 135, 140.

⁶²⁹"That they shall be peaceable. It does not consist only in that one loves peace and as far as it is possible, we keep the people with all people, Rom 12:18. But the word which is in the text, leads to this: that one shall make peace [with others], one shall seek to help others to the right thing and as James says, seek to convert sinners from their wild-faring ways, James 5:19. And so lead them to reconciliation, friendship and union with God as well as with themselves and with others" (*...at de skal blive fredsommelige. Dette bestaer ey allene derudi, at man elsker Fred, og saa viit mueligt er, og det staaer til os, haver og holder Fred med alle Mennisker. Rom 12, 18. Men det Ord, som her staaer i Texten, fører des foruden det med sig, at man skal gjøre og stifte Fred, man skal søge at hielpe andre til rette, og som Jakobus siger, søge at omvende Syndere fra deres Veys Vildfarelse; Jak, 5, 19. Og saaledes at føre dem til Forligelse, Venskab og Foreening saa vel med Gud, som med sig selv, eller med hverandre indbyrdes.*) HH IV, 147. Is Ewald describing a command or a promised future? I read this passage as both.

are the persecuted because of righteousness) was not so much a final, or absolute, quality as it was an encouragement to persevere in the process of sanctification.

The final section of Ewald's sermon deals with the necessity of holiness for believers (those who wish to please God).⁶³⁰ Ewald argued this based on the authority of scripture—Jesus taught it and other scriptural witnesses confirmed it.⁶³¹ He qualified holiness not as a single attribute or quality, but as the possession of all the Beatitudes (“the holy attributes”).⁶³² Ewald also reaffirmed the essential identicalness of holiness and blessedness (*salig*).⁶³³ From this, other points of his sermon fell into place: his sermon was situated both within an eschatological framework and one that emphasized the continual growth in holiness.⁶³⁴ Thus, one already partakes in the final salvation and bliss here on earth, albeit imperfectly, insofar as one is holy.

⁶³⁰ "The state of holiness is inescapably necessary, for anyone who desires to please God and be blessed." (...*Helligheds Stand er uforbigængelig fornøden, for en hver, der begierer at tækkes Gud, og at blive salig.*) HH IV, 148.

⁶³¹ HH IV, 148.

⁶³² "whereby it is clearly shown that not a single of these holy attributes can or may be missing or considered unnecessary" (...*hvormed det jo tydeligen vises, at ikke en eneste af alle disse hellige Egenskaber kand eller maae være borte, eller agtes at være ufornøden.*) HH IV, 148. The section is slightly unclear about whether he is referring to a single, several or all believers possessing all the beatitudes. The eschatological framework and plural subjects are obvious (...*Himmeriges Rige skal være deres...* HH IV, 148) but the context suggests that each one's reward is the same, thus each one possesses all beatitudes or virtues. I am tempted to read into this sentence something like the unity of all virtues, or the necessity of all virtues to each other. This view preoccupied Plato in the *Protagoras*. For a discussion, see Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the 'Protagoras.'" "

⁶³³ HH IV, 150.

⁶³⁴ Ewald notes that in the beatitudes, even those who have just 'begun' "to tread upon the way of true Christianity and Holiness" (*at træde paa den sande Christendoms og Helligheds Vej*, HH IV, 149) are called blessed. In Danish, the link between blessedness (*salig*) and salvation (*Salighed*) is clearer etymologically than in English. He also notes in the same passage that the beatitudes refer partly to the kingdom of grace (the present age) and the kingdom of glory (the 'future' age).

Ewald also used the final part of his sermon to warn against people who mocked holiness. He acknowledged the hypocritical usage of the term holiness, but then he asked the real (or imagined)⁶³⁵ audience of hypocrites,

I will now ask you all about this, you who despise and mock holiness, do you not even once desire to have part and parcel with the Holy ones? Absolutely! Yes, you would love to have your lukewarm and external worship be regarded as true Christianity; and though you do not desire that it shall be called holiness, though you wish that it shall stand in the place of holiness and bring you on the way to the same right to life and salvation.⁶³⁶

To a certain extent, Ewald recognized that he was involved in a language game with cultural prejudices at play. But his question was not a purely rhetorical one. He was arguing for holiness based on its essential desirability. It was not that people wanted to only seem holy or truly Christian because of cultural expectations. Rather, Ewald assumed they wished to *be* holy because they recognized that it was a good and desirable thing even if they did not fully understand it and shied away from the culturally stigmatized term. In this way, holiness was its own justification as an inherent good. Of course, such an argument depended on the notion of the will as orientated towards good, that is, the will naturally desiring the good and good things.⁶³⁷ This allowed Ewald to assume that even those that denied holiness as a preferred term still sought the good which is “life and salvation/blessedness.”⁶³⁸

In the conclusion of the sermon, Ewald returned to the theme that opened the second half of the sermon: in all times people have desired to be holy but very few have achieved it. His response to this was that many chose the wrong way to be holy.⁶³⁹ In Ewald’s understanding,

⁶³⁵ It is a rhetorical device, but Ewald's trial manuscript does indicate that some people came to listen to him preach so that they could report back on his supposed heretical teachings. See chapter 2.

⁶³⁶ *Jeg vil kun ny bar spørge eder om dette, I som foragte og drive Spot med Hellighed, begiere I da engang at faae Lod og Deel med de Helligede? Aldeles! Ja I vil og gierne have, at eders lunkne og uadvortes Dyrkelser skal ansees for en sand Christendom; og omendskiønt I ikke begiere, at det skal kaldes Hellighed, saa vil I dog, at det skal staae i Helligheds Sted, og til veye bringe eder den samme Ret til Liv og Salighed.* HH IV, 150.

⁶³⁷ I will discuss this axiom below, alongside the early modern discourse about freedom in chapter 5.

⁶³⁸ HH IV, 150. Full citation above.

⁶³⁹ HH IV, 150. Full citation above.

the right way was the *ordo salutis*, which he recapped in the sermon conclusion. He concluded his sermon by highlighting how the process of sanctification was also aimed at the neighbor, or other. To be merciful and upright enabled the believer to work for the conversion, edification, and salvation of the other.⁶⁴⁰ Ewald did not dwell much on this purpose of the *ordo*. Salvation and sanctification on the individual level was the main focus. Nevertheless, a communal eschatological vision of holiness remained in the background.

Now, I turn the clock back a year to June 1740 to explore Ewald's explication of sanctification.

3.5.2.2 Sermon on Saint John's Day, June 24, 1740⁶⁴¹

Gospel Text: Luke 1:57–80

Exordium: Exodus 27:1–8

Ewald's close linking of holiness and sanctification that characterized his sermon discussed above is also seen elsewhere in his writing. However, in this sermon that he preached in the summer of 1740, Ewald brought in the theme of atonement. My examination of Ewald's sermon will reveal how he used the theme of atonement in his theological project to support the importance and centrality of sanctification.

Introduction and Exordium

Ewald began his sermon with a restriction: one can know nothing of God nor enjoyment of divine things by the light of nature and natural powers of the intellect. Already here he intertwined the themes of knowledge and desire.⁶⁴² It was not only that given the condition of human sinfulness and depravity, the fallen human being could not know God, but additionally they could not desire and enjoy God. Ewald writes,

Because of the Fall, we became so turned away and separated from God and from the participation and enjoyment of the divine and heavenly things, so that we cannot know or grasp any of that which belongs to God and his Spirit, much less rightly value

⁶⁴⁰ ...at vi endag kand arbeide paa Omvendelse, Opbyggelse, og Forbedring til deres Sieles Frelse... HH IV, 151.

⁶⁴¹ HH II, 980-1000.

⁶⁴² See my discussion above under the theme of illumination.

them or seek and tread after them by means of the light of nature and our natural powers of understanding...⁶⁴³

In Ewald's description, the ignorance of divine things was problematic, but a lack of desire for divine things was equally problematic. I argue that Ewald attributed a logical priority to knowledge over the estimation and desiring of something, but this priority was only operative in the knower—not in the thing known. That which is known—spiritual, divine, and heavenly good things—was already impregnated with the language of moral value and desirability, at least in Ewald's eyes.

So it was necessary that the quality, excellence and glory of the spiritual, divine and heavenly good things were again clearly described and laid forth in order to teach us about them and to awaken us and ignite in our hearts a true and serious desire, yearning and attraction.⁶⁴⁴

Thus, although Ewald paralleled the teaching (knowledge) and the awakening of a true and serious desire for divine things, he assumed that knowledge was morally shaped and bound up in moral categories. What was known *was* the glory of good things. The desire that was awakened was not a foreign or unnatural implant, opposed to human nature or the quality of the thing itself; as if it were a miraculous manipulation by God. Rather, the desire was a natural response to the inherent goodness and gloriousness of the divine things.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴³ *Da vi formedelst Syndefaldet ere aldeles blevne afvendte og afskildte fra Gud, og fra de Guddommelige og Himmelske Tings Deelagtighed og Nydelse, at vi formedelst Naturens Lys og vor naturlige Forstands Kræfter ikke kand kiende eller fatte noget af det, som hør Gud of hans Aand til, langt mindre sette den rette Priis derpaa, eller søge og tragte derefter...* HH II, 981.

⁶⁴⁴ *Saa var det fornøden, at de Aandelige, Guddommelige og Himmelske gode Tings Beskaffenhed, Ypperlighed og Herlighed blev os igien tydelig beskrevet og forelagt, for at undervise os om dem, og at opvække og antænde en sand og alvorlig Begierlighed, Lyst og Attraa after dem i vore Hierter...* HH II, 981-2.

⁶⁴⁵ Here I push back against a notion that revelation is complete opposed to natural reason or sensation. If so, how could any good thing be recognized or remembered as good? See for instance, Clark, "Orwell and the Anti-Realists." Note Ewald's use of the word 'again' (*igien*) in the above quotation. One could say we remember the pre-fallen knowledge of the divine things, but this connecting of knowing and desiring is also part of even our 'fallen' knowledge of earthly things. The problem lies in how to understand nature as only fallen nature or also as human nature both pre-fall and in its redeemed state. This theme is explored in chapter four.

Although I am reading the text and conceptually separating the act of God's word giving 1) knowledge and 2) desire as two different actions in the believer, this does not negate Ewald's original emphasis on the good and glorious quality of divine things *as the very things* that must be known. The second action (awakening and igniting a serious desire in our hearts) could still be interpreted as a separate supernatural desire given by God. But if the depravity of the natural faculties included a disjunction between the will and the intellect, the second action was not so much an irrational desire forced upon the human being as an action on the part of God to remedy this disjunction.⁶⁴⁶ For Ewald, it was not enough that the intellect had to cease to be ignorant of divine things, but equally the will did not respond as it ought even to divine knowledge. Hence, God must awaken desire in the believer's heart corresponding to the gloriousness of divine knowledge. However, this was a question of the sickness, or impairment, of the will's inclination towards good; one might say a matter of degree. Ewald did not deny that the will was inclined to—desirous of—the good. I will return to these psychological concerns later in this dissertation when I discuss the Early Modern context of Ewald's understanding of the human faculties.

Despite this ambiguity concerning the intellect and the will and God's respective actions toward them, the matter did not override Ewald's stress on the goodness of God, especially relative to the believer, both in the opening prayer and in the sermon introduction.⁶⁴⁷ Ewald assumed that what was good was ultimately and naturally desirable.⁶⁴⁸ If this principle is not recognized as operative in Ewald's entire sermon and theological corpus, the later claims in this sermon about the necessity of sanctification for salvation⁶⁴⁹ cease to be about a logical

⁶⁴⁶ See my above discussion of Markus Matthias' judgment about the irrationality of faith in Pietism in the section on faith and also below my discussion of Buddeus' understanding of the will's sinful self-love.

⁶⁴⁷ HH II, 980-2.

⁶⁴⁸ In this sense, goodness is its own justification. This is not a rational argument, but a principle Ewald must take as axiomatic in order for the rest of his arguments about holiness and sanctification to stand up.

⁶⁴⁹ "Yes, it is clear from many of these and other places that God's grace-filled promises are so closely bound to our sanctification that anyone can easily see and understand that it belongs in the order of making-blessed, and that we can neither expect life or bliss if we are not truly sanctified." (*Ja det er klart af mange af disse of andre Steder, at Guds naadefuld forjættelser saa nøye bindes til saadan vor Helliggjørelse, at enhver letterlige*

internal necessity but become a legal and external necessity from authority: it is so because God wills it to be so in a radically voluntaristic sense.

After a short introduction, Ewald turned his focus to Christ as the way to enter God's holiness. The Exordium text brought him to the topic of altars and burnt offerings. As usual, Ewald read these texts as a Christological allegory,⁶⁵⁰ whereby God's revelation of the truth was given but in shadowy form and images.⁶⁵¹ The altar for burnt offerings symbolized the atoning office of Christ.⁶⁵² Ewald described the altar in full and took pains to show how the different aspects of it symbolized aspects of Christ, such as Christ's two natures and Christ's self-emptying, or humiliating (*fornedrelse*).⁶⁵³ Ewald insisted on the universal nature of Christ's atonement⁶⁵⁴ and that it could be known by all, although only in the proper order.

kan see og forstaae, at den hør med til vor Saliggjørelses Orden, og at vi hverken kand vente os Liv eller Salighed, hvis vi ikke i Sandhed helliggjøres...) HH II, 991.

⁶⁵⁰ Ewald justifies his exegesis here by citing the end of Col 3:11 (*Christus er alle Ting*), HH II, 985. He means this in a restricted sense that the altar and the tabernacle prefigure Christ, and he does not engage here in more abstract meditation on allegorical interpretation. The Christological interpretation of the Old Testament is also found in the major Pietist figures like, Joachim Lange and Johann Rambach, Sæbø, *Hebrew Bible-Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation.*, 924.

⁶⁵¹ HH II, 982.

⁶⁵² HH II, 983.

⁶⁵³ This concern is chronologically prior to the kenotic Christologies of 19th century Lutheranism. A similar focus on Christ's self-emptying can be found in a near contemporary of Ewald, Rambach, Rambach and Neubauer, *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre. 1 1*, 940 sqq. Ewald does not seem to have a problem with the entire divine fullness dwelling in Christ, merely that it was hidden to others. " [Christ] did not let his divine majesty and glory be known, though the entire fullness of the divine dwelled in him bodily" (*...ikke lod sin Guddommelige Majestæt og Herlighed kiendes, da dog Guddommens hele Fylde boede i ham legemligen.*) HH II, 986.

⁶⁵⁴ Ewald is clearly writing against a notion of pre-determined limited atonement (HH II, 986, 988). As I will discuss below, Ewald's affirmation of the doctrine of apokatastasis suggests this is not merely God's will for universal atonement, but actual universal atonement. As mentioned above, Ewald's teacher Buddeus insisted on God's will for universal atonement, see Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.3.XVII, 467. Ironically, Ewald was accused of preaching a 'Calvinist' doctrine of grace, wherein only a few were offered grace. Ewald noted in response that he had a great horror (*stor horreur*) of such a doctrine. Exner,

That the altar stood under the open sky symbolizes that Christ with his atoning office should be clearly set forth before the eyes of all humans, and it shows that each ought to have access to this, though in its right order...⁶⁵⁵

Ewald rephrased the idea about the proper order in the next page: “we neither can nor may come nearer to the Lord’s holiness, if we are not first partakers in the power and fruit of Jesus’s death, blood and atonement.”⁶⁵⁶ In this restatement of his argument, Christ’s saving action, or atoning office, was exchanged for God’s holiness. Any discussion of Christ’s atonement was for the aim of drawing near to the holy God. As he did at the beginning of the sermon, Ewald assumed that God’s holiness (or the glory of divine things) was what his audience naturally desired, even if they were ignorant of it in a certain fashion.⁶⁵⁷ Thus, by identifying Christ as the most holy, Ewald shifted the focus of the natural human primal desire to Christ. In what remained of the Exordium, he argued for the *ordo salutis* as the way to

Efterretninger om det kongelige Vaisenhuus., 24–25. Given Ewald's confession of *apokatastasis*, his reaction seems fair.

⁶⁵⁵ *Saa forestilles ogsaa derved, at Alteret stod under aaben Himmel, at Christus med sit Forson-Embede skulde klarligen fremstilles for alle Menniskers Øyne, og vises, at enhver torde have Adgang dertil, dog i sin rette Orden...* HH II, 986.

⁶⁵⁶ *...vi ikke kand eller maae nærme os videre til HErrens Helligdom, hvis vi ikke først ere blevne deelagtige i JEsu Døds, Blods og Forsonings Kraft og Frugt.* HH II, 987.

⁶⁵⁷ One could also say, they desire bliss or salvation (*Salighed*), but Ewald insists that bliss cannot be divorced from holiness, HH II, 991. There is a certain unexpected or even ecstatic quality to the Pietist language of conversion, which Erik Nielsen argues for: "But far greater joys!...Conversion is an initiation, an introduction to joys and forms of desire which previously have been and always shall be unknown for 'the world'. It is insufficient to motivate people negatively by means of punishment and methods of fear: the strategies of hell, as P.G. Lindhardt calls them; one must also be positively motivated which the Pietists do by opening up a knowledge of holy and secret desires that the converted can experience" (*Men langt større glæder!...Omvendelsen er en indvielse, en indføring i glæder og i lystformer, som hidtil har været og for altid skal være ukendte for "verden."* *Der er derfor ikke nok at motivere mennesker negativt ved stokkemotoder og skræmmestrategier, helvedsstrategier. som P.G. Lindhardt kaldte dem; der må også motiveres positivt, hvad pietisterne gør ved at åbne til en viden om de hellige og hemmelige lyster, den omvendte kan opleve.*) Nielsen, H. A. Brorson : *pietisme, meditation, erotik*, 54–55.

enter into the atoning office of Christ—"partaking in the alter, in Christ and all his grace".⁶⁵⁸ Like the priests in Exodus, Ewald insisted that one must be holy to go into the holy.⁶⁵⁹ Ewald explored the external and internal implications of this vision in the second half of the sermon.

Gospel Exegesis

In the second half of the sermon, Ewald explicitly addressed the theme of sanctification in a two-fold definition: in a negative sense, sanctification was a cleansing from internal and external sins, and in the positive sense, it was the mind, desire, and power to live a God-pleasing life. In other words, one would not only know what was required for a God-pleasing life but would desire such a life and have the capacity to live it. In short, "to be holy in all one's circumstances, both inwardly and outwardly, in heart, mind, desire and affections, in thoughts, word and deed."⁶⁶⁰ It is not clear how much of this language was grounded in an eschatological horizon, though there were elements of that vision in the conclusion of the Exordium.⁶⁶¹ However, Ewald tempered his language by speaking of pursuing holiness, which tied also into the notion of progression, not merely possession. What was not up for discussion for Ewald was the centrality of holiness for "life or bliss" (*Liv eller Salighed*).⁶⁶²

After arguing for the necessity of sanctification, Ewald qualified his understanding of this necessity. He was not arguing for a works-righteousness that gave from an externally imposed law and was self-motivated through fear. For Ewald, the external sense of necessity from fear and worry about scripture's injunctions ended in either a pharisaical sense of security or a slavish anxiety. In utter despair over this necessity, some even despised the Christian life and

⁶⁵⁸ *deelagtige i Alteret, i Christo og al hans Naade*. HH II, 988. Ewald gives a short version of the ordo which includes desiring righteousness and peace, repentance, faith, atonement, cleansing and sanctifying (HH II, 988-89).

⁶⁵⁹ HH II, 989.

⁶⁶⁰ HH II, 990-1, *at være hellig i al sin Omgængelse, baade indvortes og udvortes, i Hierte, Sind, Lyst og Affecter, i Tanker, Ord og Gierninger*. HH II, 991.

⁶⁶¹ "[to them] is given richly entrance into the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ" (...*gives rigeligen den Indgang til vor HErres og Frelseres Jesu Christi evige Rige*.) HH II, 989.

⁶⁶² HH II, 991.

judged all Christians to be hypocrites.⁶⁶³ Ewald insisted that these errors (self-righteousness, slavish anxiety, and distrust) stemmed from a false understanding of Christ's work of atonement. According to Ewald, if one did not rightly know God's grace, they could not have the desire to love and obey God.⁶⁶⁴

Ewald's model of atonement in his sermon had strong elements of what has been termed the *Christus Victor* model mixed with classical Lutheran language about forgiveness of sins and justification.⁶⁶⁵ However, there is a tension in Ewald's thought both in terms of his understanding of sin and his implicit discomfort with justification as imputed righteousness.⁶⁶⁶ Christ came because "he wished to redeem us from the hand of all our enemies, that is, from their power and violence."⁶⁶⁷ Ewald, in using language of enemies and power, referred to sin as the internalized dominating power of sin in a person, but after this he shifted to using substitutionary language. Sin was forgiven, and in faith Christians were justified.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶³ HH II, 992. Ewald's divisions here match Buddeus' comments, see Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:12–17. Buddeus divides up those who have either a vulgar or subtle sense of security from those who are in "the state of slavery" in their fears over the moral law. Ewald refers overtly to these categories or divisions twice more in the second half of this sermon (HH II, 997, 999).

⁶⁶⁴ HH II, 993.

⁶⁶⁵ For a discussion of what constitutes 'classical Lutheran language' see particularly chapters 2 and 3 in Kilcrease, *The Doctrine of Atonement: From Luther to Forde*.

⁶⁶⁶ Ewald uses the language of justification and the forgiveness of sin through Christ's atonement (HH II, 994), but he later on restricts himself twice to the forgiveness of sins alone as the ground and starting point of our salvation. It may be that justification in Danish, *retfærdiggjørelse*, (lit. making righteous) is harder to divorce from Ewald's desire to preserve the notion of righteous as actual (not imputed) righteousness. In Ewald, actual righteousness is more connected to holiness. Referring to the Sermon's Gospel text, Lk 1:74-75, Ewald speaks of serving God in holiness and righteousness multiple times. HH II, 991, 992, 993, 995.

⁶⁶⁷ *...hand vilde forløse os af alle vore Fienders Haand, der er, af deres Magt og Vold...* HH II, 993. Also later in the same sermon, Ewald writes that sin may no longer rule/dominate over those in a state of grace, HH II, 998. Buddeus also affirms that dominating sins (*herskende Synder*) only persist in the un-converted, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:367, 559.

⁶⁶⁸ HH II, 994.

[Christ] should show them, that the Blessedness/Salvation (*Salighed*) first and foremost consisted in the grace-filled forgiveness of their sins, which is the beginning and ground of all our true blessedness in God...⁶⁶⁹

It is possible that Ewald associated sin here primarily with guilt, although he did not state that explicitly. Still, for Ewald, justification and forgiveness of sins was the means to true sanctification as actual, not imputed, holiness and righteousness,⁶⁷⁰ it was never an end in itself. Ewald presented this forgiveness as the reveal of God's mercy and in this way an encouragement to humanity.

The entire *ordo*⁶⁷¹ began with God's "inward mercy" (*inderlige Barmhiertighed*)⁶⁷² to the end that believers were free "to serve him in holiness and righteousness."⁶⁷³ Ewald writes,

We must be perfectly convinced of our freedom from the power and violence of our enemies before we can seriously consider that we wish to serve [God] in holiness and righteousness.⁶⁷⁴

Justification and forgiveness of sins existed as psychological necessities for the believer to freely, not slavishly, serve God. Still, this freedom was not just a negative freedom, that is, freedom from fear, that resulted in slavish obedience to the Law,⁶⁷⁵ but also a freedom in the

⁶⁶⁹ Hans skulde vise dem, at denne Salighed først og fornemmeligen bestod i deres Synders naadige Forladelse, som er Begyndelsen og Grunden til al vor sande Salighed i Gud... HH II, 994-95.

⁶⁷⁰ HH II, 994.

⁶⁷¹ This section is concerned with the right order of grace, i.e. the *ordo salutis*. HH II, 993.

⁶⁷² HH II, 993. Ewald's point here seems to be that God's mercy is not motivated by our actions, but arises from his own nature.

⁶⁷³ *tiene ham i Hellighed og Retfærdighed*. HH II, 993.

⁶⁷⁴ *...vi maae være fuldkommelig forvissede om vor Befrielse af vore Fienders Magt og Vold, førend vi kand for Alvor tænke, derpaa, at vi ville tiene ham i Hellighed og Retfærdighed*. HH III, 994.

⁶⁷⁵ What is this fear? Ewald's language here lacks notions of God's wrath or a fear of punishment as the *main* fear. One is always being freed from the enemy and the enemy's power, not merely God's just judgment. Even the slavish-being (*Trældoms. Væsen*, HH II, 992) of those who try and fail to follow the law without the aid of grace, is already one who accepts the demand for holiness and righteousness as true to the nature of salvation (*Salighed*). The problem isn't that they fear hell or damnation *per se*, but they make their lives bitter because they fail in their attempts to actually be holy. It is not the negative possible state (hell), but the loss of the positive state (salvation) that is the driving force here. Ewald does define the enemy Christ frees us from as

positive sense of renewed capabilities and possibilities (the reception of both desire and power to serve God).⁶⁷⁶ Ewald never abandoned the importance of righteousness and justification in his theology of the atonement, but always moved towards a healing that empowered the believer to serve God in righteousness.

As I mentioned above, Ewald's description of atonement was his answer to the epistemological dilemma concerning knowing Christ's saving work and the necessity of sanctification. The *content* of his atonement theory, not the mechanisms of knowing, was Ewald's focus in this sermon. His was essentially an argument from moral persuasion, or fittingness (*ex convenientia*).⁶⁷⁷ Ewald's argument is essentially based on grasping the important of these premises: Look at God's inward mercy that drove the entirety of the action! How marvelous that Christ came to save us from our enemies! To grasp Ewald's argument was to grasp something of the hideousness of sin and know how a great a thing it was to be free of it. It was to grasp God's mercy and something of who God was. To some extent, only those who already existed within it could recognize fully its coherence⁶⁷⁸ and that a heart filled with love, trust, joy, and boldness because of God's mercy had no place for fear—it desired only to serve God.⁶⁷⁹

"foremost sin, the devil and the world, thereafter God's wrath, which lies upon us for the sake of sin, and death and hell, which are sin's well-deserved payment" (*først og fornemmeligen, Synden, Dievelen og Verden, dernæst Guds Vrede, som ligger paa os for Syndens skyld, og Døden og Helvede, som ere Syndens velfortiente Løn.*) HH II, 996. The language of victory or release from one's enemies (in this broad sense) is more central than language of penal substitution, even though language of God's wrath is present.

⁶⁷⁶ ...*faae vi baade Lyst og Kraft til at tiene Herren...* HH II, 995. Having the desire and ability to serve God is implied to be thus the true state of Christian freedom. Pietism comes about during a changing conception of human freedom of the will. This will be discussed in more depth in the second section of this dissertation. Here it is enough to note that Ewald sees the presence of the desire to serve God as the preferred Christian state, rather than a limitation on a notion of the pure undetermined freedom of the human will.

⁶⁷⁷ For a short reflection on arguments from necessity vs. fittingness, see Sanders, "Fittingness: How Conveniens."

⁶⁷⁸ Those who experience the "working of faith and grace in their hearts" (*Troens of Naadens Virkning i deres Hierte og Samvittighed*) HH II, 997.

⁶⁷⁹ HH II, 997.

Still, Ewald assumed on some level that his audience recognized that trust in God was bound up in the *moral quality* of God's actions (his merciful love in Jesus),⁶⁸⁰ and this recognition implicitly assented to the notion that it was good to trust a merciful actor. Trust, or faith, never devolved into a pure willing devoid of ground and content for Ewald. Thus, no matter how much these qualities—love, trust, hope, desire to serve God—in the believer were said to be given or effected by faith and grace, there could not be a strict pre-faith sense in which love and trust were absolutely incomprehensible.⁶⁸¹ This is not to say that the nature of love and mercy could be fully grasped by the natural person, nor that (common) grace wasn't already at work in Ewald's theological understanding.⁶⁸² Still, if Ewald aimed this argument at the unconverted, he opened up his doctrine of God to the *Euthyphro* dilemma, and it can appear that for Ewald, one thereby judges God's action through a comparison with a logically prior concept of good actions.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ HH II, 997.

⁶⁸¹ As discussed in chapter 2, this argument touches on some points of contention between Buddeus, his son-in-law Georg Walch and Christian Wolff concerning natural knowledge of the attributes of God. In Walch's Philosophical Lexicon, he allows natural knowledge of the *existence* of God, but not natural knowledge of the attributes of God. See, Walch and Gleditsch, "Gott.". I wonder if this debate has parallels here. Is the debate concerned perhaps with an *a priori* rational understanding of love and mercy (if that is even possible) vs. an *a posteriori* understanding drawn from one's given experience of the world?

⁶⁸² The language of common grace or prevenient grace is pertinent here. Ewald already has theological concepts available to him that evade a purely 'natural' language. I have discussed this concept briefly in my article, see Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism." and discussion in chapter 4.

⁶⁸³ "[W]hether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods." Plato, *Euthyphro*. Gottfried Leibniz, a rough contemporary of Ewald, rephrased the question as "whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just", from "Meditations on the Common Concept of Justice" in Leibniz et al., *Leibniz: Political Writings*, 45. Hernan Caro investigates this question through the lens of theodicy and uses Ewald's teacher, Buddeus, as an opponent to Leibniz's 'solution' of eternal ideas of justice in the mind of God. Buddeus (or rather his doctoral student, Georg Christian Knoerr) objects to this notion which goes against the simplicity of God (separating will and intellect). Caro describes Buddeus's and Knoerr's account as a voluntarist understanding of God. See, Caro's discussion, Caro, "The Best of All Possible Worlds? Leibniz's Optimism and Its Critics 1710 - 1755," 42–63, esp. 50. I would hesitate to agree fully with Caro because I do not think he fully grasps how the classical theistic doctrine of the simplicity of God entails that God is identified with the good. For a short discussion of the

There are two possible solutions in Ewald's argument for the necessity of sanctification.⁶⁸⁴ The first is a crude and extreme notion of divine command theory: serving God in holiness and righteousness is necessary because it is commanded/willed by God, and Christ's atoning work gives the believer the tools and impetus to do this. Desire in this model is experienced by the believer but somehow externally imposed, rather than inherently aimed towards one who is loving and merciful. This could account for Ewald's language in this quote: "Christ's love both that which he has shown and shows to them and that [love] which they again have given to him, which *forces* them and *drives* them" [my emphasis].⁶⁸⁵ I find this interpretation inadequate. The language of force in this quotation cannot be interpreted in a purely external, mechanical, causal sense. To do so, ignores the reciprocity of love in the statement: the love of Christ towards the believer and the believer's love of Christ, which negates a purely external necessity.⁶⁸⁶ I would argue that Ewald assigns mechanical terms to a non-material concept. At best one can say that Ewald used the language of force metaphorically.

The other solution, which I find more coherent and which I have hinted at earlier when discussing the opening of this sermon, is that Ewald assumed what is essentially a Christian Platonism⁶⁸⁷ and grasped at a simplicity of God.⁶⁸⁸ God's nature was mercy, holiness, and

dilemma in light of the classical understanding of God, see Hart, *The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss*, 275–76.

⁶⁸⁴ The main theme for Ewald: we shall be holy, we shall serve God in holiness. HH II, 995.

⁶⁸⁵ *Christi Kierlighed baade den, hand har beviist og beviser imod dem, og den de igjen har fattet til ham, den tvinger og drive dem...* HH II, 998.

⁶⁸⁶ Danish, like English, involves a linguistic ambiguity (subjective and objective genitives indicated by the same form) that Ewald actually plays on here.

⁶⁸⁷ Consider, for example, Martin Schmidt's worry about how the doctrine of partaking in the divine nature (an essential part of the Pietist theology) was essentially a Platonic understanding that had infiltrated Christianity. I discuss Schmidt above in the footnotes to section 3.3.4. See also, Schmidt, "Teilnahme an der göttliche Natur." Although I agree with Schmidt's generalization, I do not share his worries about the dangers of Platonism for theology.

⁶⁸⁸ Certainly in the academic literature, the doctrine of the simplicity of God was taught. At least, Johann Jacob Rambach considered it the first general attribute of God, see Rambach and Neubauer, *Dogmatische Theologie*

righteousness: perhaps God was free, but he was not capricious, he could be trusted, not out of a sense of demand and authority but because he was the one who was and acted in merciful love.⁶⁸⁹ Moreover, goodness was desirable as an end in itself and human beings could not help but desire it, however weakly.⁶⁹⁰ The problem then was having the knowledge of the real good thing and strength to desire it *properly*, as it deserved to be loved—not weakly or poorly. The necessity of sanctification came from the inexorable draw of God as the holy, righteous, and merciful one, even as God was also the one strengthening and prompting believers. Love (enabled and engendered by Christ’s love) drove believers to please God. Ewald’s recognition that this love must be given and that the heart must be “filled up,”⁶⁹¹ speaks to the mutuality of love, rather than pure assimilation.⁶⁹² Sanctification was a healing, restoring and renewing process, given that believers were wounded and lacking.

The final hint of a metaphysical vision lying murkily behind the text is in Ewald’s insistence that a soul “partaking in Christ and his grace...could have no desire or will to remain in the love and service of sin.”⁶⁹³ Ewald was not talking about the possibility of a soul that could desire two finite but different things. Sin and Christ were not two possible options that could both be 'chosen'. Rather, sin was the opposite of God; it was the absence of love for God. The

oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre. 1 1, 317–18. Buddeus writes of the unity (*vnitas*) and simplicity (*simplicitas*) as negative attributes of God. Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.I.XI, 204.

⁶⁸⁹For a modern reflection on this theme, see Williams, *Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief*.

⁶⁹⁰ This must be taken as axiomatic, even by the Pietists. Despite the language of depravity from sin and being inclined towards evil, Buddeus actually argues that the 'natural' or fallen man is inclined towards evil things because of self-love—see my discussion in chapter four and Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:172–80. The self has been mistaken as the ultimate good. Buddeus is not arguing that evils things are loved or desired because they are evil. There is also a discussion on the nature of the human will that is needed at this point. Ewald’s text does not supply one. I will examine the will in the early modern context below.

⁶⁹¹ HH II, 997, 998 .

⁶⁹² See my remarks in chapter five about Buddeus's characterization of the union with God as an affective union.

⁶⁹³ *Heraf kand vi let begripe, at det ikke er mueligt, at en Siel, som er bleven deelagtig i Christo og i hans Naade og Forsoning, kunde have Lyst eller Villie til at blive i Syndens Kierlighed og Tieneste*. HH III, 998. This also seem particularly true of Ewald's catchisms, see my discussion of *vitterlige* sins in section 3.4.

person who loved justice could not love injustice.⁶⁹⁴ At times in Ewald's corpus, his language was deterministic: the reborn, converted believer moved immediately and perfectly away from sin.⁶⁹⁵ Yet, immediately after making this absolute pronouncement, Ewald moved into language of growth in regards to sanctification.⁶⁹⁶ Thus, Ewald did not abandon the pastoral context of the sermon for a strict binary philosophical vision that does not encompass the reality of willing, acting, and living in the fallen and temporal world. Ewald led his audience away from despair and towards "striving after holiness, without which none can or shall see the Lord."⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁴ A similar statement can be found in George Macdonald's reflections on righteousness in *Unspoken Sermons*.

"To be righteous is to be such a heart, soul, mind, and will, as, without regard to law, would recoil with horror from the lightest possible breach of any law. It is to be so in love with what is fair and right as to make it impossible for a man to do anything that is less than absolutely righteous. It is not the love of righteousness in the abstract that makes anyone righteous, but such a love of fairplay toward everyone with whom we come into contact, that anything less than the fulfilling, with a clear joy, of our divine relation to him or her, is impossible." MacDonald, "Righteousness."

Macdonald takes up the themes of fulfilling the law, not from fear, but because one desires to do so. The desire itself is a type of psychological necessity (it is impossible to do otherwise), but not mechanical necessity. George Macdonald is a Victorian Christian universalist, whose doctrine of God's eternal caring mercy and holiness will finally and eventually draw all people to the divine, although only as purified and cleansed from sin, see MacDonald, "The Consuming Fire."

⁶⁹⁵ "We can easily conceive from this, that it is impossible that a soul, which has become a partaker in Christ and in his grace and redemption, could have the desire or will to remain in the love and service of sin. Sin shall and can no longer rule over them who are under grace." (*Heraf kand vi let begribe, at det ikke er mueligt, at en Siel, som er bleven deelagtig i Christo and i hans Naade og Forsoning, kunde have Lyst eller Villie til at blive i Sydens Kierlighed og Tieneste. Synden skal og kand ikke længere herske over dem, som ere under Naaden*) HH II, 998.

⁶⁹⁶ "Yes the sanctifying grace teaches and disciplines, reminds and encourages those, who have begun to partake in it and who seek to grow in the grace and knowledge of Jesus, so that they are always burning more and more in the spirit to serve the Lord" (*Ja den saliggjørende Naade oplærer og tugter, paaminder og tilskynder dem, som ere blevne deelagtige i den, og som søge at vøxe i Jesu Naade og Kundskab, saa de blive altid mere brændende i Aanden, til at tiene HERren.*) HH II, 998.

⁶⁹⁷ ...*efterjage Hellighed, uden hvilken ingen kand eller ske see Herren.* HH II, 1000.

Looking Ahead

Ending this examination of the *ordo salutis* with a reflection on the “necessity” of sanctification is helpful for my entire endeavor, partially because it has become more and more apparent to me that Ewald’s project was dependent on an understanding of human anthropology and his philosophical assumptions about God’s nature. This understanding is not easily accessible on the surface of Ewald’s devotional texts. One example is the concept of grace. The language of grace was a constant thread throughout Ewald’s entire discussion of the *ordo salutis*, both on the part of God’s action towards humanity and Ewald asking the person to “rightly use the grace of God.” I have been moving steadily towards the technical language of grace and cooperation one finds in Buddeus, Ewald’s teacher. It has become increasingly apparent that any understanding of Ewald’s *ordo* would benefit from a technical discussion. From a larger perspective, I have also been arguing that Ewald’s theology presupposed a logic and relation between God and creation. Otherwise, his *ordo salutis* collapses into theological incoherence. This also will be touched on in the coming sections. Before I come to that point, I want to consider the “end” of sanctification, behind which lies the pesky question of eschatology. In doing so, I return also to one of the main contentious points of Ewald’s trial: *apokatastasis*.

3.5.3 A Meditation on Ewald and Apokatastasis

I have not written at length about the role of justification in Ewald’s *ordo*. I have attempted to confine my investigations to the path laid out in his early catechisms and in his sermons on these themes. As such, this analysis has not taken up in depth or at all many other common theological topics, such as sacramental theology, trinitarian theology, and ecclesiology. The focus on the *ordo salutis* in a theological discussion also requires a focus on the individual Christian. Yet does this oblige me to assert an intense individualism in Ewald’s theology and that he was most concerned with the holy life of the individual believer in terms of soteriology? As I conclude this section on Ewald, I want to briefly complicate the picture of Pietism, sanctification, and individualism, with a discussion of *apokatastasis*.⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁸ Illaria Ramelli has discussed this concept in length, in relation to the Christian doctrine of apokatastasis, which she argues in the patristic tradition bears certain specific hallmarks. See, Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine*

My question cannot be answered in a fully satisfying manner here, but will be explored more thoroughly in the final section of this dissertation. All I want to do here, is set up my final sermon analysis. Chapter Six will delve more deeply into this issue and the Early Modern context. In my analysis of Ewald's trial above, I sketched out as precisely as possible what the trial revealed about Ewald's eschatological heresies. But when it comes to the rest of his literary corpus, I have to take into account the difficulty of Ewald's silence: what he did not and could not say. As discussed above, Ewald was famously accused and convicted of holding the doctrine of *Apokatastasis*, or the restoration of all things (*Wiederbringung aller dinge*).⁶⁹⁹ Not much in the way of detail was given in the trial discussion by Ewald or his opponents, except for *apokatastasis's* close connection to millennialism and the fact that the devil and the damned would not suffer eternal punishment or, rather, "the redemption of all the devil's and the lost's torment and pain."⁷⁰⁰ Ewald confessed that he held this teaching but denied

of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena. Robin Parry gives a nice overview of her "patristic doctrine of apokatastasis" in their joint book: Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 3–10. For the sake of brevity and in the most minimalistic sense, their definition of *apokatastasis* means the salvation of all human beings (and in the extended sense, even the Devil, as a creature of God). It involves a belief in the ontological goodness of all that is created, the non-substantiality of evil, the role of Christ as the rescuer from sin and death and the healer of human beings, divine punishment as corrective-not retributive, the unity of the divine attributes, hell as limited and temporary rather than eternal, and the final consummation where God will be all in all. Parry then discusses a variety of figures who held to a type of universalism in early modern history. Not all embraced the exact contours of Ramelli's concept of Christian universalism, but many elements of it. Parry suggests that certain Pietist universalists were likely influenced by the patristic writers and held much of the same understandings, Parry and Ramelli, 93. See my discussion in chapter six.

⁶⁹⁹ See discussion in chapter 2, Ewald's trial manuscript uses *Wiederbringung* ("Kaasbøll's Accusations against Ewald," 2.), *Restitutione Omnium* ("Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 6.), *Apocatastasi* ("Ewald's Second Response to Kaasbøll," 4.), *Wiederbringung aller dinge* ("Reenberg's Accusations against Ewald," 3.)

⁷⁰⁰ "What *Wiederbringung* concerns is the redemption of all (the devil and the lost) from the torment and pain of hell. Now is it known that this doctrine is unavoidably mixed up with the preceding one, such that anyone who defends a vulgar chiliastic view also approves and agrees with the *Wiederbringung*..." (*hvad Wiederbringung angaaer, som ere alle Dieve/lens og forsømtes forløsning af helvedes Qval og Pine / da er det nocksom bekient, at denne Lærdom ligesom / det u-opløseligt baand hænger tilsammen men det næst*

that he had ever taught or preached on the subject.⁷⁰¹ He suggested that he could not teach or preach that which was in direct contradiction to this view (it would be against his conscience to do so), but he sought to speak about present rather than future things.⁷⁰² The trial ended with him being prohibited from teaching or preaching about *apokatastasis* or even to speaking about it in private company, though he kept his position at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus.⁷⁰³

Thus, barring a diary or undiscovered letters, from 1734 onwards Ewald's silence on the topic of *apokatastasis* is likely absolute—at least in terms of explicit discussion. It is probably that he still held to the doctrine, given that his library catalog (published after his death) contained several volumes defending *apokatastasis*, including one published in 1739, after his trial.⁷⁰⁴ If

/forrefaaende saa at hvar den, som forsvarer den / grove Chiliasmum approberer og samtycker ogsaa i Wiederbringungen...) "Kaasbøll's Accusations against Ewald," 2–3.

⁷⁰¹ See chapter 2.

⁷⁰² "When I am in the pulpit, it has never been my intention to propose this teaching, which I am here suspected of doing, and I distance myself entirely from that which could not speak this doctrine, for I cannot speak against it, for this would be against my conscience, but rather focus more on the present things rather than the future things." (*Paa Prædickestoelen har endnu aldrig været min Intention / at proponere denne Lærdom, som ieg dog her skal giøres fortænckt for, ieg abstraherer ganske derfra hos saadane // som ey kunde taale denne Lærdom; Derjmod kand ieg icke / taale, thi det var imod min Samvittighed, men for re/sten soger ieg meere at agte paa de nærværende end de / tilkommende Ting.*) "Ewald's First Response to Kaasbøll," 6–7.

⁷⁰³ Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 64. Also discussed above.

⁷⁰⁴ To the best of my ability to discern from his library catalog, Ewald owned the following early modern German universalist authors and titles: several volumes by Johannes and Johanna Petersen (see footnote below in the next page), Johann David Schäfer's *Ewiges Evangelium*, two copies of Ludwig Gerhard's *Kurtzer Begriff des ewigen Evangelii von deren Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, Paul Siegvolck's [Georg Klein-Nicolai] *Gedanken, die er J. L. Mossheims seine ungegründete Gedancken von der Ewigkeit der Höllenstrafen* and (likely) Siegvolck's *Kurtze Erörterung einiger der wichtigsten Fragen von dem einstehenden Reich Jesu Christ*, Benjamin Reußing's *Fragen von der ewigen Liebe Gottes, in der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, Christian Pagencopen's *Gründliche Erkenntniß der Ewigen Liebe Gottes in Christo gegen alle gefallene Creaturen*, (likely) Leonhard Christoph Strum's, *Eines Fürstlichen Rahts und Liebhabers Christl. Studien Gottseeliger Seitvertreib, zu sicherer Beweisung der Wiederbringung aller Dinge...*, Siegmund Bärensprung's *Die Wiederbringung aller Dinge in ihren ersten guten Zustand der Schöpfung* (Frankfurt 1739). There are not usually publication dates

Ewald didn't discuss the doctrine explicitly, based on this library, one can reasonably assume he was well acquainted with the Johanna and Johannes Petersen (the foremost proponents of *apokatastasis* in Radical German Pietism) school;⁷⁰⁵ The presence of these volumes in

listed for these titles in Ewald's catalog; many were published during the 1720s, but the Bärensprung's work was first published in 1739. He also owned a copy of Württemberg Pietist, Johann Albrecht Bengel's commentary on Revelations. Furthermore, Robin Parry asserts that Count Zinzendorf of the Moravians was likely a universalist (Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 85–86.) and Ewald not only owned a variety of books by Zinzendorf, but knew him somewhat personally. For the titles, see Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*. Several of these titles are short treatises or pamphlets that were bound together to form one volume. The Danish Royal Library has copies of many of these works in its collection. There seems to have been an effort on the part of its defenders to disseminate shorter works that were included in the larger collected volumes of Johann Petersen defending *apokatastasis*. Given this and the fact that many of its defenders wrote in German rather than Latin, the authors aimed for a wide, not simply an academic audience. (See the preface to Leonhard Christoph Strum's treatise and notice the subtitle to Gerhard's *Kurtzer Begriff* that indicates his volume is aimed at the "unstudied"). Older research literature on universalism describes some of these works and the back-and-forth treatise debate of these years (see Whittemore, *The Modern History of Universalism: From the Era of the Reformation to the Present Time*; Allen and Eddy, *A History of the Unitarians and the Universalists in the United States*). Two modern histories of this era, called Pietism universalism by Robin Parry, include Parry's *A Larger Hope* and Michael McClymond's *The Devil's Redemption*. In terms of historical Christian universalists, Ewald also owned several works by Origen (*Origenis Opera omnia*, Basil (1571), a copy of *Origenes contra Celsum* (Hamberg 1745), and *De oratione libellus: accedit Marci Diadochi Sermo contra Arianos* (1694)) and the writings of Macarius the Egyptian, likely *Sancti patris Macarii Aegyptii Opuscula nonnulla et apophthegmata* (1699?). Macarius was important for Ewald's teacher Buddeus's notions of grace (see chapter 4) and influential among the pietists and John Wesley in general, see Benz, "Die Protestantische Thebais: Zur Nachwirkung Makarios Des Ägypters Im Protestantismus Des 17. Und 18. Jahrhunderts in Europa Und Amerika"; Snyder, "John Wesley and Macarius the Egyptian"; Goldschmidt, *Johann Konrad Dippel (1673-1734): Seine Radikalpietistische Theologie Und Ihre Entstehung*, 39:129–30. Illaria Ramelli considers Macarius the Egyptian to have held a doctrine of *apokatastasis*, Ramelli, *Evagrius's Kephalaia Gnostika: A New Translation of the Unreformed Text from the Syriac*, xv. It is also possible that the 50 homilies of Macarius that the early modern pietists were reading were heavily dependent upon Gregory of Nyssa, see above articles and Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena*, 464.

⁷⁰⁵ Ewald's library catalog reveals five books or treatises by the Petersens': *Die Warheit Des Herrlichen Reiches Jesu Christi : Welches In der siebenden Posaune noch zu erwarten ist ; Geschrieben zu Magdeburg im Jahr nach der Geburth Christi 1692, Die Erklärung der 12 kleinen Proph. nach dem Geist der Weissagung dargesstellet*

Ewald's library does not definitively determine that Ewald agreed with the views on the doctrine expressed in them, but combined with his remarks during his trial, it is not unreasonable to assume some continuity. In the final chapter, I will touch on how the doctrine of *apokatastasis* was held by the Pietist universalist authors⁷⁰⁶ Ewald owned and investigate one text in particular.

More concretely, the trial manuscript suggests that Ewald was silent in a different manner—he promised neither to teach *apokatastasis*, nor preach against his conscience concerning the future things.⁷⁰⁷ This promise also provided a rationale for his focus on sanctification *in this life*.

(1723), *Hertzens Gespräche mit GOtt* (1729?), *Die Herrlichkeit der Braut des Lammes* (1718), *Die von J.W. Petersen kurz vor seinem Ende nochmalen nachdrücklich gerettete Wahrheit des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge ... Mit einigen Erinnerungen von C.P.* (1727).

⁷⁰⁶ As stated above, Robin Parry notes that pietist universalism generally had a great deal in common with patristic universalism but with an added layer of premillennialist convictions, Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 93. Parry also gives a good summary of Paul Siegvold's influential work, *The Everlasting Gospel*. An older assessment of millennialism and universal salvation states that "Nearly, perhaps quite all those who at that time maintained the notion that Christ was to reign on earth a thousand years, connected the doctrine of universal salvation with it." Allen and Eddy, *A History of the Unitarians and the Universalists in the United States*, 10:331.

⁷⁰⁷ One does not expect to find sermons or writings about eternal hellfire, if one accepts him at his word. However, Ewald's catechism does suggest this (BE 92-93), but its early date in comparison to the trial did give time for Ewald's change of mind. Ewald's sermon on the 25th Sunday after Trinitatis 1739 also cites 2 Thes 1:8-9 about punishment and an eternal rejection from the face of the Lord, HH II, 242. Ewald cites this passage again in a later sermon given on the second day of Christmas (HH II, 364), speaking of Christ as the revenger when revealed from heaven with flames (*Ilde-Lue*). Still, two pages later Ewald reminds his audience that the Lord scares people in their lack of belief (*Vantroet*) in order to awaken them and strengthen their faith. The pedagogical uses of harsh language utilized and permitted even by Christ is explicitly named later, even though it is still *God's goodness that actually leads to conversion*. HH II, 369. I would suggest the pedagogical function even of punishment is revealing and Ewald's insistence that God's goodness brings the believer to conversion affirms his other statements that question how one could love a judge and revenger. See discussion below in this section.

Yet, Ewald did not shy away from all eschatological imagery. The bridal imagery and the Lamb's wedding eucharist were favorites with him.⁷⁰⁸ Moreover, he applied the imagery of spiritual union, which often bled into bridal imagery and this final eschatological image of the Lamb's wedding, both to the individual believer and the congregation as a whole.⁷⁰⁹ The *ordo salutis* in Ewald's thought thus operated within a larger, if implicit, vision of cosmological proportions. In the end, Pietist universalists like the Petersens offered Ewald an eschatological vision that went beyond humanity as its only concern:⁷¹⁰ as Johann Wilhelm Petersen remarks, "however it is better and God is more glorious, if not only the least, but rather all his creatures should worship and unendingly praise him."⁷¹¹ Ewald's comments about the union of believers in Christ, seen from an eschatological perspective, reinforced the communal aspect of the holy life and salvation.⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁸ As also cited above, the Eucharist of the Wedding of the Lamb is *Lammets Bryllups Nadvere*, here HH V 592-3, also HH I 496, 517, HH II 104, 112, 114, HH V 583, Sometimes this is simply called 'his Great Eucharist' (*hans store Nadvere*) and Ewald recognizes it as a symbol of God's kingdom-the eschatological promise (HH II 194, 1013-1014). For bridal imagery see for example, BE 81, RG 187-8, HH I, 496-517, 650-660, HH II, 108-114, HH V, 483-49, TS 134, 141. In Ewald's texts the bridal imagery is often combined or used in conjunction with union with God language.

⁷⁰⁹ See, for instance the opening prayer in HH I, 496 which presents Christ as the bridegroom of our souls (plural), taking us to be his bride (singular). This sermon also contains language that moves back and forth from the individual soul as bride (*enhver Siel, som skal blive hans Bruud*) to the singular congregation, where the many have become one. HH I, 499-501. See also HH V, 483-492 which touches on the bride both as the individual soul and the gathered congregation.

⁷¹⁰ Johann Petersen speaks of the restoration of all *things*--not merely universal salvation, as if to be a created thing is a human reality alone. The language of creatures (*Creaturen*) and creations/the created (*die Geschöpfe*) does not exclusively refer to humans. Humans are rather the noblest of God's created beings, Petersen and Pagencopen, *Die von Dr. Johann Wilhelm Petersen kurtz vor seinem Ende nochmalen nachdrücklich gerettete Wahrheit des ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, Vorrede, 14-15. Petersen makes this point explicitly in his treatise (pp. 28-37); Christ is not merely the head of the re-born, but of all creatures (p. 28) and Christ's redemptive work extends as far and as wide as creation itself (p. 33).

⁷¹¹ *...es allerdings besser, und GOtt rühmlicher sey, wenn ihn nicht nur die allerwenigsten, sondern alle seine Creaturen loben und unendlich preisen sollen.* Petersen and Pagencopen, Vorrede des Auctoris, 16.

⁷¹² "The focus is on the close union among all the believers, who are bound together with each other in Christ, and this foremost by the power of Christ's redeeming, since Christ does not alone reconcile them by one body, but also binds them in and by himself to one body" (*Herved forestilles først igien den nøye Foreening imellem*

Ultimately, Ewald's trial and promised silence means this brief discussion is informed speculation, rather than explicit analysis. However, to discuss Ewald's understanding of the *ordo salutis* without any reference to *apokatastasis* is to hobble an analysis of his theology because the doctrine changes the final eschatological vision in which the process of sanctification operated for Ewald. Is the vision one of final duality or of a (perhaps hierarchical) harmony? I believe it is better to gesture towards a murky picture than to exclude historical silences from the record.⁷¹³ Otherwise, one ends up concluding that "the great conversion of the Jews or other eschatological events connected to it do not seem to interest these [Danish Pietist] theologians. Enevold Ewald discusses it only briefly, as he mentions that the Lord 'has promised still again to save his people, when he shall gather the displaced of Israel and gather the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the Earth, after that he has lifted up a banner for the Gentiles."⁷¹⁴ The legal censure laid upon Ewald is not considered as an explanation for his historical silence.

alle Troende, som sammenheftes og sammenbindes med hverandre i Christo, og det fornemmeligen ved Christi Forsonings Kraft, da Christus ikke allene har forliget dem ved eet Legeme, men og forbinder dem i og ved sig selv til eet Legeme.) HH III, 30.

⁷¹³ It is difficult to judge how widespread this doctrine was private held or discussed in early modern Germany or Denmark. Public affirmation generally led to a resignation of public positions (Johann Petersen and Ludwig Gerhard). Even Erik Pontoppidan owned several of the same contemporary treatises on *apokatastasis* as Ewald, which suggests an intellectual curiosity in the topic, see, *Catalogus Librorum*. Nor should the persuasiveness of their arguments be underestimated. Ewald's own teacher, Buddeus admits the reasonableness and historical presence of *apokatastasis*. The doctrine would harmonizes God's attributes of justice and mercy in Buddeus's view. The universalist Siegmund Bärensprung cites and translates Buddeus's comments from *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae variis observationibus illustratae*. II.III p. 488 [the edition I refer to has this citation on p. 464], reference in Bärensprung, *Die Wiederbringung aller Dinge in ihren ersten guten Zustand der Schöpfung, nach ihrem Beweiss und Gegen-Beweiss*, 12. Buddeus comes as close to the line as possible, but cannot cross it.

⁷¹⁴ ...men tanken om Den store jødeomvendelse eller andre eskatologiske begivenheder i denne forbindelse synes ikke at interessere disse teologer. Enevold Ewald omtaler det kun kortfattet, idet han nævner, at Herren har lovet endnu engang at frelse sit Folk, naar han skal sanke Israels Fordrevne og samle de Adspredte af Juda af de fire Jordens Hiørner, efter at han har opløftet en Banner for Hedningene.) Lausten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*, 104–5.

3.5.4 Sanctification and Apokatastasis

With these above remarks in mind, I will discuss now a final sermon on sanctification and the *ordo salutis*. I argue that though hidden and not discussed in his sermons, Ewald's belief in the restoration of all things (*Wiederbringung aller Dinge*) lends coherency to the placement of his *ordo salutis* within a larger theological system. There are several reasons for my judgment. First of all, with such a doctrine, the strictness of Ewald's *ordo* never had to war against the doctrine of an abundantly merciful God who willed the salvation of all, nor the justice of God.⁷¹⁵ Secondly, Ewald was not confined to only an imputed legal righteousness, but affirmed the *effecting/effective* power of Christ's merits without falling back into a limited and elect atonement. Thirdly, he did not need to develop an ecclesiology that was hidden in a political or institutional sense. The visible church (reborn and repentant Christians) comprised the first-born in a temporal sense, but this did not involve the absolute exclusion of others in the final sense (the after-born). The church was ultimately provisional within a great eschatological horizon that included all of humanity. Fourthly, it explains the prominence that Ewald gave to the *ordo* in so many of his sermons, not as a possible option held out to the people but as the only option—the path that all must take in the end. Finally, Ewald successfully argued for the desirability and loveliness of God and holiness as the believer's ultimate and freeing motivation, over and against a language of fear and punishment. Such measures were only pedagogical in a qualified sense,⁷¹⁶ but the fulfillment of his *ordo salutis* was ecstatic desire for God. This desire would not descend into mad and

⁷¹⁵ Punishment in hell is either considered to be a finite punishment for a finite sinful act (see Gilje, "Ludvig Holbergs Origenisme: – En Analyse Av Holbergs Syn På Helvetesstraffene."), or in authors such as Paul Seigvolck, an action of purgation and correction, Siegvolck, *The Everlasting Gospel*, 12–13. Additionally, the German defenders of *apokatastasis* (f.ex. Gerhard and Siegvolck) discuss this reality as displaying "all divine Attributes in the finest Harmony", Siegvolck, 124. See also chapter six.

⁷¹⁶ See for example, Buddeus's notion of the state of slavery helping to lead towards the state of grace, mentioned above and discussed in Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:12–18.

dark eroticism because in the doctrine of *apokatastasis*, God was good and loving, who believers could trust and rejoice in.⁷¹⁷

Thus, if one accepts—as I do—the likelihood of Ewald continuing to hold this doctrine after his trial and the honesty of his statements that he would not preach nor teach it, it is reasonable to consider this final sermon in light of *apokatastasis* as an implicit eschatological background. If my earlier analyses of sermons on sanctification were attempts to understand Ewald's notion of holiness and his argument for the necessity of sanctification, this one explores the content and practices of sanctification. The sermon I discuss is complex: Ewald is attempting to connect holiness and freedom, disrupt the notion that Christ's yoke is simply a type of slavery, *and* implicitly allegorizing from the relation between the hallowed firstborns and the rest of Israel to the relation between the 'firstborn' Christians and the rest of humanity. With these themes in mind, I turn now to Ewald's sermon.

3.5.4.1. Sermon on 26th Sunday after Trinity Sunday, 1739

Gospel Text: Matthew: 11:25–30⁷¹⁸

Exordium: Exodus 13:1, 2, 11–16

Introduction and Exordium

Ewald's opening prayer introduced the soteriological vision at work in the sermon: the freeing of sinful human beings from the slavery of sin, the world, Satan, and the law. Ewald affirmed that misery was the natural lot of humanity.⁷¹⁹ Christ was the one who bought freedom for humanity from all this (sin, misery, the slavery of the law), but this freedom was not a license.

⁷¹⁷ In this sense, the true, the good, and the beautiful coinhere in a general Platonic understanding. One does not ultimately desire in a sadomasochistic manner, desiring a deity who is tyrannical and inflicts pain for the sake of it. Nor does one desire that which is 'beyond good and evil' or morally neutral. The erotic themes within Danish Pietism have been extensively discussed by Erik Nielsen in Nielsen, *H. A. Brorson : pietisme, meditation, erotik*.

⁷¹⁸ HH II, 246-268. This is the last Sunday of the liturgical year or Christ the King Sunday. In the Swedish and Finnish Lutheran liturgical year it is sometimes known as Judgment Sunday-though Ewald does not give it this name. It is fitting that Ewald touches upon eschatological themes.

⁷¹⁹ I would argue that nature here is sinful nature, not nature as such. HH II, 246.

The prayer's end reveals the freedom that was promised in Christ: "the yoke, which is gainful, and the burden, which is light."⁷²⁰ Ewald developed these themes in the Exordium and Gospel exegesis in his contrast of slavery and freedom.

Ewald began his sermon with a discussion of the states of freedom and slavery. He argued that Adam and Eve, and by extension humanity, misunderstood what freedom was. They conceived of it as a state of complete independence from God⁷²¹ and thereby became enslaved to sin, Satan, the law, corruption, and death. Christ's atoning work was God's response to this, but many failed to see this.

And when the good God desires anew to free us in Christ, so the majority do not only love their state of slavery more than this 'making-free' (*Frigiørelse*), but also—even if some few let themselves be persuaded to believe in Jesus and be freed by him—the others consider this [freedom in Jesus to be] slavery and try to persuade [the few to return] to their previous state of thralldom.⁷²²

Here Ewald's argument hints at a limited notion of atonement, but I would argue that this passage ought to be seen as a provisional description of the present. His real interest was to explore what it was to be free. He had already denied that freedom was complete independence—perhaps here the notion that the Gospel promises freedom from the Law or good works? But as mentioned above, Ewald closely associates this freedom with holiness.⁷²³

⁷²⁰ ...dit Aag, som er gavnligt, og din Byrde, som er let. HH II, 247

⁷²¹ "But when they were satisfied with this, their condition of freedom and wanted to be now even more free, and entirely independent, see, then they separated themselves by their freedom, and became at once the servants and slaves of sin, Satan, the law, corruption, yes of Death" (*Men da de ikke vare fornøiede med denne deres Friheds-Stand, og vilde nu være mere frie, og gandske independente, see, da skildte de sig ved deres Frihed, og bleve paa eengang Syndens, Satans, Lovens, Forkrænkeligheds, ja Dødsens Tienere og Trælle*). HH II, 247.

⁷²² Og naar den gode Gud paa nye vil frigiøre os i Christo, saa elske ikke allene de Fleeste deres Trældoms-Stand mere end som denne Frigiørelse, men om end og nogle Faa lade sig overtale til at troe paa JEsu, og frigiøres ved ham, saa holde de andre dette for et Sclaveri, og søge at overtale dem igien til deres forige Trældoms-Stand. HH II, 248.

⁷²³ As is evidenced particularly in the passage from Numbers, which begins in Ewald's sermon as "And the Lord spoke to Moses and said, Hallow for me all the firstborn" (*Og HErren taledede til Moses, og sagde: Helliggiør mig alle Førstefødte*), HH II, 248. Consider also Ewald's heading: "The firstborn's sanctification as an image of our

This sermon is therefore an investigation of freedom in a positive and active sense *and* an argument against the contemporary sentiment that the freedom which Pietists(?) spoke of seemed rather to be slavery. Moreover, this call to be holy did not require an affirmation of the elect to the exclusion of all others. The language and imagery of the firstborn in the Exordium suggests a further eschatological horizon, read in light of contemporary treatises on *apokatastasis*.⁷²⁴

As is usual for Ewald, in the Exordium he interpreted the Exodus text on the dedication of the firstborn to the Lord in a metaphorical manner.⁷²⁵ He invoked eschatological and apocalyptic imagery only in a limited way,⁷²⁶ but by treating the firstborn as a symbol for true believers, the remnant (the people of Israel) remained. Ewald affirmed that

[t]he firstborn, *as well as the entire people*, were freed from the destruction, which bypassed the Egyptians, and also from the Egyptian service of slavery. Therefore, should now the whole people, but especially the firstborn among them, belong to the Lord, be his special property, and be hallowed to his service. All this is a picture of the grace, freedom, and bliss that is granted to us in Christ.⁷²⁷ [emphasis added]

liberation and glorification in and by Christ" (*De Førstefødtes Helliggjørelse, som et Billede paa vor Frigjørelse og Herliggjørelse i og ved Christum*). HH II, 250.

⁷²⁴ As mentioned above Siegvoldck uses this terminology in *The Everlasting Gospel*, see also Parry's discussion of Siegvoldck [as Siegvolk] in Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*.

⁷²⁵ "Nevertheless, it has something particular to mean, that it pleased the Lord to elect and separate the firstborn for his service. That they have been a pre-figure of Christ and of all those, who belong to Christ, I wish to show more clearly after this." (*Imidlertid har det dog havt noget besynderligt at betyde, at det behagede HErren, at udvælle og fraskille i sær de Førstfødte til sin Tieneste. At de have været et Forbillede paa Christum, og paa alle dem, som høre Christo til, vil jeg herefter vise tydeliger.*) HH II, 250. In his allegorical interpretation, Ewald moves fluidly from discussing Israel to discussing the true believers in Christ.

⁷²⁶ In the first section of the *Exordium*, he notes that all Christians should be holy, but that all true Christians are the firstborn and first-fruits for God and the lamb. He refers to Hebrew 12:13, James 1:18, Rev 14. HH II, 251.

⁷²⁷ *De Førstefødte, saa vel som det gandske Folk, vare da frigiordte fra den Ødeleggelse, som gik over Ægyptiske Trældoms Tieneste. Derimod skulde nu og det hele Folk, men besunderligen de Førstefødte iblant*

Following these words, Ewald moved immediately to a discussion of the sanctification of the firstborn. Yet the question of the rest lingers in the background. Ewald made explicit that the separation of the firstborn did not mean the remnant was disregarded as the non-elect (after all, the whole of Israel was freed from slavery in Egypt). Ewald privileged the firstborn (“especially the firstborn among them”) but never in an exclusive way. He did not allow for a limited atonement, nor even an atonement limited to Christians as related to a visible and institutional church. Instead, he insisted that God wanted “all people, all humans to be holy and become his.”⁷²⁸ Ewald was careful with the language he used. He did not state explicitly that all would become holy, but any reader of his *apokatastasis* treatises would recognize room for the unspoken syllogism (if God is God, then God’s will must be done). Ewald was not concerned to distinguish between a primary will and a secondary will.⁷²⁹ This implicit conclusion was further stated in Ewald’s following statements on the degrees of glory and holiness in heaven. According to Ewald, there were differences between those who came to Christ in this world and the after-born (*de Efter-fødte*), though Ewald destabilized this hierarchy by referring to Matthew 19:30.

So is also shown here, that there are different degrees of holiness. A soul can always be more hallowed, and a believer can surpass another in holiness, just as there shall be degrees in glory and in blessedness. cf. Dan. 12:3, 1 Cor. 1:41, sq. The firstborn have various prerogatives and glories above the afterborn. There is a difference in Christ’s kingdom between the firstborn and the afterborn, or the late arrivers, (as I may call them). Though one must notice here that the first can be last and the last first (Matt. 19:30).⁷³⁰

dem, høre Herren til, være hans besunderlige Eyedom, og helliges til hans Tieneste. Alt dette er et Billede paa den Naade, den Frihed og den Lyksalighed, som os skenkes i Christo. HH II, 250.

⁷²⁸ *...at alle Folk, alle Mennsker skulde være hellige, og blive hans.* HH II, 251.

⁷²⁹ In some modern Reformed theology, there is discussion of the two wills of God: a revealed will and a secret will, Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God.” Sometimes this is called the antecedent and consequent or permissive will of God like in John of Damascus and Thomas Aquinas, see Echeverria, *Divine Election: A Catholic Orientation in Dogmatic and Ecumenical Perspective*, 213.

⁷³⁰ *Saa vises ogsaa hermed, at der ere adskillige Grader i Hellighed. En Siel kand altid mere helliges, og een Troende overgaaer den anden i Hellighed, ligesom der og skal være Grader i Herligheden og i Saligheden. s. Dan, 12,3. ! Cor. 15,41. sq. Den Forstefødte har adskillige Prærogativer og Herligheder frem for de Efter-fødte.*

If Ewald exegeted this Exodus passage in order to insist on sanctification as the mark of true believers, he still conveyed a sense that true believers (as the firstborn) were not eternally separated from the rest of humanity within an eschatological horizon. At least this conclusion seems to follow implicitly from Ewald's discussion of the firstborn and their relation to the entire Israelite people.⁷³¹ Additionally, this allows Ewald to set up true believers in a mediatorial and guiding role—a royal priesthood.⁷³²

That this separated group (the royal priesthood) drew the remnant after it and would be united with the remnant is also present in Ewald's second interpretation of the same passage.

Der er og Forskiel i Christi Rige imellem de Førstefødte og EFter-Fødte, eller Silde-Fødninger, (at jeg saa maa kalde dem.) Dog er ogsaa her vel at merke, at de første kand blive de sidste, og de sidste de første. Matth. 19,30. HH II, 252. One possible Pietist reading of this passage might include a chiliastic or millennialism frame of reference (the late-born come to Christ during the 1000-year reign of Christ), that need not necessarily involve the restoration of *all* things. Halle Pietist Johann Rambach also speaks about a difference in degrees of glory, Rambach and Neubauer, *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre*. 2 2, 2049–51. His understanding of degrees of grace is related to in what degree one is purified and renewed in this life. Rambach's explanation does not require necessarily the language of the late-born as the doctrine of *apokatastasis* does. However, the phrase 'afterborn' (*Efter-fødte*) is used in universalist literature to refer to those who must undergo a purgative process in the world to come, Siegvold, *The Everlasting Gospel*, 78.

⁷³¹ Although Martin Lausten discusses both the conversion of the Jews and chiliastic beliefs among Pietists, he does not touch on *apokatastasis* and the doctrine's implications for how Ewald saw Judaism. However, Laursten writes that for Pietists, "The Jewish relationship to God and the Jewish history can be a mirror for the Christians'. In Ewald, this view is present to a remarkable degree. In each and every instance, where he discusses the Jewish relationship, he goes on immediately to connect this to the present Christians'." (*Jødernes gudsforhold og hele historie kan være et spejl for de kristne. Hos Ewald er dette synspunkt i ganske udpræget grad til stede. I hvert eneste tildælde, hvor han omtale jødiske forhold, fører han straks forbindelsen frem til samtidens kristne.*) Lausten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*, 106. I would argue Laursten's observations lend credence to my theological interpretation of the firstborn and remnant/afterborn in the above sermon text.

⁷³² HH II, 253. It seems likely that Ewald envisions the true believers ruling the world with Christ during the chiliastic period (the thousand-year kingdom). Ewald refers to the eschatological horizon of this co-rule in the following page (HH II, 256), Siegvold sees this co-ruling of the first-born with Christ as what differentiates the final condition of the first born from the after-born. They are purified and happy, but not co-rulers with Christ, Siegvold, *The Everlasting Gospel*, esp. 74-82. Thus in Siegvold's and Ewald's view, there is a sense of urgency and something to lose if sanctification is not sought in this present life.

Here, the firstborn symbolized not the small group of true believers but Christ.⁷³³ Christ was the firstborn, the first-fruits, the high priest. In this reading, it is clear that Ewald did not see the firstborn as an exclusive heir to the kingdom but the one who saved others and enabled their glorification. Ewald devoted the rest of the Exordium to detailing Christ's atoning work as the rescuing from sin, death, and the devil (the power of death). He did not conceive of this rescue only in negative terms, but also as a transformation to become Christ-like in Christ or by means of Christ (the notion of union with Christ is key for this concept). To be glorified and inherit all things involved the power to rule over sin, not to avoid sin's penalty.⁷³⁴ Ewald's language also involved the sense that the strength by which one ruled over sin was not entirely one's own.⁷³⁵ Ewald thus secured Christ at the center of his theological project⁷³⁶ and avoided a sense that the freedom, salvation, and glory that humans possessed was independent. Additionally, Ewald positioned Christ, not only as a rescuer but as a teacher. Christ was the one who taught *how* one should be his servant.⁷³⁷

Gospel Exegesis

In this final step, Ewald identified the substance and path of sanctification as a practice of obedience and self-denial done through love. Sanctification was not as a metaphysical transformation, though Ewald did not completely disregard its mysterious elements.⁷³⁸

⁷³³ HH II, 253.

⁷³⁴ HH II, 256.

⁷³⁵ HH II, 256.

⁷³⁶ There are various doctrines of universal salvation, particularly in the modern period, some which universalize religious dogma to the extent that Christ is not considered the only way to salvation. What has been defined as Christian *apokatastasis* or patristic universal salvation by Robin Perry and Illaria Ramelli maintains the centrality of Christ in the entire system. See Perry's preface in Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*.

⁷³⁷ "This same thing Christ teaches us further in our [Gospel] text, where he teaches us, both how we can be set free through him, and how we should become his servants instead." (*Dette samme underviser Christus os selv videre om udi vor Text, hvor hand lærer os, baade hvorledes vi kand blive frigiordte formedelst ham, og hvorledes vi derimod skulle blive hans Tienere.*) HH II, 257.

⁷³⁸ Christ is the one who gives the true believers his power. Ewald refers here to 2 Pet 1:3 and John 15:4-5, HH II, 266. Ewald wants to insist that Christ's atoning work is actually effective against sin's domination. Gerhard also uses a similar argument, but he does not go deeply into *how* Christ gives his power. Peschke speaks of this

Though Christ's power was imparted in mysterious ways in sanctification, not everything remained a mystery. Ewald outlined two points in the second half of his sermon: *how* Christ freed those who came to him and the easy yoke Christ laid upon them.⁷³⁹ Ewald painted a familiar picture in the first section: the psychological and spiritual experience of the human being in different stages of the *ordo salutis*. The human being was a slave to sin, the fear of death, and the tyranny of the devil. People followed their own desires but were really corrupted servants of sin or the devil. They could not understand the willingness of Christians to suffer all that the Christian path required because it seemed to them that Christians were unhappy slaves who denied themselves the world's advantages and pleasures.⁷⁴⁰ Ewald argued that the Christian frame of reference and Christians' action appeared unreasonable and foolish to those who could not imagine *willingly* and happily denying themselves. In Ewald's view, these people were in denial about their own enslavement and flee from demands of 'true Christianity' by any means available.⁷⁴¹ One might be tempted to say such people act 'rational' according to their own limited awareness and understanding—but not according to their real state.

as a 'mystical-spiritualist' understanding of justification, Peschke, "Der Pietismus in Dargun," 84–85. However, both Ewald and Gerhard would resist any notion of a purely hidden Christian righteousness or identity that the Finnish school of Luther Interpretation advocates for. See, Schumacher, *Who Do I Say That You Are?: Anthropology and the Theology of Theosis in the Finnish School of Tuomo Mannermaa*, 59. Perhaps unfinished and unfolding, but not something that is utterly and mysteriously hidden, yet ontologically present. This is a concern that possibly falls under discussion of early modern causality and the question of the concept of power in general. Additionally, there however are philosophical and categorical problems with arguing from causality in terms of created agents 'back' towards causality as regarding the how of creation. The act of creation itself determines the possibility of created causality and is thus categorically different than created causality. For some good starting points about the historical development of causality and the difference between God's causality and created causality, see Hanby, *No God, No Science: Theology, Cosmology, Biology*; Matava, *Divine Causality and Human Free Choice: Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy de Auxiliis Revisited*.

⁷³⁹ HH II, 257.

⁷⁴⁰ HH II, 258.

⁷⁴¹ HH II, 259.

This pre-*ordo* stage of slavery to sin and the devil would come to an end when the Savior awakened them from “the sleep of security.”⁷⁴² They would then know they were not free, but miserable. Ewald’s entire descriptive project was reflexive: a person did not just feel miserable but knew that they were miserable: they were required to pay attention to their misery and be persuaded of their lowly condition.⁷⁴³ Hence, Ewald affirmed self-knowledge as the knowledge required for faith. This experiential knowledge, known and not ignored, led naturally to a desire for self-improvement.⁷⁴⁴ A person could strive against sin but would fail. This failure would lead to despair under the burden of sin.⁷⁴⁵

Only upon reaching this despair can the words of Christ be heard and attended to: “Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest” (Matt 11:28 KJV). This portion of Ewald’s *ordo* rested upon the assumption that Christ’s words were heard because of a psychological necessity; the burdened soul wanted and needed to hear Christ’s words. This necessity was grounded upon a primal orientation towards happiness and health. Humans wanted to be happy, and they wanted to rest when weary. Thus, Ewald’s argument must be based on human experience and patterns of perception on the part of the person, at least in an Early Modern sense.⁷⁴⁶ On a purely propositional level, there is nothing that suggests why Christ’s words could not equally be attended to by any rational mind. Ewald also argued for the universality of Christ’s call and efforts to free everyone from sin, but he tempered his language with the insistence that Christ could not free those who remained in

⁷⁴² *Sikkerheds Søvn*, HH II, 259.

⁷⁴³ HH II, 259.

⁷⁴⁴ Erik Nielsen speaks of this self-knowledge as a condition of consciousness (*bevidsthedstilstande*) where by the awoken or converted 'I' realizes it is known fully by God even in its transgressions. Nielsen argues that the self-oversight leads to the "duty to confront and control the world of one’s desires and impulses" (*pligten til at gribe stryrende ind i sin Verden af lyster og tilskyndelser*,) Nielsen, *Solens Fødsel: Seks Tekster Om Kristendommens Hemmeligheder*, 119.

⁷⁴⁵ HH II, 260.

⁷⁴⁶ This will be discussed further in the second half of the dissertation.

self-deception, unaware of their slavery.⁷⁴⁷ The yoke (knowledge) of the law revealed their slavery to them and from this self-knowledge, they "may thereby be driven to seek Christ."⁷⁴⁸

Ewald was insistent that only those who tried but failed to uphold the law would be persuaded by Christ's words. The fear, doubt, and anguish in this narrative of the *ordo* were part of the burden, which was not confined to evil desires or actions. This anxiety, for Ewald, was pedagogical (though not an inherent good in itself) because it led to a humble heart and a flight to Christ.⁷⁴⁹ This flight ended in a trust that God would do what he had promised (forgive, justify, and give rest).⁷⁵⁰ Ewald cautioned that this required the believer to remain in and with Christ. Considered within a final eschatological horizon of *apokatastasis*, neither premise was untrue. God remained faithful, willing, and effecting his salvific action unceasingly and endlessly, *and* this action was still dependent upon the believer remaining with Christ. This voluntary action on the part of the believer was a weakness in Ewald's and other German universalists' argument, if the free will was seen as absolutely undetermined and indifferent. However, it is not clear from the sermon whether the will as part of the human being was considered thusly by Ewald.⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁷ "But it is impossible that he can release then one, who does not know himself to be bound, or free the one who knows nothing of any thralldom." (*Men det er umuligt, at hand kand løse den, som ey kiender sig at være bunden, eller gjøre den fri, som ingen Trældom veed af at sige.*) HH II, 260. Ewald affirms the doctrine that God wills to have all people saved, just prior to this passage: "The faithful Savior, who has come in order to save all who were lost, (Matt 18,11), seeks to bring help to all. He calls all to himself;" (*Den trofaste Frelsere, som er kommen for at frelse alt det, som var fortabt, (Matth. 18,11) søger vel at komme alle til Hielp. Hand kalder alle til sig;*) HH II, 260.

⁷⁴⁸ *...maae derved drives til at søge Christum...* HH II, 261.

⁷⁴⁹ HH II, 263. See, Simon Grote about Buddeus and the pedagogical steps towards recognizing your own inability to not sin, Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:39–44.. The likely difference with the German universalists is that they extend this pedagogical role of regret or fear into the eschatological horizon. The punishments or discipline of hell is meant to humble. See discussion of Gerhard below in chapter six.

⁷⁵⁰ *...og venter, ja er forsikret om, at hand skal vist gjøre det, som hand har lovet...* HH II, 263.

⁷⁵¹ This will be examined further in the second part of the dissertation. The notion of the will as inclined and directed has not fully disappeared in this Early Modern period. Additionally, the argument Siegvölck gives around the human will is based on the difference between the creature and creator, namely that they are

In the final section of the sermon, Ewald addressed the yoke of Christ. He vehemently denied that believers could sin as much as they wished because they had been made free by Christ: a notion that saw freedom as related only to the *punishment* of sin rather than the actual sin. Instead, Ewald treated freedom as the movement from being a slave to being a child of God that must be taught and brought up as the child of God. The training of the believer (by the law of God) was symbolized as the yoke freely taken upon oneself by the believer.⁷⁵² Yet even a yoke freely chosen could still be heavy and burdensome. To address this concern, Ewald returned to a discussion of the various concepts of the divine.

What followed in Ewald's sermon was a moral argument based on (presumably) normal human experience. Ewald affirmed that it would be difficult to naturally love "an enemy, a revenger, a just and harsh God and Judge,"⁷⁵³ if mercy was not expected. It would be difficult to love someone who hurt or punished you, however fairly or unfairly; people naturally dislike punishment. In this way, Ewald suggested, seeing the yoke of Christ as light seemed foolish. On this count he agreed with the non-believing sceptics. But then he countered; it was easy to love "a friend, a savior, a bridegroom, a pious and gracious God and Father, who one has faith and trust in."⁷⁵⁴ Ewald was not appealing to revelation, but human experience. On the philosophical and experiential level, he assumed that it was easy to love what was loveable. Ewald reminded his audience that this was what Jesus demanded of them: to love what was loveable, namely the pious and gracious Father. From loving Christ and the Father, one moved to love those who they loved: "love each other, love all humans for [Christ's] sake, and do all

unequal in power and endurance, so the creature cannot bitterly withstand God infinitely. Moreover, creatures are not wills alone and may undergo a purging process: "bodily and spiritual Plagues, both in this and the next world, torment and fire-purge them so long till they be softened enough, and acknowledge their Wrong and Misery, humbling themselves with their whole Heart before the righteous God" Siegvolck, *The Everlasting Gospel*, 5. Siegvolck's argument and Ewald's sermon treat not a naked will, but the whole creature who may weaken and grow faint or heavy-burdened. This creature is naturally desirous of rest when weary.

⁷⁵² HH II, 264.

⁷⁵³ ...en Fiende, en Hevnere, en retfærdig og streng Gud og Dommere...HH II, 264-5.

⁷⁵⁴ ...en Ven, en Frelser, en Brudgom, en from og naadig Gud og Fader, den man har Troe og Tillid til. HH II, 265.

that which love demands and drives the right Lover to.”⁷⁵⁵ Ewald did not ask his audience to love what was dark and mysterious; he assumed a continuity between what his audience knew and loved (a friend, a father one trusts) and a loving God. Additionally, he assumed that loving what was loveable was easy. Consider a similar meditation by the 17th-century English priest, Thomas Traherne:

Yet in truth, it is far more easy to think well than ill, because good thoughts be sweet and delightful: Evil thoughts are full of discontent and trouble. So that an evil habit and custom have made it difficult to think well, not Nature. For by nature nothing is so difficult as to think amiss. Is it not easy to conceive the World in your Mind? To think the Heavens fair? The Sun Glorious? The Earth fruitful? The Air Pleasant? The Sea Profitable? And the Giver bountiful?⁷⁵⁶

By easy, both Ewald and Traherne meant that love or good thoughts were fitting and pleasant to human nature. To love the loveable not only concerned the aim of one’s actions, but the acting as well. Ewald and Traherne insisted that the process itself was easy; it was the manner in which one was naturally intended to act.⁷⁵⁷

Building in rhetorical force, Ewald insisted four times in this section that it was easy to love. A person loves first the one who loved them first (Christ), then Christ’s father and children; a person loves those who partake in the same grace. Finally, a person loves even their enemies for the sake of a friend “who still can partake in the same grace with us.”⁷⁵⁸ Ewald set the last

⁷⁵⁵ ...elske hverandre, elske alle Mennsker for hans skyld, og gjøre alt det som Kierlighed udkræver, og driver af sig selv en ret Elskere til... HH II, 265.

⁷⁵⁶ Traherne, Dobell, and Christian Classics Ethereal Library., *Centuries of Meditations*, 1.8-9.

⁷⁵⁷ The natural way to act is, of course, the way one would act if untouched by sin or depravity: human nature as an original ontological good, but human nature as sinful. Ewald’s and Traherne’s arguments work only if this ontological goodness or proper manner of acting is somehow ontologically prior to depravity, and thus present in some manner even within a corrupted human nature. Traherne’s argument is more clearly an argument from beauty or pleasure. In other places, he draws on the intellectual delight one has in the flourishing of the other as a necessary component for the fulness of that flourishing, Traherne, *The Works of Thomas Traherne, Vol. 2 Commentaries of Heaven*, 177. Ewald merely assumes that it is easy to love what is loveable and trustworthy and then logically extends this love further.

⁷⁵⁸ ...endnu kand bliver deelagtige i samme Naade med os. HH II, 265.

possibility in a conditional framework, but he enfolded each step of this easy love within the first. For Ewald, love arose ultimately from the one who was Love and thus could never cease to love.⁷⁵⁹ Implicit in the text was the suggestion that loving enemies for the sake of Christ would one day be turned into love of a friend. In this way, it was easy to love because the believer never loved in vain. Yet, according to Ewald, this would be impossible to comprehend for those who suspected that God was a tyrant instead of the one who disciplined in order to perfect and make holy.

These last points are key to understanding Ewald's argument, depending on whether one accepts that he held to the doctrine of *apokatastasis*. If he did, Ewald was not naïvely facing an uncertain outcome in his admonishments about the ease of love and its demands. From love followed obedience and self-denial.⁷⁶⁰ Love justified itself in its ease or delight, but self-denial and obedience were not as obviously self-justifying. On the next page of his sermon, he anticipated the skeptic's argument and insisted that self-denial and obedience were always done with an end of bliss, glory, and salvation in sight.⁷⁶¹ Ewald did not expect the believer to find pleasure in humbling themselves, apart from the expectation of God's grace and goodness toward them.⁷⁶² If certain, the reward was present even now *as* the believer's

⁷⁵⁹ The German universalist Gerhard insists that the love of God for his creatures and his will for their redemption must be obtained otherwise God acts finally in vain (which is impossible since he is perfect). Thus, Gerhard infers that this love must ultimately be fulfilled in the completed act of redemption. See chapter six and Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, 129–35. For a modern meditation along similar lines, see David Bentley Hart's Meditation Three. He remarks at the end that "if there is any true continuity between the charity we are called to cultivate in this life and the transfiguring love that supposedly unites us to God, then surely there can be no brake upon our desire to include those still outside the company of the redeemed. Such love could find its complete joy only in the joy of completion" Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*, 157.

⁷⁶⁰ HH II, 265.

⁷⁶¹ HH II, 266, in this section Ewald again uses repetition to build up a momentum, asking if it is burdensome to do difficult tasks for the sake of glory (*Herlighed*), salvation (*Salighed*), and innumerable good-deeds (*utallige Velgierninger*) from God? These are semi-rhetorical questions. Ewald also ensures his audience that Savior himself will provide divine power for our tasks.

⁷⁶² I.e., pure humiliation in itself is not considered an inherently good thing, but bearing a burden for the sake of another could be a conditional good.

encouragement and foundation for trust in God. Under such conditions, there was no spirit of fear, only discipline and love.⁷⁶³ Good efforts, actions, and love were never done in vain within the final eschatological horizon.

By supplying this final horizon, Ewald's present-oriented encouragement moved beyond platitudes. He concluded his sermon by acknowledging the difficulty of self-denial and obedience; they could make one's situation appear worse than before.⁷⁶⁴ Without such a horizon, his words appear conditional, based only on human actions ("If you come to Christ, and pray that he will grant you the peace, which he has promised the tired and burdened souls, so [God] shall surely fulfill his promises to you").⁷⁶⁵ Or, they stand within a framework of unceasing and endless divine grace that surrounds, encourages, and enfolds human action within itself. In the first instance, the anxiety that was present in the earlier stages of the *ordo* and sanctification remained at the existential level—the believer could turn away—even if anxiety ceased at the experiential level by encountering God as one the believer could trust. However, this trust on the part of the believer was either *potentially* mistaken in the character of God⁷⁶⁶ or it revealed what logically followed⁷⁶⁶ from the discovery of the deity who loved us first, namely the unceasing action of God towards us for our redemption. In the second instance, Ewald's words about the lightness of the burden found a firmer foundation. The believer, though experiencing the burden of obedience and self-denial, need not be troubled by anxiety or futility, as seen from the light of eternity.

⁷⁶³ *ikke Frygtens Aand, men Magtes og Kireligheds of Tugtes Aand?* HH II, 266. The Scriptural reference is 2 Tim 1:7.

⁷⁶⁴ "Yes, it seems then that your condition becomes worst that it earlier seemed to be" (*...ja synes det end, at eders Tilstand blive verre, end som den syntes tilforn at være...*) HH II, 267.

⁷⁶⁵ *Kommer saa til Christum, og beder, at hand vil skenke eder den Hvile, som hand her lover de trætte og bebyrdede Siele, saa skal hand visseligen opfulde sine Forjættelser paa eder...* HH II, 267-8.

⁷⁶⁶ Insofar as eternal, infinite, never-ceasing damnation is considered an actual possibility, God's promises of peace might fail. Additionally, this reveals God's character as essentially voluntaristic-arbitrarily willing that the end of life is the end of a decision period *or* engaged in a type of double predestination. More on this in chapter six, see also Meditation One in Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*.

This argument is not explicitly made in Ewald's text. It remains possible to treat Ewald's assertion of the yoke's lightness as a result of the divine power Christ provided.⁷⁶⁷ Yet, I judge it to be pertinent that German universalists such as Siegvold, Johann David Schäfer, and Ludwig Gerhard all deemed the doctrine to be an encouragement and comfort for the present labor and trials of sanctification.⁷⁶⁸ In the midst of a theological framework of obedience and self-discipline that would never reach an end in this life,⁷⁶⁹ an assurance of the useful purpose of this labor was no small thing.

3.6 Final Thoughts on Ewald, Sanctification and the *Ordo Salutis*

In this last reflection on sanctification in Ewald's theology, it becomes clear why Ewald envisioned the entirety of the *ordo salutis* as part of the process of sanctification. There were specific experiences that the believer had to undergo, which unfolded semi-naturalistic lines corresponding to human nature. Sanctification was not a disparate piece of the puzzle of salvation. The impulse towards holiness and, thereby, union with God, drove the whole *ordo*. Sanctification included self-discipline and actions permeated by humility, patience, and long-suffering. Bliss and salvation consisted of holiness and righteousness on the part of the believer. The salvation Christ set out to effect had to be actual and complete. Yet, though this was the fruit of sanctification, it was impossible for a person to carry it out by their own effort.⁷⁷⁰ The questions and solutions of justification and co-operative grace in the Western

⁷⁶⁷ "And how can any of this be difficult, when the Savior himself pours out all the divine power, which we need for life and piety, see 2 Pet 1:3 sqq. John 14: 4-5, Phil 4:13." (*Og hvorledes kand noget af alt dette blive svart, da Frelseren selv skenker os al den Guddommelige Kraft, som vi behøve til Liv og Gudfrygtighed, s. 2 Pet. 1,3. sq. Jon 15, 4.5. Phil 4, 13.*) HH II, 266. The 2 Peter reference refers to the partaking of the divine nature, again a gesture towards the union with Christ.

⁷⁶⁸ Schäfer, *Ewiges Evangelium, oder die Lehre von dem tausendjährigen und ewigen Reiche Christi und seiner Heiligen und der damit verknüpften Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, 135–36; Siegvold, *The Everlasting Gospel*, 117–36; Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, 282–368.

⁷⁶⁹ Erik Nielsen comments on Pietism's continual self-reflection and denial of self, its unceasing self-discipling, Nielsen, *Solens Fødsel: Seks Tekster Om Kristendommens Hemmeligheder*, 117.

⁷⁷⁰ Part of a more technical conversation that is useful to understanding the 'mechanics' of sanctification is the language of grace and nature and the different technical classifications of grace. I will discuss this more in chapter 4, but I have also written about it in my article, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism."

Protestant tradition play a role and will be touched on in the next section. However, to focus on the action of grace and justification by the merits of Christ alone misses the larger picture Ewald drew about the nature of God. These issues (grace and Christ's merits) helped fill in technical problems in the *ordo*, but the question remained: is God trustworthy and do you trust him?⁷⁷¹

Thus sanctification, in a narrow sense, must always be the antecedent to faith. Faith, for Ewald, was not concerned with an act of the intellect or will considered in itself but also the *content* of the act. Who was God? Could he be trusted? Do I trust him? In Ewald's theological vision, the believer was implicitly and equally concerned with these questions. Since salvation did not consist of faith alone as an act of the intellect and will on the part of the human being (Ewald saw faith as the foundation of sanctification), it mattered what type of trust had been given and whether this trust was fitting. The believer took up the yoke of Christ in faith. Yet if the object of that trust was not trustworthy, faith became a pure willing on the part of the believer. In that case, Markus Matthias' comments about the supernatural act of God on the will might be necessary.

In the paradigm, I discussed above none of Ewald's prescriptions about the lightness of the yoke and the internal necessity of sanctification find traction on a purely rational level—if by rational one takes in no consideration of the human psyche or treats rational as formally contentless. Instead, I argue that the lightness of the yoke of Christ and the necessity of sanctification must be interpreted in an *experiential* sense. This could account for Ewald's rhetoric and argument. And this argument from experience does not exclude the content of such trust. The *experiential* side of the *ordo salutis* rooted in an a priori trust in sensation, could indeed confirm the absolute divine love towards the believer. Ewald's thought depended on the will's natural inclination towards the good and happiness, particularly when healed of sin. Why would it be surprising, in this paradigm, that Ewald considered it easy or

⁷⁷¹ I touch on Ewald's or other Pietists' doctrine of God only haphazardly in this dissertation, but it seems likely to me that the Pietists attempted to hold to a version of traditional classical theism rather than the deism of the Enlightenment. See my above comments on Johann Jacob Rambach and divine simplicity and also chapter six where I mention that the pietist universalists refer to divine simplicity in their arguments.

even delightful to obey and follow the loving, trustworthy, and good God? Still, however much Ewald underestimated the depth of sin or needed to invoke a 'spiritual rebirth', his vision was based on a particular structuring of human nature and the belief that it could be healed. The next three sections will continue to address these points.

It is time to turn to the wider world and describe the theological and philosophical debates I have hinted at in the above pages. I begin with a question of grace, then a discussion of human freedom and the human faculties, and finally of *apokatastasis*.

Early Modern Context

Chapter 4: Grace and Nature

The following section, which seeks to define and outline the nature and grace in Johann Franz Buddeus's *Collegium theologico-morale, eller gudelig Lærdom om gode Gierninger og Sæder*, is a summary and reworking of my recently published article in *Pietismus und Neuzeit*.⁷⁷² For information on Ewald's connection to Buddeus and Buddeus's importance for Danish Pietism, refer to section 1.5 in this dissertation. In my article, I sought to renew an interest in grace and nature as hermeneutically valuable when reading Pietist and Pietist-friendly theologians. My article began with a focus on grace, but here I will delve first into the language of nature. I will then recap Buddeus's discussion of grace—particularly sanctifying grace—and the technical terminology he used. I will also touch upon the importance of the *unio mystica* and divine concurrence in light of the question of human-divine cooperation inherent in grace. Buddeus's theological answer to Early Modern philosophical problems of agency and causation carried within it an ambiguity that left it vulnerable. At the same time, his language of cooperative grace revealed an invested effort to preserve human action and real moral improvement as the appropriation of Christ's merits. Finally, I will discuss where Ewald's understanding and language of grace extended beyond Buddeus's framework. My aim in this chapter is twofold: to establish the concept of divine-human cooperation in grace and to open up the reach of God's grace. The former is important to the discussion in the following chapter on human freedom, and the latter informs the perceived limits of God's salvific action that Pietist universalism discarded.

4.1 Introduction to Nature

By paying attention to the dualism of grace and nature,⁷⁷³ it becomes clear that the concept of nature carried a two-fold reference in Buddeus's thought: an ontologically, or logically, prior concept of human nature and the present depraved state of all the un-reborn.⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁷² Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism."

⁷⁷³ See, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 148–50.

⁷⁷⁴ One sees this in Philip Spener's treatise *Handlung von der Gnade und Natur* (different editions in 1687, 1714, 1733. The later edition was translated into Danish in 1733 (Spener, *Tractat om Natuur og Naade*).

Buddeus recognized that the term *nature* was used in a variety of senses in philosophy and scripture. Ultimately, he defined nature in line with philosophy as “the concept of all the natural faculties, inclinations, and habits, in the mind and body.”⁷⁷⁵ He did not posit an explicit metaphysical or ontological substance, but linguistically his moral theology was dependent on persisting human nature. If his *Collegium theologico-morale* deals more with the functioning of human nature, it is still a concept distinct from the fallen, sin-effected condition that was the scriptural nature. Buddeus’s philosophical definition of human nature was thus formal, or functional, but there are also elements in his *Collegium theologico-morale* that suggest a notion of the end, or *telos*, of this nature. I discuss his understanding of the insatiable desire of the will as pointing towards an infinite object—God—in the following chapter.

In Ewald’s trial, a great deal of the confusion over the progressive versus binary language of sanctification stemmed from the implicit ontological and metaphysical claims at play that were inherent in the question of natures. Consider, for example, Ewald’s distinction between the different degrees of rebirth. He worked with a binary division between the reborn and un-reborn, yet was obviously drawing upon a notion of progression and perfectibility in the eschaton: being reborn was not a static state but a dynamic and growing one, just as a newborn was fully human, yet not a perfect person.⁷⁷⁶ Even apart from a thorough working

Spener acknowledges that nature here does not mean the human being as they were in the state of innocence (1.1, p. 1), nor does he deny that natural powers cooperate with the Holy Spirit (2.1-4, p. 3-6). Rather nature is used mainly in the sense of the hopelessly corrupted human faculties. But the linguistic imprecision remains.

⁷⁷⁵ *Den gandske naturlige Formues-Tilbøveligheds-og Færdigheders Begreb, saavel i henseende til Sindet, som til Legemet*, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:2.

⁷⁷⁶ "...that we shall be reborn to receive God’s image again is true and that this rebirth shall be perfect, whole and not half in reference to part, though not in reference to degree, for otherwise it became a monster of which I know well that a newborn child shall be a perfect man when we meet all together in the unity of faith and confession of God’s Son, Ephes. 4:13" (*At vi skal igienføddes til at faae Guds-billede igjen, er sandt, og denne igienføddsel skal være fuldkommen, heel og icke half qvoad partes skiønt icke qvoad gradus, Thi ellers blev det et monstrum af dog veed ieg vel at et nyt fød barn skal være indtil vi møde allesammen til Troens og Guds Søns Erkiennelses Eenighed til én fulkommen Mand Ephes. 4:13.*), “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” 8.

out of the concepts, one cannot but notice a similarity to the Aristotelian notion of a proper *telos*, or perfection of a thing.⁷⁷⁷ Thus, when Buddeus and Pietists such as Spener, Pontoppidan, and Ewald wrote that grace did not destroy nature but hallowed it,⁷⁷⁸ insofar that holiness was considered the perfection of one's attributes,⁷⁷⁹ they were not far from the earlier metaphysical framework.⁷⁸⁰

The theological language of Ewald's sermons, in particular, did not speak of nature in a philosophical sense, but almost exclusively referred to the unregenerate condition (the natural human condition).⁷⁸¹ Practically speaking, however, this language could never replace the underlying philosophical substrate, or functional structure, of human nature. In fact, it is clear that Ewald's notion of the four-fold condition⁷⁸² of the human being logically (or at least linguistically) required a basic abiding human condition.⁷⁸³ Even if one takes into

⁷⁷⁷ *Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit*, the well-known Thomistic axiom found in *Summa Theologica* I, I, 8 ad 2.

⁷⁷⁸ See below for Buddeus, see also, Spener, *Tractat om Natuur og Naade*, 2.4, 6; Pontoppidan, *Collegium Pastorale Practikum : Pontoppidans Pastoralteologi*, 88. Ewald, HH I, 115.

⁷⁷⁹ Ewald, HH IV, 132. See also my above discussion of this sermon in the section on sanctification.

⁷⁸⁰ As I mention in my article, it is obvious that the mechanical understanding of causality has not fully overcome the notion of a *telos*. See, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 154–55. As I mention there, Pontoppidan's argument for the immortality of the soul requires the notion of a final cause to be a coherent argument. Pontoppidan, *Tractat om Sielens Udødelighed samt dens Tilstand i og efter Døden, stadfæstet ved Guds Ord og den sunde Fornuft*, 81–82.

⁷⁸¹ See for instance, HH V 440 or HH I 1004. Ewald uses the concept of 'natural human' in contrast to the reborn human.

⁷⁸² Ewald expresses this classical Augustinian division here: " that it speaks about the four-fold condition, in which the human either has been, or is now, or shall come [to be]" (*at det taler om en firedobbelt Tilstand, i hvilken Mennisket enten har været, eller nu er, eller og skal komme.*) HH III, 343. The idea is also present in the early modern Reformed thought like in Thomas Boston's *Human Nature in its Fourfold State* (1720), i.e. the state of innocence, state of sin, state of grace, and state of glory. The Formula of Concord relates these four estates specifically to the condition of free will. MacKenzie, "The Bondage of the Will in Lutheranism—Man's Sin or God's Will?," 11–12.

⁷⁸³ Pietist universalist Ludwig Gerhard arguments indicate, at the very least, a sense of the abiding metaphysical creaturehood of rational souls—see below and Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, 131–33.

consideration the role of the *unio mystica* and indwelling grace in the works of Buddeus and Ewald, the ontological picture is never purely relational.⁷⁸⁴ The inner hallowing, or healing, of human nature as a psychological reality is too prominent in Buddeus for that.⁷⁸⁵ Ewald, in his sermons, used general, not technical, language and emphasised the anticipated healing and the promise of perfect health and salvation.⁷⁸⁶ In comparison, Ewald's catechism painted a strong picture of the God-pleasing actions required of the reborn here and now.⁷⁸⁷ It is clear that sanctification (*helliggiørelse*) in Ewald's theology involved the functional enabling of the human believer to do God-pleasing actions because of their inward holiness.⁷⁸⁸ Still, when

⁷⁸⁴ Raunio notes that "a relational ontology as an alternative to substantial ontology is in fact a more or less a Kantian idea, which was developed further by Hegel", Vainio, *Engaging Luther: A (New) Theological Assessment*, 29. Pietism's philosophical tenets ought to be investigated more closely to understand its position in relation to the German-Finnish Lutheran discussion. Perhaps more pertinent to this discussion are the arguments for the general *concursus dei* which upholds, preserves, and concurs in human actions. See further discussion below.

⁷⁸⁵ This is the main theme of Buddeus's *Collegium Theologie-Morale* after his discussion on the difference between grace and nature. Buddeus then goes through the main human faculties (intellect, will, conscience, etc...) and discusses their functioning in the state of grace.

⁷⁸⁶ Ewald exhorts his listeners, "You shall let yourselves be guided and led to Jesus and by his loving petition, let yourselves be persuaded to come to him, to seek help in him, to call upon him for grace and salvation; you shall trust him and completely deliver yourselves into his hands of grace, with a humble, faithful, constant and quiet heart, and not depart from him, before he helps you, which he will and shall do according to his great mercy and faithfulness and grace-filled promises, so that you shall feel and sense his healing and saving power in your souls for a perfect cure and salvation. Then you shall have cause to say with mouth and heart that he has made all things well." (*I skal lade eder veylede og føre til JESUM, og ved hans kierlige Indbydelse lader eder overtale til at komme til ham, at søge Hielp hos ham, at paakalde ham om Naade og Frelse; I skal betroe eder ham, og aldeles hengive eder i hans Naades Hænder, med et ydmygt, troende, stadigt og stille Hierte, og ikke vige fra ham, førend hand hjælper eder, hvilket hand da efter sin store Barmhiertighed og Trofasthed, og efter sine naadefulde Forjættelser visseligen vil og skal gjøre, saa at I skal føle og fornemme hans lægende og frelsende Kraft paa eders Siele til en fuldkommen Lægedom og Frelse, saa at I skal vinde Aarsag at sige med Mund og Hierte, at hand haver giort alle Ting vel.*) Ewald, HH III, 127. The sermon was preached on Jesus's healing miracles, and Ewald also reminds his listeners that Christ is also worried about their bodily needs and is their only doctor, whether he works through other means or immediately. Ewald, HH III, 128

⁷⁸⁷ See below, also Ewald, BE 43.

⁷⁸⁸ "a human does not only receive a mind and desire for all that is right, good and pleasing to God, for the spiritual and heavenly things, but also is given power and made capable to wander in a new, holy and God-

one reads the language of the “natural human,” “nature,” and “the world,” it is essential to remember that Ewald mainly used this language to refer to the unregenerate (fallen) condition of human being.

If the various meanings of nature are not clarified, Buddeus’s axiom “nature by means of grace is not completely destroyed, but hallowed, improved and inclined”⁷⁸⁹ can easily be misunderstood. Even if he was referring to the sinful condition as nature, he implicitly included an underlying philosophical concept of nature or persisting form, since presumably one would want the sinful condition to be destroyed. Additionally, to take on a new nature in rebirth did not mean to simply double one’s nature in the philosophical sense such that one had both a sinful human nature and a hidden Christian nature. This only preserved the sinful condition. The Latin and German editions of Buddeus’s *Collegium theologico-morale* make a distinction between a philosophical notion of nature and the theological language of renewal, or the new person. Here the spiritual condition is tied into a moral evaluation. As I note in my article, “[t]he Latin emphasizes the ontological goodness of human faculties and habits and the German distinguishes the language of the old man (*der alte mensch*) who is evil, from human essence or nature (*die natur oder das wesen des menschen*).”⁷⁹⁰ This is also apparent

pleasing life and way of living; to bear the fruits of the Spirit, and with a word to walk holy and innocently before God, according to God's and our Savior's holy word and will, and so to be holy in all his comportment, both inwardly and outwardly, in heart, mind, desires and affections, in thoughts, words and deeds." (...*et Menniske ikke allene faaer Sind og Lyst til alt det, som er ret, got og behageligt for Gud, til de aandelige og himmelske Ting, men ogsaa iføres med Kraft og gøres duelig og dygtig til at vandre i et nyt, helligt og Gud behageligt Liv og Levnet, at omgaaes i Aanden, at bære Aandens Frugter, og med eet Ord, at omgaaes hellig og ustraffeligen for Gud, efter Guds og vor Frelsers hellige Ord og Villie, og saaledes at være hellig i al sin Omgængelse, baade indvortes og udvortes, i Hierte, Sind, Lyst og Affecter, i Tanker, Ord og Gierninger.*) Ewald, HH II, 990-91.

⁷⁸⁹ *Naturen formedelst Naaden ikke adeles bliver destrueret, men helliget, bedret og bøyet.* Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:24. Buddeus repeats this axiom a page later: *See! saaledes blive Naturens Gaver ved de extraordinaire Gaver ikke ophævede, meget mindre ved de ordinaire Gaver, men blive ikkun forbedrede og helligede.* Buddeus, 1:25.

⁷⁹⁰ See, Lied, “Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on ‘Grace and Nature’ Influenced Danish Pietism,” 150. Also, both the Latin and German editions of the text, Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis*, 1.1.XXXVI-XXXVII; Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, 1.1.XXXVI-XXXVII.

in Buddeus's explicit denial that human nature was transformed in rebirth, the *unio mystica*. An essential change would mean that the reborn Christian was no longer human.⁷⁹¹ Thus, the notion of nature being hallowed depended on human continuity, as common experience and observation suggests: the human faculties persisted in all conditions.⁷⁹² By understanding the concepts of grace in Buddeus's text in this way, it becomes easy to grasp the implications of his idea that grace hallowed nature—it did not destroy nature. The internal corruption of human nature is being healed: human nature is being made fully capable again. Buddeus's axiom thus suggests a place for human action and human functioning within the *ordo salutis*. To understand how this was permitted within an Early Modern Lutheran and Pietist context,⁷⁹³ it is necessary to define grace according to Buddeus.⁷⁹⁴

⁷⁹¹ As I wrote in my article, "Rebirth for Buddeus must explain the continuing operation and healing of the actual human faculties (the intellect, will, imagination, etc...). Buddeus' fear here is dependent upon a underlying notion of human essence--what I have also called human nature. Essential change (*Væsens Forandring*) for Buddeus removes the implicit source or substate of the human faculties. See, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:23. Buddeus' discussion here is derived from observation or experience, not an *a priori* reflection on nature and essence." Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 150.

⁷⁹² See, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:23.

⁷⁹³ Or not permitted, Valentin Ernst Löscher repudiated Pietism because of their focus on human action, seeing this as a "devaluation of the means of grace by their association with human piety" and "a mystical confusion of nature and grace in the conception of an essential part of man which is pure and good in itself even before rebirth." Busch, *Karl Barth & the Pietists : The Young Karl Barth's Critique of Pietism and Its Response*, 126–27. In his analysis, Barth places Buddeus firmly on the side of the Pietists. Busch, 128–29.

⁷⁹⁴ In my article, I also try to treat some of the historical background within Reformed and Lutheran thought.

4.2 Defining Grace

Buddeus defined salvific grace as the Trinity's actions outside itself.⁷⁹⁵ He primarily defined grace in three ways: 1) "God's love grounded in Christ's merits,"⁷⁹⁶ 2) "God's working grace in the souls of humans, that is, the Holy Spirit illuminating humans, converting, disciplining, working/effecting faith, upholding, and making them perfect,"⁷⁹⁷ and 3) "the divine gifts in themselves, as well as the working of the divine gifts."⁷⁹⁸ This included the knowledge that the reborn have about God (which is a gift of grace).⁷⁹⁹ The most prominent definition in Buddeus's *Collegium theologico-morale* is the second one. It gives rise to the main technical terminology about grace that Buddeus used: prevenient grace (*forekommende Naade*), effecting, or working, grace (*virkende/arbeydende Naade*), and cooperative grace

⁷⁹⁵ "Because grace, the working, as well as the cooperating, is an operation, which works outside the Divinity, so in Scripture it is accounted to all three Persons" (*thi fordi Naaden, saavel den arbeydende, som den medarbeydende er en Gierning, som virker uden for Guddommen, saa bliver den i Skriften tillagt alle tre Personer*). Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:30. Grace or mercy here are more specifically linked to salvific divine actions (actions that have the 'miserable', sinful human being as its object). This seems a likely way to maintain an essential distinction between God and the created world—Buddeus was a fierce critic of Spinoza. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment : Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750*, 634.

⁷⁹⁶ *Guds Kiærlighed, saa fremt den grundes paa Christi Fortieneste*, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:25.

⁷⁹⁷ *Guds virkende Naade i Menneskene Siæle, da den Hellig Aand oplyser Menneskene, omvender, tugter, virker Troen, opholder, gjør fuldkommen*. Buddeus, 1:25–26. In the German *Moral Theology*, Buddeus refers to a contemporary debate (Jean Le Clerc and Augustinian interpretation are involved) about the Scriptural usage of grace in this meaning. Buddeus argues for its inclusion and asserts the church fathers used grace in this sense. This is vital because this definition produces a great deal of the technical language and discussion that follows. Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, 1.1.XXXIX.

⁷⁹⁸ *de guddommelig Gaver i seg selv, saavelsom de guddommelig Gavers Virkninger*, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:26.

⁷⁹⁹ *...der kalder Paulus den Lærdom og Kundskab, som de havde om Gud, Naade, fordi det var en Naades Gave og den Hellig Aands Virkning*. Buddeus, 1:26. Buddeus is unwilling to exclude the divine gifts in his broad definition of grace and his German *Moral Theology* expressly includes also "natural gifts" such as the intellect, considered in their un-depraved/unfallen state as a gift or working of the divine grace. Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, 1.1.XXXIX.

(*medarbeydende Naade*).⁸⁰⁰ These types of grace corresponded roughly to the three stages of Ewald's *ordo salutis* that I discussed above: call/conversion, faith, and sanctification. Buddeus's Danish *Collegium theologico-morale* reveals that he drew primarily on Heinrich Müller's mystical devotional treatise *Himmlische Liebes-Kus* for many of these terms.⁸⁰¹ The Latin and German editions trace his distinctions back to Macarius of Egypt and Augustine. It is immediately apparent that the second definition of grace involved an internal enabling, or healing, of humans. Buddeus argued that grace must be seen as scriptural and that the early church fathers understood grace in this sense.⁸⁰²

Buddeus elaborated on his second understanding of grace. Technically, prevenient grace was operative before conversion, and Buddeus considered this as a cause of conversion.⁸⁰³ This was to avoid meriting human effort in the process of salvation *via* the *ordo salutis*. Hence, Buddeus designated grace in conversion as working/effecting grace (*arbeydende Naade*). Buddeus was careful to say that God did the actual work and that the passive human was given new abilities. In this stage, cooperative grace entered the picture "when a human is

⁸⁰⁰ Buddeus acknowledges that other theologians have given alternative names for these types of grace (such as assisting grace and indwelling grace), but he suggests this is a semantic issue, not actually different concepts. Additionally, cooperative grace can be called by different names depending on the circumstances. for example, illuminating grace, confirming grace, comforting grace. Common grace or assisting grace, which includes prevenient and effecting grace, has different types as well: disciplining grace or cleansing grace. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:36–37.

⁸⁰¹ Buddeus names Müller's *Himmlische Liebes-Kus* as the source for much of his terminology on grace. Buddeus, 1:38. He just substitutes grace for the term love in Müller's work.

⁸⁰² The German version of the *Moral Theology* often refers to Macarius of Egypt, when defining grace. Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, 1.1.XLIV, 1.1. LIV. Buddeus's concern here comes from a contemporary debate that involves Jean Le Clerc and Augustinian interpretation. Buddeus, 1.1.XXXIX. This Macarius of Egypt is likely Pseudo-Macarius, associate of Gregory of Nyssa. See my footnote above in the mediation on Ewald and Apokatastasis and my conclusion for further comments on this.

⁸⁰³ "It is that, which one calls prevenient grace (*gratiam præventientem*) which comes before conversion, therefore, everything which aids the human's conversion is *Gratia præveniens*." (*det er det, som man kalder den forekommende Nadde (gratiam prævientem) som kommer for Omvendelsen, derfor, alt hvad, som noget forhielper til Menneskets Omvendelse, er Gratia præveniens.*) Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:27.

converted and has received new powers, that he himself can effect something, though grace goes forth, hallowing him more and more”⁸⁰⁴ and “the human by the powers of grace also effects something, although the main work arrives by grace.”⁸⁰⁵ Buddeus assigned agency to the human being—the human was no longer purely passive—but action was not derived solely from human nature.⁸⁰⁶

For Buddeus, the most theoretically complex concept of grace was cooperative grace. While he mostly avoided issues of synergism, or semi-Pelagianism, in conversion (if the distinction between an active God and passive human holds), sanctification was a different matter. Buddeus described grace as co-operative: human activity could not be denied. Here also his third definition of grace as divine gifts and the working of those divine gifts is relevant. Buddeus could not avoid the question of grace-enabled human action. He was forced to examine more closely divine-human causality in his discussion on cooperative grace.

⁸⁰⁴ *naar en Mennesket er omvendt, og haver bekommet nye Kræfter, at hand selv kand virke noget med, so farer dog Naaden fort, helliger ham mere og mere.* Buddeus, 1:28.

⁸⁰⁵ *Mennesket ved Naadens Kræfter ogsaa virker noget, ihvorvel Hoved-Gierningen ankommer paa Naade.* Buddeus, 1:28. There are two ways of interpreting this statement in terms of the divine-human causality dynamic. Either one is working within a zero-sum game (perhaps with an understanding of early modern concurrence). In this sense then God is doing 90 percent of the work and the human ten percent (to put it crudely), or if one uses an earlier understanding of causality, the attribution of causality is working at two different qualitative levels. God is doing 100 percent of the work (his essence being identical with his powers and act) and the human being is also doing all the work at a lower level (while still yet having some claim of possession or agency over the graced actions). A lot of this understanding also depends on the metaphysical picture one is presented with, is it the caricature of the static substance metaphysics or not? What does it mean for a human being to ‘possess’ the power? This is where language’s apparent precision starts to slip and slide, but Buddeus’ language here is steeped in metaphorical usage when the Christian virtues are described as various precious jewels and the ‘effect’ of cooperative grace is that “namely that the human souls are always more and more decorated with virtues” (*nemlig at Menneskens Siæle altid mere og mere blive med saadanne Dyder udprydede*) Buddeus, 1:29.

⁸⁰⁶ Consider also D.C. Schindler's comments about activeness, not merely passivity, within human receptivity. See Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*, 172–73.

To solve this problem and avoid making human action meritorious, Buddeus turned to *unio mystica* as a special type of divine concurrence with believers. Following figures like Luther and Johann Arndt, the *unio mystica* for Buddeus was not the end of the Christian's search for perfection, but the beginning.⁸⁰⁷ Focusing on the believer's union with Christ, Buddeus argued that the special concurrence in cooperative grace occurred in three ways: by effecting good in the believer, through Christ's merits, and by Christ's example.⁸⁰⁸ As I note in my article,

[t]his last aspect [of concurrence] is expanded to include Christ's special influence given his role as the head of the body (with believers as the limbs). Buddeus limits human actions in cooperative grace (*medarbeydende Naade*) to the removing of hindrances, and God's action to the positive communication (*meddeling*) of spiritual powers. Certainly, for Buddeus, even if the human uses these powers or means for good works, he cannot claim full or sufficient causality for his own action.⁸⁰⁹

By understanding grace in this way, Buddeus maintained a divide between the arena of common grace (prevenient and working grace) and cooperative grace. Common grace was available to all, while cooperative grace was limited to the believer. Here also, the divine gifts of grace (*Naade-gaver*) were at work in believers, hallowing them. Thus, grace was not merely about human actions "empowered" by Christ, as if humans were passive machines and Christ the fuel. Instead, this hallowing touched upon the inherent condition of humans and their faculties; Buddeus spoke of this grace decorating the human being with virtue (the jewels of faith).⁸¹⁰

Ultimately, this technical discussion of grace was meant to secure a place for human action and human function, such that what was hallowed in the *ordo salutis* were humans

⁸⁰⁷ Arndt and Oberman, *Johann Arndt: True Christianity*, 7. The reference is to Peter Erb's preface.

⁸⁰⁸ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:31. 1

⁸⁰⁹ See Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 155. Early modern German philosopher Christian August Crusius defines sufficient cause as "one in which there is nothing lacking that is required for the effect" Dyck, *Early Modern German Philosophy (1690-1750)*, 223. From Buddeus' standpoint, no human being could ever claim full causality or sufficient causality for any of his actions, not merely God-pleasing actions. That is why divine concurrence exists generally as well.

⁸¹⁰ *de Troendes Smykke*, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:29.

themselves. I argue that the demands of moral perfection for the reborn found in Pietist catechisms⁸¹¹ reflect a simplistic binary distinction between the fallen and reborn conditions but also the final goal of sanctification. They might be non-nuanced and open to a mechanized understanding of the state of grace. Nonetheless, they remind the reader that the aim of grace is to enable the human being. Or to use a term important in the next chapter, the aim of grace is to free.

4.3 Philosophical Issues

Buddeus's analysis of grace was primarily driven by theological concerns about meritorious human actions. Yet it is difficult to grasp his system of grace without understanding the Early Modern debates about grace and God's general⁸¹² relation to the world. Buddeus's discussion of special divine concurrence was theoretically dependent upon his concept of God's general concurrence with the world. The historical Early Modern debate over causality and the divine-world relation gave rise to three options: occasionalism, conservationism, and concurrentism.⁸¹³ Buddeus rejected both occasionalism and conservationism for

⁸¹¹ See my article, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism." For example, Ewald insists that those born of God do not sin but wander in all the Lord's commandments, "But can any human keep this or that commandment? Absolutely, for his commands are not difficult and it is said about the pious that they keep the commandments of God, yes that they wander in all of the Lord's commands. That is, the one who is born of God cannot sin and whoever sins is of the devil." (*Men kan da noget Menneske holde dette eller noget af de andre Bud-Ord? Aldeles Thi hans bud ere ikke svare og der siges om de Fromme at de holde Guds Bud ja at de vandre i alle Herrens Bud. item dend som er fød af Gud kand ikke synde og hvo der gjør Synde er af Dievelen.*) Ewald, BE 43.

⁸¹² General here is actually a technical term, it stands in contrast to a particular or special relation in the union of the believer with Christ. When discussing *concursum dei*, Buddeus notes that "ad actiones naturales ordinarie concurrunt, concursu generali." Buddeus, "Animadversiones in Petri Chavvini Librum de Religione Natvrali," VI.II, 499.

⁸¹³ Roughly speaking, occasionalism assigns maximal causality to divine agency and creaturely causality is practically non-existent, mere conservationism allows that God maintains the world, but creatures are the main causal agents. Malebranche favored occasionalism, while mere conservationism accords well with deism. For more on general divine concurrence, see Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough"; Clatterbaugh, *The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739*; Ott and Ott, *Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy*; Lee, "Occasionalism."

concurrentism in an attempt to secure a place for both God's agency and the creature's agency in causal effects. In Buddeus's understanding, *concursum* was required for all action.⁸¹⁴ There were metaphysical and scriptural questions at play in Buddeus's insistence that it was in God that we live, move and have our being.⁸¹⁵ This debate was complex and driven by other factors as well, such as the desire to shield God from any causal role in evil actions.⁸¹⁶ But I am convinced that Buddeus's main argument stemmed from the gradual rise of mechanical metaphysics such that causality was reduced to a question of measurable energy transfer⁸¹⁷ and a confusion about the ontological difference between primary and secondary causality.⁸¹⁸ In Buddeus's philosophical scheme of causality, divine and human action had to concur for there to be any human action at all. But Buddeus did not consider concurrence to be a competitive relationship (a zero-sum game) between the divine and human; there remained a philosophical possibility in Buddeus's concurrentism of God and human action as operating on two different qualitative levels.⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁴ See Buddeus's discussion of this in his chapter on *Concursum dei ad actiones hominum malas* Buddeus, "Animadversiones in Petri Chavvini Librum de Religione Naturali," VI, 498–507. Also, Graf, "Von Der Creatio Ex Nihilo Zur »Bewahrung Der Schöpfung«: Dogmatische Erwägungen Zur Frage Nach Einer Möglichen Ethischen Relevanz Der Schöpfungslehre."

⁸¹⁵ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:166. Also, in Buddeus's *Collegium Theologico-Morale*, he argues that God is the material cause, not the formal cause of even evil actions. Buddeus, 1:32.

⁸¹⁶ See Buddeus's discussion mentioned above. Buddeus, "Animadversiones in Petri Chavvini Librum de Religione Naturali," 498–507. Peter Chauvin's treatise, *de religione naturali* (1693) is his main target.

⁸¹⁷ See a good and succinct discussion of this historical shift in Hanby, *No God, No Science: Theology, Cosmology, Biology*, 110–20.

⁸¹⁸ A nice discussion of these tensions is found here, Dodds, "Science, Causality, and God: Divine Action and Thomas Aquinas." Buddeus's son-in-law, Johann Georg Walch, wants to maintain a distinction between primary and secondary causality in his *Philosophisches Lexicon*, see Walch and Gleditsch, "Causa."

⁸¹⁹ Whether or not Buddeus manages to pull this off in a philosophically coherent manner deserves more investigation. At times, he assigns God one particular type of causality (for example, God is the material cause in the general *concursum dei*) and the human being another (formal cause in evil actions). This is not precisely the same distinction between primary and secondary causality. Still, the world is not self-sufficient, nor identical with the divine (for Buddeus and Christian theology). Thus a true divine-human concurrence without competition is necessary in Buddeus's philosophy.

It is reasonable to assume that Buddeus's philosophical scheme, which he referred to in his *Collegium theologico-morale*, influenced his language of Christ's special concurrence with the reborn. Though Buddeus was concerned about assigning an active role to humans' "pre-conversion" and in the non-regenerate's interaction with common (prevenient and working) grace, he was not as worried about human activity within the context of union with Christ. There was no zero-sum game of salvation at work at this point.⁸²⁰ If the possibility of divine-human concurrence was denied in principle by Buddeus, far more than this theological question would be at stake. The very philosophical foundation upholding the non-self-sufficient world was under threat.

The problem with this assertion for Buddeus was that within Early Modern Lutheran theology a debate raged about how the language of Christ's indwelling of the believer was to be interpreted.⁸²¹ The philosophical reasoning in this debate about God's omnipresence in all things⁸²² and the scriptural language of God's increasing presence in the believer seemed at odds. In his *Collegium theologico-morale*, Buddeus described the debate but left the issue unresolved.⁸²³ In doing so, he risked leaving the concept of increasing perfection and spiritual growth philosophically vulnerable. Either the believer's union with Christ was pure mystery⁸²⁴ or it was purely symbolic language. Since Ewald drew heavily upon language of increasing and

⁸²⁰ I am aware that certain theologians like Kathryn Tanner and Rowan Williams (building on Austin Farrer) work on themes that deny *any* zero-sum game of causality between God and the individual. See, Williams, *Christ the Heart of Creation*; Tanner, *Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology*. This is dependent on certain philosophical understandings of the nature of God. I want to suggest that elements of this classical theist understanding also exist in Buddeus' and Ewald, though perhaps this is not easily apparent.

⁸²¹ See Walch's history of the debate, Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:130–45.

⁸²² The problem seems to be the notion that an omnipresent God is equally present to all things, so no believer could be closer to God and no 'unreborn' could be more distant to God.

⁸²³ See Buddeus' short discussion about intra-Lutheran tensions over the *unio mystica* and the increasing presence of God, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:252–54.

⁸²⁴ I suspect, this is why Gerhard's emphasis on the appropriation of Christ's merits is seen as pure mysticism, see Peschke, "Der Pietismus in Dargun." See also my discussion below in chapter six.

abounding grace, divine gifts, and the increasing presence of the Holy Spirit in his texts,⁸²⁵ that vulnerability was carried through in his writing about these concepts.⁸²⁶ This philosophical weakness was probably more threatening to Ewald's thought than Buddeus's, since Ewald preferred the language of indwelling and partaking over that of cooperative grace.⁸²⁷ Was this a matter of philosophy and metaphysics or moral growth? Or, to use Pietist language, was rebirth a matter of deification or moral improvement?⁸²⁸ (I am not actually certain there is a necessary conflict here for Trinitarian theology). Still, this cannot be answered here and I do not know if Ewald possessed the metaphysical resources to do so. However, even as Buddeus denied the substantial transformation of the reborn, his moral theology preserved that debate.

In this discussion, I have attempted to show briefly that there were complex and interconnecting debates concerning *concursum dei*, God's omnipresence, partaking of the divine nature, and the *unio mystica*;⁸²⁹ philosophical concerns coming into conflict with the theological language. Even if lay-orientated Pietist literature did not address these debates, nonetheless, they are relevant in understanding Ewald's thought and serve as background to the question of grace. The most important conclusion to draw from them is the possibility of a non-competitive model of divine-human co-action and thus the affirmation of human action permitted by grace in the *ordo salutis*. This permits me to consider concepts such as experience, human will, and human intellect as relevant topics in the theological discussion on grace. The presence of these concepts does not mean that Ewald reduced the *ordo* to

⁸²⁵ See, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 160–61. Also Ewald, HH V, 94-104, HH I, 689-93.

⁸²⁶ This is clear also from Ewald's trial, see Reenberg's Thesis 9, 28, and 50 against Ewald which suggest one can 'progress' in one's Christianity. See, Appendix A.

⁸²⁷ See, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 159–60.

⁸²⁸ See, Schmidt's discussion of this issue *Teilnahme an der göttlichen Natur*. His article ends with a discussion of a 19th century late Pietist catechism that emphasizes community over the material 'partaking' of the divine nature. Schmidt praises such understanding as avoiding a Greek Platonic infiltration of the Christian concept of salvation. Schmidt, *Wiedergeburt und neuer Mensch*, 296.

⁸²⁹ See above footnote and reference to Johann George Walch's historical coverage of this debate.

psychology.⁸³⁰ This reading or interpretation is primarily a temptation when the larger philosophical and metaphysical issues that Buddeus sought to answer in his technical understanding of grace are ignored.

There are historical reasons to defend a reading of Ewald's text through the lens of Buddeus's *Collegium theologico-morale*⁸³¹ to the extent that it reveals a technical background with which Ewald's non-systematic writings can be compared. But this is not to assume Ewald regurgitated Buddeus on grace. Before I move on to my case study of human freedom and the *ordo salutis*, I conclude this section by briefly discussing Ewald on grace.

4.4 Conclusion: Ewald and Grace

Ewald's early catechism contains occasional traces of Buddeus's terms for sanctifying grace, particularly prevenient grace, and language that hints at indwelling and cooperative grace.⁸³² His sermon series contains similar vocabulary and descriptions of grace.⁸³³ In my article, I suggest that whether or not Buddeus's *Collegium theologico-morale* or the original Latin edition was the principle source for Ewald's language is secondary to the concern that Ewald's lay-orientated texts ought to be read as the works of a trained theologian familiar with a

⁸³⁰For these descriptions of the Pietism and Buddean *ordo*, see Wundt, "Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," 64; Coors, *Scriptura efficax. Die biblisch-dogmatische Grundlegung des theologischen Systems bei Johann Andreas Quenstedt : Ein dogmatischer Beitrag zu Theorie und Auslegung des biblischen Kanons als Heiliger Schrift.*, 246; Matthias, "Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs," 326–33. Wundt and Coors write of Buddeus's psychologizing *ordo*, while Matthias notes the historical roots of the psychological-empirical turn of the *ordo* prior to Pietism.) Also, Torleiv Austad speaks of Leiv Aalen's critique of later pietism's "psychologized" doctrine of salvation. Austad's article suggests that Aalen wants to avoid the way that the Pietist *ordo salutis* is similar to the Catholic understanding of grace. A competitive model of human-divine action lies in the background here. Austad, "Dåp Og Omvendelse i Lys Av Brytningen Mellom Lutherdom Og Pietisme," 273–75.

⁸³¹ See my introduction and background in chapter one.

⁸³² See my article, Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism," 156–58. Also Ewald, BE 46, 48, 50.

⁸³³ For example, *forekommende naade, medarbeidende naade, and iboende naade*. See, Ewald, HHV I 570, 695, 800; II, 533, 549, 558, 561; III, 475, 657, 751, 834, 937, 1007, 1020, 1023, 1040; IV, 81, 85, 369, 371; V, 101, 262, 299, 301, 362, 749. This list is not exhaustive.

technical theological scheme. By adopting Buddeus's technical scheme as a hermeneutical aid, certain theological themes and dilemmas in lay Pietist texts become more discernible.

And there are differences between Buddeus and Ewald on grace. For example, there is evidence in Ewald for a particular, localized grace that affects and inspires people.⁸³⁴ In this way, particular "acts" of grace are to some extent within the realm of sensation and too close to private revelation for Buddeus.⁸³⁵ It is here that one might see a codification of the conversion experience.⁸³⁶ Erik Pontoppidan's novel, which recounts several conversion and re-conversion stories, also evinces this.⁸³⁷ This language was not only present in Ewald's later thought but already present in some form twenty years earlier during Ewald's trial when paying attention to the prompting of the Holy Spirit was the issue of concern.⁸³⁸

In the end, Ewald's language about grace extended beyond the clear demarcations of sanctifying grace that Buddeus's *Collegium theologico-morale* addressed and thus also beyond limiting grace to only the ecclesiastically approved *means of grace (Naade-Midler)*.⁸³⁹

⁸³⁴ For example, in his later collection of devotional verse, Ewald mentions the verses were *simply* written—without any attention given to their poetry, nor did they arise from scriptural meditation, rather he says charmingly “I have found myself disposed or awakened by the Lord's grace, so I have let it flow in the pen” (*Men ligesom jeg har funden mig selv disponeret eller ved HERrens Naade opvackt; saa har jeg ladet det flyde i Pennen.*) Ewald, TS 4. Grace has supplied the office of the muses. Simplicity rather than artifice was a virtue for the Pietists, see, Bemserderfer, *Pietism and Its Influence upon the Evangelical United Brethren Church*, 113. It is interesting that just prior to the above quotation, Ewald denied that the verses arose from the contemplation of scripture, which was an officially sanctioned means of grace.

⁸³⁵ See Buddeus's comments warning against Enthusiasm, which he viewed as a fault of the imagination, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:353-368.

⁸³⁶ See above my comments on conversion in chapter three.

⁸³⁷ Lied, “Danish Catechism in Action? Examining Religious Formation in and through Erik Pontoppidan's *Menoza*”; Pontoppidan, *Menoza*, 1860.

⁸³⁸ For example, Kaasbøll's Thesis 1 against Ewald, see Appendix A.

⁸³⁹ What is an approved 'means of grace' is slightly unclear. Buddeus has a section in his *Collegium Theologie-Morale* on the means of sanctification (*Om Saliggjørelsens Midler*, p. 667-755), which includes renewal, daily repentance, God's work, sacraments, prayer. However, in Ewald's trial, Ewald faced accusations that he held

Ewald referred to all good (both bodily and spiritual good that humans “have, manage to do, or achieve”) as from God and thus acts of God’s grace.⁸⁴⁰ When he noted that all was grace, he was referring both to what Christians received and the good actions they did.⁸⁴¹ As such, Ewald moved away from the possibility of independent, meritorious action apart from God, but he also significantly extended God’s (salvific?) action towards humans. He refused to limit God’s action to prescribed sacraments. While these maintained the special title of *means of grace*, no place was outside of God’s purview, though all blessing was granted through Christ. Ewald did not speak of this grace only in the context of believers; everyone’s being and bliss, whether reborn or not, must be named as God’s grace in the widest sense.⁸⁴² This broad understanding of God’s action towards humans also included that which humans considered evil, but ultimately had a pedagogical function in God’s governance of the world, making humans aware of their unhappy state.

And if he is often required to discipline and humble them for the sake of such blunders, and he allows sometimes one or another hard and dark hour to come over them for

the 'means of grace' in contempt, by which Kaasbøll seems to mean the sacraments and reading of Scripture in particular. See, “Kaasbøll’s Accusations against Ewald,” 3.

⁸⁴⁰ *Dette burde i sær tiene os dertil, at vi maatte lære at kiende, at alt det Gode, som vi have, formaae, eller udrette, saavel i det Legemlige, som fornemmligen i det Aandelige kommer fra GUD, Ewald HH I, 179.*

⁸⁴¹ Ewald does not argue that the 'natural' un-reborn human never receives good things, but rather that because they see those things as their own or ascribe to themselves credit for their deeds, they hinder God from doing good to them and from showing them his grace. (Ewald, HH I, 180). Ewald thus judges the purpose and the achievement of the purpose of things as part of an action's or thing's estimation as good or evil. Thus on one sense, God's good gifts to the un-reborn cannot be considered gifts of grace because they are not received thusly.

⁸⁴² "Of you we are that we are and though we still more and more pervert ourselves and make us disgusting to you by our many sins and transgressions, so you still do good towards us from time to time, and grant us by grace all that can serve for our bodily and spiritual, temporal and eternal bliss." (*Af dig ere vi, hvad vi ere, og omendskiønt vi endnu meere og meere forderve os selv, og gjøre os vederstyggelige for dig ved vore mange Sunder og Overtrædelser, saa bliver du dog ved fra Tiid til Tiid at gjøre vel imod os, og at skienke os af Naade alt, det, som kand tiene til vor legemlige og aandelige, timelige og evige Lyksalighed.*) Ewald HH I, 177.

the sake of their folly, lack of care, secret pride and capriciousness; so they know that the one whom the Lord disciplines is blessed.⁸⁴³

I would stipulate that it is unclear here if Ewald would consider *all* experiences as potentially pedagogical or if there is a sense of certain evil actions being merely divinely permitted.

Still, it is in this widest sense of grace that all human experience assumes a theological role because of God's concurrence in, and governance of, the world. Nonetheless, these divine actions that Ewald's sermons and texts discuss are primarily educational: revealing God's loving kindness towards humanity and humanity's need of it. This need is so pervasive that Ewald's devotional verse in his final book, *Troende Sieles daglige Opmuntring til Troe og Kierlighed, Haab og Taalmodighed*, often focused on God's action (grace) and the believer's plea to him.⁸⁴⁴ This did not negate the particular delineations of sanctifying grace (prevenient, effecting, and cooperating, or indwelling, grace) that purified, renewed, and enabled the believer to do God-pleasing works.⁸⁴⁵ Technical terminology is absent in the devotional verse, but the healing hope and aim of grace is expressed in full force.⁸⁴⁶ As I conclude this section on grace, it is important to emphasize that Ewald, in his fullest understanding of God's actions towards humans, never posited a situation where even experiences of unhappiness did not

⁸⁴³ *Og om hand ofte nødes til at tugte og ydmyge dem for saadanne Forseelsers skyld, og hand lader undertiden een og anden haard og mørk Time komme over dem for deres Daarligheds, Uforsigtigheds, lønlige Stoltheds eller Selvraadigheds skyld; saa vide, de, at den er salig, som HErren tugter.*) Ewald, HH I, 1010. Also, HH I, 991.; The entire sermon deals with God's unchanging purpose towards us: that "the Lord has done, wants to do, and always does all things well" (*HErren har gjort, vil gjøre, og altid gjør alle Ting vel,*) HH I, 1003. Buddeus also names disciplining grace as a type of common or helping grace. As such, it is not limited merely to the reborn (see above). See also, Ewald, TS 27.

⁸⁴⁴ See, for example, poems from 1., 20., 28. January, 1. February among others. Ewald, TS 7, 15, 19, 21.

⁸⁴⁵ It is through or in grace that Ewald begs God to free him from sinful desires: "Lead me, O Love! in the ways of love, / from sinful love, in grace free me. / Oppress the desire of the flesh and do not let me lust for / the pleasures that can separate me from you." (*Leed mig, o Kierlighed! i kierlighedens veje, / Fra syndig kierlighed gjør mig i naade fri. / Dæmp kiødets onde lyst, og lad mig ey begiere, / Hvad det fornøye kand; det stiller mig fra dig.*) Ewald, TS 40.

⁸⁴⁶ For example, "Oh! give me grace, that I may not depart from you/ Make me free from the power of sin and the lusts of the flesh." (*O! giv mig naade, at jeg ey fra dig maa vige, / Gjør mig fra syndens magt og kiødets lyster fri.*) Ewald, TS 30, see also, Ewald, TS 50, 63, 67, 70-71, 77. The list goes on.

work ultimately towards God's purposes, and his purposes were unchanging. I will return to this point in the final section on *apokatastasis*.

Chapter 5: Human Freedom and the *Ordo Salutis*

5.1 Introduction

Like I did in the previous chapter on grace, here I deepen the conceptual framework that is inherently, rather than systematically, laid out in Ewald's texts. My examination of Ewald's trial revealed his great concern with experience. I read this term as necessarily referring to what humans perceive and do, but also what humans are. In my discussion in this chapter, experience as human action and the *ordo* come together. However, the following discussion is not meant to be exhaustive. My aim is to draw attention to how key philosophical definitions of human anthropology/psychology and human freedom explain what is seen as the psychologizing of the *ordo salutis* in Buddeus and Pietism more generally.⁸⁴⁷ Since Buddeus's concept of grace is essentially resistible (able to be rejected) and eventually cooperative, any description of the *ordo* must include an understanding of what free human action is; *free* because it cannot presumably be coerced and *human action* because otherwise the term *cooperative grace* cannot intelligibly be used. If humans do not act as humans, they cannot reasonably be said to be acting at all, much less cooperatively. As in my discussion of grace, Buddeus's (and Walch's) philosophical framework becomes the lens through which Ewald's comments on freedom and human action can be understood. I will refer to Ewald's texts periodically.

Even as Buddeus and Walch argued for human freedom, they also presented a picture of human intellect and will based on two axioms. The first: You love the good thing and despise the evil thing.⁸⁴⁸ This is an essential tenet of Buddeus's moral theology. It is not an argument

⁸⁴⁷ See comments in chapter four.

⁸⁴⁸ At the start of his section on the faculty of the will, Buddeus's formulation is quoted in Latin and then Hans Højer gives his Danish translation, "*Voluntas est facultas mentis, qva bonum appetimus, malum autem aversamur (Villien er en saadan Formue i Sindet, ved hvilken vi attraaer det Gode, og har en Afskye til det Onde)*". Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:150–51. The Danish translates as "The will is a certain ability in the mind, by which we desire the good [thing] and despise the evil [thing]". Walch describes the will as "*vor diejenige Kraft der Seele, da sie gegen eine Sache, eine Neigung; und vor deijenigen, an der man was Böses wahrnimmt, einen Abscheu haben kann;*

or even a command, merely Buddeus's observation. The other (which can be read as the semi-logical extension of the first) is: all actions have a ground, or reason, of movement (*Bewegungsgrund*).⁸⁴⁹ As will be seen below, this did not mean for Buddeus that human actions were completely determined; the humans were free from determination as a necessity. But rather, actions were based on reasons (good or bad). What remained to discuss in relation to human freedom for Buddeus (and Walch), was *how* human faculties functioned.⁸⁵⁰ In terms of the existing and experienced world that they described, can Buddeus's and Walch's functional understanding be used to explain a perceived failure to love the good thing, without a denial of the axiom itself?

I will begin with the philosophy of Walch, Buddeus's son-in-law, and his description of freedom in *Philosophisches Lexicon*.⁸⁵¹ After this, I move on to Buddeus's theological understanding of freedom as expressed in his *Moral Theology*. There is a good deal of conceptual overlap between the two texts since Walch referred frequently to Buddeus, but also because their definition of (human) freedom required a particular understanding of the human being and the functioning of human faculties. I will necessarily touch on some of Buddeus's anthropological definitions in the theology section. The theological, or spiritual, understanding of freedom bleeds into a discussion of the enslaved state of un-reborn humans and their will. In the final part of this chapter, I will reflect on how the *ordo salutis* is both a

oder will man die Sache kützer geben, so kann man sagen, der Wille est dasienige Vermögen der Seele, da sie das Gute liebt, und das Böse hasset." Walch and Gleditsch, "Wille des Menschen," 2901.

⁸⁴⁹ Denying the common contemporary conception of the freedom of the will in Hobbes, Becmann, le Grand, Walch writes "*Denn eine solche Wahl muß allezeit ihren Grund haben, und ist ohnmöglich, daß man ohne Bewegungsgrund etwas wollen, ober nicht wollen könne, daher man auch billig bey den wirlichen Handlungen der Menschen, warum die siese gethan, oder unterlassen, den Grund zu wissen verlangt."* Walch and Gleditsch, "Freyheit des Willens," 1037.

⁸⁵⁰ I treat these two authors as essentially in agreement on these topics, though a closer inspection and comparison is in order. Walch was Buddeus's only son-in-law and his colleague at Jena. Walch also gathered and published various texts of Buddeus, even posthumously, for example, Buddeus, *Observationes in elementa philosophiae instrvmentalis*. and Walch's publication of the *Philosophisches Lexicon* was published in 1724 during Buddeus' lifetime. Walch frequently refers to Buddeus' moral theology in the *Lexicon* articles I discuss.

⁸⁵¹ Ewald's library contained a copy of the *Lexicon* along with several other works by Walch.

supernatural and natural response to this lack of spiritual freedom. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts about the Buddeus-Walch model of freedom and its fate.

5.2 Georg Walch and the Freedom of the Will

5.2.1 Background

The space limitations of this dissertation do not allow me to do justice to the long history of the free-will debate. Instead, what I will do is briefly describe some modern distinctions and then follow Walch's text, which draws on Buddeus's *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis* for a positive definition of the will's freedom, and remark on Walch's descriptions of free will, particularly as they pertain to the larger debate.

The Stanford Encyclopedia names two main contemporary understandings of free will, compatibilist and libertarian (or incompatibilist), that derive from who the source, or agent, is that is "willing." Compatibilism is "the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism."⁸⁵² Classical compatibilism (a subcategory of compatibilism) sees an external constraint on the agent as the opposite of freedom, rather than determinism. Thus motives and desires are not considered to constrain a person's freedom, whereas prison or a lack of money do. Libertarians, as related to the freedom of the will, argue that despite a number of determining factors, "it remains open to the person when she acts freely to do or not to do what she in fact does."⁸⁵³ The agent here is considered to be self-determining, or put another way, "the agent, rather than his motives, cause his actions."⁸⁵⁴

Early Modern figures such as Spinoza and Hobbs still figure in the modern discussion of freedom's history, so perhaps Walch's descriptions (which reference Hobbs, Leibniz, and Wolff) were not far off the trodden path. As will be shown, Walch's definition of freedom was multifaceted. He incorporated elements of the classical compatibilist understanding of freedom,⁸⁵⁵ but he also regarded external freedom (the absence of external hindrances) as

⁸⁵² Coates and McKenna, "Compatibilism."

⁸⁵³ O'Conner and Franklin, "Free Will."

⁸⁵⁴ O'Conner and Franklin.

⁸⁵⁵ O'Conner and Franklin. For example, Hobbes.

insufficient for true freedom.⁸⁵⁶ While never advocating a pure libertarian self-determination apart from one's reasoning, inclinations, and desires, Walch insisted that no particular action was ever necessary, only certain.⁸⁵⁷ The agent must will, or intend, their actual actions. However, the agent could always circle back to the decision-making process. Finally, and perhaps essentially, both Walch and Buddeus preserved the concept of spiritual freedom as a background to their discussions. This links back to the pre-modern discussion of freedom, tied into the notion that the will was always fundamentally inclined towards the good,⁸⁵⁸ even when this inclination manifested as sinful action.

5.2.2 Walch's Discussion of Freedom

In his encyclopedia discussion of the freedom of the will, Walch began by noting both philosophers and theologians were concerned with the subject.⁸⁵⁹ There was already a hint in his previous discussion of the freedom of the intellect/understanding that freedom was hindered by sin.⁸⁶⁰ Thus a reader of his *Lexicon* is prepared to grant sin some part in his definition of freedom (or lack thereof).

On the philosophical side, Walch named two contemporary and commonly held understandings of the freedom of the will before describing and defending a third understanding—the correct one, as he understood it. Walch categorically rejected free will

⁸⁵⁶ "Der andere Definition, daß diese Freyheit in einer Abwesenheit der äusserlichen Hindernissen bestehe, ist nicht hinlänglich. Es gehort swar diese mit zur Freyheit, daß uns von aussen kein Hinderniß im Weg stehet, und hat also ein krancker Lehrer keine Freyheit, ob er lesen, spatzieren gehen will, oder nicht; es ist aber dieser Begrieff nicht hinlänglich." Walch and Gleditsch, "Freyheit des Willens," 1038.

⁸⁵⁷ Walch and Gleditsch, 1038–41. This appears a subtle philosophical distinction between necessity and certainty, the former interpreted in a mechanistic way, the latter allowing slight wiggle-room for the agent to reconsider their decision. See also discussion below.

⁸⁵⁸ See for example, Thomas's Aquinas notion of the 'first' act of the will, see the discussion in Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite"; Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, Qq. 6-17)." or Maximus the Confessor's distinction between the natural will and the gnostic (deliberative) will. See, Blowers, "Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Gnostic Will (Γνώμη) in Christ: Clarity and Ambiguity"; MacFarland, "The Theology of the Will."

⁸⁵⁹ Walch and Gleditsch, "Freyheit des Willens," 1036.

⁸⁶⁰ Walch and Hennings, "Freyheit des Verstandes," 1401.

(*Freyheit des Willens*) as being indifference to opposites (Latin: *indifferentia ad opposita*), that is, if there were two equal choices (e.g., two identical gold coins on a table) a person was still free to pick one over the other. Walch's problem with this understanding of freedom (roughly a libertarian definition of freedom) was that he believed: 1) that all choices had a reason that drove them (*Bewegungsgrund*) and 2) that in an action (not in a logical, imagined possibility) there was never a perfectly indifferent scenario. Though one might not consciously perceive the difference, it was there, even if it was only that one gold coin was a little closer to the person than the other. Walch demonstrated here a preference for actual experience, rather than purely analytic logic. He cited Leibniz and Wolff in support of his position.⁸⁶¹ This second argument against *indifferentia ad opposita* paralleled the preference for experience, rather than conceptual argumentation, that is evident in Walch, Buddeus, and other Pietists.⁸⁶² Interestingly, Walch's 1775 editor disagreed with him about the indifference of the will.⁸⁶³

The other philosophical definition of freedom was more concerned with the removal, or absence, of external hindrances. Walch did not categorically reject it, but he did consider it insufficient (*nicht hinlänglich*). Additionally, drawing on Buddeus's moral theology, he argued that irrational animals did not have freedom, even though they were not entirely determined by eternal principles. Thus, the ground of freedom must be sought for in the interior of the soul, not in external principles. Obviously, this argument arose from Walch's desire to differentiate humans from irrational animals (probably for theological reasons), but likely also from the observation that animals had a certain amount of interiority. Walch did not link humans too closely to animals but also refused to see animals as purely mechanical. They were not machines, solely moved by observable external principles; they had some freedom

⁸⁶¹ Walch and Gleditsch, "Freyheit des Willens," 1037–38.

⁸⁶² See, Sparr, "Philosophie." Also notice Walch's references to 'the actual actions of the human' (*den würrklichen Handlungen der Menschen*) or his appeal to experience (*Es zeigt solches die Erfahrung*). Walch and Gleditsch, "Freyheit des Willens," 1037.

⁸⁶³ "Ich stimme in dieser Lehre nicht völlig mit dem Verfasser überein. Siehe den Artikel: *Aequilibrium und meine Geschichte von den Seelen*. §2.3. Ferner *Crusius Metaphysik*." This comment is inserted in brackets in this section and suggests that the conversation around the freedom of the will was changing rather quickly. Crusius's *Entwurf der notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten* (Leipsiz, 1745; Crusius's *Metaphysik*) comes out only twenty years after Walch's Lexicon. Walch and Hennings, "Freyheit des Willens," 1403.

to choose when obstacles were removed.⁸⁶⁴ This anthropocentric view also pushes Walch towards a more positive and rationalist understanding of freedom—rather than a negative definition.

Walch expanded on the idea of the inner ground of freedom in his compatibilist view. First, he connected the actions of the will to the intellect. He did not view the intellect, or rather, the knowledge the intellect provided, as impeding the freedom of the will. He explored rhetorically whether a house buyer who had a great many practical concerns about purchasing the house lost his freedom by “determining” his decision with such information. The answer was obviously no.

However, while Walch argued for a level of determination, he distinguished between physical and moral types of determination. This is where Walch’s definition gets interesting. He argued for a straightforward determinist understanding of the will in the physical sense. The prerequisite for this description was the essential axiom that the will desired the good and despised the bad. In other words, the will was always and principally orientated or determined towards the good. In this physical process of determination, the intellect (as the place where sensation was taken up and represented via the imagination) was crucial, albeit passive. In Walch’s understanding, sensations were apprehended and an idea or image created in the intellect, but otherwise the intellect did not reflect upon the idea: a natural desire or disgust (*der natürliche Trieb*) was already present. A person could imagine the smell of a lovely flower delighting or a rotting corpse repulsing the beholder.⁸⁶⁵ Thus, the will was determined to love or desire the fragrant flower. It did not will itself to love the flower.

⁸⁶⁴ The mechanization of nature as a historical development has been investigated. See, Roux and Garber, *The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy*; Jonas, “Seventeenth Century and after: The Meaning of the Scientific and Technological Revolution”; Hanby, *No God, No Science: Theology, Cosmology, Biology*, 107–20. Paul Hinlicky who notes that Christian Wolff, even when adapting Leibniz’s thought, tends to mechanize Leibniz’s philosophy. This mechanization is the very thing Joachim Lange apparently disliked about Christian Wolff. See, Hinlicky, *Paths Not Taken: Fates of Theology from Luther through Leibniz*, 18, 101.

⁸⁶⁵ The social determination of one’s desires or dislikes is perhaps secondary or falls into the moral, rather than physical category. I am unsure of this, see Walch’s distinction between physical and moral distinctions in the will. Walch and Gleditsch, “Freyheit des Willens,” 1039.

But the moral determination of the will was more complicated for Walch than that; it was still bound by the need for a ground of movement, and it was inclined, not indifferent. Walch connected pride (love of honor), greed, and lust to the Fall,⁸⁶⁶ and thus treated these tendencies as natural (although not approved)⁸⁶⁷ desires. As such, they existed prior to a particular act of knowing, willing, and choosing the good object or course of action. As with physical determination, the intellect and will worked together in the process of moral determination. For Walch, there had to be a modicum of knowing by which an object was thought to be good or bad. The knowledge of an object might not be true (one could be mistaken about the quality of an object), but, false or not, that knowledge could not be neutral. An object, as the intellect understood it, attracted or disgusted the will. Walch insisted again that “no conclusion may happen in the will apart from a ground of movement,”⁸⁶⁸ and he acknowledged that this orientation of the will towards the good could be seen as an inner necessity, or determination.⁸⁶⁹ Several complications arise from this. First, is the intellect’s perception of an object true? An object might be considered good, but in truth be evil.⁸⁷⁰ Second, the will, which ought to be subject to the guidance of the intellect, begins to overrule reason. It influences and prejudices the intellect. Pride, lust, and greed come into play as prior inclinations of the will, influencing the selection, or perusal, of particular objects.

⁸⁶⁶ Walch does implicate both the intellect and the will in the 'guilt' of the fall. Both were involved in Adam’s choice. Presumably he is unwilling to let the excuse of ignorance on Adam’s part, somehow mitigate Adam’s guilt, as he writes *ignoti nulla cupido*. Walch and Gleditsch, 1039.

⁸⁶⁷ In the sense of morally good inclinations.

⁸⁶⁸ *...dein Schluß im Willen ohne Bewegungsgrund vorgehen mag*. Walch and Gleditsch, “Freyheit des Willens,” 1039.

⁸⁶⁹ . Walch and Gleditsch, 1039.

⁸⁷⁰ One sees the potential vulnerability here, that it is not enough that the intellect presents something as a good, but that it actually is the good it is imagined to be. “*Er ist von Natur und nach der göttlichen Absicht der Direction, oder Regierung des Verstandes dergestalt unterworfen, daß er weder was gutes verlangen, noch was böses aversiren soll, es sey denn vorher vom Verstand auf eine iudicieuse Art als ein Wahrhaftig Gut; Oder als ein wahrhaftig Böses erkannt worden, und ist daher nicht genug, daß es der Mensch dafür hält; sondern ob es an sich selbst so beschaffen, wie man sichs einbildet.*” Walch and Gleditsch, 1039–40.

The final issue when it came to moral determination, for Walch, was freedom itself. For a human being, the conclusion reached by the interplay of the intellect and the will (understanding an object as good or seeming good and desiring it) was never final. It did not necessarily result in action, only in a certainty (*Gewissheit*) that action would follow. This was the subtle philosophical distinction upon which Walch's understanding of freedom rested. A certain conclusion could always be changed with more knowledge and reflection. There was no necessary mechanical action that followed from a decision in a finite course of action. Thus, no finite object or act could necessarily determine the will.⁸⁷¹ Walch buttressed his description with practical examples.

In his final positive definition of freedom in his three-part definition, Walch moved the conversation away from free will alone, as if it was a specific human faculty. Rather he wrote of human freedom and the will's part in its expression:

1. The being of freedom is nothing other, as a faculty (power, ability) of the soul, by virtue of which the will can be directed now hither, now thither and determined towards something:
2. of its ground, which is not in the will, but rather is sought in the intellect and its imaging/representing, through which the will can be moved soon to this side, soon to the other:
3. the expression of this freedom, which always happens in the will through determination, such that the will is directed and determined either to this or to that.⁸⁷²

⁸⁷¹ Walch and Gleditsch, 1039. As mentioned above, to witness a more intricate unpacking of the actions of the will, see Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, Qq. 6-17)." Walch's language of certainty vs necessity, the realization that a particular action or decision can never be absolute, and his insistence of the orientation or determination of the will towards the good have great similarity to Gallagher's description of the freedom of the will in Aquinas. Any further investigation of freedom in Pietism and Pietist-friendly figures might find inspiration in the well-researched Thomistic scholarship.

⁸⁷² 1) *auf das Wesen der Freyheit welche nichts anders ist, als ein Vermögen der Seele, kraft dessen der Wille bald da, bald dorthin kann gelenket und zu etwas determiniret werden: 2) auf ihren Grund, der nicht in dem Willen; sondern in dem Verstand und dessen Vorstellungen zu such, durch welche der Wille bald auf diese, bald auf jene Seite kann bewogen werden: 3) auf die Aeufferung derselbigen, die allezeit im Willen durch eine*

Thus, Walch christened freedom as a separate faculty or ability, conceptually distinct from the will and intellect. In practice, freedom was a way of describing the interplay of actions and operations of the intellect and the will. Perhaps inadvertently, Walch's definition so focused on indeterminacy (that no particular action was necessitated) that he gave less emphasis to the prior essential determination of the will towards the good. This was likely because Walch had to deny spiritual freedom because of his own theological commitments. Thus, his concept of human freedom was linked primarily to this indeterminacy.

Walch concluded his positive description of the freedom of the soul with a discussion of its theological implications. He denied that humans had any freedom in spiritual matters. It was in grace that a person had to find a solution. Walch took up the concepts of effecting grace (*gratia operans*) and cooperative grace (*gratia cooperans*) to explain repentance/conversion (*Bekehrung*) and sanctification.⁸⁷³ Thus, technically any freedom to live a virtuous life and action was only granted through the power of grace. Any appearance of virtue in the un-reborn was a natural virtue but not a true virtue.⁸⁷⁴ Walch claimed that one's daily experience confirmed this: the evil inclination of the will was so strong that "no imagination of the intellect is sufficient to oppress [it]."⁸⁷⁵ Despite Walch's denial of such spiritual freedom in humans' depraved state,⁸⁷⁶ in this short section, he supplied his reader with the second

Determination geschieht, dass derselbige entweder zu diesem, oder ienen gelenket und determiniret wird.

Walch and Hennings, "Freyheit des Willens," 1406–7. This summary comes from the 1775 edition and is not found in the 1726 edition. However, it is not marked as Hennings' editorial brackets, which suggests it was a later addition by Walch, perhaps in the 1733 edition.

⁸⁷³ Walch and Gleditsch, "Freyheit des Willens," 1041. It seems highly likely that Buddeus's reflections over grace resonate in this paragraph. Two pages earlier, Walch drew explicitly upon Buddeus's moral theology.

⁸⁷⁴ Good actions are not the outward following of the law, but also depend upon good intention for Walch. If the fear of public shame or the desire to be seen as generous in the eyes of others to donate to the poor, this is outwardly a good action, but being motivated by pride, it is not a perfectly virtuous action. Walch and Gleditsch, 1041.

⁸⁷⁵ *daß keine Vorstellungen des Verstandes selbige zu dämpffen hinlänglich*, Walch and Gleditsch, 1041.

⁸⁷⁶ For more, see Walch's delineation of the will's natural, depraved, and improved (natural and spiritual) states. Walch and Gleditsch, "Wille des Menschen." Walch treats certain inclinations as innate (planted by God): such as desire for human company, the knowing of the truth, and the highest bliss. Walch and Gleditsch, 2904.

definition of freedom: namely, the freedom to live truly virtuous lives.⁸⁷⁷ At the same time, he removed the label *freedom* from the will and its natural (and necessary) determination to the good.⁸⁷⁸ This removal of the name *freedom* from the necessary determination of the will suggests that Walch already viewed freedom as primarily related to choice, self-determination and probably even indetermination. Although Walch affirmed the will's necessary orientation towards the good, he also threatened this axiom and its relation to spiritual freedom by denying the will the name of freedom.

It will be hard or even impossible to accommodate any type of this philosophical freedom with any determination, even determination towards the transcendent good. If spiritual freedom has anything to do with philosophical freedom, a notion of spiritual freedom is more likely a negative freedom (freedom from hinderances and freedom from absolute determination) than a positive freedom (freedom to do good works). Of course, one can hold these two freedoms as absolutely dissimilar but in doing so, all one does is insist that freedom is used in an equivocal, not analogical sense. Thus, from the viewpoint of philosophical freedom, spiritual freedom is nonsensical or a threat. As I discuss in chapter 6, the modern eschatological debate shows that the philosophical understanding of freedom is being used to overrule the second definition of spiritual freedom.

5.2.3 Walch's Definition of Freedom in Context

Before moving on to Buddeus's theological treatment of the will, the intellect, and freedom, it is important to understand that Walch did not stand alone. His understanding of freedom, which had elements of compatibilism, matched the Early Modern English *Chambers' Cyclopaedia's* definition, which juxtaposed the freedom of contradiction and the freedom of

⁸⁷⁷ Or perhaps the freedom from sin.

⁸⁷⁸ "Das Wollen und nicht wollen ist an sich in dem Willen allezeit nothwendig. Denn diese ist die gemein Eigenschafft des menschlichen Willens bei allen seinen Begierden, daß er eine facultas necessaria, das ist, er muß das Gute lieben, und das Böse hassen, und in so weit kan man ihm selbst keine Freyheit beylegen, womit aber der Mensch seine Freyheit noch nicht verliert, indem es nur darauf ankommt, worinnen man dieselbige setzen soll, von welcher Materie wir oben weitläufftig gehandelt haben." Walch and Gleditsch, "Wille des Menschen," 2908. Note here that Walch is describing the natural (non-fallen) state of the will. The depraved or fallen state is described afterwards.

contrariety. The first was freedom to do or not do something (thus dependent upon external freedom), and the second was to choose this or that thing.⁸⁷⁹ Chambers noted that

though the human mind may have a *Freedom* of contradiction, with respect to all objects, even the supreme good itself; yet the *Freedom* of contrariety is restrained to certain particulars, which either are, or appear to be good: the will having such a natural propensity to good, that it cannot desire evil, but under the notion and appearance of good.⁸⁸⁰

Chambers did not consider the freedom of contradiction to be equivalent to pure indifference, but like Walch, noted that this freedom required that “we have a power of not assenting thereto, by diverting our attention to something else.”⁸⁸¹ Additionally, Chambers opened up the possibility that a person could turn away from the supreme good. This notion is also inherent in Buddeus’s treatment of the subject matter, as I argue below.⁸⁸²

5.3 Buddeus, the human being, and Freedom

5.3.1 The active intellect and the effect of sin

Before examining Buddeus on the freedom of the will, I want to backtrack to his anthropology. In his description of the intellect, it is easy to see how he understood the intellect to function and how it was affected by sin, that is, depravity. Buddeus began his description of the human being by asserting the Cartesian duality of body and soul. Body as material and soul as mental/immaterial were not total opposites insofar that all ideas even of “immaterial concepts” like justice and truth had their origin in the external senses.⁸⁸³ Thus, the material,

⁸⁷⁹ Chambers, “Freedom of Contradiction”; Chambers, “Freedom of Contrariety, or of Contraries.”

⁸⁸⁰ Chambers, “Freedom of Contrariety, or of Contraries”.

⁸⁸¹ Chambers.

⁸⁸² Though one might ask Chambers if it is possible for the finite mind to really be faced with the “evident truth” of the supreme good. In contrast to Chambers and possibly Walch, the German contemporary philosopher “Leibniz repeatedly stated that the man who has been ravished by a glimpse of the sublime beauty and goodness of God’s plan as a whole, cannot but love God above all things...” Alsted et al., *Alsted and Leibniz: On God, the Magistrate and the Millennium*, 190.

⁸⁸³ Buddeus’s intellectual target here is Malebranche who suggested God, not the exterior sensible world, produced all thoughts in the soul immediately. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:47.

or the bodily, world for Buddeus was bound up in an intrinsic intelligibility accessed through the senses and mediated by the soul. Moreover, the intellect had an *active* role in its mediating and in the composition of ideas. This is key for understanding the psychological activity inherent in Ewald's *ordo*. The believer was always interacting with the world *and* the spiritual nudges it received. It was never entirely passive.

Since the intellect played such an active role in its mediation and the composition of ideas (along with the comparison of ideas),⁸⁸⁴ it was vulnerable to greater error because of internal prejudices.⁸⁸⁵ Buddeus did not blame the material: the body was not the automatic cause of such evil. One might read this as a basic trust in daily bodily experiences.⁸⁸⁶ Including and reaching beyond the mind as primarily concerned with the composition of ideas, Buddeus spoke of the intellect's three capacities: knowledge (factual), cleverness (the use of one's knowledge to achieve certain ends; *klogskab*), and wisdom (judgment of good and evil).

It is not obvious whether for Buddeus, knowledge as pure fact was a neutral matter in relation to morality, but it is obvious that the conscious knowing of something as good or evil was not a straightforward nor mechanical matter for him. No knowledge in the fullest sense was entirely passive for Buddeus; there was a great deal of mental activity involved before a judgment could be rendered.

Working theologically, Buddeus also described the effect of sin on the intellect: it was difficult for the intellect to form immaterial concepts (which gave rise to many theological errors). The intellect was hobbled by ignorance, error, and confusion and imperfection of concepts, which

⁸⁸⁴ Buddeus, 1:47–49. The *Ingenio* is responsible for grasping of an idea but the *Judicium* is responsible for the comparing of ideas. Buddeus also describes here the scriptural understanding of the intellects operations: 1) seeing, knowing, feeling, noticing, 2) 'grasping' (*fatte*) which involves an assent or dissent, and 3) the reasoning (*Raisonnieren*) by means of syllogism. In particular, the assent or dissent relates to belief, and in spiritual matters is impossible without the Holy Spirit's effecting.

⁸⁸⁵ Buddeus, 1:48.

⁸⁸⁶ Buddeus paints certain doubts as sins or sicknesses of the mind. Here the doubting of common physical experiences (seeing the sun, sleeping, waking) as real. Buddeus, 1:61. Thus, one must say that Buddeus grounds his thought essentially on trust, not skepticism.

affected its activity and ability to judge. But it was not merely a matter of learning more. In Buddeus's understanding, these stumbling blocks to the intellect were secondary explanations. The primary cause of these errors was located in the will's *love of self* above all else. As such, the will prejudiced the intellect towards what it knew as good and desirable. For instance, a person's temperament could affect their judgment. Buddeus described the theological errors of Calvin as grounded in his "melancholy-choleric" temperament and those of Epicurus as arising from his sanguine and lustful temperament.⁸⁸⁷ Buddeus did not only blame bodily humors. Rather, he observed that a person's temperament conditioned what they desired and then this judgment was superimposed onto spiritual concepts about God. Everything began to circle around the will's preference for self-love⁸⁸⁸ rather than a singular focus on more education or a stringent control of the body and temperament.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to explore how a person's self-love and temperament might influence *all types* of perception, knowing/understanding, and judging in general. Buddeus's focus was on the human difficulty in forming immaterial concepts (as a result of sin), not ideas of material things themselves.⁸⁸⁹ Since all concepts or ideas originated from the external senses (they were not magically given by God), there was no way around this difficulty. Even natural knowledge was infected by human depravity. Buddeus distinguished also between natural knowledge and spiritual knowledge *in the human being*. Though I find this section somewhat ambiguous, I interpret Buddeus here as indicating that spiritual knowledge must also be considered as a subjective phenomenon.⁸⁹⁰ It is how something is

⁸⁸⁷ Buddeus, 1:57–58.

⁸⁸⁸ The affections and the 'harmful' self-love are tied together. Buddeus, 1:64.

⁸⁸⁹ Consider Buddeus's statement, "Question: where do ideas come from? Resp. it is best to say, as far as we know, that the external senses permit the opportunity for the first production of the ideas." (*Spørsmål: Hvorfra reyser sig da Ideerne? Resp. Det er best at sige, saa vit vi veed, at de udvortes Sandser give leylighed til Ideernes første Product.*) Buddeus, 1:47.

⁸⁹⁰ "When the word reason is taken in the first meaning, namely the subjective sense, so one must be aware that one can consider it in the natural things, as in the spiritual things." (*Naar nu Ordet Fornuft tages i den første Meening, nemlig Subjective, saa har man at give agt paa, at man kand saavel betragte det i Naturlige, som i Aandelige Ting.*) Buddeus, 1:68. Buddeus is indicating here that one's reason or reasoning is dependent

known, not exactly what is known. Hence, when Buddeus spoke about the darkened intellect in relation to spiritual things, he was not creating a secret subject matter or hidden spiritual facts that the reborn knew and the un-reborn were unaware of.⁸⁹¹ Rather, he argued that the un-reborn failed to apply the *ordo salutis* (*Saliggjørelsens Værk* or *Helliggjørelsens Orden*) to themselves because of their evil affections. The un-reborn still knew 'spiritual' things in a certain sense, but not in the right manner. Buddeus affirmed that many theologians had a good intellect, judgment (*judicium*), mind/intelligence (*ingenium*), and memory, but if they were “fleshly minded” or had evil affections, they could not know (*kiende*) the truth.⁸⁹² Divine

on the subject/the knower. How one knows natural things or spiritual things is, in a certain sense, according to the mode of the knower (to steal a Thomist expression).

⁸⁹¹ "If I consider afterwards the human's understanding in the spiritual things, I must confess that it is blind and darkened, that is: The natural human does not sense the things which belong to God's Spirit, I Cor 2:14; and it is important to notice that when the apostle speaks about the natural human in the same verse, he is not taking about the unlearned or common people, but (when we consider the previous [verses]) about the learned, wise and about the authorities of this world, cons. v. 6. The same do not sense what belongs to God's Spirit. However, the matter must be rightly grasped, when it says that reason and the intellect are blind and darkened concerning the spiritual [things], for thereby the usual usage of the intellect is not understood, as each must, of course, used their intellect; just as it can be that one knows many truths by means of the intellect, for ex. that one reads the Bible, that one understands languages and applies hermeneutics...for just as the good [people] may use their intellect, so the ungodly also do so: the same can also explain the text..." (*Betragter jeg dernest Menneskets Forstand i de Aandelige Ting, saa maa jeg tilstaae, at den er blind og formørket, da heder det: Det Naturlige Menneske sandser ikke de Ting, der høre GUDs Aand til 1 Cor. 2,14: Og det er vel at give agt paa, naar Apostelen sammesteds taler om det Naturlige Menneske, han da ikke taler om Ulærde og Gemene Folk, men (naar vi anseer det foregaaende) om de Lærde, Kloge, og om denne Verdens Øverster, cons. v. 6. De samme sandser heller ikke hvad GUDs Aand hører til. Dog maa Sagen ret begribes, naar der siges, at Fornuften eller Forstanden er i det Aandelige blind og formørket, thi derved bliver ikke Forstand sædvanlige brug forstaaet, saasom enhver maa jo bruge sin Forstand; Ligesom det og kand være, at man med Forstand kiender mange Sandheder ex. gr. At man læser Bibelen, at man forstaar Sprogene og applicere Hermeneuticam...thi ligesom den Gode maa bruge Forstand, saa gjør ogsaa den Ugudelige det, den samme kand ogsaa forklare Texten...)* Buddeus, 1:70.

⁸⁹² Buddeus, 1:69–70. Note that the Danish verb for knowing is from *at kende*: to know in a familiar/experiential sense versus *at vide*: to know a fact. This might help explain the difficulty of translating and explaining these concepts in English.

truths could be technically known, but they would not be understood and perfectly applied or appropriated.⁸⁹³

5.3.2 Buddeus and the Freedom of the Will

Buddeus's vision of freedom and free will was complicated. He was sensitive to contemporary debates and, unsurprisingly, the theological complications are much more apparent in his works than in Walch's. Buddeus rejected a determinist model. He brooked no necessity in human action, so that "if a human has all the necessary requirements to do a thing, he can either do a thing or not do it."⁸⁹⁴ He noted that Reformed theologians were unhappy with this definition because it appeared to permit (as a necessary logical possibility) the ability to sin even in heaven. However, Lutheran theologians, in Buddeus's understanding, wished to retain a model of non-determinist freedom, if not the absolute libertarian model of freedom that consisted of an indifference of opposites (*indifferentia oppositonis*). In this non-determinist angelology,⁸⁹⁵ angels did not possess the "freedom of contradiction," or freedom of indifference.⁸⁹⁶ But they did possess a "freedom of contraries" (*Modbydelses Frihed*), which Buddeus defined as the freedom to do a good or another good.⁸⁹⁷ Furthermore, this freedom

⁸⁹³ Of course, in Buddeus's project, such spiritual assent (i.e. the assent given in faith) and appropriation must be provoked by the effecting of the Holy Spirit (*naar det kommer an paa Samtykken og fornemmeligen NB. den aandelige, som hidkommer af den Hellig Aands Virkning, som derhos tillige udfordres...*) Buddeus, 1:48. I suggest that Buddeus' picture of this 'provoking' must be identified with God's nature as the highest good. In this way, one is provoked not in a mechanical manner that overrules one's nature, but rather one is drawn towards that which one's nature is naturally orientated towards. The other option is that the categories of mechanical force as a type of causality are being blended and confused with the classical notions of the appetizing draw of the good thing.

⁸⁹⁴ *et Menneske, som har alle nødvendige requisita til en Ting at gjøre, kand enten gjøre det, eller ikke.* Buddeus, 1:158.

⁸⁹⁵ It is worth noting that Buddeus assigns freedom primarily to the (non-fallen) angels and to the prelapsarian human being (who may know God and inwardly love God).

⁸⁹⁶ *en Modsigelses Frihed*, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:158.

⁸⁹⁷ "They have freedom in one or another way to do good; this one can well allow." *De have Frihed paa en og anden Maade at gjøre got, det kan man vel lade passere.* Buddeus, 1:158. The idea seems to be that one good

consisted of being free from all external and internal compulsions *and* having freely chosen or determined oneself towards illumination/"things" that belong to one's bliss.⁸⁹⁸

Let me take a brief aside to consider the implications of this before going on. By determination towards, or determining oneself towards something, I am referring to the choice of something and the directionality of intention. Buddeus believed that the method to bliss (the *ordo*) involved a level of intentionality on the part of the human being. The existential implications of self-creating were to be invited. Erik Nielsen argues something along these lines in his defense of Ewald's poet son, Johannes:

For this [Johannes] Ewald, who was apparently crooked and crushed, was in his last year of life, a free man in his own way, because he had learned to free himself by taking over and understanding instead of rejecting and breaking [himself]. His life-long proud assurance of his own imaging of God had come to include that he, as human, took over from God as judge and became his own judge instead. In the ode *To the Soul*, it is Ewald's own voice; he is well aware that he is forcing himself—by his own authority into a meeting with the Clarity which shall cleanse his being. Humility and pride are each other's pre-requisites.⁸⁹⁹

act might be chosen over another good action, perhaps like someone might chose to bake a chocolate cake or write a letter to a friend: two particular good but different actions. My translation of the obscure word, *modbydelse*, as contrary or opposite, rather than disgust, attempts to capture the opposing quality of different good choices.

⁸⁹⁸ "the ability to determine oneself towards illumination...The freedom of the human's will is this, that he will love the things, which belong to his true and perfect bliss, and this does not hinder his freedom, for freedom is given the humans for the purpose of their bliss, not perversion" (*den formue til at determinere sig selv til Oplysning;...Menneskets Villies Frihed er denne, da han vil og elsker de Ting, som høre til hans sande og fuldkomne Lyksalighed, og det hindrer ikke hans Frihed, thi Frihed er givet Menneskene til deres Lyksalighed, og ikke til deres Fordervelse.*) Buddeus, 1:159.

⁸⁹⁹ *For den Ewald, der tilsyneladende døde krumbøjet og knust, var igennem sine sidste leveår blevet en fri mand på sin egen måde, fordi han havde lært at frigøre sig ved at overtage og forstå i stedet for ved at forkaste og bryde. Hans liveslange, stolte forvisning om sin egen gudbilledlighed var kommet til at indebære, at hans som menneske også overtog Guds væsen som dommer og blev sin egen dommer derved. I oden Til Sielen er det Ewalds egen stemme; han er udmærket klar over, at der myndigt tvinger sig selv ind i mødet med den*

Nielsen's main argument is that Johannes Ewald developed a Pietist worldview in a poetic framework. The Pietist role of the individual as their own authority is also present in Sigrød Nielsby Christensen's concluding argument about Ewald.⁹⁰⁰ George Macdonald, the 19th-century Christian universalist gave an explicitly theological and Christological perspective that blended human intentionality and the partaking of the divine nature:

Because we are come out of the divine nature, which chooses to be divine [Christ the Son], we must choose to be divine, to be of God, to be one with God, loving and living as he loves and lives, and so be partakers of the divine nature, or we perish. Man cannot originate this life; it must be shown him, and he must choose it.⁹⁰¹

The intentionality of the believer in turning towards God is present in Buddeus, Johannes Ewald, Enevold Ewald, and George Macdonald, but was not divorced from the objective reality of what will bring bliss, life, and cleansing. I see here a path away from both accusations of mechanical determinism *and* a purely irrational willing of faith.⁹⁰²

klarhed, som skal rense hans væsen. Ydmyghed og stolthed bliver hinandens forudsætninger. Nielsen, *Solens Fødsel: Seks Tekster Om Kristendommens Hemmeligheder*, 175.

⁹⁰⁰ Christensen, "Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram," 29.

⁹⁰¹ MacDonald, "The Creation in Christ."

⁹⁰² Here I am thinking of Buddeus's concerns about Christian Wolff's morality and Markus Mattias's accusations against Joachim Lange that I discussed in chapter one. See, Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:19–42; Matthias, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy." See also David Bentley Hart's Meditation Four in Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*. Hart argues in the meditation for an intellectualist understanding of freedom: one is truly free only in so far as one is able to make the rational choice that enables our flourishing. As a conceptual aid, Hart refers to Maximus the Confessor's distinction between the natural will (ur-inclination towards the good, i.e. God) and the gnostic/deliberate will (which chooses and selects between different options). Hart's essential argument is that the apparent libertarian freedom of choice is not the same as true freedom (our flourishing as rationally chosen). After all choice is done towards some end or purpose, not as an action that is an end in itself. To intend, is to intend *something*. Moreover, one can never say that a human freely chooses Hell *because* in so far as one chooses hell and thus, one's non-flourishing, one simply reveals how enslaved one actually is to sin and destructive tendencies. Any 'door of hell' locked from the inside only reveals more sin that Christ has set out to destroy in his salvific work. Moreover, the undetermined gnostic will can select certain paths, but because it exists within the ur-inclination of the natural will, the human being, exercising their gnostic will, still chooses a path towards the transcendental good. Or as Hart writes, "All concretely limited aspirations of the will are sustained within formally limitless aspirations of the will". Hart, 177. Specific actions are selected, not

Buddeus's model incorporated both a negative definition of freedom (a person was free from external *and* internal compulsions, i.e., sin) and a positive, or active, definition of freedom (one can and actually does the good action).⁹⁰³ This was Buddeus's definition of true freedom, reserved for the unfallen angels, innocent humans, and presumably the perfectly hallowed human being. In the original Latin and German versions of Buddeus's *Moral Theology*, freedom is defined in the same way: the active intending or determining power of the agent is emphasized.⁹⁰⁴ However, Buddeus's further explication redefined the free agent as the "one who *follows the right understanding*, and according to this judgment is able to incline towards an action and decide [to do it].*[emphasis added]*"⁹⁰⁵ He thereby brought the role of the intellect and right understanding into the full concept of freedom. The question we must ask is whether this notion of freedom warred with the first non-determined quality of freedom or whether it represented a spiritual freedom that preserved within it for philosophical freedom's intentionality and non-determination (of concrete actions). For a modern answer to this question, see footnote on the page above.

mechanically necessitated—but the will is not formally indifferent. This description holds even if the human being is 'confused' about the actual goodness of a particular action, such as electing for suicide and non-existence over the pain and despair of one's life. In my view, this is similar to Walch's and Buddeus's understanding of philosophical freedom. But since for Hart, God is not merely a good, but the fullness of Being and Goodness itself, one may wander where one will, but all our choices for this or that good are in truth a choice *for* God, however dimly we realize this. Within God's infinite horizon, the deliberate choices when freed from sin and untruth through Christ, lead inexorably to the Divine. It should be clear I find Hart's argument a convincing refutation of the Hell-locked from the inside view.

⁹⁰³ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:158–59.

⁹⁰⁴ "daß wenn auch aller vorhanden, was zum handel nöthig ist, einer dennoch etwas thun und auch nicht thun; und wiederum etwas so, oder anders thun kan" and "qua omnibus ad agendum positus requisitis, agere aliquis potest, vol non agere, hoc item vel alio modo agere." Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, 1.4.XI; Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis*, 1.4.XI.

⁹⁰⁵ "derjenige ist frey, welchen dem richtigen verstande folgen, und nach desselbigen urtheile sich zu einer handlung lencken und entschliessen kan" and "Liber enim is est, qui rectum intellectum sequi, & pro eius iudicio se determinare potest" Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, 1.4.XI; Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis*, 1.4.XI.

5.3.3 Ewald on Freedom: A Comparison

As a side-bar before I investigate Buddeus's position more fully, it is clear from Ewald's sermons that he viewed God's action towards humanity as non-determinative, or non-compulsory: "However, we must here consider that God does not deal with us according to his absolute power, or force some human to his good and giving will. He sets before us fire and water, we can grasp whichever we will."⁹⁰⁶ At the same time, God was the one calling us, reaching out his hand, drawing us and persuading us.⁹⁰⁷ In the fact that this call was rejected, as common experience showed Ewald, one can see the outline of the philosophical non-determinative freedom assumed by Ewald. The will could be persuaded and inclined, but it must determine itself—it was not absolutely determined by God. At the same time, Ewald treated freedom in the sense of being freed from sin by Christ.⁹⁰⁸ The state of freedom was the state of perfection: the *telos* of the *ordo salutis*.

Unlike Buddeus, Ewald did not explicitly associate this understanding of spiritual freedom with the ability to act according to a proper understanding and perspective. Yet there are hints towards this notion. For example, following Paul, Ewald rejected the notion that the law was nullified by faith. Thus, to take up the yoke of Christ (roughly speaking, the moral law) was not to lose true spiritual freedom. Christ's yoke only "*appears* to be heavy and difficult for our blind reason, and our corrupted flesh."⁹⁰⁹ But this appearance of heaviness and difficulty was a false understanding. As Ewald wrote, it is difficult to love God when he is the

⁹⁰⁶ *Men vi maae her hos vel betænke, at Gud ikke handler med os efter sin absolute Magt, eller tvinger noget Menniske til sin gode og gavnlige Villie, Hand setter for os Ild og Vand, vi kand gribe til hvilket vi vil.* Ewald HH I, 1005

⁹⁰⁷ Ewald HH I, 1007

⁹⁰⁸ See, for example, the sermon Ewald preached on Maundy Thursday 1740 (Ewald, HH II, 69-713), where Ewald speaks of being set free from the slavery of sin, the devil, the world and the law by Christ in the first half of the sermon. Of course, in other places, Ewald warns that this freedom is not a freedom to sin (Ewald, HH II, 263 sqq.).

⁹⁰⁹ *Det synes vel at være tungt og besværligt for vor blinde Fornuft, og vort fordervede Kiød.* Ewald HH II, 264; emphasis added.

“enemy, a revenger, a just and harsh God and judge.”⁹¹⁰ In other words, if the intellect did not view God as the obvious source of bliss, that person’s will would not easily be inclined to him. If there was no hope of mercy, we would not be able to love him freely because our intellect would find no reason to view him as good. But “it is no burden to love a friend, a savior, a bridegroom, a pious and gracious God and Father, who one has faith and trust in.”⁹¹¹ According to Ewald’s perspective, the intellect found *reasons* to love, and if one was truly free from sin, it ought then to be easy to love and to take up Christ’s yoke. For those who lacked the proper illumination to grasp this and rightly desire God, the spiritual freedom found in Christ’s yoke would only be a dark contradiction of philosophical non-determinative freedom. For them, what was demanded by Christ (good actions/yoke of Christ) was the very rejection of freedom since Christ's demands (or really any demands) remained an external constraint upon the human being.⁹¹² Moreover, Christ's demands seemed irrational for non-believers since they do not seem to lead to human flourishing, but rather slavery.⁹¹³ By understanding Ewald’s Early Modern context and the juxtaposition of the two notions of freedom (freedom as non-determination and freedom as being freed from sin so to willingly take up the yoke of

⁹¹⁰ *Det er tungt at elske en Fiende, en Hevner, en retfærdig og streng Gud og Dommere, saa længe man intet Haab har om Naade og Barmhertighed.* Ewald HH II, 264-5.

⁹¹¹ *...det er ingen Byrde, at elske en Ven, en Frelser, en Brudgom, en from og naadig Gud og Fader, den man har Troe og Tillid til.* Ewald HH II, 265.

⁹¹² "or of a slavish fear, [a fear] of the law and of the threats and curses, so that there is always a type of compulsion therein and an unwillingness, which is clearly marked, when the circumstances and reasons, which have moved and driven such a hypocrite, are quickly changed." (*eller og af en Trældoms Frygt, for Loven og for den Truseler og Forbandelser, saa at der altid er et slags Tvang derhos, og en Uvillighed, hvilket kiendeligen merkes, naar de Omstændigheder og Aarsager, som have bevæget og dreven saadant et [hyklerisk] Menneske, i en Hast forandres.*) Ewald HH I, 426. Ewald’s point here is that worship, virtue, or obedience towards God easily becomes a type of burden when the natural (self-benefiting) reasons that originally inspired such actions disappear.

⁹¹³ *Og naar den gode Gud paa nye vil frigjøre os i Christo, saa elske ikke allene de Fleeste deres Trældoms-Stand mere end som denne Frigjørelse, men om end og nogle Faa lade sig overtale til at troe paa JEsu, og frigjøres ved ham, saa holde de andre dette for et Sclaveri, og søge at overtale dem igien til deres forige Trældoms-Stand.* HH II, 248. Also quoted and translated above in chapter 3. There are implicit suggestions here that freedom is related to our fulfillment or flourishing. At least, that is why presumably the 'majority' view the few believers as not free but enslaved.

Christ), it is possible to see what Ewald did with freedom in his texts and in his treatment of the state of slavery v. the state of freedom in the early stages of the *ordo salutis*. I now return to Buddeus to explore his systematic treatment of the intellect and will in their free actions.

5.3.4 Buddeus: Philosophical Freedom and Spiritual Slavery

Buddeus wanted to maintain a non-determinist, positive model of freedom without positing an indifference of the will. The will always had a reason for its action: an object that was conceived as desirable or disgusting. As such, the intellect and the will were bound up in a circular movement and dialogue. The intellect, through the external senses, conceived both material and immaterial concepts of objects, for example, the idea of the seen tree that the intellect makes or an immaterial notion of fairness. For Buddeus, people were dependent on the external world as the origin of all ideas,⁹¹⁴ thus there was a passive or receptive element in his understanding of the intellect. The intellect did not simply create the world, but received it after a fashion. An object could be presented to the mind as lovely and desirable, and, ergo, a person desired it. However, a person's freedom, or non-determinacy, consisted of the fact that "he can represent to himself the same object as something that belongs to his true bliss, for *therein consists freedom's center and purpose*. [emphasis added]"⁹¹⁵

Thus oddly, a person's 'freedom' in the determining power of the will also revealed their slavery. The greedy man imagined that money and possessions (which he *necessarily* desired because of the sinful inclinations of his will) were his salvation. The lustful woman formed mental representations of bodily delights and believed they were her true happiness—she yearned after them.⁹¹⁶ This indeterminacy of the will was not the same as indifference for Buddeus. There must be a reason why one thing was chosen rather than another. But the will and the intellect worked together to evaluate different objects as possible sources of true

⁹¹⁴ See above.

⁹¹⁵ *han kand forestille sig samme objectum saaledes som noget, der henhører til hans sande Lyksalighed, thi deri bestoed Frihedens centrum og øyemeed*. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:159–60.

⁹¹⁶Buddeus, 1:160.

bliss. Since the will was generally inclined towards lust and greed (in self-love), the particular determined objects of a person's bliss were intended because of their greed and lust.

For Buddeus, given the necessary connection to the world, experience/sensation, and the intellect, this evaluation could not be reduced to voluntarism or subjectivism. Although the world provided objects of delight and hate, the mind was able to weigh and pit these objects and ideas against each other:

I will give an example, when a human ex. gr. by means of lust is moved towards all sorts of vulgar sins, the intellect sees that, if he does such things, he will bring himself to shame and harm. Now when he sets ambition [i.e., the fear of shame] against lust, he can hold back lust so that it does not break out into great sins.⁹¹⁷

Here Buddeus exchanged one object (lust) for another (ambition) as the source of happiness. But if a person was not ambitious or did not care about the opinions of their peers, their deliberation would fail or another desired object would have to be substituted. Two things are demonstrated here. Deliberation did not deny the will's lustful inclinations. The will itself was still bound in its slavery towards the apparent good (the object of lust). Additionally, what humans loved even more than desirable objects was themselves, for objects were desired only insofar as they brought delight to a person. It is here that similarities with Ewald's thought exist: both in his trial⁹¹⁸ and in his observance that "a natural human can also in his affections and mind-movements [thoughts] have something good, some likeness with God's children, and will often represent to themselves and others, that they are masters over their passions."⁹¹⁹ Ewald's point was that natural humans not only deceived others, but themselves

⁹¹⁷ *Jeg vil give et Exempel: Naar et Menneske, ex. gr. formedelst Vellyst bliver tilsyndet til allehaande grove Synder, men Forstand seer, at, saafremt han gjør saadant, vil det gringe ham i Foragt, Skade, 2c. Naar han da sætter Ambitionen imod Vellysten, saa kan han holde Vellysten tilbage, at den ikke udbryder i grove Synder.* Buddeus, 1:162.

⁹¹⁸ See above discussion in chapter two about 'natural' virtues, also see Appendix A, Kaasbøll Thesis 11.

⁹¹⁹ *Et naturligt Menniske kand endogsaa i sine Affecter og Sinds-Bevægelser have noget Got, nogen Liighed med Guds Børn, ligesom og saadanne ofte vil bilde sig selv og andre ind, at de ere Herrer over deres Passioner.* Ewald, HH III, 731.

as well; they were primarily ruled by self-love and self-delights, as their sorrow at the absence of those delights revealed.⁹²⁰

In this section, Buddeus demonstrated the extent of what he called natural freedom.⁹²¹ It combined the indeterminacy of the will and the intellect (they shifted and deliberated over apparent “good” objects) and the view that freedom was the ability to do good actions and not sin. The will was inclined towards desired objects but only generally, not particularly.⁹²² This natural (philosophical) freedom always operated within self-centered motives, in Buddeus’s opinion. Even though he logically granted the human being a great deal of freedom, it never produced perfect good actions (spiritual freedom) by which God could be praised because the self, not God, was loved as the highest good.⁹²³ Yet here one catches a glimpse of how “lower” goods might be permitted and enjoyed to the extent they served a love of the “higher” good. Buddeus emphasized the ability of education, discipline, and social pressure to control “vulgar desires.” However, this control was conditional and situational, not a perfect guarantee. The depraved will had a great deal of power over other faculties. It could influence a person’s knowledge. Ideas began in the external senses, but this was not a purely passive reception of the knowable thing; knowing something or someone also depended on where and when one directed their attention (a “willed” action). For instance, if one found something interesting, one’s will might redirect one’s attention towards it again and thus learn more about it. Buddeus gave the example of a blue object that under closer inspection was actually seen to be green or gray.⁹²⁴ The blue object was sensed, but the attention, or directing, of the will allowed it to be known more accurately. Thus, according to Buddeus, it was impossible even for education to *guarantee* a way out of the will’s domination

⁹²⁰ Ewald, HH III, 732.

⁹²¹ Or at least freedom in the prelapsarian state and in the fallen state. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:158–64.

⁹²² Buddeus is working here against Spinoza (or his reading of Spinoza). Buddeus, 1:164.

⁹²³ This is the main problem of sin: the (wrong) love of self. See below, also Buddeus, 1:181–82.

⁹²⁴ Buddeus, 1:169.

via self-love.⁹²⁵ Since the will could not be forced and since it controlled knowing to a degree, no promise of education was absolute.

5.4 Buddeus: The Way to Repentance

In the previous three sections I have shown how Buddeus and Walch operated with two different notions of freedom: a philosophical concept and a theological, or spiritual, notion of freedom. I concluded the last section by demonstrating that for Buddeus, not even a proper education and upbringing could overcome the spiritual condition whereby the will was enslaved to self-love. Thus, for Buddeus, Ewald, and Walch, a person could perform certain outwardly virtuous actions, while still denying true virtue. The next section draws on the anthropological framework I have presented and reflects on its implications for the *ordo salutis*.

5.4.1 A Matter of Experience

For Buddeus, the philosophical model of freedom required a conversation between the will and the intellect. Even as the will's domination was pervasive, it could be (consciously?) known, and in this knowledge lay the way to repentance. The desire for the good, or seemingly good thing, was experienced or sensed as affection.⁹²⁶ These sensations were key for the undetermined dialogue between the will and the intellect as they revealed the will's inclination to the intellect. The implications for this are important for the *ordo salutis*. The close (but somewhat inscrutable) link and mutual influence between the body and soul/mind meant that mental (*sindelige*) affections can still result in a change in the body.⁹²⁷ One could

⁹²⁵ Walch does make the case for education securing a certain improvement in the will, but not true virtue. See, Walch and Gleditsch, "Wille des Menschen," 2910–12.

⁹²⁶ The affections of the mind are the main inclinations of the will when the inclinations "break out into actions" (*udbryde i Gierningen*). Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:173.

⁹²⁷ *Dog merk, at vel ogsaa ved Affecterne sindelige og aandelige kan skee, at i visse Maader en Alteration og Forandring i Legemet kand opkomme*. Buddeus, 1:174. Note, this possibility is not a necessity of physical alterations in the body. It is worth considering if the possibility of a conversion 'experience' in sensible phenomenon becomes codified into a necessity by later generations. See Jonathan Strom's reflections on the historical development of conversion. Strom, *German Pietism and the Problem of Conversion*.

consider the description of the physical markers of conversion in Pontoppidan's novel *Menoza*.⁹²⁸ Buddeus was worried about the tendency to interpret physical sensations (e.g., sorrow caused by sad music) as indicative of mental or spiritual affections.⁹²⁹ He argued for a close investigation of the origin of such affections to avoid misapprehensions,⁹³⁰ but his structure of human affections was well suited to the experiential nature of spiritual development. Buddeus also allowed that "a natural affection often can give occasion to a spiritual affection."⁹³¹ Singing hymns may produce a natural sorrow, which in turn prompts one to reflect on one's sins in real spiritual sorrow. There was no mechanical necessity or guarantee in this process, but with this observation, Buddeus preserved the role of experience and sensation in general as a means of repentance, or conversion.

He made this observation casually in line with his willingness to trust daily experience. Even if the mechanical determinism between a natural affection and spiritual affection was kept out, mediation could still creep in between sense and understanding. Buddeus defined the "Book of Nature" narrowly as experience, self-reflection, and reflection on other human beings.⁹³² Despite the anthropological framing of this Book of Nature, Buddeus's understanding of the permeability between the world and the human being (via the sensations of the body) meant that human experience never existed in pure isolation for him. Thus, while the world and sensations gave rise to particular affections, even though this experience did not fully determine the human will, experience was part of the critical

⁹²⁸ See the discussion in my earlier article, Lied, "Danish Catechism in Action? Examining Religious Formation in and through Erik Pontoppidan's *Menoza*."

⁹²⁹ Such as spiritual sorrow (*Den Aandelig Bedrøvelse*), Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:175.

⁹³⁰ This requirement of self-examination and reflection stems from the fear that a natural affection is misread as divine or supernatural in origin. In a parallel way, one might read the entire of Philip Spener's treatise on grace and nature as a practice in discernment between 'graced' actions or 'natural' actions. See, Spener, *Tractat om Natur og Naade*.

⁹³¹ *en naturlig Affect ofte kan give Occasion til en aandelig Affect*. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:175.

⁹³² *Naturens Bog*, Buddeus, 1:For-Lecture 37-39.

pedagogical apparatus for moral understanding.⁹³³ Admittedly, Buddeus had a narrow understanding of which experiences were helpful.⁹³⁴ One could argue that the distrust of dance and theater typical of Pietists,⁹³⁵ reveals how seriously Buddeus, Ewald, and Pontoppidan took the formational effect of experience on the human being. Even though a dualistic framing of body and soul is present in Buddeus's *Moral Theology*, the two remain integrated in matters of knowing, understanding, and acting. This integration in turn naturally drew upon the world as perceived, even as the condition of the human being actively influenced *how* the world was perceived.⁹³⁶

5.4.2 The Limits of Philosophical Freedom: Idolatrous self-love

This short sketch of human nature and human freedom as Buddeus understood it, involved three elements: intellect, will, and experience (i.e., human perception of the world). I have not touched on a variety of other elements in Buddeus's anthropology: conscience, imagination/power of mental representation, sensible desires/affections, and the body, particularly in relation to human temperament. Imagination and affections played a role in Buddeus's juxtaposition of free will as indeterminacy and free will as indifference. But neither of these options (the former accepted, the latter rejected) according to Buddeus, was spiritual freedom. True freedom was freedom from sin and having the will and desire to love true bliss (God as the highest good), yet the natural/sinful human being was shut out from this freedom.

⁹³³ The book of Nature is one of three 'helping aids' for the doctrine of Divine Ethics/morals. Buddeus, 1:38. For a theological reflection on the ability of all experience to communicate the divine, consider Johann Georg Hamann's playful description of Eden, "Every phenomenon of nature was a word,—the sign, symbol and pledge of a new, mysterious, inexpressible but all the more intimate union, participation and community of divine energies and ideas. Everything the human being heard from the beginning, saw with its eyes, looked upon and touched with its hands was a living word; for God was the word." Quoted in Griffith-Dickson, *The Philosophy of Religion*, 95.

⁹³⁴ See, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:38–39.

⁹³⁵ See, Pontoppidan, *Sannhet Til Gudfryktighet: Forklaring over Martin Luthers Lille Katekisme*, Q. 137, 216, 225.

⁹³⁶ See above Buddeus's reference to John Calvin's temperament and theological errors. Also, Buddeus describes the unconverted as essentially self-deceived. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:39.

Why? Because the will, trapped within its desires, was not free to determine itself. The human intellect (perhaps via the power of imagination and representation)⁹³⁷ could play various desires or inclinations against each other to avoid certain evils.⁹³⁸ Still, desire was not the problem: the will, at least in part, simply *was* desire and inclination. There was no hope in reaching a perfect indifference and imagining this to be freedom.⁹³⁹ No, the problem was primarily an issue of power or domination, not function, for Buddeus. The will and its inherent inclinations were so dominate among the human faculties that they prevented the intellect from knowing (*kiende*) the truth. The intellect was also internally free in the sense that nothing could force it to know something different than it knew.⁹⁴⁰ Yet knowledge was not automatic and perfectly self-evident from one's sensory impressions; the direction of attention (here the will entered in) influenced the effort and time spent in knowing and investigating a matter.⁹⁴¹ Thus, different desires and intentions could blind humans.

It is important to note that this dominion of the will and the subsequent blindness of the intellect, though functionally capable of imprisoning human beings within their own desires and prejudices in this world, could not exercise an absolute necessity, according to Buddeus.

⁹³⁷ In Buddeus's section on the freedom of the will in the fallen human, he notes that "the human can give a counterweight to his will, by opposing apparently good things, and there in the will has a freedom to determine itself." (*Mennesket ved stidige skin-gode Ting kand give sin Villie Mod-Vægten, og deri har Villien en Frihed til at determinere sig*). Buddeus, 1:162. The example he gives is when a lustful man turns away from vulgar sins (rape?) because he is ambitious and thus afraid of ruining his reputation. The intellect is involved and some sort of capacity to imagine possible scenarios.

⁹³⁸ Or in the positive sense, the human being is capable of many externally good actions like almsgiving. Buddeus, 1:162.

⁹³⁹ In the German edition, Buddeus explicitly states that "concept of freedom must not be extended to the point where it means as much to be unbound and set loose from one's own inclining instinct" (*daß man den begriff von der freyheit nicht biß dahin ausdehnen müsse, als wenn es so viel hiesse, als ungebunden und von einem eignen lenckenden triebe los seyn*) Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, I.IV.XI.; His rationale is that if one is guided or inclined by inner righteousness to obey God in this or that particular situation, one is still free.

⁹⁴⁰ See Walch and Hennings, "Freyheit des Verstandes.", but perhaps also as a reason the dictates of one's conscience (which is a type of knowing), cannot be legally condemned. See my discussion in chapter two.

⁹⁴¹ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:169.

For though it commanded, it could not command itself. It remained vulnerable and dependent upon the world and even its own habits. Buddeus illustrated this with a negative example: “many a person who accustoms themselves to imagine sinful images cannot stop, even if they prefer not to think about them.”⁹⁴² This description (though a sobering indictment of addiction) reveals that there was no actual situation, for Buddeus, where freedom of the will was a solitary willing. Habits, addictions, and the perpetual bodily experience of the world pressed upon the will. Even as it directed, it was directed.

Daily experience for Buddeus confirmed this circle of impressions, responses, inclinations, reasoning, and determination. Nowhere did Buddeus suggest that a person ever escaped from it in this life: it was the structural functioning of being human. The problem was not that all actions and choices operated within such a system (or nature). Rather, as should be theologically unsurprising for an Early Modern Lutheran, human nature was deeply perverted. Sin (the condition of idolatrous self-love) pervaded and encumbered the whole.

For Buddeus, self-love was the original cause of sin, insofar as this cause was not temporally prior to all other causes, but rather categorically determinative. Buddeus firmly asserted that the will desired the good (or seeming good) and hated the evil thing (or seeming evil).⁹⁴³ No evil could be desired as evil, only as perceived relative good. Thus, improper self-love became the controlling category to which all other goods were subordinated.⁹⁴⁴ Buddeus did not

⁹⁴² *Mangen en har vent sig til at forrestille sig syndige Billeder, om han end ikke gjerne ville tænke derpaa, saa kan han dog ikke lade det...* Buddeus, 1:170–71.

⁹⁴³ Buddeus, 1:176. See also the beginning of the chapter. He also writes that in all humans whether they are good or evil, their inclinations are towards something good. Buddeus, 1:172.

⁹⁴⁴ This existential state of inordinate self-love is essentially original sin or the result of original sin. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:180. Buddeus positions original sin here as the ‘source of all types of evil’, rather than primarily as a legal question about the debt we owe to God. This is probably because of the text’s focus on moral, not dogmatic theology. Buddeus has a purely forensic definition of justification as a universally applicative (though not appropriated). Brouwer, *Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy*, 193. In Buddeus’s comments on *apokatastasis*, he does affirm that the grace and love of the divine and the merit of Christ is universal (no limited atonement), see Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.III.XVII, 467.

disregard self-love entirely; it had a natural place in all creatures, implanted by God for their own self-preservation.⁹⁴⁵ Again he was drawing upon observations and experience. This insight also allowed him to uphold a version of eudemonism, such that the ultimate good to be known as good must also be a relative good for the individual. Buddeus was not a mystical annihilatist.⁹⁴⁶ The problem wasn't self-love per se. It was idolatry, that is, the self, not God, occupied the *place* of the highest good.

For Buddeus, the issue was not that humans, even in their sinful state, could not know that God was the highest good in terms of propositional knowledge. Given the infinitely insatiable love and desire of humans, God, as the infinite object, was the only proper object of human love.⁹⁴⁷ Finite and apparent good (*endeligt-og Skin-God*) ultimately failed to satisfy. But the objective reality of God as the proper object of human love in terms of an intellectual judgment (which even the pagans acknowledged according to Buddeus), was not matched by the will's inclination. The will was sick, bent towards the self, resulting in evil and sins.⁹⁴⁸ Ultimately, humans could not heal themselves although they could do much to become aware

⁹⁴⁵ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:176.

⁹⁴⁶ "Mystics have thought that if love should be of the right type, so the human should love God without any consideration of his own blessedness, even if he should be eternally damned. But to say the truth, this is to aim the bow too high" (*Mystici have meent, at om Kierligheden skulle være af den rette Art, saa burde Mennesket elske Gud uden nogen henseende paa sin egen Salighed, om han endog ævig skulde blive fordømt. Men at sige Sandheden, saa spende de Buen alt for høyt.*) Buddeus, 1:179. With this, Buddeus also circumvents the idea of double predestination. You could not actually love a god, even if he was the highest good, if he willed your damnation. That is folly. The absolute good must be also a good for you. This was also Buddeus's criticism against Christian Wolff's concept of God. God must be worthy of worship, thus he must be one who cares about his creatures. Nüssel, "Gott Als Spiritus Independens : Zur Umformung Der Gotteslehre in Der Lutherischen Theologie Der Frühaufklärung," 96.

⁹⁴⁷ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:178. Buddeus also notes here that the pagan philosophers and teachers considered God to be the greatest good (*Summum Bonum*).

⁹⁴⁸ Buddeus describes perverted or inordinate self-love as the main disease of the will. Also, "self-love thus is regarded as the main cause for sin, and as such is involved in all other types of sins" (*Egen-Kierligheden ogsaa er at ansee som en Hoved Aarsag med Synden, og saaledes gaaer det ogsaa i alle andre Synders Arter*) Buddeus, 1:182.

of their illness.⁹⁴⁹ If the will had the power to perfectly determine itself, to decide what it wished to desire as the highest good without reference to experienced reality (objects that necessarily awoke desire or disgust), presumably a good philosophical or theological argument for God would be salvifically persuasive.⁹⁵⁰ But this propositional belief was not enough for Buddeus and Walch because they denied that an un-reborn person was able to know God in a true sense. At best, the un-reborn knew of the existence of God but not his infinite attributes or essence. This area of Buddeus's and Walch's thought might merit a closer investigation particularly as it pertains to the question of univocal and analogical knowledge of God. These concerns were also relevant to the extent human experience was vital in the larger Pietist theological project. At present, it is enough to mention this as the historical Pietistic stance.⁹⁵¹ For Buddeus, at least, no perfect knowledge of God was possible through natural means.

5.4.3 The *ordo* as the solution to idolatrous self-love

For Buddeus, when one's misery was known even by means of philosophical argument, one could easily slip back into the theological scheme of the *ordo salutis*:

For when a human shall be freed from his misery, so must the perverted self-love be oppressed, and the honor, which we have plundered from God, must be given to him again, to which end repentance and contrition are necessary to subdue self-love, for the one, who will repent, must know the law and from the law, learn to know his sins.⁹⁵²

⁹⁴⁹ "how necessary it is to learn to know yourself" (*hvor nødvendigt det er at lære at kiende sig selv*) Buddeus, 1:183.

⁹⁵⁰ Questions about guilt aside.

⁹⁵¹ Walch's Lexicon gives two possible ways of knowing God: through nature and through revelation. He subdivides nature into mere (common) experience and reasoning but both these types of knowing are about God's existence, not so much about the essence and perfections of God. See his articles, Walch and Hennings, "Erkenntniß Gottes"; Walch and Hennings, "Gott." Walch's and Buddeus's stance here is directed in part at Christian Wolff. They fear that he has erased the absolute (infinite) distinction between dependent human souls and God as independent spirit, and rather made between the two a difference of only degrees.

⁹⁵²...*thi naar et Menneske fra sin Elendighed skal vorde befriet, saa maa den Forvendte Selv-Kiærlighed vorde undertrykt, og den Ære, som vi have berøvet God, maa gives ham igien, til hvilken Ende Poententzen og*

Since the origin of sin lay within the structural nature of the human being (though always as a perversion of the good created thing, not a positive evil),⁹⁵³ the exorcism of sin required a psychological (or spiritual, if one reads *psyche* as pertaining to the soul) solution. Buddeus did not interpret the scriptural language of self-denial as annihilationist or anti-eudaemonist. Rather, it was the cure that made bliss attainable. The perversion of the will by its idolatry of self was self-harm and humans' disease. Sanctification, in comparison, consisted of the "daily practicing of repentance"⁹⁵⁴ and self-denial.

For Buddeus, this self-denial had to be intended and its purpose fully understood. Otherwise, it would be an irrational and fideistic self-hatred and self-flagellation whereby an intermediate goal (hatred of one's sins) would become the goal.⁹⁵⁵ Hence, the knowledge of the law, the knowledge of one's self and sins, a comparison of the two, and the resulting sorrow and humbling of self were part of this order, for Buddeus. They fit into the rational process by which a person knew something, compared and judged something (their sins), and properly despised the evil thing. In this way the intellect and the will worked together as they were intended to. The theological language of conversion, repentance, and illumination shimmer into place in this psychological model where understanding and intention (free determining) matter for salvation. Insofar as they are psychological experiences, they reflect a process of healing (or hallowing) that is not antithetical to the nature of the human being

Ruelsen er fornøden til at tæmme Selv-Kiærligheden, thi den, der vil gjøre bood, maa kiende Loven, og af Loven lære at kiende sine Synder. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:183–84.

⁹⁵³ Evil as *privatio boni*. Evil as no metaphysical existence, see Augustine and basically all the classical Christian and Neoplatonic traditions. For a short discussion of evil and this tradition, see Milbank, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon*, 1–12. Milbank contrasts a ontologically positive account of evil with the traditional Augustinian doctrine of privation.

⁹⁵⁴ *dagligen gjøre Poenitentze*, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:184.

⁹⁵⁵ This is not to deny that some sense of sorrow or even disgust over the self is required (*alvorlig Sønderknuselse og Sorg*), but it is a *rational* disgust over one's sins, not an absolute hatred of oneself (the created and beloved creature of God). One is not getting rid of self-love entirely, only righting the order of loves. Buddeus, 1:184. Again, this is why Buddeus is not a mystical annihilist, it suggests that even being creatures of God, there are no reasons to love oneself (by love, one means to will a blissful end for the object).

as free. In fact, the *ordo salutis* must work with the one type of freedom (the freedom of indeterminacy or philosophical freedom), aided by grace, in order to renew the proper type of freedom (freedom to love the true good and act out of that love or spiritual freedom). One also sees hints here of the importance of rationality and intentionality for human flourishing and truly free human action.

There was no magic or mystical transformation in this *ordo salutis*, for Buddeus. Divine grace was present, but a person never ceased to be human.⁹⁵⁶ Never was human functioning overwritten by irresistible or (mechanically) efficacious grace.⁹⁵⁷ Theologically, this type of grace was possible, but it was impossible that the result of such a cause was a freely

⁹⁵⁶ This is Buddeus's argument against an understanding of the union with God as a substantial transformation, see Buddeus, 1:254. This insight is also present in Joachim Lange's insistence that God's grace (or providence of God understood in a particular, not common, sense) does not work against nature but only as a particular *influence* upon on nature to achieve special effects and direction. Lange, *Bescheidene Und Ausführliche Entdeckung Der Falschen Und Schädlichen Philosophie in Dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico Von Gott, Der Welt, Und Dem Menschen*, 71. Lange's worry here and earlier in his book (pp. 55-60) is to secure the possibility of God's providential activity without insisting that any special action on God's part effectively must re-create the order and structure of the world. If the world is defined purely in mechanical and mathematical terms, God's special actions (miracles) introduce extra 'energy' into the physical world: thus technically destroying the previous mathematical/mechanical order. Lange's concern to preserve the structure of the world can also be read into the nature of sanctification as a healing vs. an overturning of human nature.

⁹⁵⁷ See, my discussion in chapter four and also Lied, "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism." Rather than reading efficacious or irresistible grace as mechanical, it is also possible to read efficacious grace from the viewpoint of eternal foresight (pro-vidence). This might be Buddeus's view but thus it cannot be understood to be *irresistible* grace from the point of view of human action. For Buddeus, God's actions towards us are dependent upon our status as reasonable creatures--human beings are not rocks, therefore all grace is 'resistible'. Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:39.

determined human action.⁹⁵⁸ In any such theoretical model, salvation remained a wholly external matter⁹⁵⁹ or ontologically destructive of human nature.⁹⁶⁰

5.4.4 Return to Ewald

I have not given Ewald much attention in the previous section, although I addressed the *ordo salutis* in the latter half. As discussed above, Ewald also operated with two definitions of freedom: philosophical non-determinism and spiritual freedom. Philosophical non-determinism is further confirmed in Ewald's treatment of grace and its resistibility. Human nature could not be overwritten because God's grace was not determinative, or mechanistic. On one hand, Ewald noted that God's grace was pervasive and that "on the contrary, the Lord's grace and its offer are so powerful, that it can bend even the hardest hearts."⁹⁶¹ Ewald noted that no one was required to "obstinately harden one's heart."⁹⁶² However, this was not a content-less grumpiness towards God, a pure willing of indifference. Rather, the majority of people rejected God's grace because they saw their bliss in worldly pleasures and advantages.⁹⁶³ In one sense, they exercised their philosophical freedom through an

⁹⁵⁸ One is dipping back here into the contemporary discussions about freedom. From my reading, Buddeus operates with two different definitions of freedom (which are ultimately compatible for the reborn and presumably angels). For more on this topic, see, Stump, "The Problem of Evil."

⁹⁵⁹ I am motivated here by Schindler's comments about divine law and divine reward/punishment as an external, not intrinsic, motivation in John Locke. Schindler notes that "what we have here is the replacement of the simultaneous unity of the transcendent and the immanent in the classical conception of the good by an isolation of the moments, which are nonetheless connected, perhaps even *inseparably*, but only as *successive* moments: the immanent is connected to the transcendent through law, and the transcendent is connected to the immanent through reward or punishment." Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*, 34.

⁹⁶⁰ See above footnote about Buddeus's distrust of the substantial union with God as destructive of human nature.

⁹⁶¹ *Men HErrens Naade og dens Tilbydelse er derimod saa kraftig, at den kan bøye endog de haardeste Hierter.* Ewald, HH II, 106.

⁹⁶² *modtvilligen forhærder sit Hierte,* Ewald, HH II, 106.

⁹⁶³ Ewald, HH II, 107. In the same page, Ewald also writes, "what comes of this, is that they despise the offered grace and consider it much poorer than that which they own and possess, or strive and pursue of earthly

intellectual judgment and rejection of grace and its offerings, which was offset by a comparison with the worldly pleasures they possessed.⁹⁶⁴ They could even become embittered against spiritual things because they recognized that Christ's call "would draw them away from their earthly desires, and interfere with their unpermitted lusts."⁹⁶⁵ Ewald portrayed their decision as a rational argument against the call of grace: the weighing of options typical for un-determined freedom of the intellect and will. For Ewald, there were psychological justifications for their decision. Yet he recognized that justifications were not absolutes, and his understanding of philosophical freedom meant that no decision could not be reconsidered.⁹⁶⁶

5.5 Final Thoughts on Buddeus's *Moral Theology* and What Happens Next

Let's return for a final time in this chapter to Buddeus. The rest of Buddeus's book contains further descriptions of other "mixed" human faculties,⁹⁶⁷ their condition and ailments under sin (i.e., the fallen state), and the means of healing grace. Buddeus's section on the main means of grace, or sanctifying aids (*Saliggjørelsens Midler*), works its way through the *ordo salutis*'s steps or structure but always in light of the intellect's and will's essential roles in human action.⁹⁶⁸ Sanctifying aids were there to help the intellect and the will progress through the *ordo*. A prime example is the important place Buddeus gave of the philosophical study of virtue. In contrast, the other human faculties did not receive as much notice or

things" (*deraf kommer det, at de foragte den tilbudne Naade, og agte den meget ringere, end som det, de eye og besidde af de jordiske Ting, eller og stræbe og tragte efter*).

⁹⁶⁴ The problem does arise whether it is a fully rational decision or comparison taken with a perfect understanding of God's offer of grace. That they reject God demonstrates they are not spiritually free-remember Buddeus's definition of spiritual freedom depends on right understanding.

⁹⁶⁵ *ville afdrage dem fra deres Jordiske Beierligheder, og forstyrre saaledes deres formeente Lyst*. Ewald, HH II, 107.

⁹⁶⁶ At least until death, and then possibly after as the final chapter will explore.

⁹⁶⁷ By this, Buddeus means the abilities of the human being that involve perhaps both the intellect and will or the intellect and the body. See Max Wundt's discussion of Buddeus, Wundt, "Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," 72.

⁹⁶⁸ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:674, sqq.

sanctifying aids. There was potentially a great sense of the body's, imagination's, and affections' positive influence on the human being, for example, with sacraments and liturgy forming habits of worship and prayer or connecting to a larger community. Still, the sacraments received only minimal attention from Buddeus, and his focus was on the individual's use of the sacraments, not participation in an ecclesial community.⁹⁶⁹ Yet Buddeus was wary of bad company and the dangers of peer pressure,⁹⁷⁰ and no one can reasonably deny that the Pietist movement embraced community and common study of the Bible. Here again one meets in Buddeus theological advice drawn from daily experience. The whole of the *ordo* in Buddeus and his reflections on the means of grace evince this basic assumption. The spiritual life must be a human life and must be an answer to the dangers, temptations, and sinful distortions that the world presents to humans as a result of their perverted will.

When the *ordo salutis* was codified and transformed into specific conversion experiences that signaled one's salvation,⁹⁷¹ a mechanical understanding of grace and salvation loomed in the background. This was, ironically, the very process Buddeus tried to avoid. In my view, this process is expedited when one fails to recognize the specific human anthropology Buddeus advanced. The other option is to divorce theological language about the *ordo* from human action and internal human structural realities and to label such attempts as synergistic.

⁹⁶⁹ Buddeus, 1:701–12. At least in this first part of the *Moral Theology*, the focus is on the individual. The second and third parts, found in volume two, have a more communal focus, though again the sacraments do not have a major role. See, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740. 2.

⁹⁷⁰ He speaks of the dangers of bad crowds (as a professor, he is particularly sensitive to the potential temptations of the university experience). Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:753.

⁹⁷¹ See discussion in Strom, *German Pietism and the Problem of Conversion*.

Historically, major disruptions to Buddeus's eudemonistic moral theology came in the form of libertarian understandings of the will's indifference, or equilibrium.⁹⁷² It is clear that the question of freedom was not settled; on the horizon were the 1720s debates between Joachim Lange, Christian Wolff, Buddeus, and Walch over the freedom of the will.⁹⁷³ The tensions in the debate related to how both types of freedom (freedom from mechanical determination and freedom to will the known good) were considered together. Wolff did not deny the will's ur-orientation towards the good, but his mechanical system and passivity of the intellect indicated a necessary determination towards particular known goods.⁹⁷⁴ To escape this mechanical determination, he introduced spontaneity as a mental possibility.⁹⁷⁵ On the part of Lange, his desire to secure freedom and avoid determination towards particular known goods (Wolff's paradigm) almost overrode the will's essential orientation towards the good. This tendency possibly pushed in the direction of equilibrium.⁹⁷⁶ Later, with

⁹⁷² Consider the fact that Hennings indicates his disagreement with Walch's understanding of freedom by inserted comments in 1775 edited Lexicon, compare Walch and Gleditsch, "Freyheit des Willens"; Walch and Hennings, "Freyheit des Willens."

⁹⁷³ For discussions of this debate, see Schmidt-Biggemann, "Praktische Philosophie Als Provokation: Christian Wolffs Philosophie in Der Ideenpolitik Der Frühaufklärung"; Bianco, "Freiheit Gegen Fatalismus. Zu Joachim Langes Kritik an Wolff"; Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:18–66.

⁹⁷⁴ See Grote's and Bianco's discussions. Also, Wolff as cited in Lange, "Der Mensch, der etwas als besser erkennt, kan das schlimmere dem dessern unmöglich vorziehen; und also erwehlet er dass bessere nothwendig, Aug der andern Seite: der Mensch wird nicht gezwungen das bessere zu erwehlen, weil er auch das schlimmere erwehlen könnte..." Lange, *Bescheidene Und Ausführliche Entdeckung Der Falschen Und Schädlichen Philosophie in Dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico Von Gott, Der Welt, Und Dem Menschen*, 140. In my view, Wolff on freedom represents something of the older traditional understanding of freedom, though the mechanistic aspect of the world is problematic.

⁹⁷⁵ See, Sgarbi, *Kant on Spontaneity*, 23–26..

⁹⁷⁶ I am not yet fully clear about this aspect in Lange. Lange notes that imagined reasons can prompt the free will to decide or determine itself, but not force the will. Lange, *Bescheidene Und Ausführliche Entdeckung Der Falschen Und Schädlichen Philosophie in Dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico Von Gott, Der Welt, Und Dem Menschen*, 45. Essentially, Lange defines freedom as the ability to determine oneself, although this liberty is directed by the intellect, Lange, 69–70. Consider also the later Pietist Christian August Crusius who defines perfect freedom as the freedom of indifference, thus locating freedom fully in self-activity and indeterminacy. See Crusius, *Anweisung vernünftig zu leben*, 60–62.

the Pietist Christian August Crusius, freedom became essentially associated with self-activity and not knowing *and* desiring the true good.⁹⁷⁷ In one fell swoop, both the will's naturally inescapable entanglement with perverted self-love and its natural (pre-sin) orientation towards the good were threatened.⁹⁷⁸ Pontoppidan's *Truth unto Godliness's* opening question ceased to be rhetorical and became actual.⁹⁷⁹ The natural eudemonistic structure whereby Pietists like Ewald spoke of God's enticement was undermined. Still, piety and loyalty preserved a Pietist theological framework long after the corresponding understanding of human nature and grace disappeared.⁹⁸⁰

The focus on freedom in the Early Modern era ran the risk of paying attention more to the philosophical definitions of freedom, non-determinacy, libertarianism, and indifference than the will's ur-orientation towards the good. What Buddeus and Pietism made clear even as they strongly affirmed a philosophical non-determinative freedom was that this freedom was secondary to the bondage of idolatrous self-love. Thus, there could be no spiritual freedom

⁹⁷⁷ This is not to say that Crusius abandons the inclination of the will and the role reasoning and rational plays here. Sometimes, no freedom is possible because there will be too much reasons or resistance against a certain action. (Crusius, *Anweisung vernünftig zu leben*, 61.) But his definition of *perfect* freedom as freedom of indifference undermines the distinction between true goods and merely apparent goods. Any potential inclination or influence on the will destroys perfect freedom. Thus, even God's seducing glory and beauty inhibits perfect freedom. This is also one of D. C. Schindler's main arguments in Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*, 1–129, esp. 81.

⁹⁷⁸ This is a complicated debate that seems to also derive from the apparent divide in Christian Wolff's thought between the physically determined body (body as a machine) and thus the self-determining soul. The Pietists (Lange, Walch, Buddeus) advocated for a more permeable distinction between body and soul, but did not want to insist that physical causes were fully determinative for mental events-hence the language of prompting or certainty but not forcing or necessity.

⁹⁷⁹ See my discussion above in chapter three. See also, Pontoppidan, *Sannhet Til Gudfryktighet: Forklaring over Martin Luthers Lille Katekisme*.

⁹⁸⁰ Consider that the Pietist Erik Pontoppidan's catechism was considered the layman's dogmatic theology for nearly 150 years in Norway, Aarflot, *Hans Nielsen Hauge : Liv Og Budskap*, 49. How it was understood, interpreted and taught is another investigation. Consider Austad's worry that Pontoppidan presented a synergistic picture of grace, see my discussion in chapter four and Austad, "Mennesket Og Nåden. Til Forståelse Av Bakgrunnen for Erik Pontoppidans Lære Om Frelsestilegnelsen."

for the un-reborn. But even the fact of idolatrous self-love depended on a primary determinism of the will and the intellect: namely, that the will was orientated towards the good. Without this ur-orientation, idolatrous self-love became a brute fact—act of madness—rather than an understandable (semi-rational) error and sin.⁹⁸¹ Buddeus knew this instinctively when he commented that an evil cannot be desired as an evil but has to be desired as an apparent good.⁹⁸² Thus, bliss was to be sought in every desire and reasoned decision, even if never found. But put in its proper form and in consideration of the indeterminacy of the human desire for finite objects, in every particular desire, God, the infinite object and Bliss and Goodness itself, was to be sought.⁹⁸³ Until one was free to know and desire God, the philosophical freedom of indetermination would grasp at all finite objects and be satisfied with none. This was the proper understanding of the will's ur-orientation towards Goodness. Buddeus was aware that God as the infinite object was the proper object of human will (human love),⁹⁸⁴ but the description of God as an infinite object did not trigger a concept of God as transcendent or Goodness—the divine remained the greatest Good (*det Største Gode*).⁹⁸⁵ Since the divine was an infinite object alongside all other finite objects, indeterminate human freedom was free to reject it for another.⁹⁸⁶

⁹⁸¹ And thus, it is fair to ask, can one punish the madman?

⁹⁸² "Is it possible, that the humans love the evil [thing/action], as an evil? Resp. no, but that they love it, happens because it comes to them under the appearance of some seeming good" (*Om det er muligt, at Menneskene elske det Onde, som ont? Resp. Ney, men at de elske det, det skeer, fordi det forekommer dem under den Skikkelse af noget siunligt Got*) Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:153.

⁹⁸³ See, Meditation 4 of Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*. This is a main premise also in Talbott, *The Inescapable Love of God*. And, of course, Plotinus via Augustine; "you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you." Augustinus and Chadwick, *Confessions*, 1.1.

⁹⁸⁴ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:178.

⁹⁸⁵ Buddeus, 1:178. For some insights into God as the greatest good vs. God as infinite goodness, see, Johannes Hoff's analysis of the "domestication of the infinite in Early Modernity" in Hoff, "The Rise and Fall of the Kantian Paradigm of Modern Theology."

⁹⁸⁶ For a modern characterization of this dilemma of human freedom and our essential orientation towards the Good, see again David Bentley Hart's Fourth Meditation in Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*., which I outlined briefly above. This chapter and its importance for the final chapter on *apokatastasis* draws heavily on Hart's argumentation against hell being locked from the inside-i.e. that one's libertarian free will means that we

5.6 Conclusion

The last half of this chapter has been a demonstration of how the *ordo* as conceived by Ewald can be characterized as the path towards true spiritual freedom, that is, salvation. Buddeus operated from the theological assumption that salvation was foremost the healing of the inwardly damaged human being, so that people might be united with God in bliss.⁹⁸⁷ Since this union, for Buddeus, was primarily an affective union,⁹⁸⁸ humans must be put to right so as to enact this union. They must again become capable of perfectly loving the truest and highest good. Thus, the manner and mode of this capacity is united with the structural functioning of the human being. For as Buddeus notes

The freedom of the human will is this, that he wants to love the things which belong to his true and perfect bliss, and it does not hinder freedom, for freedom is given to humans for their bliss, and not for their perversion. Ergo it is not a sign of imperfection among the angels and the blessed, that they cannot sin, for otherwise they were less blissful, as far as they could sin. The freedom of the human will consist therein, that the human has determined himself to chose and love that, which belongs to the promotion of his true bliss; This is true freedom.⁹⁸⁹

might ultimately reject God. Hart argues that such a model is folly given that to be free ultimately is not merely to choose but to choose well (i.e. the good). My contribution is only to insist that hidden within Buddeus's understanding of the human will is a model pre-disposed towards God as goodness itself, where perfect freedom must be the freedom to love the only adequate 'object' of the undetermined will, the infinite God. See, also Schindler, *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*. for another excellent discussion of early modern freedom and the disappearance of the classical conception of being orientated towards the good in John Locke's thought.

⁹⁸⁷ Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:246–48; Buddeus, *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*, 1.IV.LXXXV.

⁹⁸⁸ *affectus unionis*, or a moral-transformation, see Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:194, also For-Lecture 90. This notion of an affective union with God was common for pietism according to Stoeffler, *German Pietism during the Eighteenth Century*, 215. Of course, Martin Schmidt argues that this understanding of partaking in the divine nature only becomes a moral transfiguration in later Pietism, see Schmidt, "Teilnahme an der göttliche Natur."

⁹⁸⁹ *Menneskets Villies Frihed er denne, da han vil og elsker de Ting, som høre til hans sande of fuldkomne Lyksalighed, og det hindrer ikke hans Frihed, thi Friheden er givet Menneskene til deres Lyksalighed, og ikke til*

The *ordo salutis* becomes *how* the human is healed and hallowed and this is, by necessity, a psychological description.⁹⁹⁰ Free, natural human actions are never overruled, though they must be aided by grace. That grace is resistible indicates that the first act of repentance is *freely* taken/determined in the philosophical sense. Still, the final end of the *ordo*, bliss, is also the natural, or proper, end of the human will properly understood. Hence, in the *ordo* the will is determined towards bliss and yet undetermined in its particular intentional actions (specific actions of repentance). The weakness here in Walch's or even Ewald's thought is that freedom is often defined more in negative terms—freedom from determination, even freedom from sin. There are indications of freedom in a positive sense as related to bliss or flourishing in Buddeus's moral theology, but I wonder if the Early Modern debates are beginning to drown out this older notion in favor of indifference, spontaneity, and indetermination in later Pietist writings.

What remains for me to address in this dissertation is a return to *apokatastasis* and the restoration of all things. I will discuss the historical situation at the time, given Ewald's profession of this doctrine, before investigating more closely Ludwig Gerhard's ardent defense of universalism.

deres Fordervelse, Ergo er det ikke noget ufuldkommenheds Tegn hos Englene og de Salige, at de ikke kunne synde, thi ellers vare de mindre lyksalige, saa fremt de kunde synde. Menneskets Villie Frihed bestaaer deri, at Mennesket har determineret sig til at udvælge og elske det, som høre til hans sande Lyksaligheds befordring; Det er den sande Frihed... Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:159.

⁹⁹⁰However, if one has a different understanding of the 'operational mechanics' of human action, particularly mental action, the picture that Buddeus draws fails. It simply ceases to work if one does not understand the human being as naturally desirous of the good or if the libertarian/indifferent understanding of the free will prevails. Such understandings of the human mind must begin to understand faith as 'groundless', beyond reasoning, pure willing or completely passively 'received.' Buddeus's understanding of the human being is already situated within a constant interchange of reception, action, and reflection: a miraculous and purely passive reception of faith wars with the perverted nature of our will and intellect.

Chapter 6: Pietism, Ludwig Gerhard, and Apokatastasis

In the following section I begin with discussing why further clarification about universalism, or *apokatastasis*, is useful for understanding Ewald's thought. After this, I will examine what historical forms of universalism were available to Ewald and what the contemporary Early Modern debate reveals. Finally, I will discuss in more detail the arguments for universalism found in Ludwig Gerhard's *Kurtzer Begriff des ewigen Evangelii von deren Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, Gerhard being seen as the principal proponent of the doctrine in the late 1720s. The chapter will conclude with some thoughts on Ewald and universalism.

6.1 Why does *apokatastasis* matter?

Above in Chapter 2 and the end of Chapter 3, I sketched out how Ewald's trial, particularly his confession of the doctrine of *apokatastasis* and his enforced silence around the matter, complicate my reading of his *ordo salutis*. What I have come to realize is that Ewald's silence and thus a silence in the scholarship, which attempts to stay close to the words on the page, hinders an understanding of Ewald's theology. Without more speculative historical and explicitly theological and philosophical deliberation, misunderstandings about the nature of millennialism/chiliasm and *apokatastasis* remain. Thomas Bredsdorff's examination of Ewald's trial and Christian David's short treatise *De Otto Saligheder* may hold true about his cultural argument about the Enlightenment but Bredsdorff's analysis is a theological oversimplification with a focus on progress in this world. As mentioned above, at best, it ignores questions about premillennialism versus post-millennialism and questions of the nature of grace, although his analysis serves the purposes of his cultural argument well.⁹⁹¹ The problem is that among Christian universalists (a modern designation for someone who believes that all may/will be saved) there is a range of opinions. In the current theological

⁹⁹¹ See Bredsdorff's length discussion of Enevold Ewald, Christian David and Count Zinzendorf, Bredsdorff, *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*, 18–78.

Bredsdorff makes the claim about Ewald's theology as enabling progress on p. 59. Compare the longer discussion of the political implications and expressions of apocalyptic and chilastic thought in the Early Modern period, see Lausten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*, 61–77; Alsted et al., *Alsted and Leibniz: On God, the Magistrate and the Millennium*, 127, sqq.

debate, there is a distinction between “hopeful” universalists (God may save everyone, i.e., it is not required that anyone be eternally damned or annihilated) and dogmatic universalists who treat the doctrine as a necessary theological doctrine (God shall or will save all).⁹⁹² Neither can it be assumed that present-day Christian universalism is synonymous with ultra-universalism (automatic heaven). Christian universalists like Robin Parry, Thomas Talbott, and David Bentley Hart maintain a place for hell in their theology, just not an eternal place.⁹⁹³ There are more recent historical treatments that have painted an overview of Christian universalism, noting its variants and different forms.⁹⁹⁴ But how does one distinguish these variants if all that is left is a short confession, like Ewald’s comments during his trial? Consider

⁹⁹² This division is given as Hopeful Universalism and Convinced Universalism in Dyrness et al., “Universalism.” Other modern universalists, like Gregory Macdonald [Robin Parry] speak of dogmatic universalism, see, MacDonald, *The Evangelical Universalist: The Biblical Hope That God’s Love Will Save Us All*. Even this distinction may point towards a greater tendency within even parts of the mainstream theological world (laity, academics and even church authorities) to accept a universalist *hope*. Roberto De La Noval remarks on this phenomenon in the Catholic and Orthodox spheres and furthermore notes, “What is more, universalist axioms like the idea that God’s punishment is always restorative and not retributive are so in the water at this point that they are likely effecting change in other doctrinal spheres, as witnessed in the Catholic Church’s recent categorical condemnation of capital punishment. Formerly an obvious given, the very logic of eternal damnation, both in Christian communities and outside them, is becoming more and more incomprehensible.” De La Noval, “Divine Drama or Divine Disclosure? Hell, Universalism, and a Parting of the Ways.” A historical treatment of this doctrine, especially within the purview of church history, is tacitly in conversation with the modern theological considerations. Prior historical scholarship which treats figures like Gerhard or Siegvolk as heretics purely on the ground of universalism must be read carefully. Insofar this label fits the traditional or historical mainstream theological picture, that is one thing, but to begin from a viewpoint that such a doctrine is heretical is to invite modern theological considerations to the table.

⁹⁹³ See chapter six in MacDonald, *The Evangelical Universalist: The Biblical Hope That God’s Love Will Save Us All*; Talbott, *The Inescapable Love of God*, 75-101. David Bentley Hart reads Paul as speaking of two eschatological horizons, the first of which has space for judgment and purgation of hatred. Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*, 103–9. Even the ardent opponent of universalism, Michael McClymond, acknowledges that a belief in universal salvation does not only arise from one doctrinal system. McClymond, *The Devil’s Redemption*, 939.

⁹⁹⁴ Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena*; Ramelli and Bauckham, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 1 : Universal Salvation from Christian Beginnings to Julian of Norwich.*; Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*; McClymond, *The Devil’s Redemption*.

for instance, the disagreement about Kierkegaard's single comment apparently endorsing universalism.⁹⁹⁵ Yet it is more perilous to overlook Ewald's confession than to speculate about it as Bredsdorff did; one loses a grasp of Ewald's wider systematic theology. It is, after all, about the end of things—the aim of Ewald's *ordo salutis* writ large. Parry, a modern Evangelical defender of Christian universalism, commenting on J. Robinson's universalism, notes,

[A]t the very heart of this book [Robinson's] lies a profound insight: that eschatology is not a road map for the future (in the sense that fundamentalists think that it is) but is, rather, a function of our doctrine of God....As Robinson says, eschatology is "the explication of what must be true of the end, both of history and of the individual, if God is to be the God of biblical faith."⁹⁹⁶

Ewald and his fellow adherents to the doctrine of universal salvation were not unaware of this aspect of eschatology, as will be discussed below. Thus, as one reaches the final step of Ewald's *ordo salutis*, it is fitting to see how, by taking seriously Ewald's confession and what it entails about his understanding of God, the lens through which his texts can be read shifts. The main purpose in a theological reading of Ewald is not to discern the degree of his 'heretical' opinions.⁹⁹⁷ Rather, it is to seek the ways in which Ewald expressed a coherent theological picture. Perhaps Ewald even avoided the divided self that Lutheran Pietism created.⁹⁹⁸

⁹⁹⁵ See, Eller, *Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship*, 284–85; Mulder, "Must All Be Saved? A Kierkegaardian Response to Theological Universalism"; Dyrness et al., "Universalism."

⁹⁹⁶ Robinson and Parry, *In the End, God ... : A Study of the Christian Doctrine and the Last Things*, Foreword.

⁹⁹⁷ See the Christensen's good summary of the historical record on Ewald which was primarily concerned with Ewald's theological orthodoxy or whether he was more expressive of a Halle-pietism or Moravian pietism. Christensen, "Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram."

⁹⁹⁸ Bente and Torben Bramming, biographers of the famous Danish Pietist hymnist, Hans Adolph Brorson, speak of the divided self in Brorson. They refer to the practical emphasis on the life of faith that Pietism preached, that one must be perfect (interpreted as a burden, not a release) and the Lutheran emphasis on righteousness alone through Christ. Bramming and Bramming, "Brorson Inspirerede Både Kierkegaard Og Andersen." As this chapter argues, this is part of what Ludwig Gerhard is trying to address.

6.2 Possible Influences on Ewald

The first step in addressing Ewald's confession of *apokatastasis* is to identify the likely form of his universalism. Above in chapter 3, I listed the contemporary works in his library sale catalog defending *apokatastasis*. This list alone does not guarantee Ewald's agreement with the form of Christian universalism contained in these texts. However, their presence in his library combined with his trial confession make these texts likely sources for his structure of Christian universalism.⁹⁹⁹

Besides the books and treatises, other possible influences on Ewald's position were his circle of friends and associates. It was suggested to me that Count Zinzendorf and/or Johann Conrad Dippel could have been important to Ewald's thought because of the historical circumstances (Zinzendorf knew Ewald and was a prominent instigator of the Pietist conventicles in Copenhagen in the early 1730s, and a group of Dippel's followers were expelled from Sweden in the spring and early summer of 1734, arriving off the coast of Copenhagen. They caused a large stir in Pietist circles at the time).¹⁰⁰⁰ Neither of these influences can be ruled out as Ewald owned books by both Zinzendorf and Dippel.¹⁰⁰¹ Members of the Moravian Brethren, possibly Zinzendorf himself, have been linked to Christian universalism.¹⁰⁰² On the historical

⁹⁹⁹ One could also compare Ewald's library to his fellow Danish Pietist, Erik Pontoppidan. Pontoppidan's library catalog contains as well a number of contemporary texts arguing for *apokatastasis*, but it also includes some of the contemporary texts attacking the doctrine, *Catalogus Librorum*, esp. 81. At the very least, Pontoppidan's library indicates an interest in the debate itself, regardless of whether he agreed or disagreed with the doctrine. Ewald's library seems lacks these opposing treatises. Possibly, the historical debate was not as interesting to him, though this is speculation.

¹⁰⁰⁰ For more details and the dates related to this arrival, see Rørdam, "Svenske Emigranter Ophold i Danmark," 48–63.

¹⁰⁰¹ See Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*, 9, 31, 33–34.

¹⁰⁰² See, Zinzendorf, *Sixteen Discourses on the Redemption of Man by the Death of Christ*, 34, Discourse 3. A confirmed universalist was Peter Bohler [Böhler] who met and was a mentor or teacher to John Wesley. Wesley, *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley*, 180–87. George Whitefield in a letter to John Wesley, notes that "You cannot make good the assertion that Christ died for them that perish without holding (as Peter Bohler, one of the Moravian brethren, in order to make out universal redemption, lately frankly confessed in letter) that all the damned souls would hereafter be brought out of hell." cited in, Lay, *Readings in Historical Theology: Primary Sources of the Christian Faith*, 339. As an interesting point against an instantaneous

front, Zinzendorf is well within the time frame as a possible influence, but he is not listed among the historical defenders of the doctrine in Zedler's encyclopedia, the most important German encyclopedia of the 18th century.¹⁰⁰³ Dippel, on the other hand, is listed in Zedler's as a defender of the doctrine, but no specific treatise of his is listed. Rather, Dippel's teaching on a middle condition after death and his denial of eternal/unending damnation are given as evidence.¹⁰⁰⁴ Zedler cited Walch's history of the Lutheran church debates, which in turn was drawn from a summary of Dippel's system given in the German journal *Unschuldigen Nachrichten*, as evidence of his position.¹⁰⁰⁵ In one of Dippel's own treatises included in his *Vera demonstratio evangelica* (1729), the treatise concludes with an affirmation of the restoration of all things (that God will be all in all), but Dippel refused to get involved in further speculation about the end times.¹⁰⁰⁶ In terms of the historical timeline, however, while Ewald

understanding of sanctification, Wesley comments on a conversation he had with Bohler. Bohler denies that any sin-free perfection exists in this present life and that "the old man will remain till death. The *old nature* is like an old tooth. You may break off one bit, and another and another. but you can never get it all away." Wesley, *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley*, 347. For a longer discussion of Wesley and Böhler, see Jordan, "The Chronicle of Peter Böehler, Who Led John and Charles Wesley to the Full Light of the Gospel." The theme of God's *will* to save all is discussed in the article, but universal redemption or the *apokatastasis* is not directly named.

¹⁰⁰³ See Zedler, "Wiederbringung aller Dinge."

¹⁰⁰⁴ Zedler, 1913. Affirming this, Dippel's modern biographer, Stephen Goldschmidt, also notes "*Ansonsten finden sich noch verstreute Hinweise darauf, dass Dippel von einer Allversöhnung ausging...Ausführlich ist Dippel der Frage der Apokatastasis in seinem Werk nirgends nachgegangen*". Goldschmidt, *Johann Konrad Dippel (1673-1734): Seine Radikalpietistische Theologie Und Ihre Entstehung*, 39:251. Goldschmidt essentially downplays the importance of *apokatastasis* for Dippel, though he notes that a contemporary of Dippel, Johann Sensti, thought it was a key dogma for one of Dippel's books. Goldschmidt, 39:251–52.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1733, 2:738–45.

¹⁰⁰⁶ After confirming that God will be all in all, Dippel writes "*Was es aber mit deisen Jungsten Tage, mit der Auferstehung des Fleisches, und der Vertilgung, oder Verneurung dieser Welt in dem Feuer, von eigentliche Umstände und Beschaffenheiten habe, wird die Zeit, und nicht unsere Muhtmassung entdecken*." Dippel, *Vera Demonstratio Evangelica*, Grund-Riss zu einem solchen Systemate Theologico, 117. This could indicate Dippel did not have the same millenarian and chiliastic interests as the Petersen-circle did. For more on the development of Dippel's eschatology, see Goldschmidt, *Johann Konrad Dippel (1673-1734): Seine Radikalpietistische Theologie Und Ihre Entstehung*, 39:250–66.

might have had access to Dippel's *Vera demonstratio evangelica* (1729) before his trial, the Dippelians from Sweden who caused a stir in Copenhagen arrived a few months *after* Ewald's trial. This historical timeline means that speculation about Dippel's influence on Ewald pre-trial puts him into the same possible situation as the other authors listed in the catalog. If Ewald's *apokatastasis* was solely dependent on Dippel's influence, one might expect higher praise to be given to Dippel in Ewald's chronology. Instead, Ewald gave a measured judgement of Dippel's texts, noting that "here and there were some intelligent assessments."¹⁰⁰⁷ But one need not rely on Dippel alone as a source for Ewald's confession of *apokatastasis*; there were other more prominent contemporary defenders of universalism.

6.3 The Contemporary Debate about Pietist Universalism: Who were the major figures?

A good place to begin my examination of the circle of Ewald's contemporary defenders of *apokatastasis* are the contemporary and near-contemporary assessments of the doctrine and debate.¹⁰⁰⁸ What did the people involved in the debate (conducted via books and treatises) think of it? Which works were most important? As mentioned above, Zedler's encyclopedia provides a good overview of the debate.¹⁰⁰⁹ For Zedler, the debate was explicitly tied to the

¹⁰⁰⁷"findes tilforn her og der nogen Efterretning". Ewald, *Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ Novi Testamenti Index Chronologicus*, 891. This suggests Ewald read Dippel's works and had a measured approval for his thought. This description does not suggest Dippel's theology was accepted wholesale by Ewald. In the description, Ewald notes Dippel's death on 25. April 1734 and that he wrote against Lutheran priests, their doctrines and ways of teaching.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Modern possibilities include: Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*; McClymond, *The Devil's Redemption*; Groth, *Die "Wiederbringung Aller Dinge" Im Württembergischen Pietismus*. The last-named mentions Zinzendorf briefly and the Petersens more extensively, but Dippel, Siegelvolck, and Gerhard not at all.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Printed from 1731 to 1754, this encyclopedia series is considered the most important German-language encyclopedia of the 18th century and spans 68 volumes. The contemporary German debate over *apokatastasis* is covered in volume 55 (printed 1748) under *Wiederbringung aller Dinge* (Restoration of all things), columns 1908-1995. Zedler or the author of this entry often cites Georg Walch's history of the debates within the Lutheran Church. See, Zedler, "Wiederbringung aller Dinge." For the online version see, <https://www.zedler-lexikon.de/index.html?c=zedlerinfo&l=en>.

Petersens, rather than Pietism. Zedler was careful to insist that Philip Spener and the Halle theologians did not defend the doctrine (although apparently Joachim Lange thought the doctrine was not unreasonable).¹⁰¹⁰ A skeptical historian might read this article and Ewald's description of the many authors in support of chiliastic doctrines¹⁰¹¹ and conclude that the eschatological debate was indeed intertwined with Pietism.¹⁰¹² Besides describing the issues involved, Zedler also listed books and treatises (mainly by German authors) written in defense of and in opposition to *apokatastasis*. One hundred and twenty works (or authors) that were published between 1691 and 1742 were described.¹⁰¹³ In all, 58 authors were opponents of the doctrine and 30 in support of the doctrine, including Gottfried Arnold, Dippel, Georg Klein-Nicolai, the Petersens, and Gerhard. There is no mention of the Württembergian universalist, Johann Albrecht Bengel (perhaps given the chronological limits or the focus on the Petersens). Johann Petersen was the most prolific author and his and his wife's texts received the most space. However, in Zedler's article, Gerhard essentially picked up the baton from Petersen

¹⁰¹⁰ Zedler, 1912. Now, Philip Jacob Spener was wary of Johanna Petersen against publishing her views, Albrecht, *Johanna Eleonora Petersen: Theologische Schriftstellerin Des Frühen Pietismus*, 45:290. But Wallman has argued successfully in my opinion that eschatology and millennialism was present in Spener's thought from an early date, see Wallmann, "Pietismus Und Chiliasmus: Zur Kontroverse Um Philipp Jakob Speners» Hoffnung Besserer Zeiten «."

¹⁰¹¹ See my above analysis of the trial in chapter two.

¹⁰¹² Shantz seems to argue essentially this: "For a long time, church historians regarded Spener's "hope for better times" simply as a teaching, which stood only in loose connection to his Pietist pursuits. In recent years a more nuanced picture has emerged, which goes so far as regarding chiliasm as the true motor behind Spener's Pietist endeavors. The nature and extent of Spener's chiliasm cannot be clearly determined, and was discussed by the theologians Johannes Wallmann and Kurt Aland in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, it is no longer an issue." Shantz, *A Companion to German Pietism, 1660-1800*, 150. I remain slightly confused at Shantz's final assessment that Spener's chiliasm is no longer an issue. Is he implying that historians are less concerned about portraying Spener and other Pietist figures as perfectly orthodox Lutherans, or that chiliasm has little impact on the rest of Spener's theology, or that historians have reached the end of the historical evidence and can only speculate now? I would argue that the debate over *apokatastasis* is essential for understanding the theological implications of Ewald's texts.

¹⁰¹³ Jane Lead, the English Philadelphian, is listed first. The list is mainly of specific books but a few figures get their own entry without being tied to a specific written defense of the doctrine. Lead's presence on the list enforces the fact that the entry examines the doctrine in its Petersen variant.

and renewed the debate.¹⁰¹⁴ Gerhard's book, *Systema Apokatastaseos. Ein vollständiger Lehr-Begriff des ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge* (1727), was described briefly in the encyclopedia, and after its publication, the opponents of the doctrine focused their treatises on responding to Gerhard.¹⁰¹⁵

Zedler's near contemporary description of the debate is echoed in other quarters: Gerhard's book was a bombshell and became a target for theological debate in the late 1720s and 1730s. Although the famed Pietist historian Albrecht Ritschel listed Gerhard only briefly as another defender of the restoration of all things, following Petersen, he also wrote that Petersen and Gerhard elevated the doctrine to the question of the day.¹⁰¹⁶ Modern scholarship on Gerhard is practically non-existent,¹⁰¹⁷ yet Gerhard's contemporaries thought him important enough

¹⁰¹⁴ Zedler (or the article's author) writes " *Nachdem aber gleichwohl das Werck [Gerhard's Systema (1727)] schon hin und wieder bekannt worden war, und das durch verursachte Aergerniss sich ausgebreitet hatte, so fanden andere vor nöthig, in öffentlichen Schrifften darwider zu zeugen...*" Zedler, "Wiederbringung aller Dinge," 1940.

¹⁰¹⁵ Walch lists fourteen books or treatises that were aimed at refuting Gerhard's 'system', Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:268–74. In Zedler, most of the books opposing *Wiederbringung aller Dinge* published after Gerhard's are against Gerhard's system.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ritschl, *Geschichte Des Pietismus. Band 1, Der Pietismus in Der Reformirten Kirche*, 452. Another older German historian, Gustav Frank, mentions Gerhard and writes that Gerhard's dedication of the work to Johann Franz Buddeus was malicious. Franz describes a bit of Gerhard's argument and the replies to it from Moshem and Walch, Frank, *Geschichte Der Protestantischen Theologie Vol. 2*, 2:189–90. Frank's assessment of Gerhard's dedication as malicious is telling. Gerhard is the sneering villain towards the well-regarded theologian, Buddeus. Consider however, Buddeus' own concession of the reasonableness of *apokatastasis* even as he ultimately rejects the doctrine on scriptural grounds. See, Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.III p. 488.

¹⁰¹⁷ In *The Devil's Redemption*, Michael McClymond only name drops Ludwig Gerhard, McClymond, *The Devil's Redemption*, 1009, 1089, 1090. The only real examination of Gerhard I have found is an article from 1974, Peschke, "Der Pietismus in Dargun." In older American scholarship on Universalism, Gerhard is mentioned in *The Universalist Quarterly and General Review*, v. 12 (1855). Here the author has apparent limited access to the texts, but he mentions Gerhard as an important contributor and on the period in general,

I will only add that the period I have here mentioned, is very rich in the fruits of an earnest controversy between the advocates of endless torments on the one side and those of universal

to respond to, as Ritschel acknowledged. Walch devoted over 250 pages of his history of the Lutheran church to refute Gerhard,¹⁰¹⁸ in comparison to his discussion of Petersen's *Mysterion Apokatastaseōs Pantōn, Das ist: Das Geheimniß Der Wiederbringung aller Dinge* to which he gave only twenty.¹⁰¹⁹ The later extension of Ludwig Holberg's church history also noted that Gerhard's book renewed the debate about the restoration of all things.¹⁰²⁰ This church history also discussed the doctrine and some of the post-Gerhard debate, noting the ambivalent position the "learned divines" took vis-à-vis the unending eternity of damnation. This history referred more to the wisdom of preaching and teaching this doctrine: was it a necessary article of faith? The ambivalence about eternal hell was allowed in the learned circles but not spoken about in the general public. The problem (especially for contemporaries) was that the Pietist defenders of the doctrine, the Petersens, Siegvolck, Gerhard,¹⁰²¹ desired to preach it to the majority.¹⁰²²

salvation on the other. With a very imperfect knowledge of what was passing then, I am acquainted with no less than thirty works on this subject, which appeared between 1725 and 1730. The works which appears in Germany in this controversy during the first half of the 18th century, would alone make a respectable library. Tompkins, *The Universalist Quarterly and General Review*, 12:86.

¹⁰¹⁸ Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:259–533.

¹⁰¹⁹ Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1733, 2:637–58. Walch's purposes here is to describe Petersen's volumes, not refute them.

¹⁰²⁰ Holberg's own doubts about the eternal punishment/hell is mentioned as well, Holberg and Køhler, *Herrn Ludwigs, Freyherrn von Holberg, Allgemeine Kirchenhistorie von Dem Jahr Christi 1700 Bis 1750*, 227. See, Gilje, "Ludvig Holbergs Origenisme: En Analyse Av Holbergs Syn På Helvetesstraffene." for a discussion of the possible Origenist influence in Holberg's thought.

¹⁰²¹ As evidenced from Gerhard's epitome aimed at the 'unstudied', the likely lay-audience of Paul Siegvolck's *The Everlasting Gospel*, and Johanna's and Johann Wilhelm's substantial publishing output (in German-not Latin). This tendency is also part of Jane Lead's project-Lead and her writings being a substantial influence on the Petersens. See, Petersen and Becker-Cantarino, *The Life of Lady Johanna Eleonora Petersen, Written by Herself: Pietism and Women's Autobiography in Seventeenth-Century Germany*, 15–17.

¹⁰²² Holberg and Køhler, *Herrn Ludwigs, Freyherrn von Holberg, Allgemeine Kirchenhistorie von Dem Jahr Christi 1700 Bis 1750*, 221–3. Holberg's (extended) history indicates this distinction between private and public theology was taken seriously and that there were concerns about the doctrine resulting in a moral laxity among the laity. The defenders of *apokatastasis* here appear more like moderns in their democratizing desire

As for Ewald, he included the publication of Gerhard's book in 1727 as a major event in his chronology.¹⁰²³ If nothing else, it is certain that this renewal of the debate over *apokatastasis* did not pass by unnoticed by him. Despite the lack of scholarly attention on Gerhard (the Petersens have received more attention recently),¹⁰²⁴ I believe this eschatological debate and its related issues were more mainstream in Lutheran theology and contemporary philosophical debates than the dearth of modern research interest suggests.¹⁰²⁵ Contemporary and near-contemporary sources painted it as a widely debated issue.

to preach it also to the majority (Gerhard has an entire chapter addressing this apparent concern about moral laxity). The contemporary prickly defender of a necessary universalism, David Bentley Hart, notes this worry is old indeed and that even among defenders of *apokatastasis* in the early centuries, "there was perhaps an overly pronounced willingness to indulge in a hint of holy duplicity, if that was what it took to inspire spiritual sobriety in the more obdurately cruel and brutish of the baptized." Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*, 200. Hart disagrees with this approach, as did Gerhard. Gerhard's epitome of his system is subtitled for the 'Unstudied' and an inspector named Wöllner at the Halle Orphanage actually put out a universalist catechism, titled: *Der heiligen Lehre von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge, und aus dem Worte Gottes den Einfältigen zu gute, in Frag und Antwort vorgestellt*, (1739?), Mentioned in Trinius, *Freydenker-Lexicon*, 852. Michael McClymond discusses the tensions between treating *apokatastasis* as an esoteric (private) doctrine and a public doctrine in his history of universalism. McClymond, *The Devil's Redemption*, 119, sqq. The German Pietist universalists went against this esoteric vs. exoteric division.

¹⁰²³ It is listed first for 1727 and printed in the largest font. Ewald's chronology, which is not a prose history, goes through each year and cites events according to importance in different size fonts for each year. In 1727, the publication of Gerhard's book (and the epitome published later) along with the number of quickly written responses by Buddeus, Mosheim, Stockman, Götz, Lampe, etc is listed. The establishment of Det Kongelige Vajsenhus in Copenhagen also in 1727/28 is given later in small font. Ewald, *Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ Novi Testamenti Index Chronologicus*, 876–77.

¹⁰²⁴ See, for instance, Albrecht, *Johanna Eleonora Petersen: Theologische Schriftstellerin Des Frühen Pietismus*; Petersen and Becker-Cantarino, *The Life of Lady Johanna Eleonora Petersen, Written by Herself: Pietism and Women's Autobiography in Seventeenth-Century Germany*. Markus Matthias also wrote an study of the Petersens' in their early years, Matthias, *Johann Wilhelm Und Johanna Eleonora Petersen: Eine Biographie Bis Zur Amtsenthebung Petersens Im Jahre 1692*.

¹⁰²⁵ Even Erik Pontoppidan is concerned with issues often related to the topic, such as the middle state of the soul in his treatise on the immortality of the soul and its condition after death. See in particular the last three chapters of his treatise, where he discusses the questions around instant sanctification or a middle condition (for the pious) and deep hell or prison of anguish (for the ungodly). See, Pontoppidan, *Tractat om Sielens*

If one accepts the contemporary assessments about *apokatastasis*, figures such as the Petersens and Gerhard as the leading defenders of the doctrine are important for Ewald's confession of the doctrine. If one must speculate about the form of Ewald's understanding of *apokatastasis*, the Petersens' ideas and Gerhard's defense are the most reasonable places to draw from. In this light, I will examine Gerhard's epitome of his system. There are practical and historical reasons to do so. The 1734 date of Ewald's trial situates it close to the 1727 Gerhardian renewal of the debate. Ewald appears to have owned two copies of Gerhard's epitome. The publication of his first text was severely censored and perhaps difficult to procure because of that.¹⁰²⁶ He also owned treatises by Johanna and Johann Wilhelm Petersen, but not apparently Johann's major work, *Mysterion apokatastaseos panton, Das ist: Das Geheimniß Wiederbringung aller Dinge*.¹⁰²⁷

For an accessible text available in English that lays out the chiliastic structure of the Petersen-*apokatastasis* group, Paul Siegvold's treatise is a good starting point. Ewald's library lists volumes comprising several works gathered together: one of the books he owned, Christian

Udødelighed samt dens Tilstand i og efter Døden, stadfæstet ved Guds Ord og den sunde Fornuft. Pontoppidan, though not a defender of *apokatastasis*, reinforces the idea that these questions about the middle state were up for debate. See, for example, Thomas White's book defending a purgatory state and Gottfried Arnold's translation of the same, White, *The Middle State of Souls. From the Hour of Death to the Day of Judgment*.; White and Arnold, *Betrachtung von dem mittleren Zustand der Seelen nach ihrem Abschied aus dem Leibe*. Pontoppidan's treatise also reveals that the writings of the church fathers over these issues of the middle condition were being read during this period. Pontoppidan, *Tractat om Sielens Udødelighed samt dens Tilstand i og efter Døden, stadfæstet ved Guds Ord og den sunde Fornuft*, 325. In terms of the modern research situation, this might be changing, see the recent publication, Weigelt, *Universale Heilshoffnungen Im Christentum: Apokatastasisideen in Theologie Und Kirche, Literatur Und Musik*.

¹⁰²⁶ Zedler's article mentions the censorship, Zedler, "Wiederbringung aller Dinge," 1940. Erik Pontoppidan also owned the Gerhard's epitome from 1729, not his systematic treatment from 1727 and Pontoppidan's library was much more extensive than Ewald's. The two sale catalogs (1747 and 1765) of Pontoppidan's libraries are about 170 pages each, compared to Ewald's 50 pages. See, Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger; Catalogus Librorum; Catalogus over En Deel Gode Bøger Og Mss*.

¹⁰²⁷ Works listed in chapter three footnotes, see Ewald, *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*, 3, 9, 16, 28.

Pagencopen's *Gründliche Erkenntniß der Ewigen Liebe Gottes in Christo gegen alle gefallene Creaturen*, includes the original German version of Siegvölck's *The Everlasting Gospel*. Parry notes that this work was influential among Christian universalists for a long time, being translated into English in 1753 in United States.¹⁰²⁸ There are also hints that this short treatise was specifically aimed at the uneducated class of persons.¹⁰²⁹ This is another indication that for Early Modern academic theologians, the Pietist universalists "erred" in their target audience. However, it did not receive the academic interest that Gerhard's and Petersen's works did, although Buddeus mentioned it in his dogmatic theology alongside Petersen, which suggests it was fairly widely known.¹⁰³⁰

Robin Parry has recently given a short overview of the treatise,¹⁰³¹ sketching out Siegvölck's initial focus on the doctrine of God (God as love), an understanding of divine wrath, or punishment as ultimately pedagogical, and an insistence on God's love for all his creatures (even though some were depraved, e.g., Satan). Siegvölck also briefly treated the meaning of *eternal* in scripture and other scriptural passages in support of universal salvation, before painting a millenarist and chiliast eschatological vision. Siegvölck's millenarianism was pre-millenarian (the thousand-year reign of Christ had not yet begun) in contrast to post-millenarianism (where Christ returns at the end of the millenium), where some modern scholars place Spener.¹⁰³² Parry writes that for Siegvölck, only the reborn would be resurrected during the 1000-year reign (their reward), but that

[a]t the end of the millennium, there is a general judgment. Then a second resurrection raises those who were not worthy to partake in the first, but who have

¹⁰²⁸ Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 90.

¹⁰²⁹ This is the contemporary judgment of the text which claims it was aimed at "*einer gewissen Standes-Person*". Heinsius, *Unpartheyische Kirchen-Historie Alten Und Neuen Testaments, Von Erschaffung Der Welt Bis Auf Das Jahr Nach Christi Geburt 1730*, 2:824. Heinsius here uses this judgment as a mildly derogatory comment.

¹⁰³⁰ Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.III.XVII, pp. 460–464, here 462.

¹⁰³¹ Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 90–93.

¹⁰³² Gäbler, "Geschichte, Gegenwart, Zukunft," 29.

come to Christ in Hades and had their names included in the Lamb's book of life (Siegvolck called them the "church of the *after-born*"). Yet, still many remain in sin and they are sentenced to the "second death"—confinement to the lake of fire for "the ages of ages" (i.e. a *very, very long* time). But, in the end, all will be saved through Christ from the lake of fire.¹⁰³³

Parry's description makes clear there was a specific structure to the end times that the Petersen group held to; it was more than a denial of the unending punishment of hell. Since one of Ewald's sermons refers to the after-born, it is possible that Ewald borrowed this term from Siegvolck. Petersen and others may have used the phrase as well, but it was definitely an important feature of Siegvolck's eschatological structure. His work ends with a denial that universalism caused moral laxity, a feature also found in Gerhard's defense.

In Siegvolck, one sees the particulars of the Petersen circle's chiliastic, eschatological structure, but it was Gerhard who was the more important writer from the viewpoint of academically minded contemporaries. And he put up a waspish battle making it impossible to ignore his strident claims for universalism. He was no mere hopeful and humble universalist. Let us now examine his arguments. To this end, I look at his epitome, *Kurtzer Begriff*, which Ewald owned.

6.4 Ludwig Gerhard's *Kurtzer Begriff* Described

Gerhard's first defense of *apokatastasis*, *Systema apokatastaseōs d.i. ein vollständiger Lehrbegriff des ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge* (1727), is a historically prominent systematic treatment of the concept of *apokatastasis* (as Gerhard defined it) and, moreover, there is one further minor connection to Ewald: Gerhard dedicated his *Systema* to Buddeus, Ewald's teacher.¹⁰³⁴ Gerhard's book was treated as a serious challenge at the very

¹⁰³³ Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?*, Volume 2: *Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 92; emphasis in the original.

¹⁰³⁴ As mentioned above. Despite Gustav Frank's comment about Gerhard's malicious dedication, I doubt this accusation of malice. It might certainly be a challenge, if his hope was that Buddeus might then censor and refute Gerhard's arguments himself. Buddeus was a highly regarded theologian, and though not explicitly a Pietist, Buddeus was friendly to Spener and Pietism. Moreover, he was not one of the Orthodox party: Gerhard

least, but its prickly tone and combative rhetoric also drew the attention of his opponents.¹⁰³⁵ In the preface to Gerhard's shorter epitome for the "unstudied," he detailed a conversation with a bookseller who criticized the complex arguments of the debate but praised Gerhard's style because it made the prose amusing and less soporific to read.¹⁰³⁶ There can be not doubt from the reviews of Gerhard's book in *Fortgesetzte Sammlung von alten und neuen theologischen Sachen* or in Gerhard's biting response to criticism (Gerhard alleged that some of the criticism stemmed from the accusation that his sermons stole parishioners and money from the dull pastor, D. Weider, at Marien-Kirche)¹⁰³⁷ that *ad hominem* attacks of his ideas ran high. His authorial persona was stern, blunt, and fearless.

chose someone he sees as thoughtful on the subject of rebirth and sanctification-see this dissertation's use of *Collegium theologico-morale*. Buddeus is listed among the deniers of *apokatastasis* by Zedler, but he only does so in a letter referenced in *Unschuldige Nachrichten* (1724), p. 546, and in the preface to a doctoral dissertation he directed, see Zedler, "Wiederbringung aller Dinge," 1933, 1942. Gerhard refers to this dissertation in the epitome's lengthy preface. In Gerhard's response here he repeatedly refers to Buddeus in mostly respectful tones, as if he is pleading with Buddeus to take his arguments seriously. "Aber solte denn mein lieber Herr Præceptor, der Herr Buddeus, der mich und andere viele tausend durch seine Lehr-reichen Schrifften bisher unterwiesen und erbauet hat, seinen berühmten Nahmen durch eine solche schlechte Vorrede, um nur seine Gross-väterliche Satzungen zu behaupten, mit solchen elenden Ausstüchten beschmitzen?," Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, 76–92, here 84. Buddeus never takes up a full rebuttal or response. In the letter, He is cautious on the topic of chiliasm and the 1000 years kingdom as to not reject Spener and he writes that other Lutheran Orthodox teachers have held a type of chiliasm, while simply rejecting the Petersens' doctrine of *apokatastasis* as wrong without further discussion. See, Buddeus, *Epistola De Nonnullis Ad Qvorvndam Ecclesiae Evangelicae In S [Illesia] Ministrorum Innocentiam Vindicandam Spectantibus*.

¹⁰³⁵ Other reviewers simply refused to engage with Gerhard by denying to 'reheat old cabbage' (*den alten Kohl wieder aufzuwarmen*). See *Fortgesetzte Sammlung von Alten Und Neuen Theologischen Sachen*, 595. Consider this brief review as compared to the 250 pages Walch devotes to Gerhard's system. This disparity, in my opinion, ought to spark one's curiosity in Gerhard. Walch certainly saw him as an authentic threat or opponent worth refuting.

¹⁰³⁶ *So ist auch ja eine solche Schreib-Art an und für sich nicht zu mißbilligen, wenn es nur in der gehörigen moderation, und mit einem seinen judicio geschicht; denn ein solcher Stilis muntert den Leser beständig auf, daß er nicht leicht, wie sonst wol geschicht, über dem Lesen ainschläfft.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, 115. Hereafter, *Kurtzer Begriff*.

¹⁰³⁷ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 67.

6.4.1 Dippel's Treatise

At least some of the presently extant copies of *Kurtzer Begriff* begin with a short essay by Dippel based on Matt 26:24, Jesus's words about Judas: "It would have been better for that one [Judas] not to have been born" (NRSV).¹⁰³⁸ Dippel's 16-page treatise introduced many themes that Gerhard worked out systematically in his epitome. Dippel complicated an interpretation of the Matthew passage, arguing that Jesus must be referring to an unending punishment in hell for Judas and that non-existence would have been preferable. He claimed that the historical belief systems of the Pharisees and Essenes taught an immortality of the soul and a cycle of reincarnation for the purpose of purification. This was not an endless cycle; if one failed to improve after a few lives one was put into Scheol, or hell.¹⁰³⁹ Dippel used this historical context to argue Jesus was not referring to Judas's existence as such (Judas *qua* Judas) but the present reincarnation cycle of Judas. Dippel also discussed blindness as a result of one's sin or parents' sin as part of this ancient belief system.¹⁰⁴⁰ Dippel's purpose was to deny the theological reasoning of Lutheran Orthodox theologians when they used the passage to support an endless hell. He asserted that the purpose of hell (the darkest means of God's love) was purgative and pedagogical. He also reflected on the divine nature of God (that it could only will and desire what was very good) and God as creator (that God must love his creation and desire to free it from sin).¹⁰⁴¹ He also insisted that the mediator office of Christ would not end until God was all in all (rather than at a person's death).¹⁰⁴² Finally, he spoke

¹⁰³⁸ This particular digital copy of *Kurtzer Begriff* (1729) is from the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek via Münchener Digitalisierungszentrum Digitale Bibliothek. This is the primary version I refer to in this dissertation. Dippel's essay is also found in Dippel's *Vera demonstratio evangelica* (1729), but the version in Gerhard's book includes extended comments (whether by Dippel or Gerhard is not clear). For my purposes I assume that Dippel was the author of the extended comments, but if Gerhard was, that does not substantially alter my argument.

¹⁰³⁹ Gerhard and Democritus, "Christiani Democriti Antwort auf das Verlangen eines guten Freundes, Wie doch eigentlich die Worte des Heylands über Judam Ischariot zu verstehen," 3.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Gerhard and Democritus, 3–6.

¹⁰⁴¹ Gerhard and Democritus, 11–13.

¹⁰⁴² Gerhard and Democritus, 15.

against the Manichaeic systems of Lutheran Orthodoxy and the Böhmits, which allowed light and darkness to exist eternally.¹⁰⁴³

Whether the treatise was attached to all copies of Gerhard's work is uncertain. In any event, it offers a historical, scriptural exegesis different than the one Lutheran Orthodoxy was advancing (according to Dippel). Most important is Dippel's reflection on what it meant for God to be the highest good. He considered God's role as creator and the nature of creaturehood (existence as a creature of God) as more fundamental than questions of a creature's death. He believed that the horizon of existence was wider than death and consequently God's ability and purpose stretched further than the arbitrary boundary of physical death. Within this framework, Dippel asked whether one could ever be in the position where it was impossible to choose this highest good *again*.¹⁰⁴⁴ The question seems to refer to the psychological impossibility for humans to cease to desire the good in some form. Dippel's treatise brought together questions about the nature of God and the nature of the (rational) creature, shifting the conversation away from a discussion of the limited chance to choose God. Equally important, Dippel's framework had no place for a free-will defense of hell.¹⁰⁴⁵ Humanity's innate desire for the highest good was axiomatic. Theologically, Dippel

¹⁰⁴³ Gerhard and Democritus, 15–16. Dippel's rejection of Jakob Böhme's philosophy fits with Robin Parry's response to Michael McClymond who argues that most early modern and modern universalism comes from Böhme's heterodox views. See Parry and Ramelli, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*, 279–94.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Ob eine einige von den abgewichenen Creaturen, sie sey auch in ihren Begierden so weit von dem höchsten Gut entfernt, als sie immer wolle, in einer absoluten und unüberwindlichen Unmöglichkeit sich befinde, dieses höchste Guth wiederum zu erwählen / und zur seeligen Ruhe zu kommen?* Gerhard and Democritus, "Christiani Democriti Antwort auf das Verlangen eines guten Freundes, Wie doch eigentlich die Worte des Heylands über Judam Ischariot zu verstehen," 13. The question appears to be rhetorical—the answer is obviously no. Dippel applied the same method of questioning in other treatises, see "Helle Glantz des Evangelii JEsu Christi" in Dippel, *Vera Demonstratio Evangelica*.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Certain modern defenses of hell operate from free-will defense and locked-door idea. A popular statement of this is "The doors of hell are locked from the inside" from Lewis, *The Problem of Pain*, 130. For a good discussion of Lewis's eschatology and some contemporary pushback on Lewis's formulation, see Connolly, *Inklings of Heaven*, esp. 222 sqq. By considering the actions on the part of the creature, Dippel does not

was optimistic about the freedom from sin available to the reborn (or elect) even in the present age.¹⁰⁴⁶ This optimism contrasted with Gerhard's more measured approach.

6.4.2 Gerhard's Main Defense

6.4.2.1 Structure of Gerhard's book

After Dippel's short treatise, Gerhard's text begins. Gerhard used the 100-plus pages of the preface to respond to his critics. He began by describing the type of criticism he would prefer to receive for his book: namely, his opponents discussing and refuting his system's structure, not various bits and pieces of it, by showing 1) his reading went against the meaning of scripture, 2) his readings of scripture was inadequate, 3) his arguments contravened Lutheran doctrinal statements, and 4) his conclusions were not reasonable.¹⁰⁴⁷ Gerhard consciously positioned himself as a Lutheran theologian supported by reason, whatever labels of heresy were given him.

Gerhard's epitome for the unstudied consists of five chapters. Compared to the description of his 1727 system, Gerhard's epitome left out an extended discussion on the harmony of God's attributes.¹⁰⁴⁸ This is unfortunate because it is this aspect of universalism that figures like Buddeus found appealing and which opens up a path for a defense of divine simplicity, which is central to classical theism.¹⁰⁴⁹ The other chapters in the epitome match his earlier

operate within the libertarian paradigm of free will that later discussions of eschatology sometimes assume. Dippel's creatures do not have a perfectly indifferent will: they desire the good and peace.

¹⁰⁴⁶ *wiewohl sie doch neimahlen das Loofß der Auserwählten, das ist, hier in der Zeit Wiedergebohrne und erstgeborhne Kinder der Freyen erreichen werden?* Gerhard and Democritus, "Christiani Democriti Antwort auf das Verlangen eines guten Freundes, Wie doch eigentlich die Worte des Heylands über Judam Ischariot zu verstehen," 14.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 6-10.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Siegvolck gives one a small glimpse of this in everlasting gospel, quoted above, see Siegvolck, *The Everlasting Gospel*, 124. A short description of Gerhard's *Systema* also confirms that the sixth chapter argues "that the Everlasting Gospel is the point where the divine attributes meet", Whittemore, *The Modern History of Universalism: From the Era of the Reformation to the Present Time*, 264-265.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Edward Feser is a good modern defender and explicator of classical theism, see Feser, *Five Proofs for the Existence of God*; Feser, "Classical Theism."

censored book. In the first chapter, Gerhard offered proof for universalism based on reason (philosophical and theological arguments), and in the second chapter he argued that universalism ought to be considered a secondary article of faith.¹⁰⁵⁰ The third chapter looks at the scriptural evidence for the restoration of all things, while the fourth chapter deals with the scriptural evidence against an unending, infinite punishment in hell. One could argue that Gerhard emphasized restoration more than finite punishment with this structure, although later Enlightenment philosophers were preoccupied more with the finiteness of hell than with heaven.¹⁰⁵¹ If later interpretations of universalism became more rationalistic and focused on hell, the salvific promises of *apokatastasis* were not lost to Gerhard. The final chapter deals with the claim that universalism promoted moral laxity among the populace. I will treat the arguments in chapter one and also some of his arguments in the fifth chapter in detail.

6.4.2.2 Gerhard's Philosophical and Theological Arguments for Universalism

In Gerhard's first chapter, he presented three interconnected arguments for universalism based on an understanding of God's nature as loving, unchanging, and omnipotent. The first argument provided the premise of God's universal love and salvific action, while in the second, Gerhard built on the first but incorporated God's omnipotence. I will touch on the third argument in a moment.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Here Gerhard indicates that he sees himself still within the Lutheran church. There is a difference between primary and secondary articles of faith in the Lutheran tradition. The first must be known to be saved, the latter are taught, but not necessary for salvation. Gerhard denies however that no true child of God would deny *apokatastasis*, since it stems from the depths of God's love in all ages. Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.8, p. 148.

¹⁰⁵¹ Ernst-Peter Wieckenberg notes the difference between the Pietist universalists who emphasized the salvific and religious character of the doctrine (together with its potentially charitable ideas about the salvation of the heathens) as compared to the Enlightenment supporters of the *apokatastasis* who focused on "destroying the old doctrine of the eternity of punishment in hell." Wieckenberg, "The Controversy over the Salvation of the Jews, Turks and Heathens in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: A Theological Path to Tolerance?," 63.

The first stemmed from God's role as creator and Christ's redemptive sacrifice.¹⁰⁵² Gerhard asserted that all creatures (this extended beyond humans to fallen angels, and it would be interesting to see where nonrational creatures fell into this equation), being created by God, were loved by God as creatures.¹⁰⁵³ Gerhard granted the conceptual separation of the metaphysical reality of creaturehood from the moral reality of fallen creatures (the latter being logically dependent upon the former). He refused, however, as his opponents did, to see this distinction as making a difference for the length and limit of God's love. This metaphysical *creaturehood* could not be removed from creatures even though they were in hell. As such, their being (*Wesen*) was always loved by God. At this point Gerhard introduced Christ's redemptive sacrifice that bought creaturely beings with his blood.¹⁰⁵⁴ The implication was that the purchase was universal—all creaturely beings were bought. The universal reading of this atoning purchase was in line with Buddeus's understanding¹⁰⁵⁵ and circumvented accusations of limited atonement, i.e., TULIP Calvinist, thinking. Presumably, Gerhard's Lutheran opponents did not deny this, at least Buddeus did not. Gerhard concluded

¹⁰⁵² Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.3-18, pp. 130-136.

¹⁰⁵³ It is this proposition that might come under attack by those who want to insist on the absolute freedom of God. Gerhard insists that God must necessarily and constantly love that which is good and remains constantly good (here creatureliness, *das Creatürliche Wesen*). One worry about universalism is that it assumes a sort of primordial wound in the being of God that must be repaired by the 'return' of the fallen creature. Such an assumption seems to endanger the Christian notion of creation *ex nihilo* and God's utter independence/freedom from his creation. Roberto De La Noval paints this picture as a contrast between a divine drama (the wound that must be healed within God) and a divine revelation (that God's salvific actions disclose finally and perfectly who he is). See, De La Noval, "Divine Drama or Divine Disclosure? Hell, Universalism, and a Parting of the Ways." Gerhard's doctrine of God does involve the language of necessity or requirement around God's love. However, I am uncertain whether it follows that this necessity of love derives from a deficit (primordial wound) in God, or whether from an understanding of God's being as love (God loves his creatures because it is simply his nature to do so). A further investigation, perhaps drawing from Gerhard's larger *Systema apokatastaseōs* (1727) could be of use here.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.15, p. 135.

¹⁰⁵⁵ As mentioned above, this also fits with Ewald's denial that he held a Calvinist understanding of grace and the varying tensions between George Whitefield, John Wesley, and Peter Böhler over limited atonement and reprobation, which I mention above in chapter three and in this chapter. See Exner, *Efterretninger om det kongelige Vaisenhuus.*, 24–25; Lay, *Readings in Historical Theology: Primary Sources of the Christian Faith*, 329–40.

from the following that to assert an endless hell together with the universal purchase of Christ's blood was absurd. Christ's sacrifice would thus be wasted. This was theologically ridiculous to him both because it made a mockery of Christ's sacrifice and God's love: if one believed God loved damned creatures for all eternity (as Christ's sacrifice showed) and yet would leave them eternally in hell, this was nonsense. One "must necessary believe" that God would eventually permit a "graceful" help to the damned.¹⁰⁵⁶

Gerhard used a different tactic in his shorter second argument in chapter one,¹⁰⁵⁷ although he assumed God's love towards all his creatures (including fallen angels). Gerhard began the argument by reconsidering who the archenemy of God was. The devil? Obviously not, according to Gerhard. He was still a creature of God, though fallen. Instead, Gerhard settled on the sting of the second death, namely sin. Gerhard remarked that God had overcome his enemy entirely (1 Cor 15:55–57). If hell was endless, then God's victory would be thwarted (perhaps he had in mind arguments like Walch's that preserved hell's retributive justice postulating continuing active sinning on the part of the damned).¹⁰⁵⁸ Gerhard continued this line of thought, demonstrating that even those who maintained God's love for all his creatures, but not the restoration of those creatures, placed God's omnipotence in danger.¹⁰⁵⁹ Gerhard's argument was clearly theological, rather than purely philosophical: it rested on Paul's insistence that God overcame his enemies (1 Cor).

The third argument touched on legal theory and was about the purpose of punishment.¹⁰⁶⁰ Gerhard dealt with punishment as pedagogical; purely punitive punishment was the weapon of a cruel tyrant, and he dismissed it out of hand. Infinite retributive (proportional)

¹⁰⁵⁶ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.18, p. 136.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.19-26, pp. 136-139.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Discussed more below, see Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:318–24.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.26, 139. This argument is very similar to Thomas Talbott's in *The Inescapable love of God*, Talbott argues that if one asserts both the omnipotence of God and the will of God to save, universalism is the only coherent logical option. Talbott, like Gerhard, advocates strongly for a necessary (not hopeful) universalism. See chapter four in Talbott, *The Inescapable Love of God*.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.27-35, pp. 139-145.

punishment was also problematic for Gerhard because it depended on God's greater love of self than his love for his creatures.¹⁰⁶¹ Gerhard noted that figures like Christian Thomasius and Buddeus had also reflected on these issues, possibly indicating a larger contemporary debate on punishment.¹⁰⁶² Gerhard, however, was more interested in facts than abstract legal theory (maybe a Pietist preference for "the daily experience").¹⁰⁶³ He pointed towards a judge's

¹⁰⁶¹ He seems to be referring to a traditional Christian view that God punishes infinitely because as an infinite being, he has been infinitely wronged by our disobedience and his righteousness requires him to punish his creatures for this wrong. Even under a retributive theory of punishment (punishment proportional to the crime), theologians recognized that the finite sins of finite creatures (no matter how bad), do not proportionally deserve an infinite punishment. The ingenious solution to save the infinite hell, given a framework of retributive punishment, was to tie the offense into the infinite nature of the offended (God). This makes the proportional punishment infinite. For a discussion of this argument in Jonathan Edwards, see Seymour, "Hell, Justice, and Freedom." Walch's rebuttal of Gerhard advocates a retributive notion of punishment based on the continuing active blasphemy and sin against God of souls in hell. Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:318–24. However, as odd this sounds, it reveals two options for the early modern age: that human nature was considered to be in an active, rather than passive, state in hell and that the traditional argument about infinite offense against God was seen as unpersuasive or open to attack even by Walch, an early modern defender of infinite hell-punishments. The continued activity even in hell opened Walch up to attack from universalists. Technically, repentance (by the grace of God) was still a valid option. Walch must however deny that God would ever offer that grace in hell-the time of grace is over then, see Walch, 3:325–27. Walch does refer to the notion of infinite proportional punishment according to the infinite being (God) offended, see Walch, 3:335–36.

¹⁰⁶² Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.28-29, pp. 140-142.

¹⁰⁶³ Consider Sparn's assessment of Pietism's dislike of self-sufficient rationality and conceptual philosophy vs instrumental philosophy, "*Der Gegensatz zwischen intuitiver Erkenntnis im Gemüt und rationaler Erkenntnis im Verstand wird von Zinzendorfs Gemahlin in einem Lied so pointiert: "[...] lieber noch in phantasie stehen als in philosophie: Fühlen wird durch prüfung just; raisoniren bringt verlust". Auch das 1741 gegründete theologische Seminar in Marienborn öffnete sich erst später philosophischen Interessen. Die Herrnhuter Glaubenslehre (1782) lässt trotz des Wortes "Begriff" in ihrem Titel keinerlei begriffliche Ambition erkennen...*" Sparn, "Philosophie," 249. Still, in works like Gerhard's, reasoning itself was not abandoned, rather the self-sufficient concepts were mistrusted. I wonder how much of Gerhard's willingness to seek practical examples and to engage with his opponents' moral imagination was a characteristically Pietist habit. A modern assessment of Pietism should not mistake a dislike of self-sufficient conceptual philosophy for a complete turning away from rational argument.

decision to allow a condemned man time and opportunity to speak to clergy before his death. Gerhard asked: what is the purpose of the judge's actions? According to Gerhard, the action must stem from a hope and desire on the part of the judge for repentance. From this practical observation, Gerhard pushed his observation into a broader framework. Even when death was required by earthly law, the Christian judge's decisions included a space for the chance of purification (purgative and pedagogical), rather than being purely punitive. Why should this *intention* of punishment change in the next world (hell)? God ought to be better than a cruel tyrant who loved misery for the sake of it. He also ought to be clever, able to bring his ways about (Ps 94:9).¹⁰⁶⁴ Gerhard assumed that even his critics agreed with him that God willed the betterment of his creatures, and he extended this intention into the world to come, asserting God's immutability.¹⁰⁶⁵

6.4.2.3 Gerhard's Moral Argument for Universalism

The accusation that Christian universalism permitted moral laziness was of great concern for Gerhard's opponents. In chapter five of his epitome, he touches on this accusation. Accordingly, he first denied that universalism made people morally lax (*macher sicher*)¹⁰⁶⁶ and then asserted the opposite. Gerhard insisted that far from promoting debauchery or devil-may-care attitudes, universalism inspired people to moral exertion.¹⁰⁶⁷

To defend his first assertion, Gerhard argued that if universalism was a divine truth, it was impossible that it would make people over-confident in an absolute sense. Perhaps accidentally, but not absolutely. Gerhard did not need to prove this argument; he only needed to show that his opponents accepted it in other areas. To this end he pointed out the Lutheran

¹⁰⁶⁴ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.30, p. 142. Gerhard's reference is to Psalm 93:9. Since this psalm lacks a verse 9 in the English NRSV, I assume it is referring to 94:9, perhaps because of different numbering of the psalms.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *den unwandelbahren GOtt*, Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 1.34, p. 144. One of the classical attributes of God.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.1-10, pp. 282-292. The fear of moral laxity or security is prominent in Pietism, particularly in Ewald and Buddeus as discussed above. Trust or confidence in God is one thing, self-security (from the sacraments or death-bed confessions?) is quite another.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *Zum andern, kan aber auch gar leicht das Gegentheil erwiesen werden, dass nemlich durch die Wiederbringungs-Lehre viel tausend Seelen vermuthlich eher können gewommen werden, als durch die unendliche Verdammniss*. Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.4, p. 285. Also, especially 5.10, p. 291.

understanding of the “doctrine of salvation by faith alone” (*der Lehre von dem allein seeligmachenden Glauben*).¹⁰⁶⁸ Although this doctrine was divinely true, it could be misrepresented and so accidentally lead people astray, but that was the fault of the misrepresentation (and the ones who misrepresented it), not the fault of divine truth. Implicit in this argument was the convertibility of truth and goodness: that which is true cannot lead to evil. Gerhard and his opponents both accepted this.

Gerhard’s first argument in chapter five was short, and it was his second assertion on which he focused his attention. He began by noting that all Orthodox Lutherans accepted that fear of damnation was not enough to bring about full repentance and conversion (*völligen Bekehrung*).¹⁰⁶⁹ Fear might be a powerful motivating and coercive tool, but it was an insufficient tool. This was practically observed by Gerhard. If fear of hell was enough (hell being painted as endlessly dreadful), would there not be more pious and God-fearing believers? In addition to practical considerations, theologians like Buddeus had specifically denied that this slavish fear produced true love of God, according to Gerhard.¹⁰⁷⁰ Not only was it practically insufficient, it was theologically insufficient.¹⁰⁷¹

Gerhard then moved on to introduce the need for further purification and purgation post mortem, for even a true repentance in this life did not produce an instantly righteous and holy person from the Epicurean mess they were before.¹⁰⁷² Gerhard, like Ewald and Buddeus, was a realist about virtue and sanctification. There was no jumping over the work of self-

¹⁰⁶⁸ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.3, p. 283.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.4, p. 285.

¹⁰⁷⁰ See my above discussion of Buddeus on slavish fear in chapter 5, also Grote, *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*, 117:19–42. I refer to Grote’s discussion also above.

¹⁰⁷¹ Gerhard’s argument stems from the rejection of death-bed confessions as demonstrating a real obedience to God. This was rightly seen as a forced obedience and not a true knowledge of God’s love. God was reduced in this instance to the mere prisoner of the old Adam. Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.4-5, pp. 285-8.

¹⁰⁷² Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.7-8, p. 289.

denial to the perfection of the new creation, even if time ran out in this life.¹⁰⁷³ At least in chapters 4 and 5 above I argue that is the main thrust of Buddeus's moral theology which offered the aid of grace even as it worked within the natural human structure. Gerhard prayed that the cross laid upon people by God in God's wisdom would also be laid on him so "that [he] could be purified in his life as to depart without other harsh [purgatorial?] judgment, and be led by Jesus through death's dales to the holiest face of God."¹⁰⁷⁴ Only the perfectly righteous could stand before the face of God. Should this not be terrifying to wealthy priests who had unrighteous money in their treasuries at death? Should they not rather desire purgatory/a refining fire than damnation? Gerhard turned trust in Christ's blood against his opponents while upholding the pious insistence on self-denial. He was clearly pushing up against the problems of a legal imputation of Christ's righteousness, which he saw as an inadequate Lutheranism (or perhaps inadequately just).¹⁰⁷⁵

When insisting upon such a denial, it was of great aid to have *effective* help in the battle. Like Ewald and Buddeus, Gerhard described Christ's blood (i.e., grace) as effective against sin. Gerhard wanted a repression and crucifixion of evil desires, not a resignation to daily sins; he insisted on the reality of realized righteousness and forgiveness for sins between people—his

¹⁰⁷³ *dass mein Hertz, Muth und Sin gründlich möge geändert, und völlig durch das kräftige GOTTes-Blut möge gereinigt und geläutert werden.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.10, p. 292.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *damit ich bey meinem Abschiede aus dieser WElt, ohne anderweitige harte Gerichte, nachdem mein JESus mich durch das Todes-Thal glücklich durchgeföhret, das aller heiligste Angesicht meines Majestätischen Schöpfers in vollen Freunden schauen könne.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.10, p. 292.

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Allein mien lieber Mensch du betreugest dich, und andere: denn das ist unser Lutherischer Glaube durchaus, und durchaus nicht. Wer das saget, dass wir Lutheraner also lehren, der ist ein Verleumder! Sondern das ist unser Lutherischer Glaube hievon: Wenn ein solcher reichter Geistlicher hundertmahl seine Sünden beichttet, und hundertmahl das Heil. Abendmahl empfänget, ungeachtet er weiss, und völlig überführet ist, dass, unter den vierzig tausand Reichs-Thalern, nur einen Reichs-Thaler nicht wieder erstattet, so, wie er ihn, nach Christlicher Klugheit und Vorsichtigkeit, erstatten soll: so werden ihm seine Sünden nicht vergeben, sondern er ist, und bleibet ein Kind der Verdammniß, und wird in jener Welt dafür leiden müssen.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.13, p. 298. Gerhard pushes back on the apparent Lutheran notion that a death bed confession and taking of the Eucharist could wipe all sins away, but if one was forgotten, it was worth damnation.

example was a fiscal one.¹⁰⁷⁶ The demands of righteousness and perfection in sanctification would end in despair if real aid was not supplied within the framework of one's theology.¹⁰⁷⁷ (This was what Buddeus's moral theology and theology of grace offered in his *ordo salutis*).¹⁰⁷⁸ But once Gerhard had gotten the foot of actual (not legal) righteousness in the door, there were no limits for him. He did not stop with good intentions or the desire to be a better person.¹⁰⁷⁹ Good intentions may indicate the beginning of "true inner Christianity" [i.e. holiness and union with God] but not the end or fulfillment (*Das Vollbringen*).¹⁰⁸⁰ It is important to note that the idea of the actualized fulfillment, or perfection, of one's salvation was not problematic for Gerhard or his opponents. Rather, Gerhard challenged the view that

¹⁰⁷⁶ See, Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.13-15, pp. 296-305. Gerhard knows the insistence on perfection is too difficult (Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.15, p. 301) according to his perception of current legalistic Lutheran thought, yet he also knows that righteousness (and atonement) must be actually realized between people. Teaching forgiveness without real reimbursement (*wirkliche Erstattung*) is un-Lutheran for Gerhard, see Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.16, p. 305. Dippel has a similar concept about the human-human relationships and sins, "Denn weil nicht GOtt in seinem seeligen Wesen, wohl aber die Menschheit in ihrer Dürftigkeit, kan beleidiget werden, so findet auch die Gerechtigkeit nicht Statt Zwischen GOtt und der Creatur, sondern zwischen Creatur und Creatur." See Dippel, *Vera Demonstratio Evangelica*, "Helle Glantz des Evangelii JEsu Christi," 116. This theme of the necessity of human-to-human justice and atonement is also well described in MacDonald, "Justice."

¹⁰⁷⁷ Perhaps they do. See my above comments in section 3.2 about anxiety, angst, and melancholy in Puritanism and Pietism.

¹⁰⁷⁸ This seems to be where Gerhard's system is described as mystical and esoteric. I would argue he merely takes up Buddeus' theology of grace or something very similar and pushes it beyond this world. The question of 'how' grace works in a way is just as mysterious in Buddeus's system.

¹⁰⁷⁹ *Die gute Intention allein will es auch nicht ausmachen, wie einige Moralisten unverschämter Weise schwätzen, Nein, mein lieber Mensch!* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.19, pp. 308-309.

¹⁰⁸⁰ *In diesem Vollbringen muß du nun bis an dein letztes Lebens-Ende, unter schweren Kämpften und Ringen, beständig aushalten. Du mirst zwar von deinem ärgsten Feinde, den du im Busen hegest, manchen harten Guff bekommen, daß dem Neuen Menschen auch wol bisweilen das Schwinden dabei ankommt: aber da hilft nichts zu, du mußst doch hinhurch, du mußst dich wieder in Christo JEsu ermannen; du mußst das Vollbringen, und die wirkliche Verleugung dein selbst, und deiner bösen Lüste, durch GOttes Krafft, die in dir ist, wieder anfangen, und so lange dir warm zum Hertzen ist, relieh, und nach allen von GOtt verliehenen Kräfften beständig fortsetzen. Siehe, mein Mensch, so stehet es mit dem wahren, rechtschaffenen, und innern Christenthum!* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.19, p. 309.

perfection and bliss could be achieved automatically. The idea that a believer was instantly holy (*seelig*) was foolishness, according to Gerhard.¹⁰⁸¹ What did one do with this “mixed” person? They had their portion of good and bad and considered themselves to be Christians, confident that God’s mercy and justice would not condemn them to infinite torment.¹⁰⁸² In Gerhard’s view, this dilemma necessitated a purifying period, or state after death. Even if thousands of years long, its culmination was purification.

After describing this scenario, Gerhard finally circled around to his main argument that universalism worked against moral laxity. In his eschatology, hell, punishment, and atonement for one’s wrongs existed. In fact, they could not be escaped by a death-bed confession or holy sacrament. Everyone would pay for their sins and needed to right them. This was achieved through self-denial in this life or in the more terrible time in hell. In his opponents’ view, the disproportion between one’s earthly sins and infinite punishment was so absurd that one must hold to a view that Christ’s blood would cover the “shame of my heart” (*Schande meines Hertzens*).¹⁰⁸³ Gerhard depended upon, and tacitly agreed with, a degree of moral outrage at the disproportion between one’s sins and infinite punishment. But what he offered was not a get-out-of-jail card as a response to infinite damnation because that could entice one into self-security and moral laxity.¹⁰⁸⁴ Rather, Gerhard offered the purifying fire (*Feg-Feuer*).¹⁰⁸⁵ This eschatology incorporated an element of fear, but in a

¹⁰⁸¹ *Ein solcher thörischer mensch gäaubet in seinem Hertzen gantz vestiglich, daß alles, alles, was nur Lutheraner heißt, und nicht gar übergeben gottloß ist, so fort von Mund auf, und von nun an, werde seelig werde.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.21, p. 312.

¹⁰⁸² *Es wird also der gute Mensch ganz sicher, und sorgloß, gedenckende, daß es weder GOTTES Barmhertzigkeit, noch Gerechtigkeit, zugeben könne, daß eine solche seine Creatur, an der gleichwol so viel Guts zu finden, unendlich dennoch müsste gepeinigt werden.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.21, p. 313.

¹⁰⁸³ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.23, p. 316.

¹⁰⁸⁴ *zur Sicherheit verleiten könnte?* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.24, p. 316.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *...in der Hölle, sage ich, welche nicht anders ist, als ein durch die Liebe und gerechtigkeit GOTTES angezündetes Feg-Feuer,* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.24, p. 316, or a page later described thus, *da dich die Liebe, die Weisheit, und Gerechtigkeit GOTTes so lange ganz abfegen wird, bis du unter seiner Hand gedemüthiget, und durch die Krafft des Bluts Christi, unter den erschrecklichsten Gerichten, wirst geheiligt und gereinigt seyn.* Gerhard, 5.24, p. 317. Compare these images to Stephen Goldschmidt's assessment of Johann Conrad Dippel's thought on sanctification and purgatory post mortem: "Was am Ende des Lebens eines

conditional, rather than absolute, sense. The purifying fire's final purpose was not to be feared, although it might certainly be feared. Rather its purpose was to purify. Taken seriously as an inescapable reality,¹⁰⁸⁶ it would be difficult to argue that the inevitable and inescapable purifying fire resulted in a greater temptation to moral laxity than his opponents' prison escape did.¹⁰⁸⁷ In these arguments, Gerhard attributed to his opponents a moral appreciation of proportional justice. He assumed they would agree that God willed to save even "mixed," or still impure and unrighteous souls. Who would want to eternally damn a soul for a pittance of unjust debt? Gerhard thought his opponents were inwardly aware of the moral horror of an infinite hell, though they confessed otherwise.¹⁰⁸⁸

While arguing for universalism's persuasiveness against moral laziness, Gerhard exposed several theological issues. In his view, there were real problems of right action and especially (fiscal) justice between people that would not simply be wiped away through a death-bed confession.¹⁰⁸⁹ As mentioned above, this was one of Dippel's primary disagreements with contemporary Lutheranism. Atonement or reconciliation must exist between people. Dippel

Christen noch in Bezug auf die Heiligung fehlt, müsse nach dem Tod in seinem Zwischenzustand noch erreicht werden, in den allerdings nur die wahrhaft Gläubigen gelangen. Diese Vollendung der Gläubigen bewirke Christus selbst" and "Von der Vorstellung des Fegfeuers setzt sich Dippel ab. Die Apokatastasis spielt hier noch keine Rolle." Goldschmidt, Johann Konrad Dippel (1673-1734): Seine Radikalpietistische Theologie Und Ihre Entstehung, 39:145. Even if Goldschmidt's assessment is correct, Gerhard's description better explains how God's action can be characterized as purifying yet be experienced as hellish. Moreover, Goldschmidt's (or perhaps Dippel's) explanation for the completion of sanctification feels like hand-waving away the how.

¹⁰⁸⁶ It seems unclear to me whether Gerhard views this purifying fire as a psychological, physical, existential phenomenon. I would lean towards an experiential/psychological understanding but based in a Pietist anthropology/psychology where sensation is also a mental phenomenon. Consider the ambiguous language around repentance or sorrow over one's sins in Ewald's sermons.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Later Gerhard argues, perhaps from personal experience, that the Christian in name alone (*Nahm-Christen*) is fundamentally in doubt about future damnation. This uncertainty weakens the fear hell is supposed to create to stir people to virtue. Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.31-2, pp. 328-329.

¹⁰⁸⁸ *so glaubet ers in seinem Hertzen nicht, wenn ers gleich tausend-mahl mit dein Munde bekennet.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.23, pp. 315-316.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.13-14, pp. 296-298.

even denied that God as the perfect, self-sufficient being required this reconciliation.¹⁰⁹⁰ I don't know if Gerhard would go this far, but certainly he was attentive to the need for human-to-human justice. Imputed atonement, interpreted legally and not actually (in application), was insufficient. In this realist vein, Gerhard rejected the notion that good intentions (sincerely wanting to overcome one's evil desires) alone were enough. They were only the beginning. One must also be made righteous. In this Gerhard stood within the Pietist tradition (at least how it was portrayed by Ewald). It seems to me that Buddeus's moral theology with his understanding of grace (prevenient, effective, and cooperative graces) also supported elements of Gerhard's argument. Grace in Pietism was the sanctifying workhorse.¹⁰⁹¹ Moreover, sanctification is not something externally imposed, but comes from within the structure and functioning of human nature as aided by grace. At this point, the *telos* of sanctification came in: its perfection and end. Gerhard had only to structure sanctification as a process and to question how its end was achieved: Instantly post mortem on the day of judgment or after a time of purgation and purification? He did not discuss the middle state like Thomas Burnet did, but he had already taken the step towards a pedagogical eschatological model by considering sanctification and self-denial as a process. Despite the labeling of Gerhard's project as open to esotericism and mysticism,¹⁰⁹² Gerhard tended to push for justice and salvation worked out with a great deal of fear and trembling.

¹⁰⁹⁰ *Denn weil nicht GOtt in seinem seeligen Wesen wohl aber die Menschheit in ihrer Dürfftigkeit, dan beleidiget werde so findet auch die Gerechtigkeit nicht statt zwischen GOtt und der Creatur, sondern zwischen Creatur und Creatur.* Gerhard and Democritus, "Christiani Democriti Antwort auf das Verlangen eines guten Freundes, Wie doch eigentlich die Worte des Heylands über Judam Ischariot zu verstehen," 11.

¹⁰⁹¹ This probably extends beyond Pietism at the time, see Johann Georg Pritius's preface to Philip Jacob Spener's *Tractat om Natuur og Naade* (1733). In his preface, Pritius discusses a bit of the history of effective grace or aiding grace, Spener, *Tractat om Natuur og Naade*, Pritius' Fortale, XXII-XXXII, unpaginated.

¹⁰⁹² Gerhard is characterized as a mystical-spiritualist in his doctrine of justification, see Peschke, "Der Pietismus in Dargun," 85. (I would argue this understanding of justification in Gerhard naturally includes the ideas of sanctification). Gottfried Büchner speaks of Gerhard as advocating an esoteric and exoteric bliss, Büchner and Heubner, *Gottfried Büchner's biblische real und verbal hand concordanz oder exegetisch homiletisches Lexikon*, 764.

6.5 Final thoughts on Buddeus, Ewald, and Gerhard

Let us imagine that Gerhard regarded Buddeus as a theologian worth listening to and held him in high regard. Buddeus's denial of *apokatastasis* was principally on the grounds of scripture and not philosophical and theological speculation on the doctrine of God. In the later review of the debate in an appendix to the journal *Fortgesetzte Sammlung von alten und neuen theologischen Sachen*, it was noted that Buddeus had stated his opposition to the Petersens' understanding of *apokatastasis* in a letter. Buddeus also spoke against the doctrine in his *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae*, and then also in the introduction to a doctoral dissertation attacking Gerhard's system, *Poena damnatorum numquam finienda ex Esiae LXVI. vers. XXIV* (1728). Buddeus rejected Gerhard's thought because Gerhard relied on his own convictions (he picked and chose what passages from the Lutheran Symbolic books he wanted to interact with) and because Gerhard's self-denial seemed to be self-instigated (because of the doctrine of *apokatastasis*), which confused grace and nature and was not from belief in Christ. There were some concerns about Gerhard's reading of eternal (*ewige*) as well on Buddeus's part.¹⁰⁹³ In Buddeus's *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae* (1724), he covered more of the historical aspects of the debate. He was aware, via Hugo Grotius, that Origen was not the first among the early church fathers to write on this theme. He also expanded the current Early Modern debate beyond the Petersens to include figures like Leibniz, John Le Clerc, and Henry More as partakers in the discussion. On the German side, he named Petersen's three-volume work along with Siegvold's treatise on the eternal gospel. What is significant is Buddeus's admission that if "the utterance of sensible concepts mattered," the arguments for *apokatastasis* were persuasive and hard to deny. Buddeus even went so far to state that *apokatastasis* clarified certain theological problems, such as the origin of evil and the harmonizing of God's justice and goodness, by getting rid of an unending punishment.¹⁰⁹⁴ This assessment and the historical picture did not go unnoticed by later

¹⁰⁹³ See, "Fernere Nachricht Von M. Ludwig Gerhards Erhobenen Streit Über Die Wiederbringung."

¹⁰⁹⁴ *si ex sola ratione quaestio haec diiudicanda esset*, Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.III.XVII, pp. 460–464, here 464.

German universalists.¹⁰⁹⁵ Buddeus's principal reasons for rejecting *apokatastasis* were not philosophical or theological but scriptural, or rather, hermeneutical. He focused on the language of eternal punishment, arguing for instance, that since beatitude was eternal, damnation was also eternal. Buddeus was fair to his opponents: he acknowledged they also claimed scriptural support (e.g., 1 Cor 15: 25–26).

If one reads further in this section of Buddeus's theology, several things become apparent. Buddeus did not deny the universalness of God's grace and love, nor of Christ's merit (in principle). But he affirmed that salvation was achieved through the order of salvation (*ordinem salutis*) that God had willed. Additionally, he affirmed that divine benefit had been offered to all, but that some had rejected it.¹⁰⁹⁶ Buddeus tied God's will to the *ordo salutis*, so technically, Buddeus sidestepped the accusation that God's will was thwarted. Finally, Buddeus disliked the notion that the dead would attain Christ's merit (essential for salvation) post mortem and the idea of the redemption of fallen angels (i.e., devils).¹⁰⁹⁷ This went too far beyond scripture for him.

Much of Buddeus's discussion was taken up in Gerhard's defense (perhaps intentionally, given Gerhard's dedication). Gerhard was much more willing than Buddeus and Walch to engage in theological and philosophical speculation about God's love beyond the limits of death, or non-humanity: God's love towards rational creatures. Similarly, Gerhard hinted at the end of his treatise that the *ordo salutis* should not be seen as a rigid process at the risk of missing the purpose of the *ordo*. His thoughts are also useful for uniting the conceptual divine between the 'objective' divine action and the 'subjective' human response/action in the

¹⁰⁹⁵ *Neque id quisquam insitias iuerit, grauissimas difficultates, quae doctrinam de origine mali, eiusque com iustitia atque bonitate diuina conciliatione premunt, facilius superari posse, si finis poenarum infernalium statuatur, quam si earumdem adseratur aeternitas.* Buddeus, II.III.XVII, 464. Translated and quoted in German in Bärensprung, *Die Wiederbringung aller Dinge in ihren ersten guten Zustand der Schöpfung, nach ihrem Beweiss und Gegen-Beweiss*, 12.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.III.XVII, 467.

In Thomas Talbott's modern defense of Christian universalism, Buddeus would fall under the category of Arminianism (grace is resistible, although it is offered to all). See, Talbott, *The Inescapable Love of God*, 41–46.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Buddeus, *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*, II.III.XVII, 467.

ordo.¹⁰⁹⁸ One of the main problems of Walch's response to Gerhard were his questions about the means of grace post mortem,¹⁰⁹⁹ particularly since the means of grace were reserved for this life. For Walch, there was no revealed way to, or aids for, repentance or rebirth after death (it was all speculative and thus tended towards Pelagianism). If Buddeus's *Collegium theologico-morale* dealt extensively with the how of the *ordo* (types of grace, fallenness and healing of human faculties, and the approved means of grace), perhaps his caution here is not surprising. Gerhard's and Siegvold's models of *apokatastasis* depended on a post mortem purifying punishment and repentance. Yet, as I have tried to show, this eschatological model began with questions about the nature of God, even as a good deal of scriptural exegesis was needed to support it. The (Arminian) limits tied up around death or means of grace¹¹⁰⁰ were

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ich verwerfe die Tabulatur in den Menschen-Büchern nicht, das wird kein vernünftiger Mensch hieraus erzwingen können. Denn GOtt kan wol leiden dass wir uns wegen der Schwachheit unsers machen von solchen Sachen, die soch im Wesen Eins sind: wie davon die Exempel aus der Gottes Gelahrtheit, und auch aus der Schrift selbst, bekant sind. Und also kan GOtt auch wol leiden, daß wir uns die Gnaden-Wirckungen, die sein Sohn JESus durch den H. Geist in uns verrichtet unterschiedentlich, wegen der schwachheit unsers Verstandes mögen concipiren und begreifen: wen nur dieses dabey gehöriger Maassen zu Grunde gesetzt wird daß die Wiedergeburt, die REchtfertigung, Die Vereinigung mit GOtt realiter (wircklich) auch auf keinen Augenblick können getrennt gefunden werden.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.28, p. 365. Gerhard's point here is to warn those who codify and conceptualize God's work into a rigid process when it is really one work. This also supports a notion of the unity or simplicity of God. In the prior page (p.364) the role of the human imagination is especially praised as that which may be immersed further and further in the divine light. I suspect that Gerhard sees the imagination in a synthesizing role, while the intellect often can only dissect what is in truth one. Perhaps this is a reason for R. Seeberg's dismissal of Pietism's historical influence on the *ordo*. (See chapter one). The emphasis in Gerhard is on grasping the whole and its purpose, Gerhard sees the debate over the *ordo* has misguided. A similar emphasis on the need for the imagination is expressed by Thomas Talbott, a modern defender of universalism: "For in the end, I believe, it is a failure of the imagination-an imagination crippled by fear-and the inability to see how things fit together from a universalist perspective that lies behind many of the faulty and confused exegetical arguments in the traditional Bible commentaries." Talbott, *The Inescapable Love of God*, 51.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Walch, *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, 1734, 3:320.

¹¹⁰⁰ As expressed in Walch's rebuttal of Gerhard's system, see above. Thomas Talbott writes about the limits in an 'Arminian' understanding, where by God's love is universal and for all human beings at one point, but then ceases after death or has a time-limit, if they failed to repent. See, Talbott, *The Inescapable Love of God*, 168.

secondary considerations to the reality of the created (and loved) status of all creatures. Gerhard saw clearly the absurdity of the insistence that death could limit God's love and power even if the means of grace remained obscure.

The careful reader of Buddeus, like Gerhard or Siegmund Bärensprung, recognized that Buddeus admitted the reasonableness of such a doctrine and the theological harmony it allowed. These were not trivial words. They shifted the argument of proof away from the defenders of *apokatastasis* towards its deniers, and scripture had to carry the burden. Gerhard sensed the robustness of his arguments and system (certainly on a philosophical level) and complained about the refusal of his opponents to engage with his system on a macro-level, opting rather to nitpick minor points.¹¹⁰¹

So what might Ewald do in this debate? Buddeus was undoubtedly an influence on Ewald, but even the Halle Pietists like Spener and Joachim Lange did not exhibit an active dislike of the doctrine.¹¹⁰² Certainly Gerhard treated the Halle theologians with much more respect than he did his Rostock enemies, even when disagreeing with them.¹¹⁰³ In Buddeus's *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae variis*, Ewald could read of the Petersens's and Siegvold's defenses of the doctrine and Buddeus's admission of the *apokatastasis*'s reasonableness. From Gerhard's text, Ewald had access to a "mystical-spiritualist doctrine of justification"

¹¹⁰¹ One of the modern evangelical defenders of *apokatastasis*, Robin Parry [writing as Gregory Macdonald], also argues for the doctrine partially from its overall narrative coherence (the story Scripture is telling). See, MacDonald, *The Evangelical Universalist: The Biblical Hope That God's Love Will Save Us All*. The coherence of the Christian theological system is also given weight in David Bentley Hart's defense of the doctrine. See, Hart, *That All Shall Be Saved*.

¹¹⁰² As discussed above, Spener might best be described as cautious. Juliane Engelbrecht mentions a letter exchange between Spener and August Francke (who apparently had millenarian [chiliasmic?] views). She notes Spener warned Francke against expressing these views publicly and risk losing political support. See, Engelhardt, "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6," 303.

¹¹⁰³ According to Gerhard, the Halle theologians were concerned with the teaching of another time/age of grace, which some chiliasms might have taught. Gerhard does not need to go so far. He only says that one should not confuse grace with a time/age of grace, see Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff, Vorrede*, pp. 71-72.

culminating in *apokatastasis*, that Peschke described as agreeing with Halle theology.¹¹⁰⁴ Even Gerhard's first argument about the nature of God's love and Siegvolck's insistence on God as love had a great deal in common with another earlier Lutheran devotional writer admired by Ewald and other Pietists, Heinrich Müller.¹¹⁰⁵ Ewald's Pietist and Pietist-friendly environment (perhaps even his involvement with Zinzendorf) primed him to read these texts, probably sympathetically. Considering Ewald's warm words about Buddeus in 1752 in his preface to *Den eeneste, Sande og Salige Wiisdoms Kilde*, it is not unreasonable to posit that Gerhard's initial plea to Buddeus would have been noticed by Ewald.

Earlier I read one of Ewald's sermons through the lens of chiliasm and *apokatastasis*, drawing attention to the language of after-born versus first-born and pointing to Ewald's expectation about the conversion of the Jews. I also showed how the language of urgency and inheritance limited to the first-born complicates my reading of the texts. Within the Petersen/Siegvolck/Gerhard model, there was something to lose if repentance and rebirth did not begin in the present age, namely, bliss with ruling privileges versus a "humbler" bliss. In this framework, there was an urgency, even apart from the reality of a painful humbling in hell. I have also mentioned the shift that Ewald's *ordo salutis* required toward and then away from the slavish fear of God towards a true love of God.¹¹⁰⁶ In a way, this was the beginning and the end of the *ordo* for both Ewald and Buddeus. Only here could one truly be said to begin the process of sanctification and only here was the goal of sanctification displayed. Ewald's emphasis on sanctification in relation to the holy life supported a remedial, pedagogical, and medicinal path. An eschatological vision in line with *apokatastasis*, such as Petersen held, equally supported a remedial aim on a cosmic scale.¹¹⁰⁷ Within this

¹¹⁰⁴ Peschke, "Der Pietismus in Dargun," 84–85. This very short assessment perhaps deserves more investigation. How does Peschke define Halle theology and how does he consider Gerhard's system in relation to it?

¹¹⁰⁵ Shantz, *A Companion to German Pietism, 1660-1800*, 147. Ewald wrote a preface to the Danish edition of Müller's *Himmelscher Liebes-Kuß*, praising the devotional work, see Müller, *Himmelske Kierligheds-Kys*.

¹¹⁰⁶ See my discussion in section 5.3.4, I also refer to Ewald HH I, 426.

¹¹⁰⁷ In Petersen's treatise, he is careful to insist that the redemption of the devil is not that the devil is somehow 'saved' as he is, but the devil is repaired into the angel that he was. Petersen understands the 'devil' as the self-will and disobedience in the fallen angel. Petersen and Pagencopen, *Die von Dr. Johann Wilhelm*

eschatological framework, the path towards holiness as obedience to Christ was the only path (be it long or short).¹¹⁰⁸ It should not be surprising that Ewald, in his discussion of the final step of the *ordo* in his sermons, used eschatological language.¹¹⁰⁹ For him, there ought to be no break in our actions of obedience between the sanctifying path on earth and the eschatological consummation. Both in this life and the life to come, what the believer was asked to do was the same. After a fashion, death did not matter.

A reader of Gerhard ought to listen to his words for their rhetoric power:

However, because I stand now through God's grace in the blessed battle, so I hope beyond all doubt, that God will help me through it. Yes, I am perfectly persuaded in my soul that God, who once grasped me, will not let go until he completes the great work of the new creation in me, especially he began a good work in me and has already so greatly humbled me under his hand, that I surrender entirely to him, with my body and with my soul, to treat me and do with me in this life as He would consider good; if I only could reach the true denial of myself and my desires, through this [new work

Petersen kurtz vor seinem Ende nochmahlen nachdrücklich gerettete Wahrheit des ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge, 27. I would argue he understands the devil as a privation of the good 'thing' or being that was the angel, not a positive evil 'thing'. Though Petersen does not elaborate on a remedial process or repair here, it logically follows from his understanding of the repaired or healed end. This assessment of Petersen is echoed in the recent German history of *apokatastasis*. Horst Weigelt writes about Petersen's views, "Ontologisch besitzt das Böse - im Unterschied zum Guten - keine Essenz, sondern nur Akzidenz." Weigelt, *Universale Heilshoffnungen Im Christentum: Apokatastasiseideen in Theologie Und Kirche, Literatur Und Musik*, 87.

¹¹⁰⁸ Martin Laursten also writes about Ewald's harsh language towards both Jews and the non-Christians: "The reason for all this is the same for both jews and the majority of people in the Christian Denmark: lack of faith. Jews and unconverted Christians stand in the same position. There is only one escape for jews as well as for the bad Christians, and that is the personal conversion." (*Årsagen til alt dette er både hos jøder og de fleste mennesker i det kristne Danmark: vantro. Jøder og uomvendte kristne står på samme linje. Der er kun én udvej for jøder såvel som for de dårlige kristne, og det er den personlige omvendelse.*) Laursten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*, 106. I do not think Laursten realizes the implications of his observation within an *apokatastasis* eschatological horizon, since he paints this conclusion in a semi-negative light.

¹¹⁰⁹ Discussed in chapter 3, see also Ewald, HH V 592-593.

of God in me], as much as it may be [done] in this life according to the word of God, through the blood of Christ.¹¹¹⁰

Now that he wanted to make me partake also in the blessing, which he laid on the love of the cross, in such a way that my heart, courage, and mind may be thoroughly changed and may be purified and cleansed through the powerful blood of God; so that when I say goodbye to this world, without any further hard judgments, after my Jesus has led me happily through the valley of death, I may be able to see the most holy face of my majestic Creator in full joy.¹¹¹¹

Only the dull will miss the persuasive style, joyousness, and Pauline flavor of these words.¹¹¹² Even a historical analysis of Ewald's theology should consider who he believed God to be. The problem with a notion of the Pietist as concerned with the pure will in faith¹¹¹³ is that it ignores why so many radical Pietists (or New Evangelists as Gerhard preferred to be called)¹¹¹⁴ were linked to the doctrine of *apokatastasis*. So much so that later lexicon writers separated

¹¹¹⁰ *Weil ich aber doch durch GOTTes Gnade in dem seeligen Kampff einmahl stehe, so hoffe iche ungezweifelt, daß mir GOTT hindurch helfen werde. Ja ich bin vollkommen in meiner Seele überzeuget, daß mich GOTT, der mich einmahl ergriffen, nicht eher lassen werde, bis er dis grosse Werck der Neuen Schöpfung an mir vollbracht; insonderheit da er das gute Werck in mir angefangen, und mich schon so weit unter seine Hand gedemåuthiget, daß ich mich ihm gänzlich ergeben, mit meinem Leibe, und mit meiner Seele, in diesem Leben zu handeln und zu thun, wie Er es würde für gut befinden; wenn ich nur dadurch zur wahren Verleugnung meiner selbst, und meiner Lüste, so viel es in diesem Leben nach GOTTes Wort seyn mag, durch Blut Christi gelangen könnte.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.10, p. 291.

¹¹¹¹ *nur daß er mich auch des Seegens, welchen er auf das liebe Creutz gelegt, wolle theilhaftig machen, also und dergestalt, daß mein Hertz, Muth und Sinn gründlich möge geändert, und völlig durch das kräftige GOTTes-Blut möge gereinigt und geläutert werden; damit ich bei meinem Abschiede aus dieser Welt, ohne anderweitige harte Gerichte, nachdem mein JESus mich durch das Todes-Thal glücklich durchgeföhret, das allerheiliste Angesich meines Majestätischen Schöpfers in vollen Freuden schauen könne.* Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 5.10, p. 292.

¹¹¹² The two quotations sandwich Gerhard's own citation of Phil 3:12-13.

¹¹¹³ I refer here again to Matthias, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy."

¹¹¹⁴ *Die Neuen Evangelisten*, see Gerhard, *Kurtzer Begriff*, 3.20, p. 163, 3.29, p. 171, 4.26-27, p. 214, 5.18, p. 308.

the doctrine from the Pietist label. Theologically, Gerhard's passage offers an attractive picture of God. In fact, one stands dumbfounded in wonder at God's patience and love. If faith is called for, why not also the God who is faithful in return beyond all expectation? That God is the one to trust. If love is called for, why not the God who is love and remains eternally patient, loving beyond the bounds of death and even demonhood. It is odd, though perhaps not surprising, that later characterisations of Pietism accused it of disparaging the intellect and valuing affection and will instead. Perhaps if this final eschatological horizon is disregarded, the accusations are not unfair. Still, let us acknowledge that this Gerhardian representation of God is the absolute *and* relative good¹¹¹⁵ that Buddeus's human being, at least, ought to and perhaps must love.

¹¹¹⁵ Remember that Buddeus's framework requires that a good be a relative good (good in relation to us) for the will to desire it. See above my discussion in section 5.4.2 and Ewald's definition of God's holiness in relation to us in section 3.5.2.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have traced certain strands of Ewald's thought in light of the themes of his 1734 trial. My initial close reading of the trial helped to uncover the theological and philosophical tensions at play between Ewald and Danish Lutheran Orthodoxy (Kaasbøll and Reenberg). My observations were distilled into three areas: problematic eschatological doctrines, disputes about the *ordo salutis*, and the philosophical importance of experience as related to knowledge. None of this is groundbreaking within Pietism research, but it offered up questions that a reading of Ewald's thought and a consideration of his historical context could answer. It was a straightforward reading of the trial, which sidelined the political questions somewhat. Within the documents themselves, Reenberg, in particular, was attentive to concerns about public safety—certain heresies were too dangerous for the average person to be exposed to.¹¹¹⁶ Ewald denied any revolutionary activism on his part. Nonetheless, the theological disagreements remained the main focus of the trial and thus my main focus.

After studying the trial, I moved on to examine how Ewald described the *ordo salutis* both in his catechisms and in various sermons from his five-volume set. Again, the method was to remain as close to the texts as possible. Since Ewald's writings have not been the subject of substantial scholarship prior to this, this section also serves as an introduction to those texts. Any understanding of Ewald as a central theological figure within Danish state Pietism may aid in fleshing out this intellectual climate and history as well. My examination of the *ordo salutis* in Ewald elucidated the active human response to divine action within the believer. Such activity with its psychological stages prompted the need to further investigate how human activity (especially mental) was envisioned in the Early Modern period. In Ewald's texts, eschatological imagery continued to appear occasionally,¹¹¹⁷ almost surprisingly. Given the prohibition Ewald was under because of his trial, these references suggested that silence

¹¹¹⁶ Reenberg notes that the conversion of the Jews and chiliasm (along with presumably universalism) was too dangerous for the 'Republica' and 'Ecclesia', "Reenberg's Response to Ewald," 6.

¹¹¹⁷ Here I refer especially to the conversion of the Jews. This theme was linked to bridal imagery, which in turn was used to describe the union with God or Christ.

did not mean absence. My reading and explication of Ewald's texts turned my attention again to the debates of the trial.

The final section of this dissertation took up three topics: the nature of grace, the nature of the human being (particularly their mental faculties), and a defense of *apokatastasis*. With the first, I sought a theological explanation for the activity of the human being in the *ordo*. How did Ewald, as a Lutheran, defend the strong claims of inherent righteousness and good actions by the reborn? In the second, I wanted to explore experience and how a human being was understood to function. What happened when a human being knew something and willed something? To use a metaphor I somewhat disapprove of: what were the "mechanics" of a human being? And finally, in light of Ewald's silence, I investigated possible forms and arguments related to vulgar chiliasm and *apokatastasis*. What might he have read and believed? What difference did it make for Ewald's theology if he assumed a chiliastic universalism?

My central argument has been that Ewald's universalism harmonized well with his *ordo salutis*. Moreover, it harmonized if one ceased to view the divine action and grace, not as a complete 'break' in the natural functioning of a human being, but as a general working from within and through human nature to heal the human by divine means. To understand my argument, let me go briefly into the research pathway here. The trial analysis first pointed my attention toward the *ordo salutis* in Ewald's thought, but I could not understand how such an emphasis on personal conversion or rebirth meshed with the eschatological elements. It was through reading Buddeus's moral theology in connect to Ewald's texts that this divinely-aided 'psychological' model of the *ordo* clarified the notion of an inherent sanctification. This in turn prompted a search to escape the inner-outer effective causality divide—Catholic scholars Michael Hanby and D.C. Schindler, along with Rowan Williams, were particularly helpful in this regard as their research challenged also the competitive metaphysical framework. Suddenly, the unresolved tensions in Buddeus and the trial over participation in Christ, the increasing presence of the Holy Spirit, and the *unio mystica*. I have referred to these themes only briefly in the dissertation, but methodologically I was forced to stop for a long time and consider what was at stake in the contemporary debate. Why did Ewald's *ordo* need the language of indwelling or union? Once one accepts these concepts into the theological

system, the metaphysical picture becomes more complicated. Even if this is never fully explicated in Ewald's thought, the sense of increasing perfection and deepening union with, or the indwelling of, the divine also begin to move the conversation about salvation away from a binary distinction between the saved and the damned.¹¹¹⁸ There becomes a need in the very least to speak of degrees of salvation.¹¹¹⁹ Additionally, the psychological experience and path towards loving *in* Christ and *as* Christ loved permitted both human and divine activity, which did not need to be seen as competitive.

At this point in my research, I had all these various elements: language of cooperative and indwelling grace, the necessity of inherent sanctification, the possibility of non-competitive human and divine activity—which in itself means that a psychologized *ordo* is not anti-theological or necessarily Pelagian. In addition, I also had Ewald's eschatological doctrines from his trial waiting to be explained if possible. There are historical Pietist precedents for Ewald's eschatology—certainly for his hopes for the conversion of the Jews and a chiliastic kingdom.¹¹²⁰ But how can the one who continues to insist on the resistability of grace given the nature of the human will and freedom to choose account for this? The solution came from two directions: the problem of the 'end' of sanctification in Ewald's thought and David Bentley Hart's modern defense of Christian universalism. For the first, sanctification does not seem to end during this life, Ewald's sermons on holiness or sanctification turned towards the eschaton in their final pages. Either there is no end of this becoming more and more holy or its end exceeds the limits of this life—which most experience seems to verify. For the second, Hart's book was the first time I considered the theological implications of universalism and I found his argument not merely persuasive but able to synchronize many of my own research themes. Personally, Hart's argument for the interconnectedness of human beings and thus

¹¹¹⁸ What one is left with is a divide between the first-born and after-born, which a chiliastic age well provides for. How, as I argued above, Ewald already gives an allegorical reading of the Old Testament priesthood by which the separated priesthood is to lead the rest, not be eternally separated from the remnant.

¹¹¹⁹ Erik Pontoppidan wrote a Latin dissertation titled, *De gradibus gloriae coelestis pio viatori appetendis* (1749) and Johann Rambach writes "*Daß sie von der Seligkeit des Himmels nicht quoad essentiam vel speciem, sondern nur quoad gradus unterschieden sey*". Rambach and Neubauer, *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre*. 2 2, 2042.

¹¹²⁰ See Lausten, *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*.

human bliss was definitive for me, but Hart's final meditation on the nature of human freedom has been the most relevant for this dissertation (see summary in chapter 5 footnotes). Hart's arguments come from within a Christian intellectual framework, that is, he starts with the Christian story of who God is and who God is towards humanity. He also draws upon human psychological experience when discussing the orientation of the will towards a good end—however deceived one might be about the actual goodness of a certain action or object.

After Hart, I explored both the nature of human freedom as presented in the Early Modern period and also the contemporary debate around radical Pietist universalism. Although I do not consider Buddeus's and Walch's discussion of freedom and the will's orientation towards the good as necessitating the 'choice' of God as one object among others, much of Buddeus's discussion of 'true freedom' and the will's orientation towards the good matched elements of Hart's argument. Additionally, what Ewald did emphasize was the enslaving and blinding effect of sin and how it is Christ's work through the *ordo salutis* to heal, renew and sanctify. Finally, the particular details of Pietist universalism in Gerhard or Paul Siegel resonated with odd elements of Ewald's sermons: such as firstborn and afterborn language, as I argued in chapter 3.

I am not sure that this understanding of how *apokatastasis* is properly worked out in Ludwig Gerhard, even though the pedagogical elements of purging fire are present. The use of a holy fear or a slavish fear is also present in Buddeus's and Ewald's texts as a precursor to conversion. A clearer argument or image of the 'mechanics' is available in George Macdonald's sermon "The Consuming Fire". My dissertation has argued only that these disparate elements in Ewald's idea world existed, and there are distinct gestures towards their unity in his work.

I have chosen to present Ewald's theology in a manner that emphasizes the greatest coherency of thought across his corpus, trial, and historical world of ideas. I have not attempted to tie Ewald more closely into a specific branch of Pietism, like earlier Danish research has done. Additionally, questions about Ewald's "heretical" opinions have not been my main research concern, neither has this dissertation been overtly concerned with queries

about Ewald's contributions to Enlightenment thought, though certainly the Early Modern context has been an important resource for my discussion in the second half of the dissertation. All I have tried to show is that within certain theological, philosophical, and psychological premises, a theological reading can be drawn.

Over the course of my research, I have developed suspicions about the origin of some of these themes that connect spiritual perfection, sanctification, and universalism. The following is speculative, though not ungrounded. The Early Modern Lutheran use of the *unio mystica* in Johann Gerhard, Johann Arndt, and Buddeus most likely has been strengthened by their reading of Pseudo-Macarius (or Macarius the Egyptian as they thought him to be).¹¹²¹ Pseudo-Macarius's spirituality has also been closely linked with Gregory of Nyssa's thought.¹¹²² Gregory is increasingly considered to have been a Christian universalist.¹¹²³ The elements of entire sanctification and transformation, possibly even deification, that Pseudo-Macarius touched upon¹¹²⁴ and that run through Gregory's thought¹¹²⁵ are vital to Ewald's thought even if he was not citing the early church fathers. All must be perfected¹¹²⁶ and for Ewald the method was the *ordo salutis*. This is perhaps why Pietist universalism had a slightly different

¹¹²¹ See, Benz, "Die Protestantische Thebais: Zur Nachwirkung Makarios Des Ägypters Im Protestantismus Des 17. Und 18. Jahrhunderts in Europa Und Amerika." Benz argues that Macarius's thought with its ideal of perfection appealed especially in a time when the Lutheran churches were experiencing an 'ethical quietism' (*ethischen Quietismus*), p. 129.

¹¹²² See, Burns, "Divine Ecstasy in Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Macarius: Flight and Intoxication"; Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena*, 464.

¹¹²³ See, Ludlow, *Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner*; Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena*, 372 sqq.; Ramelli and Bauckham, *A Larger Hope?, Volume 1 : Universal Salvation from Christian Beginnings to Julian of Norwich.*, 109–26.

¹¹²⁴ See, Gotlitzin, "A Testimony to Christianity as Transformation: The Macarian Homilies and Orthodox Spirituality."

¹¹²⁵ See, Robb-Dover, "Gregory of Nyssa's 'Perpetual Progress.'" This theme is also discussed in Boersma, *Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: An Anagogical Approach*. J. A. McGuckin also briefly touches upon the connection between *apokatastasis*, deification, and participation in the divine nature in Gregory of Nyssa's thought, see McGuckin, "The Strategic Adaptation of Deification in the Cappadocians," 104–10.

¹¹²⁶ HH V, 312 sqq.

tint than Early Modern arguments against the infinity of hell from the standpoint of retributive punishment.¹¹²⁷ Retributive punishment considered purely in itself does not necessarily address the underlying problem of the sinful human condition as Ewald understood it. To use a popular example, C.S. Lewis pointed out that this condition would ultimately become a hellish prison.¹¹²⁸ Something more is required in the Pietist universalist claims. Despite the reception of universalism in the Petersen Pietists via Jacob Boehme and Jane Leade,¹¹²⁹ a genealogy of the doctrine of *apokatastasis* in Pietism might also consider other theological pressures or doctrines that lay the groundwork—like the simplicity of God.

These thoughts are broad strokes, not claims that the Pietists read Gregory of Nyssa's *Catechetical Oration*, which details "a medicinal character of punishment after death."¹¹³⁰ Buddeus, at least, wished to reserve the medicinal character of the *ordo* to present life. Still, a focus on the *ordo* as a healing process, supernaturally empowered but not anti-natural in

¹¹²⁷ See above discussion in chapter 6. The focus on the individual soul vs. a purely poetic universal cosmology is noticed also by Joachim Jacob in his discussion of the poet Christoph Martin Wieland and contemporary understandings of *apokatastasis*, "Die Universalität des Heilsordnung, die sich auf diese Weise kontinuierlich durchsetzen soll, bis "in dem ganzen All wird Dank und Lob erschallen" (VI, 410) ist eine seelenzentrierte. Wenn die "Wiederbringung aller Dinge" auch als Restitution einer paradiesischen Natur vorstellbar wäre, so ist dies doch nicht die Vision, die einer von Platon und Leibniz inspirierten "poetischen Cosmologie" naheliegt." Jacob affirms here the tendency towards individualism the *ordo salutis* involves. Jacob also comments on Johann Wilhelm Petersen's universalism and also notes that Petersen, like Origen, asserted that evil (and thus sin) are not eternal. Jacob, *Heilige Poesie: Zu Einem Literarischen Modell Bei Pyra, Klopstock Und Wieland*, 194.

¹¹²⁸ "Christianity asserts that every individual human being is going to live forever, and this must either be true or false. Now there are a good many things which would not be worth bothering about if I were going to live only seventy years, but which I had better bother about very seriously if I am going to live forever. Perhaps my bad temper or my jealousy are gradually getting worse—so gradually that the increase in seventy years will not be very noticeable. But it might be absolute hell in a million years: in fact, if Christianity is true, Hell is the precisely correct technical term for what it would be." Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, 74.

¹¹²⁹ This is a major theme in Michael McClymond's work. See McClymond, *The Devil's Redemption*; Weigelt, *Universale Heilshoffnungen Im Christentum: Apokatastasiseiden in Theologie Und Kirche, Literatur Und Musik*, 82. For a good historical discussion of Jane Leade's influence, see Hessayon, *Jane Lead and Her Transnational Legacy*.

¹¹³⁰ MacDonald and Parry, "All Shall Be Well": *Explorations in Universal Salvation and Christian Theology, from Origen to Moltmann*, 59.

practice,¹¹³¹ created a way of thinking and considering God's action towards humanity (and all creatures). Ewald, with the silent eschatology included, worked out the implications of such divine saving actions. Those actions became indicative of God's nature, which remained constant.

A great deal of this dissertation operates as an extended meditation on Matthias's accusation against Joachim Lange and Johannes Musäus: that they made faith essentially irrational.¹¹³² I hope I have portrayed a Pietist answer to his accusation that affirms both a rational coherence and a place for the human will within such a faith. For, as Pontoppidan noted,

for a Christian teacher who speaks in order to teach and persuade others, it is most important that he himself is persuaded and convinced about the truth, so he feels its power in his heart.¹¹³³

It may be that an Evangelical or a Pietist might only answer Noll's accusation of anti-intellectualism as a classical Christian theist and Platonist: the reality of human intellection and the will's response must reflect something of God as the Real. For where else does the Truth coincide with the Good, thus awakening delight? If this is not so, Matthias's accusation about the fundamental irrationality of the Christian faith finds a large weakness in the experiential emphasis of Pietism. Hopefully in my investigation and presentation of Ewald and his Pietistic thought, this accusation finds no permanent purchase. In terms of the system of Christian thought that Ewald presented, the God Ewald worshipped might yet be the God worthy of such worship.

¹¹³¹ By which I mean, God's saving action attracts the human being but does not 'override' the believer's willing and intending.

¹¹³² See Matthias, "Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy." Also discussed in chapter one.

¹¹³³ *Men for en kristen lærer som taler for å undervise og overbevise andre, er det fremfor alt viktig at han selv er overtalt og overbevist om sannheten, så han føler dens kraft i sitt hjerte.* Pontoppidan, *Collegium Pastorale Practikum : Pontoppidans Pastoralteologi*, 194.

Appendices

Appendix A: Kaasbøll's and Reenberg's theses against Ewald¹¹³⁴

Kaasbøll (pp. 4-7 in "Kaasbøll's accusations against Ewald")

1. Det er icke at hvert Ord i hører der kand omvende Jer, / men naar Aanden kommer, da skal i give vel agt paa / at I straz imodtager og e imodstaaer ham; I hører /mange Prædicken, uden frugt uden bevægelse; Men / naar i føler at den hellig Aande opvækker en særdeelis / bevægelse hos Jer, da maa i Tæncker, nu er det Tiid etc / I have ofte haft bevægelser i Jer hierte naar i have / hørt een Predicken, men den har icke været den rette / det har da icke været Aandets Villie
2. Du tencker ofte, naar du enter læser eller hører / Guds ord, at du har faaet gode bevægelser deraf, men / naar du er bleven igienføed da seer du straz at / de bevægelser icke være af Aanden med at kiødet, for//di du læsde ordet uden Aanden.
3. Mand maa vel give agt paa, naar Aanden kommer, / da er det Guds villie, at omvende os, det er icke / altid hans Villie Jac 1 vers 18: Du undrer ofte over, at du har hørt saa mange Prædickener og haft saa man/ge bevægelser, dog naar du seer den i det liv, saa er / du det eene Aar icke kommed viidere hen i den Chri/stendom end det andet men da har det icke været Guds / Villie
4. Vi skulle fuldkommen igienføddes til Guds billede og ligesom vi ved den naturlige fødsel have fuldkom/men Syndesens billede i os, Item Vi kand icke blive / salige, uden den Guds lignelse, som vi ere skabte ef/ter, ligesaa fuldkommen i os igien oprettes.
5. Det er icke var egen Natur, den bliver forbedret / thi den bliver som den var, men vi faae noget andet i / os, een anden Natur saa at du ey alleene bliver / Christi brud og Søster, ved det der bliver skabt noget / nyt i dig, og du bliver deelagtig i den Guddommelige / Natur, men du bliver endog Christi Moder Marc / 3 vers 34 saa at ligesom du var i den Naturlige Til/stand, du undfangede og føde Synden, saa undfanger og /føde du Christum.
6. Synden skal gandske borttages i os 1 Joh 3: 19. Hand siger / icke den er icke Synd i ham; thi kiødet er hos ham saa/længe hand lever, men hand synder icke; thi ligesom

¹¹³⁴ From Kall Fol 93, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen, unpaginated. The numbers come from my own divisions of the accusations and responses. See discussion in chapter 2.

/ hans Naturlige begierlighed, da har var u-igien/fød gandske og aldeelis lokkede og drog ham, undfangede / og fødte Synden, og Synden døden Jac 1 14:15: Saa gjør / den aandelige begierlighed, nu hand er Igienføed, / den locker og drager ham gandske og aldeelis undfan/ger og fødte Christum thi den naturlige begierlighed / er da af Aanden undertyckt og dæmpet; Item syn/den bliver borttagen i een Igienføed med Rub og / Stub.

7. Endskiønt Christum er føed i Jødeland af Jomfru Maria, / saa kand det icke gaver os, med mindre hand ogsaa / undfanges og fødes i os, Aarsagen er fordi at Synden skal ganske borttages i os, hvilket kand icke sker, saa / lenge Christus er uden for os, hvorfore hand maa undfanges og fødes i os, for at udrydde den.
8. Begierligheden som vi undfanges med, ere vi icke selv/ skyld i, derfor kommer nock Gud til rette med den, / men det som fordømmer os er synden, som den und/fanger i os.
9. Det er icke eenhver, som taler ordet saaledes at det / kand igienfødde, men den som taler ordet med Aand / og Kraft.
10. Det, som gjør os salige, er Guds billedes oprettelse / i os, naar vi uendlig komme i den samme stand som / Adam var udi, og ligesom hand, da skulle have faaed / det Evige liv, fordi hand har Guds Billede saa og vi.
11. At et Menniske kommer saavidt at hand i nogle Ting / kand fornægter sig selv, flye et eller andet onde, skeer / alt sammen ved Naturlige Kræfter, men naar hand / bekommer kraft, fornægter hand alt det onde.
12. Endskiønt at Menniske er blever døbt, haver stedse / hørt Guds ord, og gaaed til Guds borg, saa sidder hand / dog i Mørcket og mand kand icke sige, at Gud lader / sit lys opgaae for ham, forend Gud i Igienføddelsen / lader sit lys opgaaende for ham
13. Kand een u-gudelige Præst lære Guds ord ret med Kraft? / barnet svarede: Det være langt fra at vi skulle sige / det, thi den som icke selv haver Aanden, kand icke / give anden den. // Endelig bespørger ieg mig hos ham, om hand icke kand er/rinder at have den Siette Søndag, efter Paaske i næstfor/bigangene Aar i Catechizationen gjorde dette Spørmaal / hvad det er at sætte i baand, og da barnet svarede: /Det er at holde een fra Skriftestolen og Alterens Sa//cramente, om hand da icke selve lagde disse ord dertil, / Det er rett at holde Folk fra den forbandede Skriftestoel / som hører saa mange til fordømmelse.

Reenberg (pp. 1-6 in "Reenberg's accusations against Ewald")

1. At Daabens Værdighed beviisses deraf, fordi Christus/ holdte sig fra Verden til hand var 30 Aar gammel, før hand vilde lade sig døbe.
2. Faderen drager os (det er tugter og driver os) som / u-lydige børn til Sønnen
3. Dend Grund eller indvortes Guds dyrkelse, som meest / bør drives paa, beviist af 1 Thes: 1 Vers 3 Rom 12 / vers 1 Jacob 1:20 før vers 27. Men den udvortes Guds Dyrkelse er Kirckegang, Daab, og Nadveren // hvilcke ere kun Middeler men icke Sagen selv, hvor / ved vi icke tienne? Gud, men kand vel være vor Siel til / nytte. Om nogen icke saa meget driver derpaa kand / derfor icke skiældes paa eller kaldes for een Kiettere.
4. At Guds ord, som er taldt før et Menniskes omvendelse er intet
5. **Christus begynder og fuldkommer** vor Tro ved Mid/ler Embedet or ordet.
6. Om den kand kiende om forførelse, com kiender Sandhed og / icke følger den?
7. Om den kand dømmes om Forførelse, som kan sin Theologi / har læst sin Bibel? Ney det er kun een bogstavelig kund/skab.
8. Hvilcked der forfører mest, ~~eller~~ Lærdom eller Exempeler, / Rx Exempler, hvilcked, som det e kunde beviisses af / Texten, læres dog af Erfarenhed.
9. Den Salvelse 1 Joh 2 haver icke de, som begynde paa sin / Christendom
10. De, som have den, kand icke let falde i kiødelige Synder, / men om de skal falde behøves den lang tiid; Men til / subtile ting Ex gr. Vantror, som om Christus i os; / fordi de kand eÿ uden af Forfarenhed lære den Christi/ kraft
11. Tvende Grund-Regler, hvorved vi komme til Jesum. / 1^{re} Egen Fornægtelse. 2^{de} Ordet
12. Tree ting kiende vi Jesum ved, Stiernem, ordet, og /Salvelsen, thi Gud aabenbaredes i een drøm.
13. Ligesom den oprinder een Stierne for de viisse saa op/rinder een Stierne i vore hierter 2 Petri 1 hvil/cket er icke et Fanatiske Lys, men indlades ved / ordet og skal igien prøves efter ordet og andre / Guds børns Aand, derfor siger Johannes prøver Aan/derne
14. Den forføres icke , som troer, særdeelis om Jødernes / Omvendelse, Sÿret, og Høren, men den, som icke / troer
15. Hand haver lært om det Indvortes og Udvortes; at / mand skal bruge Guds ord invortes og Guds Aands // Oplysning indvortes; Giør Skriftens Meening tvety/dig; Giør forskiæl paa den bogstavelige Kundstab, som de / u-igienfødde have, og den Aandelige, som

de Igienfødde / alleene have; at hand gjør ordet og Aanden, som 2 ad/skildte virckende Aarsager

16. At hand gjør lærdommen om de bædre tiider til en / troens Articul
17. At hand haver lært om Wiedergrungung aller dinge
18. Endelig kand een Mons^r Jerne aflegger sit Viden at H.¹¹³⁵ / Ewald haver lært at Christo legeme og Blod gives eÿ / de u-værdige i Sacramentet, thi hand har gaaed / bud imellem H. Ewald og een anden.
19. Efter alt dette har den gode mand eÿ tænckt paa sin / End, at hand eÿ skulle tillade mogen saadan lærdom / at inprentes i de Unges hiertes, som den ere / uddrager af deels bøger; saa er det og andstøde/ligt som Mons^r Egede forklarer nærmerer, at da / een Grønlænder blev begravet taldte hand over / graver disse ord: Du est fød i Mørcked, leved i / Mørcke og død i Mørcked, og denne var baade døbt / og grundlig i sin Christendoms Kundskab.
20. Om et Guds barn har altiid her i Verden fornøden / at gjøre denne bekiendelse, Je er een orm og grov Synder? Hand svarede selv, Neÿ! det bevare os Gud! / Det være langt fra
21. Der ere 2 Vigtige Forseelser et Menniske bør tage / sig være for; den første, at gjøre sin Synd for rin/ge. Den 2^{den} at gjøre den for stoer andlangende / den sidste, da vil hand eÿ forstaae den derved, som / falt i fortvivelse over deris Synder, thi de ere gand/ske faae.
22. Taldte hand om Skrifte-Stoelen i thi det er daaligt / at faae den til Præsten, at søge sine Syndens For/ladelse som og efter selv eÿ har sine Synders forladelse.
23. Endhver maa eÿ applicere paa sig alt det Christus Evan/gelisterne og Apostlerne have forstrevet, at den som / nylig har begyndt paa sin Christendom kand eÿ tæncke / at hand straz kunde faae sine Synders Forladelse ved / Christi Navn.
24. Vor Egen fornegtelse gjør os værdige til at faa Syndernis /Forladelse.
25. Ideligen taler hand imod de saa kaldede Geistlige /: Det / er hands ord:/ at de eÿ rette sig efter det ord de lære

¹¹³⁵ | am uncertain of the transcription symbol here, but confident it is an abbreviation for *Herr* (Mr.).

26. At Lærdom er hinder for Saligheden, at at Lærde Folk / ere aarsage til alt ont; skulle hand udrette noget / skulle det være ved u-lærde og Eenfoldige Folk
27. I at prøve ordet og Lærdeommen skulle mand ey troe det, / som ander sagde, enter det var Prædickentere Præster/ Læreren, eller hvem det var, e heller det mand / selv læste i bøger enten det var den hell. Skrift eller / andre gudelige bøger; Men alleene troe, hvad Salvelsen / det er Aanden lærde og derefter dømmer om Forfarelse
28. At de, som beg nte paa dens Christendom faae icke / den hellig Aand, men alleene de, som ere stadfæste/de derudi.
29. Selv fornægtelsen er at mand skal gaae ind i sig selv / grave, søge, lede, randsage, med all fliid og [?]øye / hiertets inderste kraager og Vraaer indtil imod / findes klippen Christum
30. De 13 Januar een Onsdag lærde een Student af / 2 Corith 5:16 at det var at søge Christum efter / kiødet, at et Menniske naar hand kommer i sin / syndlige Tilstands Erfaring derpaa straz søge hos / vor Frelsens alle sin Synders Forladelse, Frelse/nes Forsoning etc. / følger atter H. Ewalds Lærdomme
31. At Sacramenterne ere kuns udvortis Middeler / vedkommer ey Grunden i vor Christendom.
32. At Menniske skal holdes for ond, til mand er over / beviist at hand er god.¹¹³⁶
33. Renselsen er 2 slags, den første den hvorved at Mennis/ke skal renses føreud hand kommer til Christum, den / anden er helliggiørelsen.
34. Vantro er icke alleene det, som hindrer Christi komme
35. Uden Reenselsen gaae for sig hielpen det aldeelis / indtet, at mand beder, gaaer til Skrifte nyder / Sacramenterne; thi da renses mand icke ved saa/danne Ting, skiønt mange har den daalige Indbildning.
36. Eendeel forvirrer dem, som ved den første Reenselve / kand være kommer i u-mulige Tancker og Fortvivlelse i det de for hastig vil trøste dem, førud de udi den / 1^{ste} Reenselse ved selvornægtelsen havde faaed kraft / at trenge indtil Christum Jesum.
37. At et Menniske i Helliggiørelsen skulle, og kunde ren/se sig fra alle udvortes og indvortes Syster[?]

¹¹³⁶ See Buddeus's similar judgement about the *spiritual*, not civil, condition of a human being, Buddeus, *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*, 1740, 1:51.

38. At Sünden i sig selv i Helligjørelsen skulle udrenses.
39. At der er een Stand imellem Naadens Stand og /Vredens Stand.
40. At det, som passer sig alleene paa de Igienfødd neml:/at holde sig fra at gjøre forsettelige Synder og mot/villige Synder, det tillagde hand dem, som vare paa / Vejen at omvendes, som hand regnede i den Middel/stand
41. At een god Intention gjorde motvilligheds Synd / til een Skrøbeligheds Synd.
42. At Vantro fordømmer ickun i een visse hendeende
43. Hand regnede Vantro blant Skrøbeligheds Synder.
44. At Gud saae hen til Sündsens Grovhed og Ringhed i at / bære Taalemodighed med at Menniske og bevise ham / Naade til Omvendelse.
45. Hand paastaed at den skal være helvedes Angest over Syn/den
46. Skrøbeligheds Synder findes icke uden hos dem som / endnu ere børn i Naade-standen.
47. Naar et Menniske, som er kommen noget hen i sin /Christendom Bygynder at slunte[?] lader Gud ham falde / et stoert fald, paa det hand komme i Kundskab / om dit Skrøbelighed.
48. De, som staae og falde; falde og staae kand eÿ sies / at være Igienfødde.
49. bruger disse tale-maader Ret omvent, Ret / Igienfoed
50. At de, som beg nde paa deris Christdom kunde / det eÿ siges om, men de, som være stadfæstede / Grundfæstede og Rodfæstede derudi
51. At de Igienføddes Synd icke bliver regned for Synd / i Guds dom.
52. Jeg kaldes forførere (ere hands ord om sig selv) fordi / ieg spreder helligjøelsen for høyt; Vogter Eder for / den, som lære anderledis, de ere forførere og Anti Christ[...]
53. Dersom mand skal være Retferdig for Gud skal mand / aflede det onde og gjøre det gode.
54. Guds Aand i os kand oplÿse os om meere og forklare / det tydeligere for os, som staae i Guds ord, og hvad / guds ord hvercken forbyder os eller befaler os skal / Guds Aand sige os, hvad Gud er behageligt.
55. Kand at Guds barn vente det samme som Simeon / fick, umulig at det var ham aabenbared af den hell:/ Aand at hand icke skulle see døden førend hand fick / herrens Christum at see?/ Rx Hand svarede selv, ja.

56. Kircke skrickene[scripture?] kunde mand tage og forkaste efter / sin Egen Samvittighed. / (Fornevnte Lærdomme holde ieg for mis/ tænckelige farlige og mod den reene Lutherske Kir/ckens Lære stridige at være, som jeg dem hermed til / den høye Commission overleverer med Reservation / at hvad ieg om Vidner at Føre i Diductioners Fol: 13 / haver andført, som ieg herved eÿ vel have noged le/vodered af hvad hellers i samme Diduction er men/tionered./ Endnu er i Continuationen tilført)
57. At det var een Pharisæisk Nidkierhed at opr cke / og udrydde dem, som havde vrang Meeninger i / Religionen, Mand burde taale dem, omgaaes med / dem i Kierlighed og om de end være saa skulle mand / dog icke forfølge dem men søge at over vinde dem med / Kierlighed

Appendix B: Ewald and Reenberg Trial Exchange

Sacraments: Thesis 3

Reenberg:

Th: 3 Dend Grund eller indvortes Guds dyrkelse, som meest / bør drives paa, beviist af 1 Thes: 1 Vers 3 Rom 12 / vers 1 Jacob 1:20 før vers 27. Men den udvortes Guds Dyrkelse er Kirckegang, Daab, og Nadveren // hvilcke ere kun Middeler men icke Sagen selv, hvor / ved vi icke tienne Gud, men kand vel være vor Siel til / nytte. Om nogen icke saa meget driver derpaa kand / derfor icke skiældes paa eller kaldes for een Kiettere. (pp. 1-2 in "Reenberg's accusations against Ewald")

[Ewald's alleged statement:] The foundational or internal worship of God, which should be emphasized, is proven by 1 Thes 1:3, Rom 12: 1, James 1:20, especially vers 27. but the external worship of God is church attending, baptism, and the Eucharist, which are only means, not the matter themselves, whereby we do not serve God, but [they] can well be useful for our soul. If someone does not insist on this, they cannot therefore be abused as or called a heretic.

Ewald's first response:

At ieg har forrestillet hvad den sande Guds Dyrckelse / af de her citerede Sprog er og vel sandt og at ieg har / sagt at vi ved Naadesens Middelen brug icke saa / meget tiener Gud, som Gud tiener os tilstaar ieg / Men de øvrige ord, som her andføres har ieg icke taldt / paa den maade. (p. 2 in "Ewald's first response to Reenberg")

That I have represented what the true worship of God [is] by the here cited quotation, is true, and that I have said that we by the means of the use of the sacraments do not as much serve God as God serves us, I confess this. But the additional words, which here are alleged, I have not spoken in this matter.

Reenberg's reply:

Denne skal beviises ved Vidner. (p. 21 in "Reenberg's response to Ewald")

This shall be proven with witnesses

Ewald's final reply:

[Th] 3 til 7 Hr. Reenberg kand gierne føre sine Vidner / frem efter den høie Commissions behag. / Men for det 1^{ste} vil jeg bede ham erin/der sine Vidner; at de lidet betænke deris / Samvittighed for i Veåyen, og at prøve sig for Guds Ansigt med hvad for et hierte-lag de / var komme i Kircken for at høre mig og hvor/ledis de have hørt siden det eene men det andet, / uden Connexion og uden at sette den der/til føede udleggelse efter mit Sind og Mee/ning, saasom ieg har forklared. / I har mange gange seet hvorledis de gode Folck / som uden tvil vil være vidner ere løber bort midt udi Talen, hvorledis vil de Dømme /derom. Men desforuden agter jeg / at eenhver bør billiger til tilstæddes at være sine egne Ords Fortolckere. // Mine Ord kand jeg u-muligen alle erinder / igien lige saa lidet som Hr. Reenberg eller andre. / Men mine Meeninger veed jeg hvorudi de / bestaaer eller icke, og imod min Meening / lærer jeg icke. Altsaa kunde over alt Vid/ner kun gjøre lidet ved denne Sag; Ellers en det bedrøveligt nock, at een Lærere vil besk /l/de mig for saa mange formeente Kætterier, / og Forførrelser, og haver efter sin egne til/staaelse aldrig selv hørt mig, icke heller / taldt mindste Ord med mig derom, bar / paa saadanne Elendige og u-rigtige Vid/nisb rd derom, som een og anden kand af/bygge der har hørt mig, med at præjudiceret / Sind Jeg torde vel beraade mig paa de fleeste / af de Høie herrer, som sidde i denne Commis/sion at de, som idelig til deals have hørt / mig e have hørt slige Kætterier af mig, som / jeg nu skal gøres fordægtig for af Een, som / aldrig har hørt mig. (pp. 7-8 in " Ewald's second response to Reenberg (unsigned)")

Th. 3 to 7 Hr Reenberg can certainly lead his witnesses here according to the pleasure of the high Commission.

But for the first, I will ask him to remind his witnesses; that they should reflect in their conscience beforehand, and to examine themselves before the face of God with what mind they come into church to hear me with and how they have listened since the one [mind] with the other, without trapping one word here, the other there, with no connection, and without setting the adjoined explication after my mind and opinion, as I have explained.

You all have many times seen how the good people who without doubt desire to be witnesses run out right in the middle of a speech. How then can they judge it. But besides this I regard that each should justly be confessed to be their own interpreter of their words.

Like Hr Reenberg or others I cannot remember *all* my words again. But my opinions, I know wherein they consist or not, and against my opinion, I do not teach. Thus, all the witnesses can do little in this case, otherwise it were sorrowful enough that a teacher will accuse me of so many supposed heresies or misleading [teachings], and has according to his own confession never heard me himself, nor even spoken one word with me about this, baring such miserable and incorrect statements about it, which one or another can testify it, having heard me with a prejudiced mind. I dare to justify myself before the majority of the high gentlemen, who sit in this commission that they who often have heard me, have not heard such heresies of me, which I now am made suspect of, before one who has never heard me."

Reenberg:

Th: 52 Jeg kaldes forførrere (ere hands ord om sig selv) fordi / ieg spreder helliggiølsen for høyt; Vogter Eder for / den, som lære anderledis, de ere forførrere og Anti Christ[...] (p. 6 in "Reenberg's accusations against Ewald")

I [Ewald] am called a seducer (this is his own description of himself) because I elevate sanctification too high; You all must watch out for those who teach differently, they are seducers and Anti-Christ[s].

Ewald's first response:

Th: 52 At jeg kaldes af mange een Forførrere det skal Hr. / Christ. Reenberg selv være Vidner til, og at det skeer fordj / ieg driver alvorligen ved Guds Naade paa Helliggiø/relsen og Reenselsen fra Synden skal hand og være Vid/ne til vide Th: 37:38./ Fordi jeg efter Hands og andres Meening spender / den Lærdom for höyt og ieg derimod holder den for / forførrere og Anti-Christer, som icke alvorligen / drive paa Helliggiørelsen ligesaavel sam paa / Retfærdiggjøren after 2 Corinth: 7:1: 1 Joh:3:3 / 1 Joh: 1:9: 1 Petri: 1:14 sequ. etc: Dett tilstaaer jeg (p. 9 in "Ewald's first response to Reenberg")

That I am called by many a seducer, Hr. Christ. Reenberg shall himself witness to this and because I promote seriously sanctification and purification from sin by the grace of God, it happens he shall be a witness of this (see Th. 37, 38).

Because I according to his and others' opinions elevate the doctrine [of sanctification and purification] too high and I, however, hold the one as seducer and Anti-Christ, who does not emphasize sanctification just as seriously as justification according to 2 Cor 7:1, 1 Jn 3:3, 1 Jn 1:9, 1 Pet 1: 14, sqq. etc. This I confess.

Reenberg's reply:

Th: 52 Svared indeholder 3 Propositioner. Først / at jeg skal være Vidner at H. Ewald kaldes / forførrere af mange; Neÿ vidne er ieg eÿ, / men hand har afte [sic] i sit Svar vidnet det paa / sig selv, at hand er det, og jeg om det / tillades skal ved Vidner legge dend Sandhed / Klar og

Aaben for lÿset; Men for det / andet, at hand er en Forførerer, fordi hand / driver alvorligen ved Guds Naade paa Hellig/ giørelsen og Reenselsen fra Synden, det hver/ken tilstaar ieg ham eller after at føre/ Vidner paa; uden saa vit hand irrer i det /hand Thes: 37 Lærer at et Mennisker skulde / og kunde Reenses fra alle indvortes og udvortes / Sunder og Thes: 38 at Sunden i sig selv, det // er Syndens Roed, at udrenses i Helliggiørelsen. / Med disse og fleere ligelser, som ieg endnu / kand bringe ham under ø ne, ligger det / klart, at hand efter sine ord, spender / Helliggiørelsen for hø t; hvo som spender / den Lærdep, for hø t, hand gaar jo over de / grændser, Skriftten og August: Conf: har / og forreskrevet; thi disse maa være de / Maal efter hvilke helliggiørelsen, som / hand siger skal sprendes, og hvo den spender / dem for hø t over maalet end det mind/ste hand er en forførerer thi hand legger / Aag paa Disciplenes halse, di e kunde / bære og stÿrter deris Siæle i daglig Mis/tvifl i deris levent, og fortvivlelse i deris/ Død: Andre derimod i en Aandelig Høffær/dighed, og begge slags har vi Exempeler / nok paa iblant os; men paa det tredie / hand hand holder dem for Anti-Christi/ of forførerer, som eÿ alvorligen driver / paa Helliggiørelsen, ligesaavelsom paa / Retfærdiggjørelsen, naar hand legger / til ved Troen til Christum; Saa holder / jeg den og derfor; Men saa vist / som den, der driver paa Helliggiørelsen, / over Skrifttens og August: Conf: forskriftt / er en falsk Lærere; Saa vist taler H. / Ewald her hvor Augsburgiske Confession / Modstanderes Røst, som Art: 20 falskelig / beskylde os, ligesom vi skulde forb de gode Gierninger; Og naar H. Ewald// overbeviiser mig, at jeg eÿ driver tilbørligen / og efter Skriftten og August: Conf: paa Hellig/gjørelsen vilde jeg eÿ kalde det efter hands / Thes: 57 en Pharisæisk Nidkierlighed, om jeg / lider, som en Forførerer og Anti-Christ. (p. 27-9 in "Reenberg's response to Ewald")

The answer contains three propositions. First that I shall be witness that Hr. Ewald is called seducer by many; No, I do not witness this, but he has according to his answer witnessed it of himself, that he is that, and if it is permitted, I shall by witnesses ley this truth clear and open before the light; But for the second, that he is a seducer, because he promotes seriously sanctification and purification from sin by the grace of God, I neither claim this nor suppose to lead witnesses here [to claim this], except so far he errs in that he (Th. 37) teaches that a human should and can be cleansed from all interior and exterior sins and Th. 38 that sin in itself, which is the root of sin, is purged in sanctification. By this and more similar [accusations], which I either can bring before his eyes, it is clear that he, according to his word,

sets sanctification too high; whoever sets this doctrine too high, he goes over the border Scripture and August. Conf. have established; For this must be the goal after which sanctification, as he says, shall be aimed, and whoever aims too high over the goal in the least he is a seducer, for he lays the yoke on the disciples' neck, they could not bear [it] and ruin their souls in daily doubt in their lives, and despair in their death; others, however, in a spiritual haughtiness, and we have examples of both types [despairing and prideful disciples] among us; about the third, that he should hold them as Anti Christs and seducers, who do not emphasize sanctification, just as much as justification, when he lays it by faith in Christ; This I hold; But as far as the one who emphasizes sanctification [beyond the limits of] of Scripture and August: Conf., he is a false teacher; In such says Hr. Ewald speaks here [as?] the voice of Augsburg Confession's opposition, [that] Art. 20 falsely protects us, just as we should forbid good works; and when Hr. Ewald persuades me that I do not advocate properly for sanctification according to Scripture and August. Conf., I would not call this according to Thes. 57 a pharisaic zealotry, if I admit it, as a seducer and Anti Christ.

Ewald's final reply:

Thes: 52 Jo, Hr Reenberg er just den som uden all bil/lighed har kaldet mig een Forførerer Min / Svar kand eÿ tienne til beviise derpaa, at jeg / er det; og jeg vil bede Hr. Reenberg prøve sig / selv hvad hand er, og hvor Christelig og retsin/dig hand har beviist sig imod mig; For det / andet at det er Aarsagen med hvorfore Hr. / Reenberg kalder mig een Forførerer fordi jeg ef/ter hands Meening spender Helliggiørelsen / for høyt; Det vidner hand nu jo igien med / sine egen udtr ckelige Ord; Men om jeg er / sk ldig derudj, derom vil jeg lade ander dømme/ i sær efter mit svar til de mig imputerede / Theses N^o 37: og 38 saa kand og skiønnes paa, / om det er een Lærdom som enten fører til fortvivlelse eller Aandelig Høfferdighed, i sær / da min Lærdom i den fald som ellers ganske / Overeensstemmende med den Hellige Skrift / Een anden Helliggiørelse end den som udrettes // ved Troen til Christum veed jeg icke af. At / Hr. Reenberg eller andre iblant og skulle / forb de gode Gierninger; troer jeg icke; thi / det alt for kiendelig een Forførelse; Ellers har / jeg eÿ besk lt Hr. Reenberg, i den fald men / hand mig. (pp. 33-34 in "Ewald's second response to Reenberg (unsigned)")

On the contrary, Hr. Reenberg is just the one as without all reasonableness has called me a seducer. My answer cannot serve to prove that I am this; And I will ask Hr. Reenberg to prove

himself what he is, and how Christian and right-minded he has shown himself towards me; For the second that it is the cause with wherefore Hr. Reenberg calls me a seducer because I, according to his opinion, aims sanctification too high; this he witnesses now again with his own express words. But if I am guilty of this, on this I will permit others to judge especially after my answer to the imputed Thesis 37 and 38, so it can be understood if it is a doctrine which either leads to despair or spiritual pride, especially then my teaching in this case which otherwise is completely in agreement with the Holy Scriptures, [teaches] another sanctification that that which is established by faith in Christ, this I know nothing of. That Hr. Reenberg or others among us should forbid good works; I do not believe this; for this is much too known a misleading; I have not accused Hr. Reenberg, he has accused me."

Knowledge and Experience: Thesis 8

Reenberg:

Th 8 Hvilcked der forførrer mest, ~~eller~~ Lærdom eller Exempeler, / Rx Exempler, hvilcked, som det eÿ kunde bevisses af / Texten, læres dog af Erfarenhed. (p. 2 in "Reenberg's accusations against Ewald")

Which misleads the most: doctrine or experience, Rx [take] examples, which are not able to be proven by the text, but are taught by experience.

Ewald's first response:

Th: 8 At Exempler meere agtes paa baade til det gode / og onde en[d?] ord og tale, det kand, som sagd er / den daglig Forfarenhed lære. (p. 2 in "Ewald's first response to Reenberg")

As he said, the daily experience can teach that both for good and for ill, examples are more regarded than a word and speech.

Reenberg's reply:

Th: 8 Vidner faaer at beviise, hvor hand forcerede/ denne Lærdom af din Textes ord; At Exempler/ kand forføre mange og virckelig destoværre / forførrer mange nægtes eÿ; men det nægtes / At Exempler skulle forføre meere end Falsk / Lærdom; Hvem veed eÿ at Manichæers, Ari/aners, Donatisters og Annabaptisters Lærdom / har forført u-tallige Mennisker; Ja deels / under paaskud af et helligt Æ Levnet bragt 1st / Folck til at troe vildfarelse og Løgn, siden til / at leve som bester. Naar vrang Lærdom /tager over haand hos alle der er jo intet Chri/steligt Exempel at vente Thi Pié vivere, recte/ de Deo Doctrinaque Christiana sentire maa / følges ad.

Jeg vil tiener Hr. Ewald med / dette Argumente, hand drog af Texten; Rest/er ligesaa got, som ieg vilde siige de viise / kom jo til Jerusalem og sprudte efter Christum, / de Skrift kloge siges dem hand skal føddes udj // Bethlehem, men ginge dog eÿ Selv med / Men dog sagte de Viise Christum, Mens / efterudj dette deris Exempel eÿ hindrede de / Viise af Østerland at søge Christum, saa / kand jeg eÿ heller af denne Text endelig be/viise dette, men Forfarenhed lærer det. (pp. 5-6 in "Reenberg's response to Ewald")

Witness gotten to prove, how he forces this doctrine from the word of his text; [he does not] deny that examples can mislead many and unfortunately actually misleads many; but [he] denies that examples should mislead more than false teaching; who does not know that Manicheans, Arians, Donatists and Anabaptists' doctrines have mislead innumerable people, yes partly under the pretense of a holy life, [he] brought first folk to believe errors and lies, since then to live as beasts. When wrong doctrine takes over among them it is no Christian example to wait. For *Piè vivere, recte de Deo Doctrinaque Christiana sentire* (in order to live piously, right thinking of God and Christian doctrine) must be followed. I will serve Hr. Ewald with this argument that he took out of the text, the rest is just as good, as I would say, [now alleged Ewald-story] the wise came to Jerusalem and asked after Christ, the learned say to them, he shall be born in Bethelam, but they did not go with themselves, but the wise sought Christ; while after this [the learned's] example, the wise from the east were not hindered in seeking Christ, so I cannot of this text finally prove it, but experience teaches it.

Ewald's final response:

Thes: 7 [8] Jeg behøvde e forcere denne Lærdom af Texten;/ thi jeg pleÿer vel at være ved een Lærdom, / som har Connexion med det, som min Text / handler om, skjønt jeg ej forcerer den af Tex/ten; men i ligge tilfælde befiiser den af ander Skriftens Stæder, eller og som har / med den daglige Forfarenhed. /Det som Hr. Reenberg siger om Mannichæ/ers og Arianers og anders Lærdomme, som har // forført mange er Mig eÿ imod Thi / naar først slige Folck ere ved onde Exem/pler forledet til U-gudelighehed, som det gick / med de første Christen de forlade den første / Kierlighed, saakand de letteligen falde hen / til Kiætterier og Vildfarende Meeninger / til at troe Løgn II Thes: 2:10:11: Pa denne maa/de lade sig mange 1000de overtale til at ta/ge ved den u-rimmelige Mahumetianiske / Lærdom Naar da vrang Lærdom kommer til / et u-gudligt Levent, saa farer saadanne / Mennsker immerfort til det værre. / I det øvrige behøves det icke at Hr. Reenberg / skulle formere Argumentet, som jeg drog / af Texten, af hvilcket hand intet veed (som jeg vel fornemmer) andet, end af en / forvent Relation. (pp. 8-9 in "Ewald's second response to Reenberg (unsigned)")

I do not need to force this teaching from the text for I am accustomed to concern my teaching with that which has some connection to the matter the text deals with, though I do not force

it of the text: but in similar cases it is proven by other places in Scripture, or as here, with the daily experience.

That which Hr. Reenberg says about Manicheans and Arians and others' teachings, which have misled many, I am not against. For when first such people are, by evil examples, abandoned to the ungodliness (as it happened with the first Christians, they abandoned the first love) so they can easily fall into heretical and erroneous opinions, believing lies 2 Thes 2:10-11. On this they must have themselves persuade many thousands to take by the unreasonable Islamic doctrine. When then the wrong doctrine comes by an ungodly way of life, so such people worsen reasonably quickly.

In the other matters, it is not necessary that Hr Reenberg should form arguments, which I drew out of the text, of which he knows nothing (as I certainly perceive) other than of an expected relation."

Appendix C: Sermon Transcription from *Det Gamle og Nye Testamentes herlige Harmonie* Vol. 1 (1761)

p. 562

Prædiken.

paa den Almindelige Bede-Dag. 1739.

Hellige og retfærdige Gud! vi dine urene og syndige Creature / fremkomme paa denne Dag for dit alle helligste Ansigt for / at ydmyge os for dig, og at bekiende vore mange og svare Syn/der, hvormed vi saa tiit og saa længe have opirret dig til Vrede / imod os. Du havre [?] vel havt Aarsag nok for lang Tiid siden at / forkaste os fra dit Ansigt, ikke allene for vore Synders Skyld i / Almindelighed, men i Særdeleshed for vor Ubodfærdigheds og / Vantroes Skyld, da du saa tiit har kaldet os, og ville lede os ved din Godhed til Omvendelse, men vi have ikke agtet det, og / have alligevel gaaet gandske frek og letsindig frem i vore Synder. / Du skienker os endnu en Dag i Dag, da du lader os høre din / Røst, og byder os at forlade vore Veye og vore Tanker, og at / omvende os til dig. Det er jo din alvorlige Villie, at vi skal / komme tilbage og omvende os til dig, at vore Sunder maatte / blive udslettede, og vi maatte endnu faae Del i JEsu Naade / og Forsoning. Du vilt jo ikke nogen Synderes Død, men at hand skal omvende sig og leve. Du vilt jo ikke at nogen skal for/tabes, men at alle skulle give sig til Omvendelse. Du vilt jo i / Sandhed og Alvorlighed, at alle Mennsker skulle blive salige, / og derfor at de alle skulle komme til Sandheds Kundskab. Men / ach HErre, vor Gud! Du seer jo vore Hiertes Haardhed, at / vi ikke kand bøye os selv. Du seer vore Hierters Falskehed og / Skalkagtighed, at vi have mere Lyst til Mørket, end til Lyset, til Løgn og Bedrageri, end som til Sandhed og Oprigtighed. Hvis / du derfor ikke selv rører vore Hierter og overbeviser os, saa blive vi / liggende i vore Synder, i vor Ubodfærdighed, og i var Vantro / og Gienstridighed. Omvend du os selv, o HErre! saa blive vi / omvendte. Lad det Ord, som i dit Navn skal kundegjøres os paa / denne Dag, trænge ret krafteligen ind paa vore Hierter og Sam/vittigheder. Giv os Naade til at kiende deraf, hvorledes det / staaer til med os, om vi ere omvendte til dig i Sandhed, eller //

p. 563

ikke? Er det da ikke skeet, saa lad endnu denne Dag være os en / ret Omvendelses Dag, ja en behagelig Tiid og Saligheds Dag, / paa hvilken vi maae søge og finde Naade for dit Ansigt. Ach HEr/re! giv Haade til at tale dit Ord i Eenfoldighed og Sandhed / med Kraft og Eftertryk, og lad det blive for os alle en Livsens / Lugt til livet. Hør os, o HErre vor Gud! for JEsu skyld, i / hvis navn vi bede: Vor Fader du som est 2c.

Texten. Esa. 55, 6,7.

Søger HErren, medens hand findes, kalder / paa ham, medens hand er nær. Den / Ugudelige forlade sin Vey, og hver, som gjør / Uret, sine Tanker; og omvende sig til HEr/ren, og hand skal forbarme sig over ham, og / til vor Gud, thi hand skal mangfoldeligen til/give.

Exordium, Gen. 27, 38.

Naar vi agte paa, hvad Guds Ord først og / fornemmeligen kræver af alle Mennsker, / saa finde vi, at den gandske hellige Skrift, / og alle Guds Sandheds Vidner derudi, lige/som med een Mund kalder alle Mennsker til Om/vendelse. Saaledes (siger Christus Luc. 24,46) staaer / der skrevet, (i Mose Lov, i Propheterne og Psalmerne, / v. 44.) at Christus skulde lide og opstaae, og at der skul/de prædikes i hans Navn Omvendelse og Syndernes / Forladelse for alle Folk. Men jo almindeliger dette Kald / og denne Befalning er, som skeer til alle og enhver, des/mere er det at beklage, at der findes saa faa, sam hø/re og agte paa Omvendelsens Prædiken, og i sær, / at iblant dem, der høre tale og vidne derom, saa faa / findes, der gjøre Alvor deraf, og omvende sig i Sand/hed. De allerfleeste bekymre sig enten slet intet der/om, eller de behielpe sig med Hykleri og Bedrageri. / Thi en stoor Deel meener, at de aldeles ikke behøve //

p. 564

nogen Omvendelse, i det de tænke, at deres Tilstand / er god nok, og at der hverken bør eller kand skee nogen / sand Hiertens Forandring hos dem. De mene, at / de allerede er Christne, fordi de ere døbte til Christum, / og bruge Guds Ord og Sacramenter, og derfor ha/ve de ingen Omvendelse behov. Eller de tænke, at / de ere allerede blevne omvendte, i det de have afbe/det Gud deres Synder, have aflagt een eller anden U/dyd, Ondskab og grov Synd, og ere blevne fromme/re, dydigere og andægtigere, end som de før have vær/et eller, fordi de

nøyere iagt-tage den udvortes Dyr/kelse med Kirke-Gang, Sang og Bøn, og Ordets og / Sacramenternes flittige Brug. Andre kiende endeli/gen, at de endnu ikke ere omvendte af Hiertet, og / at al saadan udvortes Forbedring ikke er tilstrekkelig nok; / men de forhale dermed fra een Tid til den anden, og / misbruge saa længe Guds Langmodigheds og Taal/modigheds Riigdom, indtil HErren omsider hengiver /dem i et forvendt Sind, og deres Hierter forhærdes / formedelst Syndsens Bedragelse. Mange komme alt / forslide til at kiende deres Daarlighed, som begynde / da først, naar Døren er tillukt, og Naadens Tiid / er til Ende, at raabe: HErre, HErre! luk op for / os, da HErren vil svare dem: Jeg kiender eder ik/ke. Luc. 13, 25. Mange vil omvende sig paa de/res Syge-og Døds-Seng, eller naar det kommer til / det Yderste med dem. Men ligesom de vise deri deres / Hykleri, at de forhale saa længe med deres Omvendel/se, indtil Faren er over Hovedet af dem, saa vise de og / kiendeligen, at deres foregivne Anger og Omven/delse er ikke oprigtig, men fuld af Tvang og Frygt, / af Falskehed og Hykleri. Et Exempel og Billede paa / saadan en sildig og tillige falsk Omvendelse have vi i E/sau, hvorom der fortælles saaledes:

1 Mos. B. 27, 38. Og Esau sagde til sin / Fader: Haver du ikke uden denne eene Velsig//

p. 565

nelse, min Fader? Velsigne Mig, jeg er ogsaa / din Søn, min Dafer, og Esau opløftede sin / Røst, og græd.

Disse Ord ville vi saaledes betragte, at vi deraf vil/le forestille: Den alt for sildige, og derhos falske / og hykkelse Omvendelse.

Herhos vil vi betragte: (1) Den alt for sildige / Omvendelse. (2) at den silde Omvendelse or/dinare er en falsk og derfor unyttig Omvendelse.

Lader os da efter vort Forset see: (1) Den alt for / sildige Omvendelse, eller, hvorledes mange med / Esau forhale deres Omvendelse, indtil det bli/ver forsilde dermed ? Det sidste, som vi betragtede / til Indgang med hverandre, var om Esau, hvorledes / hand soldte sin Førstefødsels-Rettighed, af det 25. Ca/pital. Der forekomme vel siden adskillige Forjættel/ser og Spaadomme, som sigte til Christum, f. ex. / Cap. 26, 3.4. Hvor HErre paa nye lover Isaa, / at hand vilde give hans Sæd, og lade af ham komme den / velsignede Sæd, i hvilken alle Folk paa Jorden / skulle velsignes, item, Cap. 26, 24.25. hvor der / sigtes til det samme, og fortælles at Isaa derpaa hav/de bygget HErren et Altere, 2c.[rc.?] Og Capt. 27,27. / sqq. hvor i den

Velsignelse, som Jakob blev velsignet / med af sin Fader, indeholdes adskilligt, som sigter til / den aandelige Velsignelses Fylde, som skiendes de / Troende i Christo. Men alt dette vil jeg nu gaae for/bi, og atter vende mig til Esau, og forestille, hvad / der videre er skeet med ham, efter at hand havde soldt / sin Førstfødsels-Rettighed: Strax efter at det var / skeet, agtede Esau det ikke for noget. Thi det heder / om ham: Cap. 25, 34. Hand aad og drak, og / stod op, og gik bort. Disse Ord give en stoor Let/sindighed og Skiødesløshed tilkiende hos Esau, og at //

p. 566

at hand har intet bekymret sig videre om noget, end / hvad der hørde til hans Bug, og til hans Kiøds For/nøyelse. At hand derved havde liderligen forspildt saa stor / en Herlighed, som hand kunde have ventet, at hans / Førstefødsel skulde engang have tilført ham og hans Efter/kommere, der tænker hand ikke engang paa. Derfor /sigtes der om ham: Esau foragtede Førstefødselen. / Cap. 25, 34. Saaledes ere mange til Sinds: Kand / de kun faae det, som fornøyer og forlyster deres Kiød / og Blod, saa er det dem lige medet, hvordan det gaaer / med deres arme Siel, om den end derover skulde for/spilde alt sit Haab og al sin Trøst. Dog de troe ikke, / at det have saa meget at betyde. De meene vel, at / den lige fuldt ogsaa hisset. Esau tænkte vel ikke, at hand / derved skulde have forspildt sin Velsignelse. Vi see / her i det mindste, at hand ikke havde ventet sig det. / Ja da hand maatte høre, at hans Broder havde hans / Velsignelse borte, meente hand dog endnu, at det nok / kunde lade sig gjøre om igien. Thi da Esau hørde sin / Faders Ord derom, da skreeg hand med et stoort / og overmaade bittert Skriig, og sagde til sin / Fader: Velsigne mig, 2c. (v. 34.) Hand havde / lavet sig paa, at tage imod den, som da ogsaa hans / Fader, der ikke saar ret ind i denne Sag, havde til/tænkt ham den. Men det hialp altsammen intet. Før/stefødselsn, som hørde dertil, borttagen fra ham, som havde foragtet den, og givet den, som havde høyt/agtet den, nemlig Jakob. Da dette var skeet, da / begyndte Esau for Alvor at see op, og at betænkte, hvad / hand havde gjort. Hvor hierteligen had ham ikke da / sin Fader om hans Velsignelse, og da hand hørde af / ham, at det nu var forsilde, i det Jakob havde faaet / hans Velsignelse, og Isaak hverken kunde eller vilde / gjøre det om igien, eftersom hand nu nok merkede, at //

p. 567

HErren selv havde styret det saa, og at det var en / retfærdig Dom og Straf over Esaus Letsindighed, saa / holdt dog Esau ved, at bede om en Velsignelse, og / det med grædende Taarer. Men endskiønt Isaak / velsignede ham ogsaa, saa var det dog ikke den Vel/signelse, som Esau søgte, og som han havde været til/tænkt. Derfor var og Esau ingenlunde fornøyet der/med, hvilket hand gav tilkiende med det dødelige Had, / som hand derover fik til sin Broder, saa at hand troede, / at hand vilde slaae ham ihjel, (s.v. 41.) i hvorvel ikke / Jakob, men Esau selv var skyld derudi, at hand havde / mistet den. Dette er det, som Paulus siger til de E/bræer, Cap. 12,17. I vide, at hand og derefter, / der hand vilde arvet Velsignelsen, blev forskudt. / Thi hand fandt ikke Rum til Omvendelse, alli/gevel havde hand søgte efter det med Graade. Esau vilde / gierne have havt Velsignelsen, og meente ikke, at hans / forige Letsindighed i at selge sin Førstefødsels-REttighed / skulde have kundet hindre ham i at faae den. Men han blev forskudt. HErren, hvis Naade og Ga/ve hand havde foragtet, stryrede Sagen saa, at Jakob / forekom han, og fik Velsignelsen, og Esay maatte staae / tilbage. Og omendskiønt Esay vilde have overtalet sin / Fader til at giøre det om igien, at angre det, hand / havde giort, og at fatte et andet Sund, og at fra/kiende Jakob den Velsignelse, hvilkden hand efter Esaus / Meening ulovligen havde tilsneget sig, og at give ham den, saa hialp det ham dog slet intet. Thi da Isaak / nu kientde, at dette var saaledes skeet ved Guds Dire/ction, saa forskød hans Esau, og vilde ikke høre ham, / endskiønt hand bad derom med sine grædende Taarer. / Dette er Meeningen ag de Ord, som Paulus siger, at / Esau blev forskudt, og at hand fandt ikke Rum / til Omvendelse, hvilket hand tydeligen sees, naar vi / nøyere overveye Texten. Saa at her ikke tales om / Omvendelse fra Synden, men om Omvendelse //

p. 568

eller Sinds Forandring, til at give Velsignelsen, ikke / om Esaus Omvendelse, men om Isaaks, at hand / skulle have angret det, hand havde giort, fattet et and/et Sind, og saa giort det om igien. Derfor vilde det / være en urigtig Slutning, om nogen deraf vilde slutte, / at Esau var bleven forskudt fra Livet og Saligheden, / og var bleven fordømt. Vi have meget mere nogen / Aarsag til at haabe, at hand er bleven omvendt og frelst, / eftersom hand siden blev forsonet med sin Broder, 1 / Mos. B. 33,4. sqq. ja ogsaa kom til Jakob igien, da Isaak var død, og kierligen foreende sig med ham / til at foranstalte og besørge deres Faders hæderlige

Be/gravelse. Cap. 35, 29. Imidlertiid lærer Paulus os, / at dette er skrevet os til Advarsel, at vi ikke skal saa / liderligen og letsindigen forspilde vores aandelige / og Himmelske Velsignelse, som Esau forspildte den / Timelige og Jordiske. Dette skeet desverre! af alt for / mange, som have havt adskillige herlige Fordeele, der / kunde have givet dem et vist Haab om, at faae Velsig/nelsen i Christo og i den Himmelske Arvedeel, hvilke / dog i stor Letsindighed for spille den Naade og Leylig/hed, som dem var givent til deres Omvendelse og Sie/les Frelse. Ja Mange, som allerede have Førstefød/selens-Rettighed saa at sige i Hænderne, i det de ere ved Troen til Chrisum komme med til de Førstefødtes / Forsamling og Menighed, falde dog fra igien, og faae / et ont vantroe Hierte, som affalder fra den le/vende Gud. Ebr. 3, 13. De Ebræer, som Paulus / her advarer ved Esaus Exempel, vare jo saadanne, som / vare komne til Zions Bierg, til den levendes Guds / Stad, 2c. og til de Førstefødtes Forsamling og / Menighed, som ere opskrevne i Himmelen. Al/ligevel advarer hand dem, at di ikke skulde blive van/hellige som Esau, Ebr. 12, 22.23. sq. og v. 17. Og / herefter siger hand til dem: v. 25. Seer til, at U und/slaaer eder ikke fra at høre den, som taler. 2c. //

p. 569

Hand erindrer og adskillige gange, at de let kunde gjøre / det saa, at de kunde aldeles blive forskudte og udelukte / fra Velsignelsen, og at de kunde komme til at angre / det alt forsilde, ligesom Esau. Dette skeer, naar / man begaaer den Synd imod den Hellige Aand, / (om hvilken Christus siger: at den hverken forlades i denne eller i den tilkommende Verden, Matth. 12, 31. / 32. og at de, som begaae den, ere skyldige til en evige / Dom, Marc. 3, 29.) eller, naar de, som have været / eengang oplyste, og have smaget den Himmelske Have, / og ere blevne deelagtige i den Hellige Aand, og have / smaget Guds gode Ord, og den tilkommende Verdens / Kræfter, falde fra, og korsfæste sig selv den Guds Søn, / og gjøre ham til Spot. Thi om saadanne siger Pau/lus: at det er umueligt, at de atter fornye sig til / Omvendelse. Ebr. 6, 4. til 6. Det skeer, naar Hier/tet forhærdes ved Syndsens Bedragelse, Cap. 3, / 13. Det skeer, naar man lader Tiiden og Leylighe/den gaae sig af Hænderne, og glemmer at vaage og / bede, som Christus lærer os med den Lignelse om de fem / daarlige Jomfruer, hvilke komme alt forsilde, on ban/kede paa. s. Matth. 25, 10. sqq. item, Luc. 13, 24.25. / 2c. Ach! hvad vil det ikke være et forskrekkeligt Tor/den-Slag i deres Hierter, som da skal høre den haar/de og forferdelige Dom: Gaaer bort, jeg kiender / eder ikke, hvorfra I ere. Da vi nu have betragtet den / alt

forsildige Omvendelse, saa lader os ogsaa høre: / (2) Hvorledes den silde Omvendelse ordinair er / falsk, og derfor unyttig. Det er vel vist, at en sand / og hiertelig Omvendelse skeer aldrig for silde, men / det er derimod rart, at den silde Omvendelse er sand / og oprigtig. Vi have vel et Exempel paa Røveren, / som omvendte sig paa Korset, da hand var Døden og / Dommen nær: Luc. 23, 40. 2c. Men vi have og kun / det eneste Exempel af dette Slags i den gandske hel/lige Skrift, og hverken den anden Røvere, ikke heller //

p. 570

saa mange Tusinde andre, som den Tiid stode omkring / ved Jesu Kors, bleve omvendte. Tilmed saa er / der stoor Forskiel paa een, som ikke med friit Forset / opsetter sin Omvendelse, og da endnu paa det Sid/ste kan blive greben af den HErre JEsu, og ved hans / Kierligheds, Langmodigheds og Taalmodigheds Riig/dom lade sig lede til Omvendelse, og een, som synder / paa Naade, og modtvilligen skyder Guds forekom/mende, dragende og overbevisende Naades Virkninger / fra sig, eller og synder med fri Villie, efter at / hand har annammet Sandheds Kundskab; thi / for saadan een er der neppe Redning mere. Derfor/uden, saa er der sielden nogen Oprigtighed eller / sand Alvorlighed i deres Omvendelse, som forhale / dermed, indtil det kommer paa det yderste med dem. E/saus Anger og Omvendelse, som hand her syntes / at bevise, var fuld af Hykleri. Han kiendte ik/ke sin Skyld, sin Letsindighed og sit vanhellige Sind, / hvorved hand havde selv skildt sig ved Velsignelsen, / men farte Skylden paa sin Broder. Og det var ikke / saavel hans Bekymring, hvorledes hand kunde komme / til at andre sin Daarlighed, og af Hiertet at omvende / sig fra sine Synder, som det var ham derom at gjøre, / at hand kunde faae sin Fader omvendt eller afvendt / fra sit Sind imod Jakob, og henvendt til sig selv, for / at faae Velsignelsen. Og da hand ikke kunde naae / det ved sin utaalmodige Graad og Skrigen, saa blev / hans Sind opfyldt med Had og Bitterhed imod hans / Broder. Saaledes gaaer det ogsaa ordinair med dem, / som paa det Sidste merke, at de have levet lide, og handlet daarligen deri, at de have elsket Verden og / dens Lyst, Ære, Rigdom og Venskab, mere end Gud og deres Frelsere, og derover billigen frygte for, at Guds / Naade og Venskab, og den Velsignelse som til bydes i / Christo, vil blive dem fratagen. Det angrer og for/tryder dem, ikke saa meget at de have saa groveligen//

p. 571

forsyndet sig imod Gud og deres Frelser, som at de / skulde derover miste Velsignelsen, og den Himmel/ske Arvedeel. De undskyldte sig selv, og sette Skyl/den paa andre, de vil da gjerne bede og græde sig / Velsignelsen, Guds Naade, JEsu Forsoning og / Himmelen til, men deres Hierte er og bliver uforan/dret, fuldt af Hyleri og Ondskab. Man seer det paa / mange, der tænke, at de nu skal døe, som da vil i en / hast gjøre det got, hvad de længe have giort ont. De / græde, de bede, de kalde deres Lærere og Skriftefader / til sig, de bekiende deres Synder, og vil saa forliges / med GUD, (som de kalde det,) i sær ved Alterens / Sacramentes Brug. Men komme de op igien, eller / det bliver noget bedre med dem, saa nytter sig deres kiø/delige, forfængelige, stolte, hofmodige, gierige, vel/lystige, eller hevngierige Sind snart igien, og de vise det / selv tydeligen, hvorfor de have været saa andægtige, / væmodeige, bodfærdige, og foregivet slig Anger og Ru/else over deres Synder, Troe til JEsu, og Forset til / at forbedre sig i deres Liv og Levnet, nemlig for at faae den Velsignelse og Salighed, som loves dem, der / omvende sig i Sandhed, og troe af deres gandske Hier/te paa den HErre JEsu. Men paa det vi ikke saa / skammeligen maae bedrage os selv, men lære i Tide / og af Hiertet at omvende os til vor Frelser, hvis / det ikke er skeet, saa vilde vi endnu tale noge videre om / denne Sag, og lade os derom underviise af vor Text, / som just derfor paa denne saa kaldte almindelige Bod / og Bede-Dag er forordnet at forklare, at vi skulde / lære at forstaae, hvad der udkræves til en sand / Omvendelse, og lade os opvække og overtale til at / vende om, om komme tilbage, paa det vore Syn/der maatte udslettes, og vi engang maatte findes iblant / dem, der skal arme Velsignelsen. Til den Ende ville / vi nu forestille af vor Text: //

p. 572

Guds Aands alvorlige Formaning til en / snar og hastig, saavel som til en sand / og hiertelig Omvendelse.

Derved ville vi overveye: 1. Guds Aands alvor/lige Formaning til en snar og hastig Omven/delse. O! HErre, giv / du os selv Naade dertil, at denne Betragtning maae / saaledes velsignes paa os alle, at vi maae baade snart / og hiertelign omvendes til dig, og saa finde Naade og / Barmhiertighed for dine Øyne. Amen.

Textens Forklaring.

Lader os nu efter vor Forset betragte: 1. Guds / Aands alvorlige Formaning til en snar og ha/stig Omvendelse At alle Mennisker at Naturen ere / saa i Bond og Grund, fordervede, og aldeles afvendte / fra Gud og nedsunkne i Synd og Ondskab, at de u/den en sand Omvendelse og Igienfødsel ikke kand / komme til Gud, eller have mindske Haab til at arve / Guds Rige, derom vidner den gandske hellige Skrift / fra først og til sidst. Da Nicodemus kom til JE/sum, for at lære af ham, hvorledes hand kund komme / i Guds Rige, saa sagde JEsus ham det kort og reent, / at hverken hand, eller nogen Menniske kund faae Guds / Rige at see, hvis de ikke bleve fødte paa nye, det / er, (som hand strax forklarer det,) af Vand og Aand. / Hand setter og Aarsagen strax dertil, nemlig, fordi al/le Mennisker efter deres naturlige Fødsel vare / Kiødelige, og ikke kunde blive Aandelige, hvis / de ikke bleve paa nye fødte af Aanden. Joh. 3,3. til / 6. Derfor da Johannes den Døbere kom, og skulde / berede Beyen for den HERre JEsu, da var dette det / første, som hand raabte og prædikede for alle og enhver / Matth. 3,2. Omvendere eder; thi Himmeriges//

p. 573

Rige er nær. cons. Marc. 1,4. 2c. Lige det samme var / Begyndelsen af JEsu Prædiken, Marc. 1, 15. Tiden / er fuldkommet, og Guds Rige er nær: Omven/der eder, og troer Evangelium. Da JEsus siden / vilde udsende sine Apostler i den helle Verden, for at / kundgiøre Folk Guds Raad om deres Salighed, da / sagde hand til dem, at der skulde prædikkes i hans / Navn Omvendelse og Syndernes Forladelse for / alle Folk, Luc. 24, 47. Og herom saavel som om hans / Lidelse, Død og Opstandelse, skulde de være hans / Vidner. v. 48. Apostlerne efterkomme og troligen det/te, som var dem befalet, som vi kand see af Ap. G. 2, / 38. Cap. 3, 19. Cap. 5, 31. og andre Steder, hvor / Indholden af deres Prædikener findes optegnet. Der/for sider og Paulus: Ap. G. 17, 31. Ny byder Gud / alle Mennisker allevegne at omvende sig. 2c. / Herfra kand og bør da intet Menniske undtage sig, hand / maae kaldes Christen, eller Jøde, Tyrk eller Hedning, / ja hand maae kaldes Ond eller God, Gudfrygtig eller / Ugudelig, Skøge eller Tolder, eller Pharisæer og Sad/ducæer. Er det ikke allerede skeet, og vi ikke kand fra vor / Daabes Tiid af, (som kaldes Omvendelsens Daab / Marc. 1,4. ligesom vi da og love, eller der loves paa / vore vegne, at vi ville omvende os fra Synd og fra / Satans Magt og Gierninger til Gud, og troe paa JE/sum, elske, ære og tiene ham, og blive han lydige,) naar / vi da ikke kand (siger jeg) fra den Tiid af fremvise / Omvendelsens værdige Frugter, saa bør det endnu / skee, saa fremt vi ville

have Deel i JEsu Naade, og / redde vore Siele fra Fordervelsen. Her til henviser os / ogsaa vore Text, og dertil formaner Guds Aand os / i den samme, hvilket vi desmere have Aarsag at agte / paa, og at tage til Hierte, da der i den samme egentlig / tales til dem, som i det Nye Testamentes Tider skulde / kaldes ved Christi Evangelii Prædiken til at faae Deel / i den store Naade og Salighed, som frembydes i vor //

p. 574

Frelsere. Denne Naade og Salighed i Christo JE/su er det, som fra Beyndelsen af i dette Capitel, Esa. / 55, 1.2. sqq. alle tørstige, hungerige og fattige Sie/le indbydes til, og det af HErren deres Gud og Frel/sere selv. Nu vel, (siger HErren formedelst sin Aand / ved Propheten,) hver som tørster, kommer hid til / Vandene, og den, som ikke have Penge; kom/mer hid, kiøber og æder, og gaaer, kiøber uden / Penger og uden Betalning, Viin og Melk. Hvi / veye I Penger der, som ikke er Brød, og eders / Arbeide der, som I ikke kunde mættes? Hører / mig nøye, og æder der Gode, saa skal eders Siel / forlyste sig med det Fede. Bøyer eders Øre, og / kommer hid til mig, hører, saa skal eders Siel / leve; thi jeg vil giøre en evig Pagt med eder, / som er, Davids trofaste Miskundheder, 2c. Her / tales tydeligen om den store Naades Rigdom, som til/bydes og skienkes gandske uforskyldt i Christo JEsu. / Dette er den trofaste Miskundhed, som er lovet Da/vid, og i den Davids Søn, i Christo. Hand er det, / som er sat til et Vidne for Folk, og til en Fyrste, / som skal byde over Folk, v. 4. Hand er det, som kal/der Hedningene, der ikke have kiendt ham eller hans / Folk tilforn, til sit Folk og Menighed, og til hvilken / de skal løbe med stoor Begierlighed. v.5. Men paa det at ingen maatte forsømme sig, eller forhale / at komme paa og efter hans Naades kierlige og alvor/lige Indbydelse, saa og at de maatte ikke agte denne / Naade og Salighed ringe, Ebr. 2, 3. saa formaner / hand derpaa (i vore Textes Ord, v. 6. 7.) aller og enhver, / at de i Tide skulle søge HErren, og omvende sig til / ham, saa og at de skulde giøre det alvorligen og af / Hiertet. Det er det, som jeg har sagt i vores Hoved-/Lærdom, at Guds Aand, som har udtalet disse Ord, / formaner, saavel til en snar og hastig, som til en / sand og hiertelig Omvendelse. For det Første //

p. 575

synder hand paa, og raader alle og enhver, der begiere / at blive deelagtige i det himmelske Kald, at de skal i Tide / søge HErren, medens hand findes, de skal i Tide kal/de paa HErren, Medens hand er nør, og jo ikke forha/le deres Omvendelse; allerhelst da det ingenlun/de staaer til dem, at omvende sig, naar de vil, men til HErren, som tilbyder sin Naade til Omvendelse. Her / heder det end ogsaa i Henseende til Tiden: det staaer / ikke til den, som vil, ikke heller til den, som lø/ber, men til Gud, som gjør Miskundhed, Rom. / 9, 16. Vil HErren ikke lade sig finde, saa gavner vor / Søgen intet, og vil hand ikke være nær, og selv i Naa/de holde sig til os, og bøye til Øre til vort Raab, saa / hielper vor Paakaldelse intet. Derfor heder det, 2 / Cor. 6,2. Ny er det den behagelige Tiid, nu er / det Salighedens Dag. Hver Tiid er ikke en beha/gelig Tiid for Gud, og hver Dag er ikke en Saligheds / og Frelses Dag for os. Det er en Tiid og en Dag, / da det heder: Nu, Nu! naar dette Nu er forbi, saa / kommer det aldrig mere igien. Nu, siger HErren, vil / jeg lade mig finde, hvis I søge mig, Ny vil jeg være / nær med min Naade og Hielp hos dem, der paakalde / mig. Nu lader hand os sin Naade forkunde i Evange/ljo, og siger: Nu vel, hver som tørster, kommer / hid til Vandene, 2c. Kommer I, som arbeide / og ere besværede! Matth, 11, 28. Den, der tør/ster, komme, og den der vil, tage Livsens Vand / uforskyldt. Aab. 22, 17. Nu rekker hand os sin / Haand, og vil hielpe os. Nu kalder hand os til Om/vendelse, og vil selv omvende os. Derfor sider HEr/ren ikke allene Ezech, 18, 30. Omvender eder; men / hand byder os og sin Naade og Hielp til, og siger: / Lader eder omvende. Hand siger Ezech, 36, 26. 27. / Jeg vil give eder et nyt Hierte, og Jeg vil give / en ny Aand inden i eder. Jeg vil borttage det / Steenhierte af eders Kiød, og Jeg vil give eder //

p. 576

et Kiød-Hierte. Jeg vil give min Aand inden i / eder, og jeg vil gjøre det, at I skal vandre i mi/ne Skikke, og holde og gjøre mine Rette. Det/gjør hand ved Lovens og Evangelii Ord, Der/ved trænger hand ind paa vore Hierter og Samvit/tigheder, derved overbeviser hand os om vor dyge For/dervelser, om vor jammelige Tilstand, om vor Elendig/hed og Fattigdom, Blindhed og Nøgenhed. Derved / bøyer og ydmyger, sønderknuser og ængster hand vo/re Hierter, og derved gjør hand og hungrige og be/gierlige efter Naaden. Derved foreholder hand os / Naaden, og ovrbeviser os der om, at den er ellene / at finde i Christo JEsu, derved opvækker hand os af / Søvne, og opmuntrer og tilskunder os til at komme / til JEsu, ja virker i vore Hierter Troe og Tillid / til JEsu Blod og Død, til hans Forsoning og til at / den Naade, Kraft og

Frelse, der er i ham at finde. Og dertil bruger den HERre JESus sine troe Tienere, at de / skulle søge at overtale Folk til at troe, som Pau/lus gjorde, Ap. G. 28, 23. De ere Sendebud i Chri/sti Sted: Lader eder forlige med Gud. / 2 Cor. 5,20. Frelseren staaer selv længe for vore Hier/ters Dør, og banker paa, om vi vil luke op for ham, / eller ikke? Aab. 3, 20. Vil mand da ikke tage imod den / tilbudne Naade, saa gaaer hand videre dermed til an/dre. Dette giver JESus tilkiende ved den Instrux, som / hand hav sine Discipler: Matth. 10, 11, sqq. At de skul/de upspørge i Hver Bye, som de kom udi, om der var / nogen derudi, der var det værd, den skulde de da gaae / ind til, og ønske Fred over ham og hans Huus. Der/som da samme Huus var det værd, saa skulde deres Fred / komme over det, hvis ikke, da skulde den vende tilbage / til dem igien. Od hvis nogen ikke vilde tage imod / dem, og høre deres Ord, og antage det, da skulde / de gaae ud af det Huus eller af den Stad, og //

p. 577

ryste Støvet af deres Fødder. Og da skulde Guds / Hevn og Domme komme haardere over dem, end over / Sodom og Gomorra. Saaledes gjorde Paulus og / Barnabas, da Jøderne i Antiochia ikke vilde antage / deres Ord og Lærdom, og de sagde til dem: Efter at / I forskyde Guds Ord, og agte eder selv ikke / værdige til det evige Liv, saa vende vi os til Hed/ningene. Ap. G. 13, 45. 46. Derfor advarer den / HERre HESus Jøderne, at de jo i Tide skulde tage imod / hans Naade, medens hans tilbød dem den Joh. / 12,35.36. Lyset, siger hand, er endnu en liden Tiid / hos eder. Vandrer den Stund I have Lyset, at / Mørkhed ikke skal betage eder; hvo som vand/rer omkring i Mørkhed, veed ikke hvor hand / gaaer hen. Medens I have Lyset, troer paa / Lyset, at I kand blive Lysets Børn. Derefter gik / hand bort, og skiulte sig for dem. Ligesaa siger hand Joh. / 9, 4.5. Mig bør at gjøre hans Gierning, som / have udsendt mig, saa længe det er Dag. Nat/ten kommer, da ingen kand arbeide. Medens / jeg er i Verden, er jeg Verdens Lys. Dette Me/dens, som HERren saa ofte taler om, maae endeligen / paaminde os om, at tage vare paa Tiden, og at der / er ikke lang Betænk-Tiid for os. Derfor heder det: i / Dag, dersom I høre hans Røst, da forhærder ik/ke eders Hierter, Ebr 3,7.8. og v. 13. Formaner/ eder selv hver Dag, saa længe det kaldes i Dag. / En dag løber hastig til Ende, og den samme kom/mer aldrig igien, saa løber og Naadens og Salig/hedens Dag snart til Ende, før man veed deraf. Der/efter er det for silde, naar Huusbonden har lukt Dø/ren, da de maae begynde at staae ude, og forgieves at / banke paa, som Frelseren siger, Luc. 13,25. Det staaer / ikke til os, at

kalde den tilbudne Naade tilbage igien, / naar vi vil. Derfor skal vi tage imod den, naar den til/bydes os. Det heder, at søge HErren, medens hand //

p. 578

findes, at kalde paa ham, medens hand er nær. / Lader os nu ogsaa høre:

II. Guds Aands alvorlige Formaning til en / sand og hiertelig Omvendelse. Saa snart og ha/stig det bør skee, at vi besluttel at søge HErren, og at paakalde ham om Naade og om Barmhiertighed for / vore Siele, og saaledes at omvende os til HErren, / saa oprigtig og hiertelig bør det ogsaa skee, uden al / Lunkenhed og Sviig. Det er ikke lige meget, hvordan / vi bære os ad med vor Omvendelse. Hyklery i Steden / for Oprigtighed, Lunkenhed i Steden for Alvorlig/hed, Skin i Steden for Kraft, løse Læbers Ord i / Steden for at ygmygt, sønderknuset og Naade-hung/rigt Hierte, lunkne Bønner i Steden for at raade / og bede af sin gandske Hierte, en bar Mund-Bekien/delse, i Steden for at udøse sit Hierte for Gud med / al Oprigtighed og Alvorlighed, vil ikke giøre det, og der/med kand vi ikke bedrage Gud, men vel os selv, og an/dre Menniske til en Tiid. Saa vil og een og anden / god Bevægelse, Tanke og Forset ikke Giøre Sagen / klar. Ikke heller er det giort med en udvortes selv/giordt Forbedring efter Lov og Moral, at man af/legger een og enden grov Synd, ond Vane, og ud/vortes forargelig Talemaade eller Gierning, eller be/flitter sig paa een og anden Dyd og god Gierning, / paa et skikkeligt honet og ærbart Liv og Levnet, eller, at / man tager den udvortes Dyrkelse nøye i agt, med / Bøn og Sang, Kirke-og Alter-gang, hvilket altsam/men vel har et Skin af Omvendelse, og det kand og / være en Frugt og Virkning af en sand Omven/delse, som beviser sig udvortes ligesom indvortes; / men det er dog ikke Omvendelsen selv, ikke heller no/get sikkert Beviis derpaa, at der er skeet nogen sand / og hiertelig Omvendelse ved et Menneiske, som giør alt / saadant. Her maa skee en sand og oprigtig Foran/dring i vort gandske Sind og Hierte, og i vort gand//

p. 579

ske Liv og Levnet, og det allene ved Naadens og ved / Troens Kraft og Virkning. Dette see vi tydeligen af / vor Text. Det heder først: Søger HErren. Den / HErre, som vi skal søge, er den HErre Christus, / eller, Gud som i Christo har forliigt Verden med sig selv, / og oprettet

Forligelsens Ord iblant os. Thi om ham er / det, Propheten taler i den foregaaende. Hand fremstil/ler sig, som den der vil lade sig finde af os, hand / holder sig nær til os, for at bevise os Naade. Hand / lader kundgiøre Naade og Fred i Evangelio for de af/faldne og afvigede Siele, som ere komne langt bort fra / ham, som ligge under hans Vrede, og i Evighed ikke / kunde finde ham igien, eller vinde hans Naade og / Venskab, hvis hand ikke selv holdt sig saa nære til dem, / at de kunde finde ham.¹¹³⁷ Dette gjør hand nu, og det/te lader hand dem kundgiøre ved sit Naades Ord. Her/ved skal de lade sig opvække til at søge ham, og hand / lover at lade sig finde af dem, naar de søge og lede / efter ham af deres gandske Hierte, og af deres / gandske Siel. 5 Mos. B. 4, 29. Denne Søgen be/staaer da ikke i en møysommelig viitløftig Løben og Le/den, men i en inderlig og hiertelig Higen og Begierlig/hed, efter hans Naade, og at komme i hans Venskab / og Samfund igien. Denne deres Hiertes Længsel og / Attraa skal de give tilkiende i og ved inderlig heftig og / vedholdende Bøn og Paakaldelse. Her heder det / Beder saa skal I faae, leder saa skal I finde, banker/ paa, saa skal der blive oplukt for eder. Thi hver / den, som leder, den faaer, 2c. Matth. 7,7.8 Ja, / Hver den, som paakalder HErrens Navn, skal / blive salig. Ap. G. 2, 21. Rom. 10, 12.13. conf. / Ap. G. 22, 16. 2c. O! hvad er det got og let at be/de, naar Gaven er tilrede, og naar Naaden frembydes / og rekkes of, den man beder om. Dog maae denne / Bøn skee af et ret bøyet og begierligt Hierte; thi der/for kræves den af os, at vi derved skal give vor Fattig//

p. 580

dom, den Følelse vi have af vor egen Elendigheds / Udueligheds og Uværdigheds Kundskab, den inderlige / Længsel og Begierlighed, som vi have efter at komme / til HErren vor Gud og Frelser, og til hans Naades / Deelagtighed, ret tilkiende. Men at vi maae vide og / kiende, om vor Søgen og Beden har været ret hierte/lig og alvorlig, saa vises os nu videre i vor Text, hvor/ledes vor Omvendelse til HErren skal bevise sig? Den / Ugudelige skal forlade sin Vey, og hver, som / har gjort Uret, skal forlade sine Tanker, og saa / omvende sig til HErren. Vi maae kiende, at vi hid/indtil have været ugudelige, og at alle vore Veye og vore / Tanker have været onde, unretfærdige og vederstyggel/ige for HErren. Og derfor maae vi forlade dem. / Ja vi skal

¹¹³⁷ In my judgment, this is an obvious reference to a chiliastic age to come or some sort of *post mortem* possibility of repentance. The eschatological future and the present flow often together in Ewald's sermons.

ikke allene lade vore Veye, Fortagender / og Gierninger fare, hvorudi vi tilforn have beviist vort / onde, vantroe, og fra Gud afvendte Sind, og Lyst, Be/gierlighed og Affecter. Der skulle nu fattes gandske / andre Tanker, et andet Sind, og en anden Lyst og / Længsel, der ikke mere staaer til Verden, til de kiø/delige og jordiske Ting, eller til noget, som er syndigt, / uretfærdigt og ureent for Guds Øyne, men til HEr/ren selv, til at vinde Christum og findes i ham, til at / troe paa ham, elske ham, hænge fast ved ham, til at / glæde og forlyste sig i ham, og til at være og blive ham / behagelig i alle Ting. Derfor er det, man skal paakalde ham, / at hand, som er troe og retfærdig, maa forlade os vo/re Synder, og rense os fra al Uretfærdighed. I Joh. 1, / 9. Og dette er det ogsaa, som HErren her lover os / ved Propheten: Saa skal hand forbarme sig, og / ynkes over vor elendige og ulyksalig Tilstand, ja hand, / som er vor Gud, vor Immanuel, vor Frelser, skal / mangfoldighen tilgive, det er, hand skal ikke allene //

p. 581

bevise sig gandske naadig, villig og redebon dertil, at / tage os til Naade, thi derfor har hand selv befalet os / at søge og at paakalde, og lovet at ville lade sig fin/de, og at holde sig nær til os med sin Naade; men / hand skal og give os en gandske fuldkommen For/sikrning om Naade og Barmhiertighed, en fuld Synds / Forladelse, saa at vi ikke have Aarsag til mindste / Frygt og Bekyrming mere, men kand være tilfulde for/vissede om, at hand er vor naadige, forsonede, milde / Gud og Fader, for Christi skyld, som er hengiven / for vore sinder, og opreist til for Retfærdighed. / Saa kand vi sige med Paulo: af Rom. 8, 31. sqq. Er / Gud for os, hvo kand da være imod os? hvilken / ikke sparede sin egen Søn, men gav ham hen for / os alle. Hvor vil anklage Guds Udvalgte? Gud er den, som retfærdiggjør. Hvo er den, som for/dømmer? Christus er den, som er død, ja meget / mere, som og er opreist, som og er hos Guds / høyre Haand, som og træder frem for os. Hvo / skal kunde stille os fra Christi Kierlighed? Trængsel, eller Angst, eller Forfølgelse, eller Hunger, / eller Nøgenhed, eller Fare, eller Sverd? 2c. /

Nu, kiereste Siele! tænker jo ikke, at denne Præ/diken ikke gielder eder. Bedrager eder ikke selv, og bil/der eder ikke ind, at I uden en sand og hiertelig / Omvendelse kunde komme i Himmelen. Tænker / ikke heller, at I ikke have saadan Omvendelse be/hov, fordi I ere døbte, kaldes Christne, og baade / kalde eder selv, og kaldes af andre, Guds Børn, trøste / eder selv, og trøstes af andre, at I have Synds For/ladelse, og skal vist blive salige, naar I døer. Ere I /

ikke saaledes i Sandhed og af gandske Hierte blevne / omvendte til Frelseren, som vi nu have hørt om, saa / er al saadan Toes og TRøst forfængelig, og I blive / kun derved skammelige bedragne. Er ikke eders Sind, / eders Hiertes inderste Grund bleven forandret, afdra//

p. 582

gen fra Synden, fra Verden, og fra alt det, som er / Gud og eders Frelser imod, og henvendt til HERren, / til at troe paa ham, elske ham, tiene ham, og at bli/ve ham behagelig i alle Ting, saa er der ikke skeet no/gen sand Omvendelse endnu, saa ere I endnu i eders / uigienfødte, syndige og fordømmelige Tilstand. Men / tænker ikke heller, at det staaer i eders Magt, at I / men en udvortes og selvgiort Levnets Forbedring, bor/gerlig Skikkelighed, eller andægtig Dyrkelse; thi ellers / kunde det maaske staaer til eder. Men at skabe et nyt Hier/te, at give en nye, troende, villig og lydig Aand, det / hør Gud og Frelseren til, Alt det I selv kand bring / til Veye, er kun Hykleri uden Sandhed, og Skin u/den Kraft, hvoraf eders Sind kand opblæses i Stolt/hed og Selv-Behag, men I kand dog derudi ingenlun/de tækkes Gud. Det er ikke Christi Meening, naar / hand siger: Omvender eder, og troer, at vi selv / skulde gjøre noget for i Veyen, før vi komme til / ham og altsaa uden ham. Men hand vil kun, at vi / skal kiende vor fordervede og fordømmelige Tilstand, / og derved saaledes bøyes og ydmyges, at vi saa med / en inderlig Hunger og Tørst maae søge hans Ret/færdighed, komme til ham, paakalde ham om Naade / og Syndens Forladelse, om Aand og Kraft; saa vil hand / selv gjøre det altsammen, skiende os Troen, Forsonin/gen, Retfærdighed, Fred, Aand, Liv og Kraft, og / selv fylde os med Retfærdighedens Frugter, som skee ved / ham, Gud til Ære og Lof. Saa kommer da, alle I, / som kiende, at I have Omvendelse behov. Kommer / til JEsu, kommer, medens hand er nær, og tilbyder / eder sin Naade. Siden, naar Naadens Tiid er til / Ende for eder, og Døren er lukket, saa er det for silde, / og I maae da forgieves raade: HERre! HERre! luk / op for os! Thi da vil hand svare eder i Vrede: Jeg / kiender eder ikke, hvorfra I ere. Viger bort fra mig, / alle I, som gjøre Uret. //

p. 583

O HERre JEsu! forbarme dig over os, og / giv, at dette Ord maae bevise sin Kraft paa vo/re Siele, at vi maae endnu paa denne Dag, da / du holder dig saa nær til os med dit Naades / Ord,

af Hiertet omvendes til dig, troe paa dig, / og saa blive hos os i dig, paa det vi maae ha/ve
Frimodighed paa Dommens Dag, og ikke / skulle beskæmmes i din Tilkommelse. Hør os, / og
vær os naadig, for din Kierlighedens skyld!

Appendix D: Chronological Bibliography and Full Titles of Enevold Ewald's published texts, original editions and later printings

1. Den Sande Christendoms Rette Grundvold i Guds og JEsu Christi levende og saliggjørende Kundskab. Det er, De fornemmeste tydeligste og kraftigste Sententzer eller Sprog af den gandske Hel. Skrift saaledis efter Catechismi Anledning indrettet at ogsaa de eenfoldigste ved Guds Naade dand naae en grundelig kraftig og nøyagtig Kundskab deraf om alle de Ting som henhøre til Troen, Gudfrygtighed og Salighed, Særdelis de Eenfoldige og Ungdommen til Nytt opsat af En som Elsker deres Salighed, Tøndern, 1720.

English translation of title: *The True Christianity's Right Foundation in the living and sanctifying knowledge of God and Jesus Christ. That is: The foremost, clearest, and most powerful verses of the entire Holy Scriptures ordered by the Catechism so that also the simplest by the grace of God can achieve a basic, powerful and close knowledge of all the things which belong to faith, piety, and blessedness. Given particularly for the use of the simple and the young by one who loves their blessedness.*

Abbreviated as RG

2. Begyndelses Elementer i de Guds Ord, d. e. Lutheri liden Catechismus, med eenfoldig, dog tydelig og nøyagtig Udleggelse i Spørsmal og Giensvar paa det korteste efter Guds Ords Anviisning forfattet. Til den Ende at mand deraf maatte søge og faae en levende Kundskab om de Ting som udkræves af en hver som vil blive salig, Tøndern, 1721.

English translation: *Beginning elements in the Word of God, i.e. Luther's little catechism authored with simple though clear and close explication in short questions and answers according to the instruction of God's Word. To the end that one thereof might seek and receive a living knowledge of the things which are required of anyone who will be blessed*

Abbreviated as BE

3. Historiae Ecclesiasticæ Veteris Testamenti Index Chronologicus, eller Tiids-Register over det Gamle Testamentes Kirke-Historie, Copenhagen, 1741.

English translation: *Chronological Index of the Ecclesiastical History of the Old Testament*

4. *Historiæ ecclesiasticæ Novi Testamenti index chronologicus, eller Tiids-Register over det nye Testamentes Kirke-Historie, tilligemed de merkværdigste Ting ar den verdslige Historie, Copenhagen, 1742.*

English translation: *Chronological Index of the Ecclesiastical History of the New Testament* (Note: this also includes world historical events that have some connection to church history until 1740)

5. *Det Gamle og Nye Testamentes herlige Harmonie, og fuldkomne Overeens-stemmelse i den Lærdom om Christo, og om Guds saliggjørende Naade, som er aabenbaret i Christo til alle Menniskers Frelse og Salighed, forestillet udi adskillige Prædikener, Copenhagen, 1744-50. Volumes abbreviated as HH [Herlige Harmonie] I, HH II, HH III, HH IV, HH V*

English translation: *The glorious harmony of the New and Old Testament, and perfect agreement in the doctrine concerning Christ and God's sanctifying grace, which is revealed in Christ for the salvation and blessedness of all humans, expressed in diverse sermons*

One abbreviation and re-print: *Det gamle og nye Testaments herlige Harmoni: fremstillet i en Samling af Pædikener til alle Søn- og Helligdage det ganske Aar igjennem, tilligemed 26 Passionsprædikener, Stavanger, 1851*

6. *Den bibelske Concordantz 1. - 3. Deel: alle de Navne, som forekomme og findes i den gandske h. Skrift..., Copenhagen, 1748-9.*

English translation: *The Biblical Concordance, Part 1-3: all the names which appear and are found in the entire Holy Scriptures.*

7. *Den eeneste, Sande og Salige Wiisdoms Kilde, som er Guds Ord, eller, den Hellige Skrift, Den Hellige Skriftes høye Værdighed, store Vigtighed, rette og værdige Brug, og salige Nytte, hos dem som tilbørligen omgaaes dermed, Copenhagen, 1752.*

English translation: *The only, true and blessed source of Wisdom, which is God's word, or the Holy Scriptures, or the Holy Scriptures' high worthinesss, great importance, right and worthy use, and blessed use, among them who properly treat it [as such]*

8. Troende Sieles daglige Opmuntring til Troe og Kierlighed, Haab og Taalmodighed, og i Almindelighed til Troskab og Bestandighed paa den sande Christendoms Vey, formedelst udvalgte Bibelske Sprog til enhver Dag i Aaret, Tilforn skrevne til Privat-Opbyddelse, men nu efter adskilliges Begiering udgivne til almindelig Opmuntring; Hvortil nogle faa Psalmer ere føyede som Anhang, Copenhagen, 1752

English Translation: *The faithful soul's daily encouragement to faith, love, hope and patience and in general [encouragement] to faithfulness and constancy on the path of true Christianity, by means of selected Biblical phrases and verses for each day of the year; earlier written for private edification, men now after various [people's] desire published for general encouragement; including some few spiritual hymns attached as an appendix*

Abbreviated as TS

Bibliography

- Aarflot, Andreas. *Hans Nielsen Hauge : Liv Og Budskap*. U-Bøkene. Oslo ; Universitetsforlaget, 1971.
- Albrecht, Ruth. *Johanna Eleonora Petersen: Theologische Schriftstellerin Des Frühen Pietismus*. Vol. 45. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005.
- Allen, Joseph Henry, and Richard Eddy. *A History of the Unitarians and the Universalists in the United States*. Vol. 10. Christian Literature, 1894.
- Almond, P.C. *Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment England*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Alsted, J.H., M.R. Antognazza, H. Hotson, and G.W. Leibniz. *Alsted and Leibniz: On God, the Magistrate and the Millennium*. Wolfenbütteler Arbeiten Zur Barockforschung. Harrassowitz, 1998.
- Anckaert, L. *A Critique of Infinity: Rosenzweig and Levinas*. Studies in Philosophical Theology. Isd, 2006.
- Arndal, Steffen. "Den store hvide Flok vi see -" : H.A. Brorson og tysk pietistisk vækkelsessang. Odense University studies in literature ; vol. 24. Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1989.
- . "Krop, Sjæl Og Ånd Georg Ernst Stahls Og Christian Friedrich Richters Medicinske Antropologi." *Dansk Medicinhistorisk Årbog* 9, no. 1980 (1980): 126–66.
- Arndt, Johann. *Sex Bøger Om Den Sande Christendom, Handlende Om Sande Christnes Salige Omvendelse, Hjertelige Anger Og Ruelse over Synden*. Copenhagen: Trykt udi det Kongel. Waysen-Huses Bogtrykkerie, og paa dets Forlag, 1734.
- Arndt, Johann, and Heiko Augustinus Oberman. *Johann Arndt: True Christianity*. Translated by Peter C. Erb. The Classics of Western Spirituality. London: SPCK, 1979.
- Augustinus, Aurelius., and Henry. Chadwick. *Confessions*. Oxford u.a.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991.
- Austad, Torleiv. "Dåp Og Omvendelse i Lys Av Brytningen Mellom Lutherdom Og Pietisme." *Tidsskrift for Teologi Og Kirke* 77, no. 4 (2006): 271–80.
- . "Mennesket Og Nåden. Til Forståelse Av Bakgrunnen for Erik Pontoppidans Lære Om Frelsestegnelsen." *Ichthys* 9, no. 3 (1982): 95–106.
- Bärensprung, Siegmund. *Die Wiederbringung aller Dinge in ihren ersten guten Zustand der Schöpfung, nach ihrem Beweiss und Gegen-Beweiss*. Franckfurt, 1739.

- Barton, S.C. *Holiness: Past and Present*. New Century Theology. Bloomsbury Academic, 2003.
- Baur, Jörg. "Salus Christiana: Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Der Geschichte Des Christlichen Heilsverständnisses," 1968.
- Becker, George. "Pietism's Confrontation with Enlightenment Rationalism: An Examination of the Relation between Ascetic Protestantism and Science." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 1991, 139–58.
- Bell, M. *The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700–1840*. Cambridge Studies in German. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Bemesderfer, James O. *Pietism and Its Influence upon the Evangelical United Brethren Church*. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Bemesderfer, 1966.
- Benz, Ernst. "Die Protestantische Thebais: Zur Nachwirkung Makarios Des Ägypters Im Protestantismus Des 17. Und 18. Jahrhunderts in Europa Und Amerika." *Abhandlungen Der Geistes-Und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*, 1963.
- Berkhof, Louis. *Systematic Theology*, 1996.
- Beyreuther, Erich, and Erich Beyreuther Gerhard Meyer. *Zweiter Sammelband Über Zinzendorf*. Vol. 13. Georg Olms Verlag, 1975.
- Bianco, Bruno. "Freiheit Gegen Fatalismus. Zu Joachim Langes Kritik an Wolff." In *Halle*, 111–56. Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2012.
- Biblia*. 3. Oplag. Copenhagen: Udi det kongel. Waysenhuses Bogtrykkerie og paa dets Forlag, 1740.
- Bielfeldt, Dennis. "The Ontology of Deification." In *Caritas dei Beiträge zum Verständnis Luthers und der gegenwärtigen Ökumene ; Festschrift für Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60. Geburtstag*, edited by Oswald Bayer and Tuomo Mannermaa, 90–113, 1997.
- Billings, J Todd. *Union with Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church*. Baker Academic, 2011.
- Blowers, Paul M. "Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Gnostic Will (Γνώμη) in Christ: Clarity and Ambiguity," 2012.
- Boersma, H. *Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: An Analogical Approach*. Oxford Early Christian Studies. OUP Oxford, 2013.
- Braaten, Carl E., and Robert W. Jenson. *Union with Christ : The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther*. Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2000.

- Bramming, Bente, and Torben Bramming. "Brorson Inspirerede Både Kierkegaard Og Andersen." *Kristeligt Dagblad*, July 22, 2015. <https://www.kristendom.dk/kristen-livsstil/brorson-i-eftertiden>.
- Bredsdorff, Thomas. *Den brogede oplysning: om følelsernes fornuft og fornuftens følelse i 1700-tallets nordiske litteratur*. Kbh.: Gyldendal, 2003.
- Bredsdorff, Thomas, Søren Peter Hansen, and Anne-Marie Mai, eds. *Nordic Light*. University of Southern Denmark Studies in Scandinavian Languages and Literatures 81. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2007.
- Bricka, C. F., ed. "Reenberg, Christian Christopher." Vol. 13. *Dansk Biografisk Lexikon*, 1899. ———, ed. "Reenberg, Morten." Vol. 13. *Dansk Biografisk Lexikon*, 1899.
- Brooke, Christopher. "How the Stoics Became Atheists." *The Historical Journal* 49, no. 2 (2006): 387–402.
- Brouwer, Rinse H Reeling. *Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy*. Routledge, 2016.
- Büchner, Gottfried., and Heinrich Leonhard. Heubner. *Gottfried Büchner's biblische real und verbal hand concordanz oder exegetisch homiletisches Lexikon*. 11th ed. Braunschweig: C.U. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1859.
- Buddeus, Joannes Franciscus [Johann Franz]. *Institutiones Theologiae Moralis*. Lipsiae: Apud Thomam Fritsch, 1715.
- Buddeus, Johann Franz. "Animadversiones in Petri Chavvini Librum de Religione Natvrali." In *Parerga Historico-Theologica*, 1719.
- . *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*. Vol. 1. 2 vols., 1740.
- . *Collegium Theologico-Morale, Eller Gudelig Lærdom Om Gode Gierninger Og Sæder*. Vol. 2. 2 vols., 1740.
- . *Einleitung in die Moral-Theologie*. Leipzig: Bey Thomas Fritschen, 1719.
- . *Epistola De Nonnullis Ad Qvorvndam Ecclesiae Evangelicae In S [Illesia] Ministrorvm Innocentiam Vindicandam Spectantibvs*, 1724.
- . *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae*. Lipsiae, 1724.
- . *Observationes in elementa philosophiae instrvmentalis*. Edited by Johann Georg Walch. Hal.: Orphanotrophium, 1732.
- Burnet, Thomas. *De Statu Mortuorum & Resurgentium Tractatus. Of the State of the Dead, and of Those That Are to Rise*. London: E. Curll, 1729.

- Burns, Stuart. "Divine Ecstasy in Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Macarius: Flight and Intoxication." *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 44, no. 1–4 (1999): 309.
- Busch, Eberhard. *Karl Barth & the Pietists : The Young Karl Barth's Critique of Pietism and Its Response*. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2004.
- Campbell, Constantine R. *Paul and Union with Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study*. Zondervan Academic, 2015.
- Caro, Hernan D. "The Best of All Possible Worlds? Leibniz's Optimism and Its Critics 1710 - 1755," 2014.
- Catalogus Librorum*. Hafniæ: typis Andreae Hartvici Godiche, 1765.
- Catalogus over En Deel Gode Bøger Og Mss*. Kjøbenhavn, 1747.
- Chambers, Ephraim. "Freedom of Contradiction." In *Cyclopaedia, or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences*. London, 1750.
- . "Freedom of Contrariety, or of Contraries." In *Cyclopaedia, or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences*. London, 1750.
- Christensen, Sigrid Nielsby. "En Undersøgelse Af Enevold Ewalds (1696-1754) Teologi Og Dens Historiske Kontekst På Baggrund Af Hans Prædikener." *Prisopgave, guld Københavns Universitet.*, 2019.
- . "Enevold Ewalds Selvprøvelsesprogram." *Kirkehistoriske Samlinger Bind 2020 (2020)*: 7–30.
- Christian Friderich, Bay. *Fuldstændigt Dansk Og Engelsk Haand-Lexicon*. 2. forb. Udg. Copenhagen, 1807.
- Clark, S.R.L. *Animals and Their Moral Standing*. Taylor & Francis, 2006.
- Clark, S.R.L., and C. Pickstock. *Can We Believe in People? Human Significance in an Interconnected Cosmos*. Angelico Press, 2020.
- Clark, Stephen R. L. *God, Religion and Reality*, 2017.
- Clark, Stephen RL. "Orwell and the Anti-Realists." *Philosophy* 67, no. 260 (1992): 141–54.
- . *The Mysteries of Religion: An Introduction to Philosophy through Religion*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- Clatterbaugh, Kenneth. *The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739*. Routledge, 2014.

- Coates, D. Justin, and Micheal McKenna. "Compatibilism." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, n.d.
 <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/compatibilism/>>.
- Cobb, James G. *Lutheran DNA: Testing the Augsburg Confession in the Parish*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2010.
- Collins Winn, Christian T. *The Pietist Impulse in Christianity*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011.
- Collins Winn, Christian T., and John L. Drury. "Karl Barth and the Future of Evangelical Theology," 2017.
- Como, D.R. *Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War England*. Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Coninck-Smith, Ning de, Mogens Rüdiger, Morten Thing, and Niels Finn Christiansen. *Historiens kultur : fortælling, kritik, metode : tilegnet Niels Finn Christiansen*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum, 1997.
- Connolly, S. *Inklings of Heaven*. Gracewing, 2007.
- Coors, Michael. *Scriptura efficax. Die biblisch-dogmatische Grundlegung des theologischen Systems bei Johann Andreas Quenstedt : Ein dogmatischer Beitrag zu Theorie und Auslegung des biblischen Kanons als Heiliger Schrift*. Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie. Vandehoeck & Rupprecht, 2009.
- Corr, Charles A. "The Existence of God, Natural Theology and Christian Wolff." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 4, no. 2 (1973): 105–18.
- Crusius, Christian August. *Anweisung vernünfftig zu leben*. Leipzig: Gleditsch, 1744.
- Dahl, Aage. "Bidrag Til Johannes Ewalds Slægtshistorie." *Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift*. V, no. 9 (1932): 215–47.
- Dahl, Gina. *Books in Early Modern Norway*. Brill EBook Titles 2011. Leiden ; Brill, 2011.
- Damrau, Peter. *The Reception of English Puritan Literature in Germany*. London: Maney publ., 2006.
- Davenport, John, Grant Julin, Sharon Krishek, John Lippitt, Edward F Mooney, Marilyn Gaye Piety Foley, Pia Soltoft, Mark A Tietjen, Rick A Furtak, and Christopher B Barnett. *Kierkegaard's God and the Good Life*. Indiana University Press, 2017.
- Davis, Justin A. *Pietism and the Foundations of the Modern World*. Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2019.

- De La Noval, Roberto J. "Divine Drama or Divine Disclosure? Hell, Universalism, and a Parting of the Ways." *Modern Theology* 36, no. 1 (2020): 201–10.
- Dippel, Johann Conrad. *Der von den Nebeln des Reichs der Verwirrung gesäuberte helle Glanz des Evangelii Jesu Christi oder Schrift- und Wahrheit-mässiger Entwurff der Heyls-Ordnung*. Stockholm, 1727.
- . *Vera Demonstratio Evangelica*. Frankfurt; Leipzig, 1729.
- Dodds, Michael J. "Science, Causality, and God: Divine Action and Thomas Aquinas." *Angelicum* 91, no. 1 (2014): 13–36.
- Dunstan Robidoux. "Applying a Thomist Principle: Quidquid Recipitur Ad Modum Recipientis Recipitur." *Loneragan Institute* (blog). Accessed October 12, 2020.
<http://loneragan.org/2009/10/16/applying-a-thomist-principle-quidquid-recipitur-ad-modum-recipientis-recipitur/>.
- Dyck, Corey W. *Early Modern German Philosophy (1690-1750)*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2019.
- Dyrness, W.A., V.M. Kärkkäinen, J.F. Martinez, and S. Chan. "Universalism." In *Global Dictionary of Theology: A Resource for the Worldwide Church*. InterVarsity Press, 2009.
- Dyrness, William A, and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen. *Global Dictionary of Theology : A Resource for the Worldwide Church*, 2015.
- Echeverria, Eduardo J. *Divine Election: A Catholic Orientation in Dogmatic and Ecumenical Perspective*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2016.
- Elle Jensen, F. *Pietismen i Danmark*. Lohse, 1924.
- . *Pietismen i Jylland*. Teologiske studier. 2. afd. ; 5. Gad, 1944.
- Eller, Vernard. *Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship*. Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Ellis, Brannon. "Covenantal Union and Communion: Union with Christ as the Covenant of Grace." In *Sanctification: Explorations in Theology and Practice*, edited by K.M. Kopic, 79–102. InterVarsity Press, 2014.
- Engelhardt, Juliane. "Pietisme og krise. Den Halleske og radikale pietisme i den danske helstat under Christian 6." *Historisk Tidsskrift*, 2017.
- Ewald, Enevold [Enevold]. *Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ Veteris Testamenti Index Chronologicus*. Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Waysen-Husets Bogtrykkerie, 1741.
- Ewald, Enevold. *Begyndelses Elementer i de Guds Ord*, 1721.

- . *Den Eeneste, Sande Og Salige Wiisdoms Kilde, Som Er Guds Ord, Eller, Den Hellige Skrift*. Copenhagen, 1752.
- . *Den Sande Christendoms Rette Grundvold i Guds Og Jesu Christi Levende Og Saliggjørende Kundskab*, 1720.
- . “Enev. Edwalds [Sic] Replique Paa Hr. Christian Reenbergs Indlæg Af d. 18 Mart. 1734,” March 22, 1734. GUNNERUS XA Qv. 114d. Gunnerus Library, Trondheim.
- . *Fortegnelse Paa En Deel Gode Og Vel Conditionerede Bøger*. Copenhagen, 1755.
- . “Hr. Enev. Ewalds Svar Paa Hr. Christian Reenbergs 57 Poster Indgivne Mod Ham i Den Kongel. Commission,” 1734. GUNNERUS XA Qv. 114d. Gunnerus Library, Trondheim.
- Ewald, Enewald [Enevold]. *Det gamle og nye Testamentes herlige Harmonie*. Vol. 3. Copenhagen, 1746.
- Ewald, Enewaldus [Enevold]. *Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ Novi Testamenti Index Chronologicus*. Kbh: Det kgl. Waysen-Huuses Bogtrykkerie, 1742.
- “Ewald’s First Response to Kaasbøll,” February 3, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.
- “Ewald’s Second Response to Kaasbøll,” February 22, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.
- “Ewald’s Second Response to Reenberg (Unsigned),” March 4, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.
- Exner, A. *Efterretninger om det kongelige Vaisenhuus*. Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz, 1881.
- Fabbianelli, Faustino. “Leibniz, Budde et Wolff.” *Revue Philosophique de La France et de l’etranger* 128, no. 3 (2003): 293–306.
- Falduto, Antonino. *The Faculties of the Human Mind and the Case of Moral Feeling in Kant’s Philosophy*. de Gruyter, 2014.
- “Fernere Nachricht Von M. Ludwig Gerhards Erhobenen Streit Über Die Wiederbringung.” In *Anhang Der Sammlung von Alten Und Neuen Theologischen Sachen Auf Das Jahr 1745*, 940–42, 1745.
- Feser, Edward. “Classical Theism.” *Edward Feser* (blog), September 30, 2010. <http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/09/classical-theism.html>.
- . *Five Proofs for the Existence of God*. Ignatius Press, 2017.

- Fesko, John V. *Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700)*. Vol. 20. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012.
- Fortgesetzte Sammlung von Alten Und Neuen Theologischen Sachen*. Fortgesetzte Sammlung von Alten Und Neuen Theologischen Sachen: Darinnen von Büchern, Uhrkunden, Controversien, Veränderungen, Anmerckungen Und Vorschlägen. Jacobi, 1728.
- Frank, Gustav Wilhelm. *Geschichte Der Protestantischen Theologie Vol. 2*. Vol. 2. 1 vols. Breitkopf und Härtel, 1865.
- Freddoso, Alfred J. "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough." *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991): 553–85.
- Fuchs, Martin, Antje Linkenbach, Martin Mulsow, Bernd-Christian Otto, Rahul Bjørn Parson, and Jörg Rüpke. *Religious Individualisation: Historical Dimensions and Comparative Perspectives*. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2019.
- Gäbler, Ulrich. "Geschichte, Gegenwart, Zukunft." In *Geschichte Des Pietismus*, edited by Hartmut. Lehmann, Martin. Brecht, and Klaus. Deppermann, 4:19–48. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004.
- Gallagher, David M. "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Ilae, Qq. 6-17)." In *The Ethics of Aquinas*, edited by Stephen J Pope, 69–89. Georgetown University Press, 2002.
- . "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29, no. 4 (1991): 559–84.
- Gasparri, Giuliano. *Étienne Chauvin (1640-1725) and His Lexicon Philosophicum*. Georg Olms Verlag, 2016.
- Gawthrop, Richard L. *Pietism and the Making of Eighteenth-Century Prussia*. Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Gehrz, Christopher, and Mark Pattie Iii. *The Pietist Option: Hope for the Renewal of Christianity*. Westmont: InterVarsity Press, 2017.
- Gerhard, Ludwig. *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*. Altona: Autor, 1729.
- Gerhard, Ludwig, and Christian [Johann Conrad Dippel] Democritus. "Christiani Democriti Antwort auf das Verlangen eines guten Freundes, Wie doch eigentlich die Worte des Heylands über Judam Ischariot zu verstehen." In *Kurtzer Begriff des Ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge Nach der Ordnung Seines Systematis Für*

- Unstudirte, Zu dem Ende, Auf eine demonstrativische Art aufgesetzt*, 1–16. Altona: Autor, 1729.
- Gilje, Nils. "Ludvig Holbergs Origenisme: – En Analyse Av Holbergs Syn På Helvetesstraffene." *Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift* 107, no. 03 (2006): 144-162 ER.
- . "Ludvig Holbergs Origenisme: En Analyse Av Holbergs Syn På Helvetesstraffene." *Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift* 107, no. 3 (2006): 144–62.
- Goldschmidt, Stephan. *Johann Konrad Dippel (1673-1734): Seine Radikalpietistische Theologie Und Ihre Entstehung*. Vol. 39. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001.
- Gotlitzin, Alexander. "A Testimony to Christianity as Transformation: The Macarian Homilies and Orthodox Spirituality." In *Orthodox and Wesleyan Spirituality*, edited by S.T. Kimbrough, 129–56. St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2002.
- Gould, Stephen Jay. "Fall in the House of Ussher." *Natural History* 100, no. 11 (1991): 12–19.
- Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. "Von Der Creatio Ex Nihilo Zur »Bewahrung Der Schöpfung«: Dogmatische Erwägungen Zur Frage Nach Einer Möglichen Ethischen Relevanz Der Schöpfungslehre." *Zeitschrift Für Theologie Und Kirche* 87, no. 2 (1990): 206–23.
- Graversen, Hans. *Wajsenhuspræsten Enevold Ewald Og Den Pietistiske Bevægelse i København i Det 18. Aarhundrede*. Copenhagen, 1912.
- Gregg, S. *All You Want to Know About Hell: Three Christian Views of God's Final Solution to the Problem of Sin*. Thomas Nelson, 2013.
- Griffith-Dickson, G. *The Philosophy of Religion*. SCM Core Text. SCM Press, 2005.
- Groetsch, Ulrich. *Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768): Classicist, Hebraist, Enlightenment Radical in Disguise*. Brill, 2015.
- Gross, Andreas, Y. Vincent Kumaradoss, and Heike Liebau, eds. *Halle and the Beginning of Protestant Christianity in India*. 3 vols. Halle: Francke Foundations, 2006.
- Grossmann, Walter. *Johann Christian Edelmann : From Orthodoxy to Enlightenment*. Reprint 2019. Religion and Society ; 3. Berlin ; De Gruyter Mouton, 2019.
- Grote, Simon. *The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland*. Vol. 117. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Groth, Friedhelm. *Die "Wiederbringung Aller Dinge" Im Württembergischen Pietismus*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984.
- Hanby, Michael. *No God, No Science: Theology, Cosmology, Biology*. Illuminations: Theory & Religion. Hoboken: Wiley, 2013.

- Harrisville, R.A. *Pandora's Box Opened: An Examination and Defense of Historical-Critical Method and Its Master Practitioners*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014.
- Hart, David Bentley. *Roland in Moonlight*. Angelico Press, 2021.
- . *That All Shall Be Saved*. Yale University Press, 2019.
- . *The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami?* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2005.
- . *The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss*. Yale University Press, 2013.
- Heinsius, Johann Georg. *Unpartheyische Kirchen-Historie Alten Und Neuen Testaments, Von Erschaffung Der Welt Bis Auf Das Jahr Nach Christi Geburt 1730*. Vol. 2. Jena: Hartung, 1735.
- Hessayon, A. *Jane Lead and Her Transnational Legacy*. Christianities in the Trans-Atlantic World. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016.
- Heubach, Joachim. and Luther-Agricola-seura. *Luther und Theosis*. Erlangen: Martin-Luther-Verlag, 1990.
- Hindmarsh, D. Bruce. *The Evangelical Conversion Narrative : Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- . *The Spirit of Early Evangelicalism: True Religion in a Modern World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Hinlicky, Paul R. *Paths Not Taken: Fates of Theology from Luther through Leibniz*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2009.
- Hochstrasser, T.J. *Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment*. Ideas in Context ; 58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Hoff, Johannes. "The Rise and Fall of the Kantian Paradigm of Modern Theology." *The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism*, 2010, 167–96.
- Holberg, Ludvig., and J. L. Køhler. *Herrn Ludwigs, Freyherrn von Holberg, Allgemeine Kirchenhistorie von Dem Jahr Christi 1700 Bis 1750*. Allgemeine Kirchenhistorie ; 4-6. Ulm ; Verlag Johann Conrad Wohler, 1764.
- Horstbøll, Henrik. "Enlightenment and Pietism in Denmark-Norway in the Eighteenth Century. The Discourse of Erik Pontoppidan." In *Pietism, Revivalism and Modernity, 1650-1850*, 84–105. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008.
- Huijgen, Arnold. *The Spirituality of the Heidelberg Catechism*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015.

- Huisman, Frans W. "Danske Oversættelse Af Puritansk-Pietistiske Værker i Det 17. Og 18. Århundrede," *Kirkehistoriske samlinger.*, 2009, 83–187.
- Hunter, I., B.B.P.H.Q. Skinner, L. Daston, D. Ross, Q. Skinner, and J. Tully. *Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany*. Ideas in Context. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Iggers, Georg G. *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*. Wesleyan University Press, 2005.
- Illg, Thomas. "Philipp Nicolai and Johann Gerhard." In *Protestants and Mysticism in Reformation Europe*, edited by R.K. Rittgers and V. Evener, 287–308. St Andrews Studies in Reformation History. Brill, 2019.
- "[Innlegg] Hr. Magister Kaasbølls Indlæg Imod Mig..." København, 1734. GUNNERUS XA Fol. 73. Gunnerus Library, Trondheim.
- Israel, Jonathan I. *Radical Enlightenment : Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- "J. Trellunds 'Upartiske Theologiske Tanker,'" August 23, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.
- Jacob, J. *Heilige Poesie: Zu Einem Literarischen Modell Bei Pyra, Klopstock Und Wieland*. Studien Zur Deutschen Literatur. De Gruyter, 2015.
- Jakobsen, Rolv Nøtvik. "Johan Ernst Gunnerus—a Conservative Theologian and an Enlightened Scientist (?)." *Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskabs Skrifter*, 2011.
- Jantzen, A. "A. D. Jørgensen: Johannes Evald. Kjøbenhavn (Gyldendalske Boghandel) 1888. (263 SS.)." *Historisk Tidsskrift* 6, no. 0 (January 1, 1890): 137–51.
- Jenson, P.P. *Graded Holiness: A Key to the Priestly Conception of the World*. The Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies. Bloomsbury Publishing, 1992.
- Jonas, Hans. "Seventeenth Century and after: The Meaning of the Scientific and Technological Revolution." *Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man*, 1974, 45–80.
- Jordan, Albert F. "The Chronicle of Peter Böehler, Who Led John and Charles Wesley to the Full Light of the Gospel." *Transactions of the Moravian Historical Society* 22, no. 2 (1971): 100–178.
- "Kaasbøll's Accusations against Ewald," February 1, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.

- “Kaasbøll’s Response to Ewald,” February 17, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.
- Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti. *One with God : Salvation as Deification and Justification*. Collegeville (Minnesota): Liturgical Press, 2004.
- Kennard, Douglas. “Evangelical Views on Illumination of Scripture and Critique.” *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 49, no. 4 (2006): 797–806.
- Khan, Abraham. *Salighed as Happiness?: Kierkegaard on the Concept Salighed*. Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1985.
- Kilcrease, Jack D. *The Doctrine of Atonement: From Luther to Forde*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2018.
- “Kirkehistoriske Samlinger.” *Kirkehistoriske Samlinger* V, no. 4 (September 1907).
- Klemme, Heiner F, and Manfred Kuehn. *The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2016.
- Koch, Hal. *Danmarks Kirke gennem Tiderne*. De unges Bogsamling ; 2. De Unges Forlag, 1939.
- Koch, John D. “Saving Faith Alone.” In *Comfortable Words: Essays in Honor of Paul FM Zahl*, edited by Todd HW Brewer, 93–103. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2013.
- Koch, Max. *Der Ordo Salutis in Der Alt-Lutherischen Dogmatik*. Duncker, 1899.
- “Kraft.” In *Ordbog over Det Danske Sprog: Historisk Ordbog 1700-1950*. Vol. 11, 1929. <https://ordnet.dk/ods/ordbog?query=kraft>.
- Krogh, Tyge. “Rationalismens Syndebuk. Christian 6. Og Pietismen i Dansk Historieskrivning.” In *Historiens Kultur: Fortælling, Kritik, Metode: Tilegnet Niels Finn Christiansen*, edited by Niels Finn Christiansen. Museum Tusulanum Press, 1997.
- Kvanvig, J.L. *The Problem of Hell*. Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Lange, Joachim. *Bescheidene Und Ausführliche Entdeckung Der Falschen Und Schädlichen Philosophie in Dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico Von Gott, Der Welt, Und Dem Menschen*. Buchladen des Wäysenhauses, 1724.
- Larsen, Kurt. *Fra kirkens historie 1500-1700*. Århus: Kolon, 1998.
- Lausten, Martin Schwarz. *De Fromme Og Jøderne: Holdninger Til Jødedom Og Jøder i Danmark i Pietismen (1700-1760)*. Kirkehistoriske Studier, 3. Række, Nr. 7. Kbh: Akademisk Forlag, 2000.

- Lay, Robert F. *Readings in Historical Theology: Primary Sources of the Christian Faith*. Kregel Academic, 2009.
- Lee, Sukjae. "Occasionalism." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, n.d. <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/occasionalism/>>.
- Lehmkuhler, Karsten. *Inhabitatio: Die Einwohnung Gottes Im Menschen*. Vol. 104. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004.
- Leibniz, G.W., P. Riley, R. Geuss, and Q. Skinner. *Leibniz: Political Writings*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Lewis, C.S. *Mere Christianity*. HarperOne, 2009.
- . *The Problem of Pain*. HarperOne, 2001.
- Lieburg, Fred A. van, and Daniel Lindmark. *Pietism, Revivalism and Modernity, 1650-1850*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009.
- Lied, Laurel. "Danish Catechism in Action? Examining Religious Formation in and through Erik Pontoppidan's Menoza." *Studies in Church History* 55 (2019): 225–40.
- . "Nature Is Hallowed by Grace—How Debates on 'Grace and Nature' Influenced Danish Pietism." *Pietismus Und Neuzeit. Ein Jahrbuch Zur Geschichte Des Neueren Protestantismus* 45 (2021): 143–65.
- Lindberg, Carter. *The Pietist Theologians : An Introduction to Theology in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005.
- Lindhardt, P. G. *Peder Hersleb : Studier over Dansk-Norsk Kirke- Og Kulturhistorie i Første Halvdel Af Det 18. Århundrede*. Copenhagen: Gad, 1939.
- Lindström, Harald. *Wesley and Sanctification*. Almqvist & Wiksell, 1946.
- Linebaugh, Jonathan A. "Rational Hermeneutics and Comparison as Conversation." In *The New Testament in Comparison: Validity, Method, and Purpose in Comparing Traditions*, edited by John MG Barclay and Benjamin G White, 143–58. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020.
- Long, D Stephen. *John Wesley's Moral Theology: The Quest for God and Goodness*. Kingswood Books, 2005.
- Ludlow, Morwenna. *Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner*. Oxford Theological Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Lundbye, Jørgen. *Herrnhutismen i Danmark*. Kbh.: Schønberg, 1903.

- Macaskill, G. *Union with Christ in the New Testament*. OUP Oxford, 2013.
- MacDonald, George. "Justice." In *Unspoken Sermons*, Vol. 3, 1867. <http://www.online-literature.com/george-macdonald/unspoken-sermons/>.
- . "Righteousness." In *Unspoken Sermons*, Vol. 3, 1867. <http://www.online-literature.com/george-macdonald/unspoken-sermons/34/>.
- . "The Consuming Fire." In *Unspoken Sermons*, Vol. 1, 1867. <http://www.online-literature.com/george-macdonald/unspoken-sermons/2/>.
- . "The Creation in Christ." In *Unspoken Sermons*, Vol. 3, 1867. <http://www.online-literature.com/george-macdonald/unspoken-sermons/25/>.
- MacDonald, Gregory. *The Evangelical Universalist: The Biblical Hope That God's Love Will Save Us All*. SPCK, 2012.
- MacDonald, Gregory, and Robin A Parry. *"All Shall Be Well": Explorations in Universal Salvation and Christian Theology, from Origen to Moltmann*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011.
- MacFarland, Ian A. "The Theology of the Will." In *The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor*, edited by Bronwen Neil and Pauline Allen, 516–32. Oxford Handbooks, 2015.
- MacKenzie, Cameron A. "The Bondage of the Will in Lutheranism—Man's Sin or God's Will?" *Lutheran Synod Quarterly* 49, no. 1 (2009): 4–29.
- Mandelbrote, Scott. "'Generous Men Will Spare the Memory of the Dead': The Posthumous Publication of Writings by Thomas Burnet." In *Textual Transformations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Mason, Arthur J. *Fifty Spiritual Homilies of St. Macarius the Egyptian*. Translations of Christian Literature. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1921.
- Matarazzo, J.M., and A. Jackelen. *The Judgment of Love: An Investigation of Salvific Judgment in Christian Eschatology*. Distinguished Dissertations in Christian Theology. Pickwick Publications, 2018.
- Matava, Robert Joseph. *Divine Causality and Human Free Choice: Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy de Auxiliis Revisited*. Brill, 2016.
- Matthias, Markus. "Bekehrung Und Wiedergeburt." In *Geschichte Des Pietismus*, edited by Ulrich. Gäbler, Hartmut. Lehmann, Martin. Brecht, and Klaus. Deppermann, 4:49–82. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004.

- . *Johann Wilhelm Und Johanna Eleonora Petersen: Eine Biographie Bis Zur Amtsenthebung Petersens Im Jahre 1692*. Vandenhoeck et Ruprecht, 1993.
- . “Ordo Salutis: Zur Geschichte Eines Dogmatischen Begriffs.” *Zeitschrift Für Kirchengeschichte* 115, no. 3 (2004): 318–46.
- . “Pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy,” 15–49. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2015.
- McClymond, Michael J. *The Devil’s Redemption*. Baker Academic, 2018.
- McCormack, Bruce L. *Justification in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary Challenges*. Baker Academic, 2006.
- McGrath, Alister E. *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification: Volume II*. Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- McGuckin, J. A. “The Strategic Adaptation of Deification in the Cappadocians.” In *Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions*, edited by M.J. Christensen and J.A. Wittung, 95–114. Baker Publishing Group, 2008.
- McKenzie, E.C. *A Catalog of British Devotional and Religious Books in German Translation from the Reformation to 1750*. De Gruyter, 2016.
- Milbank, John. *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon*. Routledge, 2003.
- Møller, Jon Monrad. “Vajsenhuspræsten Ewalds Slægt i København På 1700-Tallet.” *Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift*. 101, no. 2 (1981): 133–44.
- Mulder, Jack. “Must All Be Saved? A Kierkegaardian Response to Theological Universalism.” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 59, no. 1 (2006): 1–24.
- Müller, Heinrich. *Apostolische Schlußkett Und Krafft-Kern*. Franckfurt am Mayn, 1671.
- Müller, Henrich. *Himmelske Kierligheds-Kys*. Kbh. og Aalborg: Christian Gottlob Mengel & Comp., 1745.
- Mulsow, Martin. “Eclecticism or Skepticism? A Problem of the Early Enlightenment.” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 465–77.
- Murphy, Mark. “Theological Voluntarism.” In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, n.d.
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/voluntarism-theological/>>.
- Nadler, Steven. *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony*. Penn State Press, 2010.

- Nagel, T. *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*. OUP USA, 2012.
- Neiiendam, Michael. "Enevold Ewald." In *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*, Published online 2011. https://biografiskleksikon.lex.dk/Enevold_Ewald.
- . *Erik Pontoppidan*. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Kbh., 1930.
- . *Erik Pontoppidan*. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Copenhagen: Gad, 1930.
- Nielsen, Erik A. *Solens Fødsel: Seks Tekster Om Kristendommens Hemmeligheder*. Anis, 1998.
- Nielsen, Erik A. f. H. A. *Brorson : pietisme, meditation, erotik*. Billed-sprog ; 3. Kbh.: Gyldendal, 2013.
- Noll, Mark A. *The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1995.
- Nüssel, Friederike. *Bund Und Versöhnung : Zur Begründung Der Dogmatik Bei Johann Franz Buddeus*. Forschungen Zur Systematischen Und Ökumenischen Theologie ; 77. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996.
- . "Gott Als Spiritus Independens : Zur Umformung Der Gotteslehre in Der Lutherischen Theologie Der Frühaufklärung." In *Der Gott Der Vernunft: Protestantismus Und Vernünftiger Gottesgedanke*, edited by Jörg Lauster and Bernd Oberdorfer. Religion in Philosophy and Theology, 2009.
- O'Conner, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, n.d. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/freewill/>.
- Ogden, Stephen R. "On a Possible Argument for Averroes's Single Separate Intellect." In *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Volume 4*, edited by R. Pasnau, 27–63. Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Series. Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Olson, Roger E. *Reclaiming Pietism : Retrieving an Evangelical Tradition*. Grand Rapids, Michigan ; William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015.
- O'Neill, Eileen. "Influxus Physicus," 1993.
- Ott, Walter, and Walter R Ott. *Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Ottesen, Chr. *Det Kgl. Vajsenhus Gennem to Hundrede Aar*. Kbh.: Det Kgl. Vajsenhus, 1927.
- Overgaard, Frands Ole. "Konventikel." In *Den Store Danske*, April 22, 2013. <https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/konventikel>.

- Parry, Robin A, and Ilaria LE Ramelli. *A Larger Hope?, Volume 2: Universal Salvation from the Reformation to the Nineteenth Century*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2019.
- Pedersen, Anne Katrine Blinkenberg. "Den Hallensiske Mission Blandt Jøder i 1700-Tallet, Med Særligt Henblik På Danmark.," 2007.
- Pedersen, Johannes. *Fra brydningen mellem orthodoxi og pietisme : Københavns kirkeliv 1704- 1712*. Teologiske Studier. Dansk teologisk Tidsskrift. 2. Afd ; Nr. 7. Kbh., 1945.
- . "Pietismens Tid 1699—1746." In *Den Danske Kirkes Historie : V-VI*, edited by Hal Koch and Bjørn Kornerup. *Den Danske Kirkes Historie : I-VIII*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1950.
- Pelikan, J. *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism*. Gifford Lectures Series. Yale University Press, 1993. https://books.google.dk/books?id=x9pu3b2_D68C.
- Peschke, Erhard. "Der Pietismus in Dargun." Edited by Klaus Deppermann and Andreas Lindt, *Pietismus und Neuzeit : ein Jahrbuch zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus.*, 1, no. 1 (1974).
- Petersen, Johann Wilhelm, and Christian Pagencopen. *Die von Dr. Johann Wilhelm Petersen kurtz vor seinem Ende nochmahlen nachdrücklich gerettete Wahrheit des ewigen Evangelii von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge*. Freystadt [Büdingen]: [Regelin], 1727.
- Petersen, Johanna Eleonora, and Barbara Becker-Cantarino. *The Life of Lady Johanna Eleonora Petersen, Written by Herself : Pietism and Women's Autobiography in Seventeenth-Century Germany*. University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Peterson, D.G., and D.A. Carson. *Possessed by God: A New Testament Theology of Sanctification and Holiness*. New Studies in Biblical Theology. InterVarsity Press, 2015.
- Peucker, Paul. *A Time of Sifting: Mystical Marriage and the Crisis of Moravian Piety in the Eighteenth Century*. Vol. 1. Penn State Press, 2015.
- Piper, John. "Are There Two Wills in God." In *Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace*, edited by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce Ware, 107–31. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000.
- Plato. *Euthyphro*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett, n.d.

- Pless, John T. "Sacraments." In *Dictionary of Luther and the Lutheran Traditions*, edited by Timothy J Wengert, Mark Granquist, Mary Haemig, Robert Kolb, Mark Mattes, and Jonathan Strom, 653–56. Baker Academic, 2017.
- Pontoppidan, Erich [Erik]. *Epitome of Rev. Dr. Erik Pontoppidan's Explanation of Martin Luther's Small Catechism*. Translated by Edmund Belfour. Chicago: J. Anderson, 1889.
- Pontoppidan, Erik. *Collegium Pastorale Practikum : Pontoppidans Pastoralteologi*. Collegium Pastorale Practicum. Utg. 1757. Oslo: Luther i samarbeid med Det Evangelisk-Lutherske kirkesamfunn, 1986.
- . *Menoza*. Kbh: Wøldike, 1860.
- . *Menoza*. Edited by Andreas Fleischer. Oslo: Lutherstiftelsen, 1931.
- . *Sandhed Til Gudfrygtighed Udi En Eenfoldig Og Efter Muelighed Kort Dog Tilstrekkelig Forklaring over Sal. Doct. Mort. Luthers Liden Catechismo ...* Kjøbenhavn: Det Kongel. Waysenhuses ... Forlag, 1752.
- . *Sannhet Til Gudfryktighet: Forklaring over Martin Luthers Lille Katekisme*. Det evangelisk-lutherske kirkesamfunn, 1996.
- . *Tractat om Sielens Udødelighed samt dens Tilstand i og efter Døden, stadfæstet ved Guds Ord og den sunde Fornuft*. Kbh., 1762.
- . *Udtog af Dr. Erich Pontoppidans forklaring*. Minneapolis, Minn: Den forenede Kirkes Forlag, 1898.
- Pontoppidan, Erik Ludvigsen. *Troens Speyl, Forestillende Guds Børns Kiende-Tegn*. Kjøbenhavn: Chr. Paulli, 1740.
- Preus, J. Samuel. "The Reified Heart in Seventeenth-Century Religion." In *Religion in History*, edited by Michel Despland and Gérard Vallée, 45–56. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006.
- Rambach, Johann J., and Ernst Friedrich. Neubauer. *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre. 1 1*. Frankfurt; Leipzig, 1744.
- . *Dogmatische Theologie oder christliche Glaubens-Lehre. 2 2*. Frankfurt; Leipzig, 1744.
- Ramelli, Ilaria. *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena*. Brill, 2013.
- Ramelli, Ilaria L. E., and Richard. Bauckham. *A Larger Hope?, Volume 1 : Universal Salvation from Christian Beginnings to Julian of Norwich*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2019.

- Ramelli, I.L.E. *Evagrius's Kephalaia Gnostika: A New Translation of the Unreformed Text from the Syriac*. Writings from the Greco-Roman World ; SBL Press, 2015.
- Reenberg, Christian Christopher. "Hr. Christian Reenbergs Replique Paa Hr. Ewalds Indlæg i Den Kongl. Commission." Havniae, March 4, 1734. GUNNERUS XA Qv. 114g. Gunnerus Library, Trondheim.
- "Reenberg's Accusations against Ewald," February 18, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.
- "Reenberg's Response to Ewald," March 4, 1734. Kall 93 folio. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.
- Ritschl, Albrecht. *Geschichte Des Pietismus. Band 1, Der Pietismus in Der Reformirten Kirche*. Unveränd. photomechan. Nachdr. [d. Ausg.] Bonn, Marcus, 1880. Reprint 2019. *Geschichte Des Pietismus ; Band 1*. Berlin ; De Gruyter, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111450629>.
- Robb-Dover, Kristina. "Gregory of Nyssa's 'Perpetual Progress.'" *Theology Today* 65, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 213–25.
- Robinson, John A. T., and Robin. Parry. *In the End, God ... : A Study of the Christian Doctrine and the Last Things*. Eugene, Or: Cascade Books, 2011.
- Rørdam, Holger Fr. "Svenske Emigranternes Ophold i Danmark." *Kirkehistoriske samlinger* 5, no. 4 (1909 1907): 48–140.
- . "Vartovspræsten Ole Hersleb." *Kirkehistoriske samlinger* 5, no. 5 (November 1909): 164–201.
- . "Waisenhusets Ældste Historie." *Kirkehistoriske Samlinger* 4, no. 3 (95 1893): 26–96, 520–62.
- Roux, S., and Dan Garber. *The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy*. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Springer Netherlands, 2012.
- Saarinen, Risto. "Justification by Faith." In *The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther's Theology*. OUP Oxford, 2014.
- Sæbø, Magne. *Hebrew Bible-Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996.
- "Sagen Mod Enevold Ewald 1734 (Kopier)." Copenhagen, 17?? Ledreborg 417 kvart. Det Kongelig Bibliotek, Copenhagen.

- Sanders, Fred. "Fittingness: How Conveniens." *The Scriptorium Daily* (blog), December 5, 2013. <http://scriptoriumdaily.com/fittingness-how-conveniens/>.
- Santinello, Giovanni., and Gregorio. Piaia. *Models of the History of Philosophy Volume II: From Cartesian Age to Brucker*. 1st ed. 2011. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives Internationales d'histoire Des Idées, 204. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011.
- Schäfer, Johann David. *Ewiges Evangelium, oder die Lehre von dem tausendjährigen und ewigen Reiche Christi und seiner Heiligen und der damit verknüpften Wiederbringung aller Dinge*. [S.l., 1725.
- Schindler, David C. "Freedom Beyond Our Choosing: Augustine on the Will and Its Objects." *Communio* 29, no. 4 (2002): 618–53.
- Schindler, D.C. *Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty*. Catholic Ideas for a Secular World. University of Notre Dame Press, 2017.
- Schmidt, Martin. "Teilnahme an der göttliche Natur." In *Wiedergeburt und neuer Mensch; gesammelte Studien zur Geschichte des Pietismus.*, 238–98. Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1969.
- . *Wiedergeburt und neuer Mensch*. Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1969.
- Schmidt-Biggemann, Wilhelm. "Praktische Philosophie Als Provokation: Christian Wolffs Philosophie in Der Ideenpolitik Der Frühaufklärung." *Aufklärung* 21 (2009): 147–60.
- Schneider, Ulrich. "Eclecticism and the History of Philosophy." In *History and the Disciplines : The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Donald R. Kelley, 83–102. Rochester, N.Y: Univ. of Rochester Press, 1997.
- Schonfeld, Martin. *The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project*. Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Schröckh, J.M. *Christliche Kirchengeschichte Seit Der Reformation*. Vol. 8. Leipzig, 1808.
- Schumacher, Lydia. *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge*. Vol. 27. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
- Schumacher, William. *Who Do I Say That You Are?: Anthropology and the Theology of Theosis in the Finnish School of Tuomo Mannermaa*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2010.
- Seeberg, R. "Heilsordnung." In *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, edited by Albert. Hauck and Johann Jakob. Herzog. Vol. VII. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899.

- Seymour, C. *A Theodicy of Hell*. Studies in Philosophy and Religion. Springer Netherlands, 2013.
- Seymour, Charles. "Hell, Justice, and Freedom." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 43, no. 2 (1998): 69–86.
- Sgarbi, Marco. *Kant on Spontaneity*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012.
- Shantz, Douglas. *A Companion to German Pietism, 1660-1800*. Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition. Leiden: BRILL, 2014.
- Shantz, Douglas H. *An Introduction to German Pietism : Protestant Renewal at the Dawn of Modern Europe*. Young Center Books in Anabaptist & Pietist Studies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.
- . *Between Sardis and Philadelphia: The Life and World of Pietist Court Preacher Conrad Bröske*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.
- Siegvolck, Georg Paul. *The Everlasting Gospel*. Germantown [Pa.], 1753.
- Skarsten, Trygve R. "Erik Pontoppidan and His Asiatic Prince Menoza." *Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture* 50, no. 1 (1981): 33–43.
- Smith, James KA. *Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation*. Routledge, 2005.
- Snyder, Howard A. "John Wesley and Macarius the Egyptian." *The Asbury Journal* 45, no. 2 (1990): 5.
- Sparr, Walter. "Auf Dem Wege Zur Theologischen Aufklärung in Halle: Von Johann Franz Budde Zu Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten." In *Halle*, 71–90. Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2012.
- . "Philosophie." In *Geschichte Des Pietismus*, edited by Ulrich. Gäbler, Hartmut. Lehmann, Martin. Brecht, and Klaus. Deppermann, 4:227–63. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004.
- Spener, Philip Jacob. *Pia desideria*. Francofurti ad Moenum: sumpt. Joannis Davidis Zunneri, typis Joannis Theodorici Fridgenii, 1678.
- Spener, Philip Jacob. *Tractat om Natuur og Naade*. Kbhn, 1733.
- Stein, K. James. *Philipp Jakob Spener : Pietist Patriarch*. Chicago (Ill.): Covenant Press, 1986.
- Stoeffler, F. Ernest. *German Pietism during the Eighteenth Century*. Studies in the History of Religions. "(Supplements to Numen)" ; 24. Leiden: Brill, 1973.

- Strom, Jonathan. *German Pietism and the Problem of Conversion*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2018.
- Stump, Eleonore. "The Problem of Evil." *Faith and Philosophy* 2, no. 4 (1985): 392–423.
- Sutcliffe, A. *Judaism and Enlightenment*. Ideas in Context. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Talbott, Thomas B. *The Inescapable Love of God*. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2014.
- Tamburello, Dennis E. *Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard*. Westminster John Knox Press, 1994.
- Tanner, Kathryn. *Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity : A Brief Systematic Theology*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003.
- Thiessen, H.C., and V.D. Doerksen. *Lectures in Systematic Theology*. Eerdmans, 1979.
- Timpe, K. *Free Will in Philosophical Theology*. Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.
- Tompkins, A. *The Universalist Quarterly and General Review*. Vol. 12. Boston, 1855.
- Traherne, Thomas. *The Works of Thomas Traherne, Vol. 2 Commentaries of Heaven*, 2007.
- Traherne, Thomas, Bertram Dobell, and Christian Classics Ethereal Library. *Centuries of Meditations*. London: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1908.
- Trinius, Johann Anton. *Freydenker-Lexicon*. Cörner, 1759.
- Udtog af Dr. Erich Pontoppidans Forklaring*. Trykt i Opfostringshusets Bogtrykkerie af A. Jensen, 1845.
- Udtog af Dr. Erich Pontoppidans Forklaring*. Trykt hos Fr. D. Beyer paa hans forlag af Chr. Fr. Nissen, 1849.
- Vainio, Olli-Pekka. *Engaging Luther: A (New) Theological Assessment*. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2010.
- . "Justification and Participation in Christ : The Development of the Lutheran Doctrine of Justification from Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580)," 2008.
- . "Luther and Theosis: A Response to the Critics of Finnish Luther Research." *Pro Ecclesia (Northfield, Minn.)* 24, no. 4 (2015): 459–74.
- . "Luther and Theosis: A Response to the Critics of Finnish Luther Research." *Pro Ecclesia* 24, no. 4 (2015): 459–74.
- Vlastos, Gregory. "The Unity of the Virtues in the 'Protagoras.'" *The Review of Metaphysics* 25, no. 3 (1972): 415–58.

- Von Wille, Dagmar. "Bruno, Campanella Und Die Renaissance in Johann Georg Walchs Philosophischem Lexicon." *Bruno, Campanella Und Die Renaissance in Johann Georg Walchs Philosophischem Lexicon*, 2011, 435–56.
- Walch, Johann Georg. *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*. Vol. 2, 1733.
- . *Der Historischen und Theologischen Einleitung In die Religions-Streitigkeiten Der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*. Vol. 3, 1734.
- Walch, Johann Georg, and Johann Gottlieb Gleditsch. "Causa." In *Philosophisches Lexicon*, cols. 352-357, 1726.
- . "Essentz." In *Philosophisches Lexicon*, cols. 834-837, 1726.
- . "Existenz." In *Philosophisches Lexicon*, cols. 834-837, 1726.
- . "Freyheit des Willens." In *Philosophisches Lexicon*, cols. 1036-1056, 1726.
- . "Gott." In *Philosophisches Lexicon*, cols. 1339-1355, 1726.
- . "Wille des Menschen." In *Philosophisches Lexicon*, cols. 2901-2915, 1726. /z-wcorg/.
- Walch, Johann Georg., and Justus Christian. Hennings. "Erkenntniß Gottes." In *Philosophisches Lexicon : worinnen die in allen Theilen der Philosophie, vorkommende Materien und Kunstwörter erklärt, aus der Historie erläutert, die Streitigkeiten der ältern und neuern Philosophen erzehlet, beurtheilet, und die dahin gehörigen Schriften angeführet werden*, 1:c. 1104-1105. Leipzig: In Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 1775.
- . "Freyheit des Verstandes." In *Philosophisches Lexicon : worinnen die in allen Theilen der Philosophie, vorkommende Materien und Kunstwörter erklärt, aus der Historie erläutert, die Streitigkeiten der ältern und neuern Philosophen erzehlet, beurtheilet, und die dahin gehörigen Schriften angeführet werden*, 1:c. 1399-1402. Leipzig: In Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 1775.
- . "Freyheit des Willens." In *Philosophisches Lexicon : worinnen die in allen Theilen der Philosophie, vorkommende Materien und Kunstwörter erklärt, aus der Historie erläutert, die Streitigkeiten der ältern und neuern Philosophen erzehlet, beurtheilet, und die dahin gehörigen Schriften angeführet werden*, 1:c. 1402-1424. Leipzig: In Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 1775.
- . "Gott." In *Philosophisches Lexicon : worinnen die in allen Theilen der Philosophie, vorkommende Materien und Kunstwörter erklärt, aus der Historie erläutert, die*

- Streitigkeiten der ältern und neuern Philosophen erzehlet, beurtheilet, und die dahin gehörigen Schriften angeführet werden*, 1:c. 1801-1820. Leipzig: In Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 1775.
- Wallmann, Johannes. "Pietismus Und Chiliasmus: Zur Kontroverse Um Philipp Jakob Speners» Hoffnung Besserer Zeiten «." *Zeitschrift Für Theologie Und Kirche* 78, no. 2 (1981): 235–66.
- Ward, W. R. *Early Evangelicalism: A Global Intellectual History, 1670–1789*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Watkins, Eric. "From Pre-Established Harmony to Physical Influx: Leibniz's Reception in Eighteenth Century Germany." *Perspectives on Science* 6, no. 1 (1998): 136–203.
- Wax, Trevin. "Is Sanctification a Process or a Position?" *The Gospel Coalition* (blog), August 19, 2014. <https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/trevin-wax/is-sanctification-a-process-or-a-position/>.
- Weigelt, H. *Universale Heilshoffnungen Im Christentum: Apokatastasisideen in Theologie Und Kirche, Literatur Und Musik*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2021.
- Wengert, Timothy J, Mark Granquist, Mary Haemig, Robert Kolb, Mark Mattes, and Jonathan Strom. "Word of God." In *Dictionary of Luther and the Lutheran Traditions*, 798–800. Baker Academic, 2017.
- Wesley, J. *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley*. The Works of the Rev. John Wesley. D. & S. Neall and W.S. Stockton, 1826.
- White, Thomas. *The Middle State of Souls. From the Hour of Death to the Day of Judgment*. London: s.n.], 1659.
- White, Thomas, and Gottfried Arnold. *Betrachtung von dem mittleren Zustand der Seelen nach ihrem Abschied aus dem Leibe*, 1725.
- Whitmer, Kelly Joan. *The Halle Orphanage as Scientific Community: Observation, Eclecticism, and Pietism in the Early Enlightenment*. University of Chicago Press, 2015.
- Whittemore, Thomas. *The Modern History of Universalism: From the Era of the Reformation to the Present Time*. Whittemore, 1830.
- Wieckenberg, Ernst-Peter. "The Controversy over the Salvation of the Jews, Turks and Heathens in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: A Theological Path to Tolerance?" In *Mediating Modernity : Challenges and Trends in the Jewish Encounter*

- with the Modern World : Essays in Honor of Michael A. Meyer*, edited by Lauren B. Strauss and Michael Brenner, 55–73. Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 2008.
- Wilbourne, Rankin. *Union with Christ: The Way to Know and Enjoy God*. David C Cook, 2016.
- Wilken, R.L. *The Spirit of Early Christian Thought: Seeking the Face of God*. Yale University Press, 2003.
- Williams, Rowan. *Christ the Heart of Creation*. London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2018.
- . *Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief*. Westminster John Knox Press, 2010.
- Williams, Stephen. “Barth, Buddeus and the Eighteenth Century.” *Modern Theology* 2, no. 4 (1986): 309–18.
- Williams, Stephen N. *The Election of Grace: A Riddle without a Resolution?* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2015.
- Williams, Stephen Nantlais. *Reason Judges Revelation: A Case Study in Buddeus, Tindal and Locke*. Yale University, 1981.
- Wood, W. *Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion*. Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. OUP Oxford, 2021.
- Wundt, Max. “Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung.” Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1992. /z-wcorg/.
- Zedler, Johann Heinrich. “Wiederbringung aller Dinge.” In *Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexicon Aller Wissenschaften und Künste, Welche bißhero durch menschlichen Verstand und Witz erfunden und verbessert worden*. Vol. 55. cols. 1908-1994, 1748.
- Zinzendorf, Nicolaus. *Sixteen Discourses on the Redemption of Man by the Death of Christ*. London: James Hutton, 1740.

Abstract

My Ph. D dissertation *The Freedom of a Christian: Enevold Ewald's Ordo Salutis under the microscope and macroscope* is primarily a study of the theology and relevant intellectual context of the Danish Pietist priest, Enevold Ewald (1696–1754). The dissertation itself operates as mainly a theological investigation that has been substantially intertwined with historical considerations and influences from the early modern period. To accomplish my task, I approach Ewald and his thought through both a historical and a theological/philosophical lens. By investigating Ewald, I gain historical insight into the Pietist theological idioms and points of conflicts both between the Pietist and Lutheran Orthodox camps and within the different wings of Pietism. The primary theological and philosophical claim I respond to is Markus Matthias's argument that faith is essentially irrational for the Pietist. The dissertation consists of an introduction, five chapters of analysis and a short conclusion.

My methodologies, research questions surrounding the *ordo salutis* and Ewald, and the research background on the theologians and theological themes are presented in chapter one. First and foremost, I treat Ewald and his texts—both the published texts and the 1734 trial transcripts—as the subject of a microhistory investigation. By focusing marginalized figures, microhistories seek to reveal general historical trends without effacing the individual subject. Following the general practice of microhistorians, in the first half of the dissertation I give a 'thick description' of Ewald's trial for heresy and several of his writings. The second methodological lens is an investigation of the *intellectual coherence* of Ewald's theological, philosophical, and psychological framework. Microhistory as a methodology generally turns to the macrosocial context to situate its findings. In the second half of this dissertation, I focus on Ewald's wider historical context and the contemporary intellectual concepts available to him within his 'Pietist' or 'Pietist-friendly' environment.

I select for reasons of close connection and/or historical importance, three Pietist or Pietist-friendly German Lutheran theologians: Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729), Buddeus's colleague and son-in-law Johann Georg Walch (1693-1775), and Ludwig Gerhard (1680?-1738). Each of these writers contribute to a way of reading Ewald's theology as intellectually coherent. Where Ewald only hints or gestures at a certain human anthropology or

eschatological picture in his sermons, these theologians offer contemporary concepts and arguments.

Chapter two focuses on Ewald and his 1734 trial before the Royal Commission. The trial itself was not conducted in person and consisted of an exchange of written accusations and replies between Ewald and his Lutheran Orthodox opponents Eiler Christopher Kaasbøll and Christian Christopher Reenberg. The exchange exists in several archival copies and Ewald's trial was merely one of several against leading Danish Pietist figures during 1733-1734. The verdict, declared by the Danish king, ended the trial and was a mixed one for Ewald. He maintained his position as priest at Det Kongelige Vajsenhus, but admitted that he held the doctrine of *apokatastasis* (universal salvation). I describe carefully and in detail the theological issues that are raised in the Ewald-Kaasbøll exchange. I argue the Kaasbøll-Ewald exchange was focused on contemporary eschatological debates and questions about grace and the *ordo salutis*. The Reenberg-Ewald exchange receives a slightly less thorough treatment, but I categorize Reenberg's accusations against Ewald into five groupings: theses about the sacraments, the *ordo salutis*, the mystical union, the knowledge of truth, and experience. Following this I present and discuss the back-and-forth exchange between Ewald and Reenberg for three specific theses. These three discussions each touch on one of the general themes: the sacraments, the *ordo salutis* and knowledge of truth/experience. The chapter ends with an intention to investigate how and if the eschatological debates, the *ordo salutis* and the role of experience hang together in Ewald's theology.

Chapter three is the main analysis of the dissertation. After studying the trial, I move on to examine how Ewald described the *ordo salutis* both in his catechisms and in various sermons from his five-volume set. I follow the tripartite division of the *ordo* first presented in Ewald's two early catechisms: conversion, faith in Christ, and a holy life/way of living. I discuss these three sections of the 'subjective' human *ordo* in relation to three corresponding divisions within the 'objective' divine *ordo*: the call of the Holy Spirit, illumination, and sanctification. I give a close reading of the catechism sections and a thematically relevant sermon for each division of the *ordo*. Finally, the chapter ends with a section that discusses the relevance of *apokatastasis* for the themes of sanctification and holiness and explores the subtle gestures Ewald gives towards the doctrine in a sermon preached in 1739. My examination of the *ordo salutis* in Ewald repeatedly indicates an active human response to divine action by the believer. Such activity with its psychological stages in turn prompts the

discussion of the next two chapters, where I investigate how human activity (especially mental) was conceived of in the early modern period.

Chapter four is both a summary of my published article on grace and nature in Danish Pietism and a further investigation of those themes in Ewald's thought. Here I begin to focus on the early modern context and academic, rather than devotional, texts. Ewald's teacher, Johann Franz Buddeus, and his moral theology succeed Ewald as the main focus, although I return to Ewald's texts periodically throughout the second half of the dissertation. In chapter four I begin with a discussion of the language of nature, arguing that Buddeus's presentation of the *ordo salutis* as a healing and hallowing of human nature secures some ontological continuity even within the 'reborn' believer. At the same time, I recognize that the Pietists and Buddeus used the concept of 'natural' as a contrast to supernatural or grace-enabled action.

I present Buddeus's understanding and technical terminology of grace, particularly sanctifying grace, and argue that by preserving an early entry into the *unio mystica* and upholding notions of divine concurrence, Buddeus offers a space for divine-human cooperation by means of grace. I also argue that the Early Modern causality debates are relevant to Buddeus's formulation. The cooperation, in turn, grants agency to the reborn. It also explains Buddeus's effort to preserve human action and real moral improvement, considered as the appropriation of Christ's merits, via the *ordo salutis*. Insofar as Buddeus's treatment of the *ordo* is grounded in early modern human psychology/anthropology, it does not simply collapse into psychology *sans* theology because it depends on Buddeus's understanding of grace. At the end of this chapter, I discuss where Ewald's understanding and language of grace extend beyond Buddeus's framework. The chapter aims to establish the concept of divine-human cooperation in grace as theologically vital for Buddeus and Ewald. It also begins to open up the reach of God's grace as a conceptual trend that accords well with my discussion of Ludwig Gerhard's universalism.

Chapter five takes up the theme of experience in a more purely philosophical manner, through the lens of human freedom in the early modern context. I use the chapter to see how key early modern philosophical definitions of human psychology and human freedom explain the so-called psychologizing of the *ordo salutis* in Buddeus and Pietism. Again, Johann Franz Buddeus is the main interlocutor, but I also discuss several articles in Johann Georg Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon*. Since for Buddeus's understanding of grace is resistible and

eventually cooperative, any description of the *ordo* must include an understanding of what free human action is; free because it cannot presumably be coerced and human action because otherwise the term cooperative grace cannot intelligibly be used. If humans do not act as humans, they cannot reasonably be said to be acting at all, much less cooperatively. As in my discussion of grace, Buddeus's (and Walch's) philosophical framework becomes the lens through which Ewald's comments on freedom and human action can be understood. I will refer to Ewald's texts periodically. Ultimately, I argue that Walch and Buddeus distinguish between a philosophical and spiritual notion of freedom: the former that maintains that all particular actions are undetermined although not un-grounded and the latter which is defined as having the will and desire to love true bliss and to act accordingly. However, considered in light of human nature as Buddeus understands it, even philosophical freedom is under the constraints of prior sinful human inclinations. At the end of the chapter, I briefly discuss how the *ordo* for Buddeus is reconceived as the healing *means* of overcoming one's idolatrous self-love and reaching spiritual freedom. This chapter also discusses how Buddeus's and Walch's concepts of freedom appear in Ewald's texts.

In the end, Walch's and Buddeus's understanding of philosophical freedom and human action is still grounded upon two axioms: that one loves the good thing and despises the evil thing *and* that all actions have a reason or ground of movement. These axioms gesture towards God—properly understood—as the aim of all human action and love. Such axioms ensure that Buddeus, Walch and Ewald already orientate the human will towards the good in a primal sense. The theological implications of this ur-orientation become clear in the final chapter.

In chapter six, I bring together the various thematic elements of the dissertation through an analysis of a little-studied universalist text, *Kurtzer Begriff des ewigen Evangelii von deren Wiederbringung aller Dinge*, by Ludwig Gerhard. Although mostly ignored in modern research, Gerhard was understood as the standard bearer of Pietist universalism in the 1720s. The first half of the chapter investigates the historical circumstances of the Pietist universalist debate during this decade. Given Ewald's relative silence on the eschatological doctrine of *apokatastasis*, I use Gerhard's treatise as the main reference point for how universalism was defended and the theological implications of its vision of God for the Ewald's *ordo*. I conclude that once the philosophical implications of Gerhard's universalism are understood, Ewald's thought finds a degree of internal coherency. My central argument is

that Ewald's universalism harmonized well with his *ordo salutis*. Ewald's *ordo* does not present divine action and grace as a complete 'break' in the natural functioning of a human being, but rather as a working from within and through human nature to heal the human by divine means. If one combines with this the view of God's constant salvific action towards human beings in Pietist universalism, it paints an intellectually consistent and compelling picture of God and the human response to such a God—aided by grace. As a result of this, one does not then need to prioritize either the intellect or the will in the *ordo*. In the end, Markus Matthias's worries about the irrationality of faith find no purchase in this particular formulation of the Pietist theology.

This dissertation contributes to our historical understanding of Danish Pietism and Enevold Ewald's theology. Its larger contribution is to re-examine the theological implications of *apokatastasis* for the story of Pietism.

Sammenfatning på Dansk

Min ph.d.-afhandling *The Freedom of a Christian: Enevold Ewald's Ordo Salutis under the microscope and macroscope* (En kristens frihed: Enevold Ewalds *ordo salutis* under et mikroskop og et makroskop) er primært et studie af den danske pietistiske præst Enevold Ewalds (1696-1754) teologi og relevante intellektuelle kontekst. Afhandlingen fungerer hovedsagelig som en teologisk undersøgelse, der i væsentlig grad trækker på historiske overvejelser fra tidlig moderne tid. For at løse opgaven nærmer jeg mig Ewald og hans tankegang gennem både historiske og teologiske/filosofiske perspektiver. Ved at undersøge Ewald gives der historisk indsigt i det pietistisk-teologiske formsprog. Man får også indsigt i historiske konflikter, både mellem de pietistiske og luthersk ortodokse lejre, og inden for pietismens forskellige fløje. Den primære teologiske og filosofiske påstand, jeg responderer på, er Markus Matthias' argument om, at tro i det væsentlige er irrationel for pietisten. Afhandlingen består af en introduktion, fem kapitler og en kort konklusion.

Min metode, forskningsspørgsmål og baggrund præsenteres i kapitel 1. Først og fremmest behandler jeg Ewald og hans tekster – både de offentliggjorte tekster og 1734-procesudskifterne – som genstand for en mikrohistorisk undersøgelse. Ved at fokusere på marginaliserede figurer søger mikrohistorier at afsløre generelle historiske tendenser uden at udviske det enkelte emne. Efter mikrohistorikernes almindelige praksis giver jeg i afhandlingens første halvdel en 'tyk beskrivelse' af Ewalds retssag for kætteri og flere af hans skrifter. Det andet metodologiske perspektiv er en undersøgelse af den intellektuelle sammenhæng i Ewalds teologiske, filosofiske og psykologiske rammer. Mikrohistorie som metodologi vender sig generelt til den makrosociale kontekst for at placere dens resultater. I anden halvdel af denne afhandling fokuserer jeg på Ewalds bredere historiske kontekst og de samtidige intellektuelle begreber, som var tilgængelige for ham i hans 'Pietistiske' eller 'Pietistvenlige' miljø.

Jeg udvælger, på grund af nær tilknytning og/eller historisk betydning, tre pietistiske eller pietistvenlige tyske lutherske teologer: Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729), Buddeus' kollega og svigersøn Johann Georg Walch (1693-1775), og Ludwig Gerhard (1680?-1738). Hver af disse forfattere bidrager til, at man kan læse Ewalds teologi som intellektuelt

sammenhængende. Hvor Ewald kun antyder en bestemt antropologi eller eskatologisk billede i sine prædikener, tilbyder disse teologer samtidige begreber og argumenter.

Kapitel to fokuserer på Ewald og hans retssag i 1734 for den kongelige kommission. Selve retssagen blev ikke gennemført personligt, men bestod af en udveksling af skriftlige beskyldninger og svar mellem Ewald og hans luthersk-ortodokse modstandere Eiler Christopher Kaasbøll og Christian Christopher Reenberg. Udvekslingen eksisterer i flere arkivkopier, og Ewalds retssag var blot en af flere mod førende danske pietistiske skikkelser i 1733-1734. Dommen, afsagt af den danske konge, afsluttede retssagen, og resultatet var blandet for Ewald. Han fastholdt sin stilling som præst ved Det Kongelige Vajsenhus, men indrømmede, at han troede på læren om apokatastasis (alles frelse). Jeg beskriver nøje og detaljeret de teologiske problemstillinger, der rejses i Ewald-Kaasbøll-udvekslingen. Jeg hævder, at Kaasbøll-Ewald-udvekslingen fokuserede på samtidige eskatologiske debatter og spørgsmål om nåde og *ordo salutis*. Reenberg-Ewald-udvekslingen får en lidt mindre grundig behandling, men jeg kategoriserer Reenbergs anklager mod Ewald i fem grupperinger: teser om sakramenterne, *ordo salutis*, den mystiske forening, viden om sandhed og erfaring. Efter dette præsenterer og diskuterer jeg udvekslingen mellem Ewald og Reenberg med henblik på tre specifikke teser. Disse tre diskussioner berører hver især et af de generelle temaer: sakramenterne, *ordo salutis* og viden om sandhed/erfaring. Kapitlet afsluttes med en intention om at undersøge hvordan og hvorledes de eskatologiske debatter, *ordo salutis* og erfaringens rolle hænger sammen i Ewalds teologi.

Kapitel tre er afhandlingens hovedanalyse. Efter at have studeret retssagen går jeg videre til at undersøge hvordan Ewald beskrev *ordo salutis* både i sine katekismer og i forskellige prædikener. Jeg følger trepartsopdelingen af den *ordo*, der først blev præsenteret i Ewalds to tidlige katekismer: omvendelse, tro på Kristus og et helligt liv. Jeg diskuterer disse tre sektioner af den 'subjektive' menneskelige *ordo* i forhold til tre tilsvarende opdelinger inden for den 'objektive' guddommelige *ordo*: Helligåndens kald, oplysning og helliggørelse. Jeg nærlæser katekismusafsnittene og en tematisk relevant prædiken for hver afdeling af *ordo*. Til sidst afsluttes kapitlet med et afsnit, der diskuterer relevansen af apokatastasis for temaerne helliggørelse og hellighed og udforsker de subtile antydninger Ewald giver over for læren i en prædiken fra 1739. Min undersøgelse af *ordo salutis* hos Ewald indikerer

gentagne gange en aktiv menneskelig reaktion på den guddommelige handling. En sådan aktivitet med dens psykologiske stadier foranlediger igen diskussionen af de næste to kapitler, hvor jeg undersøger, hvordan menneskelig aktivitet (især det mentale) blev opfattet i den tidlige moderne periode.

Kapitel fire er både en opsummering af min publicerede artikel om nåde og natur i dansk pietisme og en nærmere undersøgelse af disse temaer i Ewalds tankegang. Her begynder jeg at fokusere på den tidlige moderne kontekst, og samtidige akademiske, frem for almene, tekster. Ewalds lærer, Johann Franz Buddeus, og hans moralteologi efterfølger Ewald som hovedfokus, selv om jeg vender tilbage til Ewalds tekster med jævne mellemrum gennem anden halvdel af afhandlingen. Jeg begynder kapitel fire med en diskussion af naturens begreb, og argumenterer for, at Buddeus' fremstilling af *ordo salutis* som en helbredelse og helliggørelse af den menneskelige natur sikrer en vis ontologisk kontinuitet selv inden for den 'genfødte' troende. Samtidig erkender jeg, at pietisterne og Buddeus brugte begrebet 'naturlig' som kontrast til overnaturlig eller nådeaktiveret handling.

Jeg præsenterer Buddeus' forståelse og tekniske terminologi af nåde, især helliggørende nåde, og argumenterer for, at ved at bevare en tidlig indtræden i *unio mystica*, og opretholde forestillinger om guddommelig samstemmighed, tilbyder Buddeus et rum for guddommelig-menneskeligt samarbejde ved hjælp af nåde. Jeg argumenterer også for, at de tidlige moderne kausalitetsdebatte er relevante for Buddeus' formulering. Samarbejdet giver til gengæld handlefrihed til den genfødte. Det forklarer også Buddeus' indsats for at bevare menneskelig handling og reel moralsk forbedring, betragtet som tilegnelsen af Kristi fortjenester, via *ordo salutis*. For så vidt som Buddeus' behandling af *ordo* er funderet i den tidlige moderne menneskelige psykologi/antropologi, falder den ikke blot sammen til psykologi uden teologi, fordi den afhænger af Buddeus' forståelse af nåde. I slutningen af dette kapitel ser jeg på hvordan Ewalds forståelse og nådesprog rækker ud over Buddeus' rammer. Kapitlet har til formål at etablere begrebet guddommelig-menneskeligt samarbejde i nåde som teologisk afgørende for Buddeus og Ewald. Det begynder også at åbne op for rækkevidden af Guds nåde som en begrebsmæssig tendens, der stemmer godt overens med min diskussion af Ludwig Gerhards universalisme.

Kapitel fem tager oplevelsestemaet op på en mere filosofisk måde gennem perspektivet fra menneskelig frihed i den tidlige moderne kontekst. Jeg bruger kapitlet til at se hvordan centrale tidlige moderne filosofiske definitioner af menneskelig psykologi og menneskelig frihed forklarer den såkaldte psykologisering af *ordo salutis* i Buddeus og pietismen. Igen er Johann Franz Buddeus hovedsamtalepartner, men jeg inddrager også flere artikler fra Johann Georg Walchs *Philosophisches Lexicon*. Da Buddeus' forståelse af nåde er modstandsdygtig og samarbejdsvillig, må enhver beskrivelse af *ordo* inkludere en forståelse af hvad fri menneskelig handling er; fri, fordi den formodentligt ikke kan tvinges, og menneskelig handling, fordi udtrykket kooperativ nåde ellers ikke kan bruges på en forståelig måde. Hvis mennesker ikke handler som mennesker, kan de med rimelighed ikke siges at handle overhovedet, endnu mindre samarbejdsvilligt. Som i min diskussion af nåde bliver Buddeus (og Walchs) filosofiske ramme det perspektiv, hvorigennem Ewalds kommentarer om frihed og menneskelig handling kan forstås. Jeg refererer med jævne mellemrum til Ewalds tekster. I sidste ende hævder jeg, at Walch og Buddeus skelner mellem en filosofisk og en åndelig forestilling om frihed: den førstnævnte fastholder, at alle særlige handlinger er ubestemte, selvom de ikke er ubegrundede. Den sidstnævnte defineres som viljen og ønsket om at elske ægte lyksalighed, og at handle derefter. Men set i lyset af den menneskelige natur, som Buddeus forstår det, er selv filosofisk frihed begrænset af det tidligere syndige menneskets tilbøjeligheder. I slutningen af kapitlet diskuterer jeg kort hvordan *ordo* for Buddeus opfattes som det helbredende middel til at overvinde sin afgudsdyrkende selvkærlighed og nå åndelig frihed. Dette kapitel ser også på hvordan Buddeus og Walchs frihedsbegreber optræder i Ewalds tekster.

I sidste ende er Walchs og Buddeus' forståelse af filosofisk frihed og menneskelig handling stadig baseret på to aksiomer: at man elsker det gode og foragter det onde, og at alle handlinger har en bevæggrund. Disse aksiomer peger mod Gud – korrekt forstået – som målet for al menneskelig handling og kærlighed. Sådanne aksiomer sikrer, at Buddeus, Walch og Ewald allerede orienterer den menneskelige vilje mod det gode i primær forstand. De teologiske implikationer af denne ur-orientering bliver tydelige i det sidste kapitel.

I kapitel seks samler jeg de forskellige tematiske elementer i afhandlingen gennem en analyse af en lidt studeret universalistisk tekst, *Kurtzer Begriff des ewigen Evangelii von*

deren Wiederbringung aller Dinge, af Ludwig Gerhard. Selvom det for det meste er blevet oversat i moderne forskning, blev Gerhard forstået som fanebærer af pietistisk universalisme i 1720'erne. Første halvdel af kapitlet undersøger de historiske omstændigheder for den pietistiske universalistiske debat i det årti. I betragtning af Ewalds relative tavshed om den eskatologiske lære om apokatastasis, bruger jeg Gerhards afhandling som det vigtigste referencepunkt for hvordan universalismen blev forsvaret, og for hvilke teologiske implikationer dens vision om Gud har for Ewalds *ordo*. Jeg konkluderer, at når først de filosofiske implikationer af Gerhards universalisme er forstået, finder Ewalds tanke en grad af indre sammenhæng. Mit centrale argument er, at Ewalds universalisme harmonerede godt med hans *ordo salutis*. Ewalds *ordo* præsenterer ikke guddommelig handling og nåde som et fuldstændigt 'brud' i et menneskes naturlige funktion, men snarere som et arbejde indeni, og gennem, den menneskelige natur, for at helbrede det menneskelige med guddommelige midler. Hvis man kombinerer dette med synet på Guds konstante frelsende handling over for mennesker i den pietistiske universalisme, tegner der sig et intellektuelt sammenhængende og overbevisende billede af Gud og det menneskelige svar til en sådan Gud – godt hjulpet af nåde. Som følge af dette, behøver man ikke at prioritere hverken intellektet eller viljen i *ordo*. I sidste ende har Markus Matthias' bekymringer om troens irrationalitet ingen relevans i forhold til netop denne formulering af den pietistiske teologi.

Denne afhandling bidrager til den historiske forståelse af dansk pietisme og Enevold Ewalds teologi. Dens større bidrag er at genoverveje de teologiske implikationer af apokatastasis for pietismens historie.